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BHĀRATĪYA JÑĀNAPĪTHA MŪRTIDEVĪ

JAINA GRANTHAMĀLĀ

FOUNDED BY

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## GENERAL EDITORIAL

The Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha is a preeminent academic Institute of our country. It has achieved, during the last quarter of a century, quite worthy results in the form of learned publications in Sanskrit, Pāli, Prākṛit, Apabhraṃśa, Tamil and Kannada. Most of them are equipped with critical Introductions embodying original researches which shed abundant light on many a neglected branch of Indian literature. The number of these publications is nearly one hundred and fifty, included in the Mūrtidevī and Mānikachandra Granthamālās. Most of these works are brought to light for the first time, and thus some of them are rescued from oblivion. It has also published in its Lokodaya and Rāstrabhāratī Granthamālās nearly 350 titles in Hindi comprising almost all the literary forms like novels, poems, short stories, essays, travels, biographies, researches and critical estimates etc. Through these literary pursuits the Jñānapīṭha aims at giving impetus to creative writings in modern Indian languages. By their quality as well as by their appearance the Jñānapīṭha publications have won approbation and appreciation everywhere.

The Jñānapīṭha gives, every year, an award to the outstanding literary work in the various recognised languages of India which is chosen to be the best creative literary writing of the specific period, and its author gets a prize of one lakh of rupees at a festive function.

The Jñānapīṭha, which is so particular about the publication of ancient Indian literature and also in encouraging the progress of modern Indian literature, cannot but take into account the forthcoming 2500th Nirvāna Mahotsava of Bhagavān Mahāvīra, one of the greatest sons of India and one of the outstanding humanists the civilised world has ever produced. Naturally the Jñānapīṭha, among its various plans to celebrate the occasion, has undertaken the publication of important Jaina works; and this *Pañcāṅga-kāya*, edited and translated by the late Prof. A. Chakravarti is one of them.



The General Editors record their sense of gratitude to Shriman Sahu Shanti Prasada and his enlightened wife Smt. Rama Jain for the patronage they have extended to the publication of these works which belong to the neglected branches of Indological learning. It is through their patronage that many unpublished works have come to light, and a number of important texts, accompanied by learned Introductions containing valuable research, have been put in the hands of scholars.

Thanks are due to Shri L. C. Jain who is enthusiastically implementing the publication programme of the Jñānapitha.

Vira Nirvana Day  
13th Nov 1974

A. N. Upadhye  
Kaiflashchandra Shastri

## PREFACE

The *Pañcāstikāya*, as it is specified by its brief title, is one of the important works of Kundakundācārya who occupies unique position, next only to Mahāvīra and his Gaṇadhara Gautama, in the South Indian Jaina tradition. It deals with Jaina Metaphysics or ontology and Ethics, i.e., exposition of the path leading to liberation. The text is in Prākṛit Gāthās, and it mentions its title in two places. *Pañcatthiya-saṅgaha* (= *Pañcāstikāya-saṅgraha*) in Gāthā No. 103, and elsewhere, in No. 173, —*suttam* (= *sūtram* or *sūktam*) is tacked on to it, and in both the places it is qualified by *pavayanasāram* (= *pravacanasāram*). Though the brief title is more popular, some have used the title in Sanskrit like *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*, —*śamayasāra*, —*prābhṛta* and —*saṅgraha*. In this edition they are allowed to remain as they are, inherited from earlier sources.

Plenty of Mss. of the *Pañcāstikāya* are known from public libraries (*Jīnaratnakosā*, Poona 1944, p. 231). A number of commentaries in Sanskrit by Amṛtacandra, Brahmadeva, Devajita, Jayasena, Jñānacandra, Mallisena and Prabhācandra are known. Those of Amṛtacandra and Jayasena are already printed and well-known. There is a commentary of Bālacandra in Old-Kannada: but, so far, it is not published. Some expositions of this work in Hindi have been composed by Hemarāja (Samvat 1700), Rājamalla (Sam 1716), Hīrācanda (Sam 1718) and Vidyācanda (Sam 1891).

The importance of this work has been all along recognised, and we have a number of editions in print of which the significant ones may be noted here :

(1) The text in Prākṛit, along with short introductory remarks in Sanskrit, taken from Amṛtacandra's commentary, was published in Roman script in *Giornale della Società Asiatica Italiana*, Firenze 1901, by P. E. Pavolini under the title *Il Comento dei*

*Cinque Elementi (Pamcatthiya-saṅgaha-suttam).* There is a short informative Introduction by the Editor in Italian. He significantly remarks (of course, that was in 1901) that the texts of the Digambaras are scarcely taken note of and no text entirely edited.

(2) It was published by Pannalal Bakaliwal alongwith Amṛtacandra's Sanskrit Commentary and Hemarāja's Vacanikā (put into modern Hindi) in the Rāyachandra Jaina Śāstramālā, Bombay 1904

(3) A second edition of the above by Pt. Manoharlal was published with the addition of Jayasena's Sanskrit commentary in the same Granthamālā, Bombay 1914.

As far as I can judge, these last two editions have been the basis, so far as the text and commentaries are concerned, of a number of editions published here and there

(4) The late Br. Shital Prasada brought out an edition of it giving the Text, Sanskrit Chāyā and Hindi Translation of Jayasena's Sanskrit Commentary, Surat 1926-27.

(5) Then there is quite a good edition *Pañcāstikāya-saṅgraha* of the Text, Amṛtacandra's Sanskrit Commentary and Hindi Translation by Shri Maganlal Jain and published (2nd ed) from Songad (Saurashtra), 1964.

Excepting Pavolini none of the Editors has devoted any attention to the critical editing of the Prakrit Text. Jayasena is one of the Sanskrit commentators who has noted some various readings and also given some additional Gāthās not found in Amṛtacandra's text. All the Editors are mostly interested in the exposition of the contents.

Lately, the texts of Śrī Kundakunda's works have been inscribed in marble in the Paramāgamamandira at Songad (Saurashtra) under the enlightening presence of Śrī Kanaji Swami Maharaj whose devotion to Śrī Kundakunda's words is unique and inspiring. The present writer was requested to edit the Prakrit Texts of Kundakunda's works for being inscribed there, and he has done it in his humble way using a few Mss. that were supplied to him. It is high time that the authorities in Songad collect in this Paramāgama Mandira all the known Mss. of Kundakunda's works in original, in photographs, films or photostat copies (as they might be available) so that, with the help of this material, some day a really critical text of all the works of Kundakunda can be presented for future studies. Nothing is more important and sacred than well preserving the words of this great Teacher whose name is remembered with so much of reverence in the annals of Jaina literature

*The Pañcāstikāya (sāra)* with the Philosophical and Historical Introductions, Trans-

lation, Notes and an original Commentary in English by Prof. A. Chakravarti-nayanar was published by Kumar Devendra Prasad, The Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah, as Vol. III, of the Sacred Books of the Jamas, in 1920. The learned Introductions of Prof. Chakravarti have been a source and guide to eminent authors on Indian philosophy in giving an authoritative exposition of Jaina principles. The copies of this book are no more available; and many scholars felt that a new edition of Prof. Chakravarti's *Pāncāstikāya-sāra* was an urgent desideratum.

To mark the great historical event of the 2500th Nirvāna Mahotsava of Bhagavān Mahāvira, the authorities of the Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha decided to bring out a new edition of the late Prof. Chakravarti's *Pāncāstikāya-sāra* in an improved form. And I look upon it a privilege that I was entrusted with this work. I have done it as a duty which I owe to the late Prof. Chakravarti in whom I had an elderly colleague and to the Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha which has done so much for the progress of Jainological studies.

In this edition, the contents of Prof. Chakravarti's exposition have been kept in tact. But in the English matter diacritical marks are added for Sanskrit terms so that they could be correctly pronounced. Some typographical consistency is also introduced. The Prākṛit text is better presented, taking into account the text edited by Pavolini and that printed in the Rāyachandra Jaina Śāstramālā. The Sanskrit Chāyā is brought immediately below the text from the foot-notes, and it has been added wherever it was not given in the earlier edition. While reading Prof. Chakravarti's learned exposition of a number of topics, a specialist often feels like consulting the Sanskrit Commentary of Amṛtacandra used by the Professor. That is how and why the Prākṛit Text as well as the Sanskrit commentary of Amṛtacandra given immediately below it are added afresh in the present edition at the end. It is felt that the utility and the expository value of this edition is increased thereby. This matter is adopted from the Songad edition, noted above. The Prākṛit text is presented with minor changes in spelling etc. As contrasted with this text, important various readings from Pavolini's are noted in footnotes against the siglum P. Initial *n* or *n*, *ja* or *a*, *n* for *anusvāra* and the distinction between *anusvāra* and *anunāsika* or absence of either, are all ignored while recording the various readings. In presenting the Chāyā and the text of the Sanskrit commentary minor orthographical changes are made with a view to maintaining a standard format according to the conventions of the Jñānapīṭha, noted in the Instructions to Editors. Some attempt is made to see that maximum consistency is maintained in the Prākṛit Text which appears in two places in this edition. Of course Prof. Chakravarti has included the extra Gāthās found in the commentary of Jayasena. As far as I see, misprints and minor changes apart, the Prākṛit text in both the places goes back to the edition of the *Pāncāstikāya* in the Rāyachandra Jaina Śāstramālā. The need of going back to some genuine Mss. and building up a critical text of the Prākṛit Gāthās and of the commentary still remains.

I record my sincere gratitude to Smt Rama Jain, the President of the Jñānapīṭha, and to Shri Sahu Shanti Prasada, the founder Patron, for their unique generosity in publishing these works which are a significant contribution to the cultural heritage of our land.

I offer my sincere thanks to Shri L. C. Jain but for whose kindly pressure I would not have been able to edit the present work in this form. Let me also mention that the quiet and congenial atmosphere of the Campus of the University of Mysore, Manasa Gangotri, has enabled me to complete this work much earlier than I had planned

Manasa Gnagotri  
Mysore . July 24, 1974.

A. N. Upadhye

## A Biographical Note on the late Prof. A Chakravarti

The late Prof A Chakravarti Nayanar. (1880-1960) passed his M A with distinction, in 1905, from the Christian College, Madras, and took his L T in 1909 from the Teachers' College, Madras. For a year or two he worked as a Teacher in the Wesley Girls' School and as a clerk in the Accountant General's office, Madras. In 1906, he was appointed as Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Presidency College, Madras, and thereafter he worked as such (having become a Professor in 1917) in the Government College at Rajahmundry, Madras and Kumbakonam (of the then Madras Presidency) from where he retired as Principal in 1938. He was conferred upon the title of Rao Bahadur in the same year.

Prof Chakravarti was well-versed in the various schools of western philosophy. He brought his wide learning and deep scholarship to bear upon his study of Jaina philosophy. His Introduction to the *Pancāstikāya* (Arrah 1920) is a valuable exposition of Jaina metaphysics and the path of Moksa. In 1937 he delivered Principal Miller Lectures which are published under the title '*Humanism and Indian Thought*'. He was a stalwart Jaina Śrāvaka of his times in Tamil Nadu. He was specially interested in '*Jaina Tamil literature*' on which he was written a monograph in English (Arrah 1941). He has edited a number of Tamil works by Jaina authors with their commentaries and, in some cases, with his learned exposition in English. For instance, *Neelakesi*, the text and the commentary of Samaya Divākara Muni, along with his elaborate Introduction in English (Madras 1936), *Tirukkural* by Thevar, along with the Tamil commentary by Kaviraja Pandithar (Bharatiya Jnanapitha Tamil Series, No 1, with an English Introduction, (Madras 1949), *Tirukkural*, with English Translation and Commentary and an exhaustive Introduction. He has also edited the *Merumandarapurānam* in Tamil. His exposition (described by M S H Thompson, in the J.R. A. Society, London 1955, as 'an indispensable aid to the

study of *Tirukkural*”) of the *Tirukkural* has been hailed both in India and outside as a learned and liberal exposition of the *Kural*, the Tamil Bible. His ‘*Religion of Ahimsa*’ is published by Shri Ratanchand Hirachand, Bombay (1957). It is a learned exposition in English of some aspects of Jainism.

Prof. Chakravarti, as an authority on his subject, contributed a number of essays and articles on Jainism, Ahimsa and contemporary thought to various publications such as *Cultural Heritage of India*, *Philosophy of the East and West*, *Jaina Gazette*, *Aryan Path*, *Tamil Academy*. He wrote both in English and Tamil. Some of his papers are reprinted in the *Yesterday and Today*, Madras 1946. He was a member of a number of Associations and Institution in Madras.

As a pious Jaina and a deep scholar of Jainism, he wrote a commentary in English on the *Samayasāra* of Kundakunda. He mainly follows the Sanskrit commentary of Amrtacandra. Still his exposition of the *Samayasāra* and his evaluation of its contents clearly demonstrate how ably he has expounded the principles of Kundakunda to make them intelligible to the modern world. This was published by the Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha, and a second edition of it is lately issued.

The late Prof. Chakravarti was a well-wisher of the Jñānapīṭha; and he gave two of his works, as noted above, for publication in the Jñānapīṭha Series. We are thankful to Thiru V. Jaya Vjayan, B.E. (33, Pudupet Garden street, Royapettah, Madras-14), for the bio-date of Prof. Chakravarti. He is the grand-son of the late Professor from his daughter Smt. V.C. Jothimalai (a n u.).

# INTRODUCTION

## THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

### THE AGE OF KUNDAKUNDA OR ELĀCĀRYA

Śrī Kundakundācārya, the author of our work, was a very famous Jaina philosopher and theologian. He was also a great organiser of Religious institutions. His name is held in great veneration especially by the Digambara Section of the Jainas. Many great religious teachers claimed it an honour to trace their lineage from the great teacher Kundakunda. Several inscriptions that are found in South India and Mysore relating to Jaina teachers begin with *Kundakundānvaya*—of the line of Kundakunda. Students of Jaina literature are familiar with such phrases as the following —

*Śrī-Kundakunda-gurupaṭṭa-paramparāyām ,*

*Śrī-Kundakunda-santānam;*

*Śrī-Kundakundākhyā-munīndra-vamśa*

These are some of the phrases claimed by Jaina writers such as Sakalabhūṣana author of *Upadeśaratnamālā*, Vasunandī author of *Upāsakādhyayanam*, Brahmanemiddatta of *Ārādhana-Kathākośa*. Instances may be multiplied without number, for showing the important place occupied by our author in the hierarchy of Jaina teachers.

Some of the epithets employed to characterise him are also significant of his great importance. Munīndra—the Indra among the ascetics, Muniakravartī—the emperor among the Munis, Kaundeśa—Lord Kunda, are familiar designations of the great teacher.

The personality of this great teacher, as is generally the case with world famous individuals, is lost in obscurity and shrouded with traditions. We have to depend upon so many written and oral traditions to have a glimpse of this great person. The early history of India is but a string of speculations and even as such there are very many gaps. Under these circumstances, we have to be very cautious about the history of our author.

The one great landmark in the chronology of India is Candragupta Maurya. This great emperor of Magadha is not only referred to in the various literary works of India but is also mentioned by foreign historians especially the Greeks. This emperor Candragupta especially is of peculiar interest to the students of the early history of the Jainas.



Lewis RICE and Dr F W THOMAS have done considerable service to Indian History by cautiously interpreting several available facts, archaeological and epigraphical, relating to that period. The early faith of Aśoka and the migration of Bhadrabāhu with Candragupta are now accepted facts of history. The tendency among European scholars to post date the historical events and persons relating to India is a just antidote to the phantastic and legendary notions of indigenous writers who generally measure time by milleniums. Nevertheless we have to point out that the orientalist have sometimes overreached their work. They generally proceed on the assumption that writing is a late acquisition in Indian civilization. The learned arguments put forward on Pāṇini by GOLDSTUCKER to undermine this assumption have been before the learned public for some decades. The excavations of Jaina Stūpas at Mathura and Mr K P JAYASWAL's discovery of Konika's Statue with the inscriptions try to set back the pendulum of Indian chronology to an earlier period. Speaking about the Jaina Stūpas Sir Vincent SMITH writes as follows —

"The assumption has generally been made that all edifices in this Stūpa form are Buddhist. When the inscription under discussion was executed not later than 157 A.D., the Vodva stupa of the Jainas at Mathura was already so ancient that it was regarded as the work of the gods. It was probably therefore erected several centuries before the Christian era."

Again says he,

"Assuming the ordinarily received date B C 527 for the death of Mahāvīra to be correct the attainment of perfection by that saint may be placed about B C. 550. The restoration of the Stūpa may be dated about 1300 years later or A. D. 150. Its original erection in brick in the time of Pārsavanātha, the predecessor of Mahāvīra, would fall at a date not later than B C 600 considering the significance of the phrase in the inscription "built by the gods" as indicating that the building at about the beginning of the Christian era was believed to date from a period of mythical antiquity, the date B C 600 for its erection is not too early. Probably therefore this Stūpa of which Dr FUHRER exposed the foundations is the oldest known buildings in India"

When we take these historic discoveries with the Jaina traditions that a number of Tirthankaras preceded Lord Mahāvīra we may not be altogether wrong in supposing that adherents of Jaina faith in some form or other must have existed even anterior to Mahāvīra and that Mahāvīra himself was more a reformer than the founder of the faith. If there were Jains influential enough to build Stūpas in honour of their saints even anterior to 600 B C, will it be too much to suppose that the followers of this religion might have existed in South India even before Bhadrabāhu's migration to the south? In fact it stands to reason to suppose that a large body of ascetics on account of a terrible famine in the north migrated to a country where they would be welcomed by their devoted coreligionists. If the south were instead of a friendly territory waiting to receive the Saṅgha of learned ascetics a land populated with strangers and of alien faith,

Bhadrabāhu would not have ventured to take with him into strange land a large body of ascetics who would depend entirely upon the generosity of the people. The Jaina tradition that the Pāndya King of the South was a Jaina from very early times and that Bhadrabāhu expected his hospitality might have some historical background.

Up to the time of Bhadrabāhu's migration there was no split in the Jaina fold. That the schism of the Śvetāmbaras arose about the time of Bhadrabāhu-I on account of the hardships of the famine is more than probable. This fact is evidenced by the complete absence of Śvetāmbaras in the Deccan and South India. The Jains in the South and Mysore always claim to be of Mūlasangha, the original congregation.

One other interesting fact is the migration of the Digambaras from the south to the north for the purpose of religious propagandism. "One point of agreement comes out clearly and is note-worthy, i.e. the direction of the Digambara migration." It was from the south to the north from Bhadrapur to Delhi and Jaipur. This agrees with the opinion that the Digambara separation originally took place as a result of the migration southwards under Bhadrabāhu in consequence of a severe famine in Bihar the original home of the undivided Jaina Community" (Prof. A. F. Rudolf HOERNLE, *Ind. Ant.* Vol. XXI, Three further Pātāvalis of the Digambaras, pp. 60 and 61.)

Professor HOERNLE says that he has not been able to identify Bhadrapur. It is no other than Pātāliputra or Pātālipura which is the old name of Thiruppappuliyur or modern Cuddalore (*Reports on the Archaeological Survey of India*, Vol. 1906-07—Article on the Pallavas by V. VENKAYYA) suggests that it is not the above place and identifies it with Tiruvadi, a place near Panruti with many Jaina antiquities and remains. This is only a matter of detail. But still the reason given by V. VENKAYYA is not quite sound. The fact that Pathirupuliyur is mentioned in Devaram as sacred to God Śiva will not conflict with its being also the centre of the Jainas.

Now this Bhadrapur or Pātālipura is associated with our author Śrī Kundakunda as we shall show later on.

Before we proceed further, let us make sure about the age in which he lived and worked. For this we have clear evidence furnished in the several Pātāvalis preserved by the Jainas both Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras. After Mahāvīra there had been a succession of teachers as shown below —

			Years
I —Kevalins	.. Gautama	.	12
	Sudharmā	..	12
	Jambū	.	38
II —Śruta-Kevalins,	Visnukumāra	...	14
	Nandimitra	.	16
	Aparājita	.	22
	Govardhana	.	19
	Bhadrabāhu-I	.	29

			Years.
III Ten-Pūrvins	Viśākha	...	10
	Prosthula		15
	Naksatra	.	17
	Nāgasena	..	18
	Jayasena	.	21
	Sidhārtha	.	17
	Dhrtisena	.	18
	Vijaya	.	13
	Buddhalinga		20
	Deva, I	.	14
	Dharasena	.	14
IV.—Eleven Angins	Naksatra	.	18
	Jayapālaka	.	20
	Pāndava	.	39
	Dhruvasena	.	14
	Kamsa	..	32
Total			468
			Years
V — Minor-Angins .	Subhadra		6
	Yasobhadra	.	18
	Bhadrabāhu, II		

In the year 2 after the Ācārya Subhadra's (accession to the pontificate), the birth of Vikrama took place; and in the year 4 of Vikrama's reign Bhadrabāhu II took his seat on the pontifical chair. Further succession will be evident from the following table —

INDIAN ANTIQUARY Vols XX and XXI The several Pattāvalis examined by R. HOERNLE.

# THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

v

*Kundakunda line according to the Digambara Paṭṭāvalis as worked out by Professor HOERNLE*

Serial number	Names	Dates of accession.		Householder		Monk		Pontiff		Intercalary days	Total			Remarks
		Saṃvat	Christian	Years	Months	Days	Years	Months	Days		Years	Months	Days	
1	Bhadrabāhu, II .	4 Ch S. 14	B C 53	24	.	30	22	10	27	3	76	11		He was a Brahman by caste
2	Guptigupta .	26 Ph. S 14	31	22	.	34	9	6	25	5	65	7	.	A Panwār by caste.
3	Māghanandin, I .	36 A S 14	21	20		44	4	4	26	4	46	8	5	A Sāh by caste.
4	Jinacandra, I ..	40 Ph S 14	17	24	9	32	8	9	6	3	65	9	9	
5	Kundakunda .	49 P V 8	8	11		33	51	10	10	5	95	10	15	He had four other names <i>ahva</i> viz, Padmanandin, Vakragriva Grdhrapiccha, Elācārya.

If we take this date 8 B C. as the reliable date of his accession to the pontifical chair then the date of his birth would be about 52 B C For, only in his forty-fourth year he became pontiff or an Ācārya

What is his birthplace and scene of his activities? With regard to his birthplace we have no better evidence Here also we have to depend upon tradition—oral and written Let us see whether we can have any useful information from these traditions. In a work called *Punyāsravakathā* Śrī Kundakundācārya's life is cited as an example for *śāstrādāna* or gift of *śāstras* The account is as follows —In Bharata Khanda in Dakṣinadeśa there was a district called Pīḍaṭha Nādu In a town called Kurumaraī in this district there lived a wealthy Vaiśya by name Karamunda His wife was Śrīmātī. They had a cowherd who tended their cattle His name was Mativaran. One day, when he was driving

his cattle to an adjoining forest, he saw, to his great surprise, that the whole forest was consumed by forest fire except a few trees in the centre, which retained the luxuriant green foliage. This roused his curiosity, and he went and inspected that place. There he found the dwelling place of some great Muni and also a box containing the *āgamas* or the Jaina Scriptures. Illiterate as he was, he attributed the safety of the spot to the presence of the *āgamas* which he carried home with great awe and reverence. He put up the *āgamas* in a sanctified place of his master's house and continued to worship the same daily.

Sometime after, a religious monk visited their house. He was offered *bhiksā* with great veneration by that wealthy Vaiśya. Just then this cow-herd also offered the *āgamas* to the great *ṛṣi*. On account of these gifts—food from the Master, and the Scripture from the servant—the *ṛṣi* was very much pleased and blessed them both. The Master of the house since he had no children was to have an intelligent son, and the old and faithful servant would be born as the promised son of the house. The happy event came to pass and the son born to the family became a great philosopher and religious teacher. This was our author, Śrī Kundakunda.

The story further turns upon his religious tours. The mention of his name as the wisest of mortals in the *śamavasāna* of Śrīmandharasvāmī in Pūrvaideha, the visit of the two *cāraṇas* to verify the fact, his supposed irreverence to them on account of his concentration, the return of the *cāraṇas* in disgust, the explanation of the misunderstood event, the reconciliation between the *cāraṇas* and Śrī Kundakunda and the latter's visit to the *śamavasāna* with the *cāraṇas* are all incidents mentioned in detail. Further as the fruit of his previous gift of *sāstra* he became a great leader of thought and organiser of institutions. Finally he secured the throne of Ācārya and thus spent his life in usefulness and glory.

There is another account of his life given in *Kundakundaācāryacaritra*, a pamphlet published in Digambara Jaina office, Surat. According to this, his birth-place is in the country of Malwa. His parents are mentioned as Kundaśreṣṭhi and Kundalatā. The young boy Kundakunda was apprenticed to religious teacher for the purpose of education. Early in life he showed an ascetic disposition and therefore he was ordained as a monk and admitted into the Sangha. The latter part of the story is almost identical with that of the previous one.

Both these versions appear to be quite legendary. The latter judged from the names of the parents is evidently a later construction by some imaginative mind based upon the name of the hero Kundakunda. The places mentioned in the former story are not easily identifiable. The only reliable information there perhaps is that the author belongs to Dakṣiṇa Deśa. Waiving these two stories as of no material use we have to depend more upon circumstantial evidence. Emphasis must be laid upon the fact that Śrī Kundakunda belonged to Drāviḍa Sangha.

"La communauté digambara portait le nom de mula sangha. Un synonyme de ce terme paraît être Drāvila Sangha, qui ne signifie sans doute rien de plus que" communauté "des pays dravidiens." Le mula sangha comptait plusieurs sectes dont la plus importante était le Kunda Kunda anvaṃya" (—p 42. Introduction, *Reportaire Epigraphie Jama*)

This suggestion of GUERINOT's based upon circumstantial evidence is a useful clue for our purpose

We have to collect further evidence if possible to corroborate the theory that our author belonged to the Dravidian country

(1) In an unpublished manuscript treating about *Mantra-laksana* we have the following śloka:—

*Dakṣiṇa-deśa-malaye Hemagrāme numr mahātmāsī*

*Elācārya nānmā drāvilaganādhiśo dhīmān*

This śloka is interesting to us. The work treats about a female disciple of Elācārya, who was possessed of a Brahma Rākṣasa. This possessed disciple was no doubt well-versed in Śāstras but would get up on the summit of a small hill called Nilagiri by the side of the village, Hemagrāma, in which Elācārya lived, and would laugh and weep alternately with all hysterical violence. She is said to have been cured by Elācārya with the help of Jvālāmālīnī Mantra. Fortunately we are able to identify all the places mentioned in the above śloka.

Malaya is the name of that part of the Madras Presidency comprised by portions of North Arcot and South Arcot traversed by the Eastern ghats. The Taluks of Kallakurichi, Tiruvannamalai and Wandewash perhaps form the central tract of this Malaya. Hemagrāma which is the Sanskritised form of Ponnūr which is a village near Wandewash. Close to this village there is a hillock by the name Nilagiri. On the top of this hillock on a rock there are even now the foot prints of Elācārya who is said to have performed his *tapas* thereon. Even now pilgrims frequent this village once in a year, to perform *pūjā* to the foot prints. Further the śloka mentions Elācārya to be Drāvidaganādhiśa. We know very well that Elācārya, is another well-known name for Kundakunda.

Now this Elācārya is, according to Jama tradition, the author of the great Tamil classic *Thirukkural*. This is written in the old indigenous Venba metre of Tamil language. According to the Jama tradition, this work was composed by Elācārya and given away to his disciple Thiruvalluvar who introduced it to the Madura Sangha. This version is not altogether improbable. Because even the non-Jama tradition about the author of *Thirukkural* appears to be merely another version of this one. The Hindu tradition makes Thiruvalluvar himself the author of the work. He is claimed to be a Śaivite by faith and Valluva by birth. His birth place is said to be Thirumayilai or Mylapuram or the modern Mylapore the southern part of the city of Madras. The work was composed

under the patronage of one Elāla Singh, who was evidently the literary patron of Thiruvalluvar.

This Elāla Singh of the Hindu Tradition may be merely a variation of Elācārya Thiruvalluvar figures in both the traditions, in the one as author and in the other the introducer before the Sangha. That Mylapurī had a famous Jain temple dedicated to Neminātha (Vide Tamil work *Tirumur ruanthathu*) and that it was a seat of Jain culture is well evidenced by literary remains and antiquarian facts preserved in South India. Though the work is claimed by different religionists Śivaites, Buddhists and Jains, though there is no authentic record as to the exact faith of the author, still an unbiassed study of the work itself with the special view as to the technical terms employed in the couplets and the doctrines, religious and moral, embodied in the work will constrain one to conclude that it is a treatise evidently based upon the moral principle of Vitarāga, the corner stone of Jainism. The praise of Agriculture as the noblest occupation is consistent with the traditions of the Vellalas, the landed aristocracy of South India, who were evidently the earliest adherents to Jain faith in this part of the country.

This identification of Elācārya, the author of *Kural*, with Elācārya or Kundakunda would place the Tamil work in the 1st century of the Christian era. This is not altogether improbable. Dr. G.U. POPE would bring it down to a period later than the 8th century. There is no sufficient historic evidence for his belief. He is actuated by his personal bias that such a sublime work embodying highest moral ideals could not be due to the indigenous Dravidian culture alone, but must have been influenced by Christianity brought here by the early Christian Missionaries. The tradition about St. Thomas lends weight to the supposition. There is nothing to show from the internal evidence that the author of the work was aware of Christianity. The doctrines treated therein are found widely scattered in Tamil literature especially in those works composed by Jains such as *Nāḷadiyar*, *Aranericharam*, *Pazamozi Elathi*, etc. One who is acquainted with Tamil literature will not grudge the authorship of *Kural* to purely Dravidian scholars and moralists who are uninfluenced by foreign culture. Hence we may believe with very great probability that Elācārya, the author of *Kural*, was identical with Kundakunda, the author of *Prābhrtatraya*, and that he lived about the beginning of the 1st century A.D.

This identification of Elācārya, the author of *Kural*, with Kundakunda brings in another important point of historical interest. It is an acknowledged fact that *Kural* is anterior to *Śilappadikāram* and *Manimekhalai*. The former was, written by Ilangovaligol the younger brother of Singutiuman Seran, the Chera King of Vangi. The latter work which is merely the continuation of the story of *Śilappadikāram* was written by "Kulavanukan Sattanar" a contemporary and friend of Ilangovali. During the *pratiṣṭhā* of Devī temple (*Śilappadikāram*) Gajabāhu I of Ceylon was present, according to *Mahāvamsa*, he reigned about 113 A.D. The *Kural* therefore must be anterior to this date; so this also goes to corroborate the age of Elācārya or Kundakunda.

All these scattered facts of traditions and literary remains produce cumulative evidence to establish that our author was of Dravidian origin, that he was the leader of the Dravidian Sangha, and that he was evidently highly cultured in more than one language. This use of the word *Drāvīda* in the *Drāvīda Sangha* must have a specific reference to the Jainas of South India, the Vellalas of the ancient Tamil literature, who strictly followed Kollavratam or Ahimsā-dharma; and it is further evidenced by the popular use of the word in the compound. *Drāvīda-Brahmins* who are strict vegetarians as contrasted with *Gauda-Brahmins*. It is a well-known fact that the strict vegetarianism in daily life of South Indian Brahmins who nevertheless perform *yāgas* involving animal sacrifice is a heritage from early Jaina culture in South India.

The early kingdoms of South India were the Cheras, the Cholas and the Pāndyas. It is a well-known historical fact pertaining to South India that Pāndyas were Jains and were patrons of Jainism. They changed their faith only during the Śivaite revival effected by Appār and Sundarar about the 8th century. That the Cheras were also Jainas can be inferred from *Siḷappadikāra* another great Tamil classic written by a Jaina scholar the younger brother of the Chera king (who was a contemporary of Gaḷabāhu of Ceylon). The Cholas were also off and on the Patrons of Jainas though in later days they were associated with Śivaism. These three kingdoms were known about the time of Aśoka. The court language in all the three was probably Tamil. Can we suppose that Śrī Kundakunda belonged to any one of these kingdoms? Our above discussion would lead us to such a supposition and yet there is an important stumbling block in our way.

The work that is translated here is in Prākṛit. Further all the commentators of *Prābhṛtatraya* : *Pañcāstikāya*, *Pravacanasāra*, and *Samayasāra*, mention the fact that these works were written by Kundakundācārya for the benefit of his royal disciple Śivakumāra Mahārāja. Who this Śivakumāra Mahārāja was and over what kingdom he ruled the commentators are silent about. We are once again compelled to have recourse to hypothesis. This Śivakumāra Mahārāja must have been a follower of Jaina faith and must have had Prākṛit as his court language. Further he must have been somewhere in the south in order to have Śrī Kundakunda as his religious teacher. This name does not occur in the dynastic genealogy of the three Tamil Kingdoms—the Cheras, the Cholas and the Pāndyas. Further there is no evidence that any prince of these dynasties had Prākṛit as his court language.

Before we proceed to state our theory we have to dispose of the theory proposed by K B PATHAK as to the identification of Śivakumāra Mahārāja (The *Indian Antiquary*, Vol XIV, 1885, page 15). Kundakunda was one of the most celebrated Jaina authors. The works attributed to him are the *Prābhṛtasāra* [?], the *Pravacanasāra*, the *Samayasāra*, the *Rayanasāra* and the *Dvādaśānupreksā*.

These are all written in Jaina Prākṛit. Bālacandra, the commentator, who lived before Abhinava Pampa says in his introductory remarks on the *Prābhṛtasāra* [?], that



Kundakundācārya was also called Padmanandī and was the preceptor of Śiva Kumāra Mahārāja. I would identify the king with the early Kadamba King Śrī Vijaya Śiva Mrgeśa Mahārāja. For in his time, the Jainas had already been divided into the Nirgranthas and the Śvetapaṭas, and Kundakunda attacks the Śvetapaṭa sect when he says, in the *Pravacanasāra* that women are allowed to wear clothes because they are incapable of attaining Nirvāṇa.

“cittē cintā māyā tamhā tāsīm ṇa nirvāṇam

चित्ते चित्ता माया तम्हा तासि ण निव्वानं ।

Another interesting fact that we learn from his works is that, in the time of this author Jainism had not spread far and wide in these parts and that the body of this people worshipped Viṣṇu for he tells us in the *Samayasāra*.

लोकसमगणनेयं सिद्धंतं पडि ण दिस्सदि विसेसो ।

लोकस्स कुणदि विण्ह समगणं अप्पओ कुणदि ॥

So no difference appears between the people and the Śramanas in respect of the Siddhānta; (in the opinion of) the people, Viṣṇu makes (every thing), (in the opinion of) the Śramanas the Soul makes (every thing). On these circumstances, as well as on the place assigned to him in Jaina Pāṭṭāvalis and on the fact that his writings are considered by Jaina scholars, both in Dharwar and Maisur, to be the most ancient Jaina works now extant I base my opinion that Kundakundācārya was a contemporary of the early Kadamba King, Śiva Mrgeśa Mahārāja.

The reasons cited by K. P. PATHAK are all right. Kundakunda is later than the Śvetāmbara Schism which is believed to have taken place about the time of Bhadrabahu, I. And perhaps at the time of Kundakunda the ordinary masses followed the Vedāntic form of Vaisnava cult. But still these facts do not form a cogent reason for identifying Śivakumāra Mahārāja with the Kadamba King Śiva Mrgeśa Varma (*Mysore and Coorg* by Lewis RICE, page 21.) “The Kadambas were rulers of the west of Mysore from the 3rd to the 6th century.” And Śiva Mrgeśa Varma ruled about the 5th century A.D. But the pontificate of Śrī Khndakunda began in B. C. 8 (The early dynasties by J. F. FLEET, page 288 of the *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. I) “and this is altogether too ancient, a period for the early Kadambas”. Further we do not know whether the Kadambas were acquainted with Prākṛit language. Under these circumstances we have to seek elsewhere as to the whereabouts of Śiva Kumāra Mahārāja, the disciple of Śrī Kundakunda.

Conjeppuram was the capital of the Pallava kingdom. The Pallavas ruled over Thonda Mandalam and also over a part of the Telugu country up to the river Krishna. Thonda Mandalam or Thondainādu was the name given to the land along the east coast between the two Pennars, South Pennars in South Arcot and North Pennar in Nellor and to east of the ghats. This land was divided into several Nādu and each Nādu into several Kottams. It was the land of the learned. Several great Dravidian scholars such as the

author of the *Kural*, the great Tamil poetess Avvai, the Sweet Puhazanthi the author of *Nalavenba*, all belong to Thondimandalam. Throughout the Tamil literature there are references to the literary merits and the culture of the inhabitants of Thondinadu. Conjeevuram the capital of Thondinadu must have been a great centre of learning in the south. Students from different parts of the country went to Conjeevuram for purposes of study. Scholars thronged there for the purpose of being recognised at the Pallava Court. Mayūra-śarma, one of the early founders of the Kadamba dynasty, went to the Pallava capital for the purpose of completing his education in the Sacred lore. It was there that he quarrelled with the master of the horses who was a Ksatriya. Mayūra Śarma, a Brahmin by birth, vowed that even a Brahmin could handle the weapons of warfare with skill and could found a kingdom. Thus arose the Kadamba dynasty. Thus the glory of Conjeevuram, the Pallava capital, must have wide spread about the 2nd century A.D. The kings of Conjeevuram as patrons of learning must have encouraged philosophical discussion among the representatives of the different religious sects: the Hindus, Buddhists and Jamas. Taking part in such religio-philosophical discussions must necessarily have a reaction on the personal faith of the kings. In the early centuries of the Christian era, proselytising was a common factor among the rival religionists. Great religious leaders of different denominations went about from country to country converting kings and people. Thus we hear from Jama History that Samantabhadrasvāmi visited Conjeevuram and converted Śivakoti Mahārāja who became Śivakoti Muni, the disciple and successor of Samantabhadra. Still later towards the 8th century Akalanka visited the capital, defeated the Buddhists in open philosophical contests and converted Himaśtala the then Buddhist king. It is not improbable therefore that the Pallava kings at Conjeevuram during the 1st century of this era were patrons of Jama Religion or were themselves Jamas by faith.

We also know from several epigraphical records that they had Prākṛit as their court language. What is known as the Mayidavolu grant is an important document for South Indian History. It is in Prākṛit with the exception of the last verse, which is the closing *mangala* in Sanskrit. The body of the grant is in a Prākṛitic dialect which comes close to the literary Pali, but shows also a number of peculiarities and divergent forms (Dr. BUHLER, *Ep. Indica*. Vol I, p. 2) which come nearer to the usage of the Jaina Mahārasṭri dialect than to that of the Pali and older inscriptions. It is issued by the Pallava King Śiva Śkandavarma of Conjeevuram. Further it may be pointed out that the grant resembles in many particulars the Jama inscriptions from Mathura. The use of the word Siddham in the beginning of the grant as well as in the Mathura inscriptions is very suggestive of Jama origin. The most important point for us is the name of the King Śivaskanda which is merely another form of Śiva Kumāra. No doubt the same name occurs in the Andhra line. M.J.G. Dubreuil tries to connect the two dynasties by matrimonial alliance. He suggests that the Śivaskandavarma (Yuvamahārāja) of the Pallava dynasty is the grandson of Śivaskanda Śāta Karūṇi by the daughter and received

the name of the Andhra king who was his grandfather. Whether the name was so inherited or was independently adopted by the Pallava kings it is not quite material to decide here. It is enough to notice the fact that there was a Pallava king by name Śivaskanda or Śivakumāra Mahārāja. He also figures as Yuva-mahārāja in another grant. This name is also curiously identical with Kumāra Mahārāja. It is quite possible therefore that this Śivaskanda of Conjeevuram or one of the predecessor of the same name was the contemporary and disciple of Śrī Kundakunda. This would well fit in with several facts known about Kundakunda. Kundakunda or Elācārya must have been in Thondimandalam. So also was Pāṭahputra, the seat of Dravida Sangha, a town in Thondimandalam.

In this connection we have to reject two theories about Pallavas as unfounded and improbable. The Pallavas are generally supposed to be foreigners from Persia. They are identified with Pahlavas, (*Mysore and Coorg* by L. RICE, page 53) which is the Prākṛit form of the Pārthava meaning Parthians, here especially the 'Arsacidian Parthians'. RICE further builds upon this theory another fantastic one that Chaulkyans who were sometimes the enemies of the Pallavas were by origin Salenkaians. V. VENKIYIA adopts the same theory though it is based upon purely etymological grounds. The hypothesis that is based upon mere similarity of names has no great historical importance unless it is corroborated by independent evidence. This theory unfortunately lacks such a corroboration. Hence it leaves unchallenged the other hypothesis which is perhaps more probable that the Pallavas were a section of the Hindu race in the south.

Another hypothesis deserves notice before dismissal. It is the identification of the Pallavas with some aboriginal tribes as the Kurumbas. This again is based upon the use of the word 'Kāḍavar' to designate the later Pallavas. No doubt the term 'Kāḍavar' means "the men of the forest". But there is no other ground to show that this 'Kāḍavars' were of the "forest tribe". In Tamil literature it refers to a highly civilised and cultured race. There must be some other reason therefore for the application of the name to the Pallavas. It may be merely a contraction of Palakkadavar a people of the Palakkada another seat of Pallava government.

Waiving these two hypothesis as improbable may we not suppose a much closer alliance between the people of the Thondimandalam and Andhras or the Andhrabhṛityas who succeeded the Mauryas. The term Thondu in Tamil means 'Service'. 'Thondar' may simply mean 'those who serve' and may be taken as the Tamil Translation of Āndhrabhṛityas. The Pallavas or the Thonders therefore may merely a section of the Āndhras, settled in the south who inherited that portion of the Andhra kingdom either by matrimony or by right. This theory that the Pallavas were an indigenous race with a very high culture and civilization and related to Āndhrabhṛityas is highly probable and is corroborated by other circumstantial evidence.

This digression into the history of the Pallavas we have had because such a political environment is required for our author Śrī Kundakunda Ācārya according to the available data about his life. We may therefore conclude that Śrī Kundakunda Ācārya wrote his *Prābhṛta-Traya* for one Śiva Kumāra Mahārāja who was most probably the same as Śiva Skanda Varma of the Pallava dynasty.

Several works are attributed to Śrī Kundakunda Ācārya.

1. *Prābhṛta-traya* (The three *Prābhṛtas*).
2. *Satpāhudam*.
3. *Niyamasāra*, etc.

Of these the first three, *Pañcāstikāya*, *Pravacanasāra* and *Samayasāra* are the best known and most important. The work that is offered in translation here is the first of these three *Pañcāstikāya Prābhṛta* which treats about the five cosmic constituents.

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## A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION

### JAINISM—A DYNAMIC REALISM

When the European scholars first began to study Indian Philosophy and Indian Literature they were peculiarly sympathetic towards the idealistic systems of India. These scholars were brought up in the tradition of Kant and Hegel. Kant in constructing his critical philosophy emphasised the phenomenality of our experience in general. The external world including "the starry heavens above" was merely a fictitious creation of the human mind according to its own forms and categories.

Roused from his dogmatic slumber by Hume, Kant began to inquire as to the possibility of a true metaphysics. Hume's analysis of experience ended in throwing overboard the fundamental conceptions of experience. The reality of the Self, the objective world and even the certain law of causation were all said to be fictitious concepts based upon psychological habits but having no rational foundation. From such a sceptical shipwreck Kant attempted to save metaphysics. Warping the earlier methods as dogmatic he introduced his own critical philosophy. The main characteristic of this system is the activity of the mind as opposed to the passive *tabula rasa* of the Lockean system. Nature is due to the co-operation of sense materials and the activity of mind. Forms of space and time and the categories of the understanding from the *a priori* constitutive elements of experience. Knowledge is confined to such an experience which is phenomenal. This phenomenal world or the world of appearance is but an island surrounded by the unknown ocean of *noumenal* reality. This may be taken to be the foundation of modern idealism.

No doubt Kant strongly repudiated the suggestion that his system was idealistic. It is true that he posited the existence of the thing in itself. But this realm of *noumenal* reality remained unknown and unknowable. It was preserved only because of Kant's personal predilection; hence it was the very first thing to be rejected by his successors.

Through the influence of Hegel the German idealism secured an inordinate potency. Peculiarly gifted with genius for system-building Hegel wrought out his system of idealism based on Kantian traditions. The *thing-in-itself* was got rid of as an empty abstraction. Reality was identified with concrete experience. Thus the metaphysical dualism of Kant was converted into an idealistic monism. According to this Hegelian conception reality is equal to the Absolute consciousness. All finite things and persons are reduced

to merely adjectives or qualities of this Absolute which is of the nature of the spirit. It is this spirit that is the reality of which all other things of our ordinary experience are mere appearances

Besides this idealistic monism of Germany there was another important aspect of thought that determined the trend of modern ideas. Herbert Spencer worked out a scheme of cosmic evolution in his synthetic system. This Spencerian philosophy also in its own way contributed to metaphysical monism and phenomenality of experience; hence the philosophy of the 19th century, especially towards the last quarter, had a predominant note of monism. This general proneness towards a monistic interpretation in western thought must have determined the attitude of the West towards Indian thought. Naturally were European scholars like Max Muller and Deussen sympathetically attracted by the metaphysical flights of Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja. The uncompromising monism of Vedānta was admired as the fruit of oriental culture.

The philosophical attitude is never constant. It has always been undulating between idealism and realism. In the West there is observed a distinct set-back to idealism. The English philosophers like Bradley and Bosanquet who inherited the traditions of Hegel and who practically ruled the philosophical world are now openly challenged. This revolt against idealistic influence has manifested through different channels. Pragmatism championed by James and Dewey has exposed the hollowness of a barren Intellectualism.

The Hegelian doctrine of the identity between Thought and Reality and the consequent criterion of Truth in the form of self-coherence and self-consistency are openly condemned as pernicious metaphysics. "The will to believe" is recognised as an important factor in Knowledge. Experimental verification of thought which is the method followed in Science is hailed as the true model for philosophy. Thought is studied in its true concrete setting. In as much as it is merely an instrument to secure greater efficiency of life, its value is entirely determined by its utility. Even Scientists like Mach and Poincaré acknowledge this instrumentality of thought. Concepts are only convenient fictions to comprehend Nature.

From within Oxford University itself there has sprung up a philosophical schism which boldly questions the pertensions of the Absolute. Schiller and Rashdall, Strutt and others attack the Hegelian stronghold. The Absolute is condemned because it neither satisfies the philosophical curiosity nor appeals to religious consciousness.

From France and Italy we hear a similar protest from Bergson and Croce. The former repudiating the Hegelian Absolute builds up a theory of the Universe based upon evolutionism. He too condemns intellect as inadequate to apprehend the inner nature of reality. His antagonism to Intellectualism is carried to an uncompromising revolt against even scientific and philosophical constructions in general. He appeals to intuition as the only means of getting at Reality. Similarly Croce tries to separate what is living from what is dead, in Hegel. Thus on all sides this German Idealism is being

assaulted But the most dangerous opponent of Idealism is come in the form of New Realism.

From an unexpected source there has come opposition The Science of Mathematics whose alleged weakness was the strength of Kantian Idealism has asserted its own right to challenge metaphysics. The mathematical discoveries of Cantor, Peano and Frege have once for all reclaimed certain fundamental Mathematical notions such as the concepts of infinity and continuity from the unwarranted criticisms of metaphysicians. As Mr. B. Russell clearly points out, modern Idealism must once for all relinquish its Kantian basis It can no more depend upon the so called demonstration offered by Kant as to the impossibility of real space and time.

This wave of realism is further intensified by the fact that it is intimately associated with modern Science The traditional Hegelian idealism of the West has been peculiarly adverse to the interest of Science. It may be safely asserted that a system of metaphysics which does not take into consideration the method and achievement of modern Science is so far self-condemned. Nobody can be blind to the claim of Science to be a safe means for revealing truth Its claim is so wonderfully substantiated by its achievements, that we may say that modern life and modern thought are mainly the result of modern Science. So much so any system of Metaphysics which aspires to secure the open sesame to unlock the secrets of reality must not openly conflict with modern Science. The new realism therefore is in noble company.

When we are aware of this changed attitude in modern thought we are naturally stimulated to examine similar philosophical attitudes in the past.

What is placed before the students of philosophy herein is due to such a sympathetic scrutiny of the past. The Jaina system of thought is so peculiarly consistent with modern realism and modern science, that one may be tempted to question its antiquity. Still it is a fact, that such a system flourished in India several centuries before the Christian era.

The author of the work which is translated in the following pages lived in the 1st century B C. Hence it is one of the earliest treatises on Jaina Thought. But the author was not the originator of this system. The *anekāntavāda* of the Jainas must be certainly older than Mahāvira who is believed to have revived Jainism.

The realistic tendency in oriental philosophy is not peculiar to Jainism. From the very early days, we find this principle of interpreting life and the Universe running side by side with the idealistic one. During the Vedic period we find nothing but gross form of Realism The Vedic Gods were but magnified human beings sharing all the weaknesses and foibles peculiar to mankind. When sacrifices were offered to Indra or Agni or Vāyu or Varuṇa with chanting of hymns, there could be no trace of any suspicion as to the reality of the world around. Not only the world of Nature was taken to be real but many of its elements were imaged after man. No doubt we find a unifying tendency as

an undercurrent of the Vedic thought. No doubt the Vedic Devas were subordinated to the one creative principle of the Universe, Prajāpati.

But this wonderful period of primitive culture is followed by a barren age of sheer ceremonialism. The period of the Brāhmanas is marked by sacrificial technique. Elaborate formulæ were invented for the conduct of sacrifices. Ceremonialism took the place of Poetic effusions. This led to the ascendancy of the priestly class. The sacrificial master or Yajamāna has to engage his priests, paying heavy fees or *dakṣiṇās*. Religious devotion during this period degenerated into petty commercialism. But this state of things did not last long. While the priests were further elaborating the ceremonial formulæ the work of investigating the true nature reality was taken up by another band of thinkers. By this time the homogenous Aryan tribe split up into different castes. Of these sects the Kṣatriyas or the warrior class have learned the secrets of Reality. They have introduced a new philosophical cult known as Brahmayidyā. The Brahmayidyā must have originally referred to certain spiritual intuitions obtained through introspection. Man discovered himself for the first time. The inner spiritual principle, the Ātman is taken to be the Reality. It is neither the body nor the senses. It is something behind and beyond the corporeal frame. It is that which hears but is not heard. It is that which sees but is not seen. It is that which makes the operation of the senses possible while itself is beyond sense-apprehension. This spiritual principle was indifferently called Ātman or Brahman. Like the Pythagorians of Greece, the Indian thinkers kept their metaphysical cult as a secret. The Kṣatriyas who were the discoverers and custodians of the New Thought imparted it only to the deserving few. This *upanishadic* cult, for so was it named, soon replaced the earlier ceremonialism. The Jñāna-kāṇḍa superseded the Karma-kāṇḍa as the path to Self-realisation. Even the priests, discounting their ceremonial technique, flocked to the Royal courts to be initiated into the new mysteries. Thus the age was one of intense discussion, research and self-introspection. During this period again, we have the seeds of the different philosophical systems constructed in the succeeding period. No doubt Yājñavalkya is a towering personality of the Upanishadic age. No doubt he attempted reconciliation between the old and the new. In his hands the new wisdom appeared as distinctly monistic. But that current which is evidently the source of the later Vedāntic stream was only one of the many currents of the Upanishadic wisdom. This is very well substantiated by the different systems constructed subsequent to the age. The philosophical systems in India are mainly of two classes, the orthodox and the heretic. The six Darśanas. Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, Uttara-mīmāṃsā or Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika constitute the orthodox systems. The heretical systems are Buddhism, Jainism, the philosophy of the Cārvakas and Bāṛhaspatyas. Of course this classification does not mean anything but that it was made by Brahminical scholars. 'Orthodox' and 'heretical' are terms mainly based upon the attitude towards the Vedas. Kapila's Sāṅkhya is *nirīyara* and is allied to Jainism and Buddhism in its opposition to Vedic sacrifices. Pūrva-mīmāṃsā [?] or Vedānta rejects



the creator and creation as Vyavahāric and hence the result of *māyā*. There is a good deal of truth in the statement that it is merely Buddhism in disguise. Hence the traditional classification is justified neither by philosophical nor religious criterion.

Of these different systems which represent the post-Upanishadic thought the Vedānta alone has become prominent. But students who study impartially the other systems will realise the importance of their contributions to Indian thought and culture.

The supremacy of Vedānta over the systems, which are to a very great extent realistic, is not a thing to congratulate ourselves. For, Realism is generally allied to science and many of the scientific theories pertaining to the constitution of the physical world are associated with these realistic schools, e.g., the atomic theory of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. Idealism even in the West either openly or covertly has been antagonistic to the interests of Science. Hence any attempt to escape from the hypnotic illusion of a powerful Idealism is to be welcomed by impartial students of Science and Philosophy.

It is not possible for us to examine in detail the several realistic schools of Indian Thought. Hence we shall confine ourselves to Jaina Philosophy which is generally neglected by many and misunderstood by the few who attempt to speak on it.

#### JAINA PHYSICS

We have referred to the contribution to Indian Wisdom by the Warriors. By their plain living and high thinking they led to the emancipation of human intellect from the thralldom of barren ritualism. While the priest-craft was engaged in devising sacrifice after sacrifice their minds were dominated by a passionate desire for solving the riddle of the Universe and for understanding the nature of the Eternal One behind the world of appearance. This dominant phase of monism centres round the court of Janaka. But there must have been other schools of new Ksatriya thought. This group of thinkers could not compromise with the traditional thought of the Vedic period. They show a strong bias towards Dualism and Pluralism. They represent the liberal tendency in the new thought itself. Whenever they encountered a conflict between their ideals and the Vedas they did not hesitate to repudiate the authority of the latter. To this left wing of the pioneers of thought we owe the Systems of philosophy such as the Sāṅkhya, the Jaina and the Buddhistic schools. It is worthy of notice here, by the way, "that the greatest intellectual performances or rather almost all the performances of significance for mankind in India have been achieved by men of the warrior caste."<sup>\*</sup>

The Sāṅkhya system presupposes two kinds of existences, Physical and Spiritual, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*—rather an infinite number of *puruṣas*. Salvation according to Sāṅkhya consists in the differentiation between the two, matter and spirit. The individual Puruṣa secures emancipation by recognising its own intrinsic qualities as being

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<sup>\*</sup> *Philosophy of Ancient India* by Richard GARBE

distinct from the Prakṛtic transformations which go to constitute the cosmic evolution. Not only the genuine physical changes but also the psychological facts such as will, desire and intellect are credited to *piakṛti* while the *purusas* remain passive spectators of the whole drama, having nothing to do with moral responsibility

Evidently following the same dualistic tendencies but differing in the last point of moral responsibility the Jainas and the Buddhists worked out their respective systems with a deep religious colour. The Buddhists seem to have overshot their mark. Equipped with the logic of Kṣāṇikavāda they reduced the whole world of reality, physical and spiritual, to mere concatenation of sense-qualities having only a momentary existence—a result independently reached after several centuries by Hume. Neither this sensational nihilism of Śākyā Muni nor the monistic interpretation is favoured by the Jainas. They steer clear of the two extremes. They accept the Purusas of the Sāṅkhyas, but in their hands these Purusas cease to be passive spectators. They are active architects of their own destiny and through their own effort obtain final freedom bearing all the while full moral responsibility for conduct. The *piakṛti* is also similarly elaborately reconstructed. It is made more definite. It is denied many of its psychological implications. It is identified with Matter in modern scientific sense and it is also given an atomic constitution. It appears under a new name—*pudgala*. The term *pudgala* means matter. The Physical object which has the several sense qualities and which occupies space is also called *mūrta* and *rūpa*, object. In speaking about Pudgala or matter the Jaina thinkers clearly analyse the qualities apprehended by sense perception. The qualities of touch, taste, smell, colour, and sound are generally associated with Pudgala.

But the Physical bodies that are apprehended by sense perception are constituted by atoms or *paramāṇus*. It is this atomic structure of the Universe that is the interesting part of Jaina Physics\*. The *paramāṇu* or atom is defined quite in terms of modern physics. Though modern physics revolutionised the concept of Atom still it has not completely annihilated it. No doubt an atom is a cluster of electrons as complex perhaps as the solar system itself. But the discovery of radio-activity has not interfered with the laws of Physics and Chemistry based upon atomic conception. The only change that modern Physics has introduced is that Atom is no more simple and basic but complex and perhaps secondary. In spite of this complex nature it does maintain its individuality. No modern physicist will deny that it is the fundamental foundation of the structure of the Physical Universe. It is such an atom or *paramāṇu* that is the basis of Physical structure.

The *Paramāṇu* is neither created nor can be destroyed. It is the permanent basis of the Physical Universe. The several kinds of Physical objects are all constituted by the same class of primordial atom. The *Paramāṇu* cannot be an object of sense percep-

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\* This doctrine of atomic structure is also prominent in the Njāya and Vaiśeṣika Schools

tion. It is in itself transcending the sense experience and as such it is practically *mūrta* though it is the basic constituent of all *mūrta*, objects.

This primary atom or the material point has an intrinsic attraction to similar atoms. Thus molecular aggregates are formed by the combination of atoms. These molecular aggregates are called *skandhas*.<sup>4</sup> These *skandhas* are agam of infinite variety ; you may have a molecule constituted by two atoms or three and so on up to infinite number of atoms. Thus every perceivable object is a *skandha* and even the whole physical universe is sometimes spoken of as *mahāskandha* or the Great aggregate. The physical objects being aggregates of atoms or *skandhas* their changes are entirely due to atomic distintegration or aggregation.

#### THE CONCEPTION OF MOTION

Having accepted the reality of physical object the Jainas naturally accepted the possibility of real motion

Motion has always been an unintelligible perplexity to the Idealist. Both in the East and the West Idealistic thinkers have fought shy of this by taking refuge in the conception of *māyā* or appearance. It is in the western System of thought that the conception figures prominent. Zeno trying to defend the unchangeable adamant Absolute of Parminides introduced four invincible arguments against the reality of motion. These arguments were accepted as invincible for several centuries. They figure in some form or other in Kantian antinomies and Hegelian dialectic. Even Bradley draws upon Zeno's wisdom in his attempt to condemn the realities of concrete world to the limbo of appearances. As Mr. B Russell points out the arguments are no more irrefutable in the light of modern Mathematics. Hence Realism need not approach the problem with any misgivings. Reality of motion has thus obtained a standing ground in the field of modern philosophy.

What is more important than this is the part played by this concept in Science. For Science the world of reality is a system of energies. This dynamic conception of science has given a new dignity to the concept of motion. In spite of the unwarranted caution exhibited by Physicists like E. Mach and Karl Pearson modern Physics has once again emphasised the importance and the reality of motion in understanding the mystery of Nature. Always looked upon with suspicion by idealistic metaphysics the doctrine of Reality of motion has been welcomed by Realistic and scientific systems of thought.

But in order to accept the reality of motion of Physical objects the reality of space must be postulated. Thus motion in Jaina doctrine is intimately associated with space and two other Categories with peculiar nomenclature, of *dharma* and *adhama*. We shall examine the Jaina account of these three Categories.

Reality of space is also a crucial doctrine to determine whether metaphysics is indea-

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<sup>4</sup> This term also occurs in Buddhistic philosophy but with a different meaning

listic or realistic. Curiously the non-Jaina Indian systems of thought do not pay any prominent attention to the problem of space. In fact the more influential Indian system of Philosophy, the Vedānta uses the term *ākāśa* indifferently to denote space and ether. It is the latter meaning that is more prominent. It is to the credit of the ancient Jaina thinkers that they took a bold attempt to attack the problem and that with very great success. This fact is perhaps due to their special interest in Mathematics. An adequate solution of the problem of space and time is intimately connected with Mathematical Philosophy. It is modern Mathematics that has successfully reclaimed once again space and time from the destructive dialectic of the idealistic metaphysics. Space is indispensable to Science and Realistic metaphysics. The wonders of modern science are all associated with the reality of Space and what is contained therein. Hence to "the Indian Realism" space cannot but be real. *Ākāśa* is infinite extension. It accommodates all other real existences. On account of this accommodating function it has a portion which is filled with the other real objects. This portion is called *lokākāśa* the world-space because it is co-extensive with the world or *Loka*. Beyond that there is the infinite empty space which is *śuddha ananta ākāśa*.

The interesting fact about this conception of space is the doctrine that space also is constituted by simple elements known as *ākāśāṇu* or spacial point. This *ākāśāṇu* is to space what *pudgala-paramāṇu* is to matter. And each *ākāśāṇu* is related to each *pudgalaṇu*. To borrow a convenient modern expression the class of space points and the class of material points are "similar having one to one relation."

The Jaina thinkers elaborately describe the nature of space carefully distinguishing it from matter. It is devoid of the several physical qualities and as such it is mere extension. It should not be confounded with extended objects.

Matter and space do not exhaust the Physical conception. The Jaina thinker pertinently asks the question why the atoms should be kept together constituting the world of *mahā skandha*? Why should they not get dissipated throughout *anantākāśa* or infinite space? Then there would be no world. The very fact that the structure of the world is permanent, that the world is a cosmos and not a chaos implies the existence of another principle which guarantees the permanency of the world's structure and the world form. This principle has the function of binding the flying atoms to the world's centre. Its function then is distinctly inhibitive to arrest the flying atom. This Physical principle is called *adharma* or rest. But if *adharma* alone were to function in the Universe, there would be absolute rest and universal cosmic paralysis, hence the necessity of a counteracting force *dharma*. The function of this is to guarantee free movement for the objects that move of their own accord or otherwise. This principle of *dharma* or motion then is merely to relieve the universal inhibition that would otherwise result.

These two principle, *dharma* and *adharma*, of motion and rest are described in terms that are applicable to the modern conception of *ether*. Both *dharma* and *adharma* pervade through space up to the world limit. They are absolutely non-Physical in nature.

and non-atomic and non-discrete in structure. The qualities of *pudgala* are not found therein. Nor have they the structure of space which is constituted by space points. These two Physical principle are perfectly simple. Therefore they may be spoken of as one or as many. There are spacial, and yet are non-spacial. They are *amūrta* and *arūpa*. They are neither light nor heavy. They are not objects of sense perception. Their existence is inferred only through their function. Such are the characteristics of these two principles which are distinctly peculiar to Jaina Physics.

The movement of physical objects and of organic beings is due entirely to other causal agency. Organic beings are capable of spontaneous movement and physical objects move because of impact received from other physical moving objects. Movement of these things should not be causally traced to the agency of *dharma*. Similarly when the moving objects come to rest, rest should not be interpreted as the result of the agency of *adharma*. *dharma* and *adharma* are devoid of any kind of direct causal potency. Their function is purely external and indirect. Their neutrality is so much emphasised by the Jaina thinkers that there could be no mistake about their meaning. These are in short the necessary physical postulates without posting which the structure and form of physical Universe will be quite unintelligible.

#### JAINA METAPHYSICS

There are two important concepts in Jaina Metaphysics which are preplexing to students of Jainism, the *astikāyas* and the *dravya*. The term *astikāya* is a compound name made up of *asti* and *kāya* which respectively mean existing and extensive magnitude, *astikāya* therefore means a real that has extensive magnitude. The other term *dravya* means the real that is fluent or changing. We shall try to explain these two concept in detail.

The *astikāya* are five in number, *jīva* (soul), *pudgala* (matter), *dharma* (principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest) and *ākāśa* (space). These five build up the Cosmos. Space and matter are distinctly extended reals. *dharma* and *adharma* are indirectly related to space. Their operation is in space and is limited by *lokākāśa*. Thus they may also be considered as related to space. Lastly, Life is generally associated with body, the organic body constituted by *pudgala* or matter. *Jīva* is operative in and conditioned by such a physical medium. In a way therefore *Jīva* also is related to space. These five existences which have spatiality either directly or indirectly are the five *astikāyas*. These are the constituent elements of the universe or the world.

#### KĀLA

*Kāla* or time though not an element of the physical universe may be mentioned here. Since change and motion are admitted to be real, time also must be considered real. The real or absolute time as contrasted with the relative time is constituted by simple elements known as *kālānus* or instants. Instants, points and atoms are the characteristic

conceptions of Jaina thought and in this respect it has a wonderful corroboration from the field of modern mathematics

The Jaina thinkers in distinguishing time from the five *astikāyas* made use of an important idea *astikāya* is spatiality or extensive magnitude. This extensive magnitude is denoted by a technical name, *tiyak-pracaya* or horizontal extension.

When the simple elements, say, the points are so arranged in a series where each term is an item also in another series we must have the two dimensional series which will correspond to surface or extension. Wherever there is such a *tiyak-pracaya* we have *astikāya*. But time or *kāla* has only *ūdhya-pracaya*. The elements are in a forward direction. The series is *mono-dimensional* or linear order. Therefore *kāla* has no extension either directly or indirectly. Hence it is not an *astikāya*. Though it is not an *astikāya* it is distinctly a real entity which accounts for changes in other things.

Such are the characteristics of real time. This should not be confounded with *vyavahāra kāla* or relative time which is measured by some conventional units of either long or short duration. These conventional distinctions would have no meaning if they are not co-ordinated in a single real time series

#### THE SIX DRAVYAS

The term Dravya denotes any existence which has the important characteristic of persistence through change. Jaina conception of reality excludes both a permanent and unchanging real of the Parmenidian type and also the mere eternal flux of Heraclitus. An unchanging permanent and mere change without substratum are unreal, or impossible abstractions. Jaina system admits only the dynamic reality or *dravya*. Dravya then is that which has a permanent substantiality which manifests through change of appearing and disappearing. *Utpāda*—Origin, *vyaya*—decay and *dhrauvya*—permanency form the triple nature of the Real. To emphasise the underlying identity alone would end Vedāntic conception of this Real as Brahman. To emphasise the change alone would result in the *Ksanika-vāda* of the Buddhist, the reality as a stream of discrete and momentary elements. The Concept of *dravya* reconciles both these aspects and combines them into an organic unity. It is an identity expressing through difference, a permanency continuing through change. It corresponds to the modern conception of organic development rather in its Hegelian aspect. It has duration, it is movement, it is the *Élan Vital*. The five *astikāyas* and *kāla* or time are the six *dravyas* or the real existences.

#### DRAVYA, GUNA AND PARYĀYA

OR

#### SUBSTANCE, QUALITIES AND MODES

Having introduced the Jaina conception of the real let us examine the distinctions in the realm of the reals. The dynamic substance or *dravya* is always associated with certain intrinsic and inalienable qualities called *gūnas*. Thus the yellow colour, malleability, etc.,

will be the qualities or *guna* of the *dravya* gold. The Dravyas with its inalienable qualities must exist in some state or form. This is its mode of existence or *pariyāya*. This mode or *pariyāya* is subject to change. It may be destroyed and a new mode may appear. But this creation and destruction are relevant only to *pariyāyas* or, modes and not to Dravyas, the constitutive substance. That can neither be destroyed nor created. That is eternal.

The approximate parallel conceptions in the western thought will be Spinoza's substance, qualities and modes. Of course, for Spinoza, there was only one substance whereas here we have six distinct substances or Dravyas. The term 'attribute' is used in a technical sense by Spinoza whereas it means merely the qualities in Jaina Metaphysics. Each Dravya or the real has its own appropriate attributes. Matter has the sense qualities of touch, taste, etc; soul has *cetanā* consciousness, and so with the other Dravyas. What is the relation between *dravya* and *guna*? The reals and their qualities? This is an important problem even in modern metaphysics. There have been two distinct answers proposed by philosophers. One answer always emphasises the permanent basis as the real and the other the changing qualities. The former condemns change as mere appearance or *māyā*, whereas the latter condemns the permanent substance as a mere figment of imagination. The former school generally ends in agnosticism and maintains that the real is unknown and unknowable. The latter generally ends in scepticism and sweeps away in a flood of doubt the fundamental concepts of life and world, of morality and religion. In India we have Advaita Vedānta as an example of the former and Buddhism, of the latter. In the West, the philosophers like Locke and Kant may be mentioned as representatives of the former school and Hume may be taken as a type of the latter.

The problem is once again taken by Bradley who after an acute analysis condemns it to be insoluble. Hence according to his own dialectic the thing with its qualities is self-contradictory and therefore an appearance. This is a conclusion which goes clean against science and common sense. Thing-hood is not after all a self-contradictory notion. For the Jainas it is a fundamental concept. The thing or Dravya as it is a dynamic entity is always flowing. It has no existence apart from its qualities which in their turn are not really distinct from the Dravya. The thing-in-itself apart from all the qualities is merely an empty abstraction. The qualities themselves are not merely momentary fleeting sensations. The thing exists in and through its qualities and the qualities related and organised constitute the thing. The difference between the two is only a difference of reference and not difference of existence, in the technical language of Jaina metaphysics, the *anyatva* between *dravya* and *guna* is only *vyapadeśa-mātra*. They do not have *pradeśa prthaktva*. Hence they are one in reality though having distinct nomenclature and reference.

*Pariyāya* is another technical term demanding careful understanding. *Pariyāya* means mode of existence. This again is viewed from two different aspects, *artha-pariyāya* and *vijñāna-pariyāya*. We have already mentioned that *dravya* is but an entity that is conti-

nually changing. This triple nature of reality that is permanency through births and deaths, through creation and destruction gives to *dravya* a characteristic mode of existence every moment. This continuous flow of the real is parallel to the continuous flow of the duration of time. This intrinsic change of *dravya* is known as *artha-paryāya*. All the six *dravyas* have this *artha-paryāya*. What is *vyāñjana-paryāya*? It is not merely the cross-section in the continuous flow of *dravya*. *Vyāñjana-paryāya* has a pretty fixed duration of existence. Besides the molecular aggregation and disintegration that take place every moment in a physical object, the object may have a particular mode of existence as a pot, for example for a certain duration of time. This *paryāya* of pot is *vyāñjana-paryāya* of *pudgala*. Similarly for Jiva. The continuous change that takes place in consciousness is Jiva's *artha-paryāya*. Its existence as a particular organism as a man or a *deva* with determinate age is the *vyāñjana-paryāya* of Jivas. Thus Jiva and Pudgala have both the kinds of *paryāyas* whereas the other four *dravyas*, have got only *artha-paryāya* alone. The reals are thus exhausted by the six *dravyas* with their respective *gūnas* and *paryāyas*.

Since these Dravyas are reals they have *sattā* or *astitva* or existence as their common characteristic. From this point of view of *sattā*, all the Dravyas may be brought under one class. Though from the class-point of view all the *dravyas* are one, still the *sattā*, their common characteristic, should not be abstracted and postulated as the unitary substance of which the other Dravyas may be taken as *pari yāyas*. The *ekānta* view is condemned as unwarranted and erroneous. The six Dravyas, in spite of their common characteristic of *sattā*, are fundamental and irreducible one to another.

One more point and we may leave this topic. A thing in concrete world is therefore a *paryāya* of anyone of the *dravyas*. It is also otherwise called *artha*. An *artha* or a thing is a corporate unity of an infinite number of qualities, just as the Cosmos is a system of infinite number of *arthas*. The one is extensive and the other is intensive; but both are infinite wholes. According to Jaina Philosophy therefore, we require an infinite thought to apprehend them completely. He who cannot know a thing completely cannot know the world completely and conversely he who cannot know the world completely cannot know even a single thing really and completely. This particular attitude of the Jaina thinkers reminds us of Tennyson's lines in, "*A flower in the crannied wall*" "If I could know the root and all I could know what God and man is."

Having spoken of the Dravyas in general, let us try to explain Jiva-dravya a little more in detail.

#### JAINA BIOLOGY

Perhaps it is inaccurate to speak of biology in the system before us. The science of biology as such is peculiar to modern age, hence we are not quite justified in expecting such a scientific conception in a work of pre-Christian era and which is perhaps of the same age as of Plato and Aristotle. Naturally therefore, the ideas about the organic world are curiously intermixed with various mythic and fantastic conception relating to being of



Hell and Svarga. Eliminating all these as irrelevant we still have considerable material to enable us to have an insight into the ancient ideas about life and living beings.

One important conception that would strike the reader in the very beginning is the organic unity of the plant and the animal world. Vegetable kingdom is distinctly organic. Its nature was accurately observed and carefully described. The whole plant world is included in the class of organisms having one sense, i.e. the sense of contact. Then the world of animals and insects is classified according to the same principle of sense organs. The animal world beginning with such insects as earthworm and ending with man is brought under four main groups, organisms, with two, three, four, and five senses.

### PRĀNAS

Associated with organisms there is the Conception of *prānas* or the essential characteristics of living beings. These are mainly four, *bala-prāna*, *indriya-prāna*, *āyuh-prāna*, and *ucchvāsa-nihvāsa prāna*. Every organism implies certain capacity of spontaneous activity. This capacity for action is *Balaprāna* or life potency. Every organism must possess some kind of sense awareness. This implies the possession of a sense organ and the capacity to apprehend the environment through that sense. The number of sense organs is different according to stages of organic development. Next is *Āyuh-prāna* or duration of life. Every living organism has a limited duration of life. This organic capacity to persist through a certain duration is *āyuh-prāna*. And lastly respiration. There is no organism without this *Prāna* of *Ucchvāsa-nihvāsa*. These four main *Prānas* are the essential attributes of organic beings.

### DIFFERENT KINDS OF BIRTHS

One other interesting point is the enumeration of the different means of birth of organisms. Young ones may be produced from *garbha*. These are *garbhajas*, young ones produced from the womb. Then the *andajas*, the young one produced from eggs. Thirdly *sammūrchana* or spontaneous generation. This refers to minute organisms. And lastly, they speak of *upapādikas* in the case of *Devas* and *Narakas*. The last one of course we may treat as beyond scientific pale. The recognition of spontaneous generation is a point deserving special emphasis.

### MICROSCOPIC BEINGS

Another fact deserving notice is the early recognition of the existence of microscopic organisms. These are called *sūkṣma ekendriya jīvas* or microscopic organisms having only one sense. These are said to fill the earth, air, water and fire. The possibility of microscopic organisms in fire seems a little too fantastic.\* But in the case of the other

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\*For the verification of this, one must look to the result of further scientific investigation

three we need have no hesitation as they are fully established by modern Science.

In this connection it is necessary to point out that H. JACOBI's conjecture that Jainism is very ancient though historically true rests on an unwarranted assumption as to this *jīvanikāyas*. He interprets (vide his translation of *Tattvārthādhigama*) these *jīnas* in earth, air, water and fire in such a way as to suggest that Jainism is or was once at least, a mind of Indian fetishism which believed in the souls of earth, air, etc. Then what is the purpose of calling these *sūkṣma ekendriya jīvas*? What is the meaning of this distinction between *jīva* and *ajīva*, *cetana* and *acetana*?

The different organisms mentioned above are *jīvas* or souls in association with matter or *pudgala*. If you look at the system of metaphysics as a whole, you have the picture of an infinite number of *jīvas* caught in the vortex of matter souls surrounded by a soulless environment. This picture is extremely analogous to the cosmic picture of the Sāṅkhyas. An infinite number of Purusas submerged in an ocean of Prakṛti and drifting along the current of Prakṛtic evolution. But here instead of one homogeneous Prakṛti constituting the environment of the Purusas we have the five *ajīva-dravyas* forming the appropriate stage for the enactment of the spiritual drama of souls. The primary characters are *Jīva* and *Pudgala*. The others make the things go. The whole cosmic evolution is due to the interaction between soul and matter. According to Jaina thought this entanglement of *Jīva* in the vortex of matter is *Samsāra*. How could *acetana pudgala* bring about such a calamitous result. *Pudgala* or matter in a very subtle and fine form fills the cosmic space. This form of *pudgala* is spoken of as *karma-prāyogya-pudgala*—matter fit to manifest as Karma. In this cosmic space are also the *Jīvas*. *Jīvas* by their impurity of heart led to formation of subtle material cocoon of Karmic bodies which retard and obstruct the intrinsic spiritual radiance of the soul. When once this subtle deposit of matter is begun, the grosser encrustation of matter and the formation of organic bodies is inevitable according to psycho-physical laws. Here we have to notice one important point. Even such a great oriental scholar like Hermann G. JACOBI makes the ambiguous and misleading statement that Karma according to Jains is purely material and he further suggests that since they speak of a combination between *Jīva* and Karma, Jainas assume that soul is of some subtle matter thus making the combination between the two possible. This is extremely misleading and far from the truth. There is neither combination nor direct causal relation between soul and matter. Jainas speak of *bhāva-karmas* as distinct from *dravya-karmas*. The former psychological karma is immediate to *jīva*. The latter material is mainly concerned with the building up of the bodies. No doubt the two are associated together, yet the two are distinct and separate. *Jīva* is *cetana* and *śarīra* is *acetana*.

This conjoint existence or *samsāra* is *anādi*, without beginning. Through its congenital impurity of the heart soul is thrown into impure environments from time immemorial, though there can be end to the state of existence. This end consists in securing spiritual

freedom and perfection through obtaining the purity of the heart which in its turn leads to the destruction of the material encasement. Thus the life of the soul in *samsāra* is an infinite series without beginning but with an end which is *mokṣa*.

#### JAINA PSYCHOLOGY

Jīva is the central conception of Jaina system. Its nature is *cetanā* or consciousness. *Jīva* and *cetanā*, life and consciousness, are co-extensive. Wherever there is life there is consciousness. Even in the lowest class of organisms we have to posit existence of consciousness. But this does not imply that in every living organism there is explicit consciousness. In very many cases consciousness may be latent and implicit. In the lower organisms it is mainly implicit and latent, in man generally explicit and in certain exceptional cases of men having higher spiritual development consciousness may be supernormal.

Jīva with its characteristic of *cetanā* is entirely distinct from *puṅgava* or matter. It cannot be apprehended by sense-perception; hence it is *amūrta*. The qualities which are generally associated with matter such as colour, taste, etc., have no relevancy in the case of *cetanā*.

Jaina Psychology is thus based upon the metaphysical assumption of Jīva which is of the nature of *cetanā*. It is not a "Psychology without a soul." The general nature of *cetanā* or consciousness manifests in two ways, *darśana* and *jñāna*, Perception and Understanding. These two modes of consciousness are mainly cognitive or thought elements. Consciousness includes also emotion and will. The effective and conative elements are also recognised by Jaina system. Affective states or emotions are the general characteristics of *samsāri jīva* or living beings in our ordinary sense. Conduct or behaviour is also assumed to be the natural manifestation of life, *cārita* or conduct is also associated with all *Saṃsāri Jīvas*. Thus from the point of view of modern Psychology consciousness has a threefold function and this is also assumed in Jaina system.

This tripartite division of consciousness is expressed in another way also. In describing the characteristics of Jīva its *cetanā* character is said to manifest not only in *jñāna*, *darśana*, understanding and perception but also in *Karma-cetanā* and *Karmaphala-cetanā*, awareness of action and awareness of pleasure-pain. The recognition of the threefold aspect of consciousness may be illustrated even from the conception of a perfect being. The characteristics of a perfect being are *ananta-jñāna*, *anantadarśana*, *anantavīrya*, and *anantaikaṣa*—Infinite knowledge, Infinite perception, Infinite power and Infinite Bliss. The other characteristics are irrelevant to our purpose. The first two of the enumerated qualities Infinite knowledge and Infinite perception are distinctly cognitive. Infinite power implies activity or conation and infinite bliss the hedonic experience. Thus throughout the Jaina account of life the three aspects of consciousness are assumed.

## SOUL AND BODY

Every organism or a *samsāri jīva* is an organic unity of two distinct entities, Jiva and Pudgala, soul and body. Naturally therefore there crops up the problem of the relation between the two. Soul is *cetanā* (consciousness), *amūrta* (non-corporeal), *arūpa* (non-sentient) whereas body has the opposite qualities in each case. One may be said to be the contradiction of other. The Dualism is so emphatically expressed here as in Cartesianism.

The term body implies two different things. The gross body that we actually perceive through our senses. This is constituted and nourished by matter taken in the form of food, etc. This body is every moment changing and will be given up by the soul after a certain period. Besides this gross body there is for every Jiva a subtle body known as *kārmāṇa śarīra*. This body is constituted by subtle material molecules known as *karma-pudgala*. This subtle body may also be changing. But still it is a necessary and inalienable appendage of *samsāri jīva*. This is transcended only in the perfect state. In discussing the relation between the states of this *karma śarīra* and the states of Jiva, Jainism makes an important distinction between *upādāna kartā* and *nimitta kartā*, substantial cause and external cause. Mental states are the modifications of the mind and Physical states are the modifications of matter. Mind is the Upādāna Kartā of psychical states and matter is the Upādāna Kartā of physical changes and yet physical states and psychical states may be mutually external conditions. The causal activity contemplated here is a bit obscure. One Psychical State is due to the immediately antecedent psychical state and similarly one physical state is the result of its own antecedent. Thus mental series in a way is independent of physical series. But still mental change may be externally determined by a physical change and the physical conversely by the mental change. The relation between the physical and the mental is purely external. In the technical language of the system one is the Nimitta Kartā of the other. So far as we are able to make out, the meaning seems to be thus a mental change is due to two conditions, one an Upādāna Kartā a mental antecedent and another Nimitta Kartā a physical antecedent. The mental change is the result of both these antecedent conditions physical and mental. Similarly a change in the body is to be traced to two conditions, an Upādāna condition a physical antecedent in this case and a Nimitta condition a mental antecedent. The system emphasises the causal interrelation between mind and matter even though the interrelation is one of external condition. The reason given for accepting this interrelation is the reality of moral responsibility. If there is no causal interrelation between mind and matter why should a person be taken responsible for his conduct. If moral responsibility is real, if moral evaluation of conduct is genuine then conduct must be the intimate expression of the personality.

Though the discussion is between Jiva and its Kārmāṇa Śarīra the discussion and its conclusion may very well be taken as relevant to our problem of the relation between

soul and body. The whole discussion may be taken as expressing the views in regard to the wider problem. Soul and body are capable of causal interrelation and a change in one always involves two antecedents, one physical and the other psychical. If causal interrelation is not admitted certainly ethical value will remain unexplained and unintelligible.

### SENSATIONS AND SENSE ORGANS

The sense organs recognised in the system are the usual five. But sometimes *manas* or mind is also spoken of as an *indriya*. Indriyas in general are of two kinds, *dravya indriya* or the physical sense organ and *bhāva indriya* the psychical counterpart. Sensory awareness is the result of the contact between *Dravya Indriya* and the physical object sensed. It is assumed of course that only physical objects or *Pudgala* that can be apprehended by sensation. This contact may be direct or indirect. In the case of sight the contact is indirect. The object perceived by vision is not brought in contact with the eyes. The objects in space are revealed to us by light or  *jyoti*. It is through being illuminated they are apprehended by vision. The exact operation of light on the eyes is not further explained. In the case of the other senses we have direct contact. But the direct contact may be *sthūla* or *sūkṣma*, gross or subtle. In the case of contact and taste we have the direct contact with the gross object. But in the case of smell we have contact with minute particles of the object smelt. In the case of sound also we have *sūkṣma* contact. But in this case what the ears come in contact with is merely a kind of motion. Unlike the other Indian system of thought which associate sound with *ākāśa*, Jaina system explains the sound as due to the violent contact of one physical object with the other. It is said to be generated by one *skandha* knocking against another *skandha*. Sound is the agitation set up by this knock. It is on account of this theory of sound the system speaks of an atom or *paramānu* as unsounding by itself. Thus in all these cases the environmental stimulus is either directly or indirectly a physical object. Sense perception is the result of the contact between two physical things, *Dravyendriya* on the one hand and the stimulus from the object on the other hand.

### ANALYSIS OF SENSATIONS

The next interesting point is the analysis of the different sensations obtained through different sense organs. Through the eyes we have the apprehension of five colours. Visual sensations consist of the five elements or *pañca varṇa*. But we have to note here that sensation of white is also included as one of the colours. In this respect the term *varṇa* or colour is used in its popular sense and not in the scientific sense. Similarly taste is of five kinds, pungent, bitter, sweet, sour and saline. These five tastes are obtained through the tongue which is *rasanendriya*. Skin is *spṛśanendriya* and through it the following eight kinds of cutaneous sensations are obtained : light and heavy, soft and

hard, rough and smooth, and cold and hot sensations, four pairs of opposite senses. These cutaneous sensations include sensations of temperature, contact, pressure and muscular or kinaesthetic sensations. Sensation of smell is only of two kinds, *sugandha* and *duḡandha*. Sound sensations are of infinite variety. The different kinds of sounds natural and artificial, purposive and non-purposive, articulate and inarticulate, musical and non-musical are spoken of

### SENSE PERCEPTION

What we directly apprehend through a sense organ is not merely particular sensation but the object. Sense perception is known as *darśana*. *Darśana* is the preception of a physical object. *Darśana* may be *caksu darśana* and *acaksu darśana*. *Caksu Darśana* means perception of an object through visual sensation. *Acaksu Darśana* means perception through the other senses. *Darśana* or sense perception not only implies the passive receptivity of the mind but also the active interpretation of the received stimulus, i.e. *darśana* means the complication between the datum and mental construction. This is implied in the description given of "knowledge by acquaintance" or *matī*, *avagāha*, *ihā*, *avāya* are different stages of sense perception. *avagāha* refers to roughly the datum. But the datum does not mean anything. It is merely the ununderstood patch of colour, e.g., in the case of visual sensations. At the presentation of this visual patch there is the questioning attitude of mind which is represented by the term *ihā*. As a result of this examination we may interpret the object. This interpretation is *avāya*. In the case of visual perception these three different stages may not be clearly distinguishable. But in the case of auditory perception we may clearly recognise the different stages. *Darśana* then includes all these three stages, then only is the thing known to us.

[These three stages together with *Darśana* [*Dhāraṇā* ?] or recollection constitute the different forms of *Matī Jñāna*. But recollection is connected with memory and need not be brought under sense perception.]

In this connection we have to notice one important point. The term *darśana* is not confined to sense perception. It is a general term including the sense perception as well as the supernormal perception of other kinds. Two kinds of supernormal perception are generally mentioned by Jaina thinkers, (1) *avadhi darśana* (2) *kevala darśana*. *Avadhi Darśana* refers to the peculiar kind of clairvoyant capacity which is able to perceive things and events in distant places and also in distant times either past or future. Objects and events not evident to the normal sense perception are obvious to *Avadhi Darśana*. But the objects of *Avadhi* perception appear as if they are perceived normally close at hand. If it is said that *Avadhi Darśana* is concerned with only *rūpi dravyas* or perceptual objects. The other *Darśana* known as *Kevala Darśana* is perception *par excellence*. It is associated with perfect consciousness. This faculty is acquired only

after complete emancipation from *kārmic* bondage. To this perfect perception the whole reality is obvious. In short it refers to the all-perceiving faculty of Paramātman. What we are justified in speaking of in connection with Jaina psychology are the normal sense perception (*caksu darśana* and *acaksu darśana*) and the supernormal clairvoyant perception (or *avadhi darśana*)

### JÑĀNA OR KNOWLEDGE

Jaina account of cognition is also interesting. Jñāna or understanding is said to be of different kinds according to means employed in cognition. (1) *mati jñāna*, is knowledge obtained through the normal means of sense perception and memory based upon the same. This is the common inheritance of all persons. (2) *śruta jñāna* is knowledge obtained through testimony of books. This corresponds to knowledge by description. It is acquired by study. Therefore it is possessed by only the learned men. Besides these two means of knowledge there are three other supernormal means of understanding. These are *avadhi-jñāna*, *manahparyaya-jñāna*, and *kevala-jñāna*. *Avadhi Jñāna* is the understanding of the nature of the objects obvious to *Avadhi Darśana*. *Manahparyāya Jñāna* refers to a peculiar kind of telepathic knowledge acquired by persons of certain stage of spiritual development. It is a means by which knowledge of alien minds is obtained. The last one of course refers to the perfect understanding or the omniscience of the Perfect Being or *Puruṣottama*. Treating this as the metaphysical ideal we have to recognise the other four kinds of cognition as relevant to our psychological interest.

### AFFECTION

Affective consciousness plays a very important part in Jaina metaphysics. The whole religious discipline is directly secured by a stoic freedom from the affective influence of environmental objects. Experience of pleasure, pain, is assumed to be the specific characteristic of organised beings or *Saṃsāri Jivas*. In one of the descriptions given of Jiva it is mentioned that Jiva has the tendency to continue beneficial activity from which pleasure results and to discontinue the harmful activity from which pain results. This is so very analogous to biological description of the instinct of self-preservation. Jiva equipped with this quality naturally desires pleasant things and avoids unpleasant things.

Since the psychological analysis is subordinate to the metaphysical system several facts of psychological interest are thrown into the background of the philosophical scheme. Nevertheless there is no mistake about the striking psychological analysis exhibited by Jaina thinkers. Experience of pleasure and pain, is generally referred to as *karmaphala-cetanā* or consciousness of the fruits of action. Pleasure and pain are always viewed in relation to action.

*Bhāva* or affective consciousness is of three kinds, *śubha-bhāva*, *aśubha-bhāva*, and

*śuddha-bhāva*. Feeling of pleasant nature, feeling of an unpleasant nature, and feeling of pure nature. The last one refers to the enjoyment of Self by Self. As such it may be taken to mean the spiritual experience of the pure Self. The other two kinds of the feeling are relevant to the point. These are corresponding to the normal feelings generally recognised by students of psychology. These feelings are generally related to certain objects in the environment to which there may be attraction or aversion in the Jīva. Thus on the one hand feelings manifest as the result of Karma or action and on the other hands they are determined by objects in the environment.

A very interesting classification of emotions is given in connection with the conditions of Karmic bondage. These emotions are generally divided into two main-classes *sakasāya* and *akasāya*, those that have the tendency to colour or stain the purity of the soul and those that have not that tendency. The *sakasāya* ones are *krodha* or anger, *māna* or pride, *māyā* or deceitfulness or dissembling and *lobha* or greed. The *akasāya* emotions are

*hāsyā*—laughter, *īatī*—feeling of attraction; *arīatī*—feeling of repulsion; *śoka*—sorrow; *bhaya*—fear, *jugupsā*—feeling of disgust which may manifest in hiding ones own weaknesses, *strīveda*—peculiar sex feeling of women; *pumveda*—peculiar sex feeling of men, and *napuṃśaka-veda*—the corrupt sex feeling of eunuchs

Again certain instinctive tendencies are also referred to as *samyñās*. These are *āhāra*, *bhaya*, *mathuna*, and *parigraha*—hunger, fear, sexual appetite and acquisitive instincts. There are corresponding feelings to the instinctive appetities which may colour the consciousness of a Jīva.

The feeling aspect of sensations is implied in the very classification of the sense elements. The feeling aspect is predominant in the case of smell and taste whereas it is indirectly associated with auditory and visual sensations. The rest of the references to feeling of pleasure pain are purely metaphysical and therefore they are more of religious interest than of scientific interest.

#### CONATION OR THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF ACTION

*Ātman* is not only *Jñāni* and *bhoktā*, the knower and the enjoyer, but is also a *kartā* or the agent. This may be considered as the central idea of Jaina system. Soul by its own activity is able to make or mar its own destiny. The Theory of Karma is intimately associated with the causal agency of *Ātman*. As the result of this metaphysical assumption we have several facts of psychological importance mentioned in the System. Even in the lowest organism there is the tendency to continue pleasurable activity and to discontinue painful activity. This primitive tendency of life or Jīva is just the conative activity which develops into conscious choice of an end or purpose which is the characteristic of volitional activity. In human beings this conative tendency is naturally associated with *rāga* and *dvesa*, desire and aversion.



Conative activity in general is denoted by the term *karmacetanā*. This Karma-cetanā or consciousness of activity is to be associated with the Zoological Kingdom—*trasa jīvas*. The plant world or the world of *ekendriya sthāvāra jīvas* is devoid of this Karma-cetanā. They have Karma-phala-cetanā alone whereas the other Jīvas have both and also Jñāna Cetanā to boot. The importance of volitional activity is clearly testified by the part it plays in the Jaina System of ethics. The psychology of will is also connected with another doctrine of psychological importance. Mohaniya Karma which is considered to be the root of all evil has two aspects cognitive and conative. What is known as Draśana Mohaniya interferes with the faculty of perception and belief. Cāritra Mohaniya is a sort of corruption of the will; it misleads the will and thus leads the *Jīva* towards evil. We shall consider the relation between Karman and Ātman when we go to consider the ethical aspect of Jaina system. In the meanwhile let us see what Jaina logic is.

## JAINA LOGIC

Under this head we have to consider the following three points:—

1. *Pramāna*
2. *Naya*
3. *Saptabangī*

*Pramāna* and *Naya* refer to understanding, (*pramāna-nayair-adhigamahi*). Knowledge is through *pramāna* and *naya*. *Pramāna* refers to the apprehension of reality or valid knowledge. *Naya* refers to the different aspects of considering things. These are the two means of enriching knowledge. *Saptabangī* refers to the theory of predication which is peculiar to Jaina System.

*Pramāna* is of two kinds, *pratyakṣa-pramāna* and *parokṣa-pramāna*. Immediate Apprehension of reality and Mediate Apprehension of reality. Ordinarily the term *Pratyakṣa* refers to sense perception. This ordinary meaning of the word is considered secondary and subordinate by Jaina thinkers. They call it *vyāvahārika pratyakṣa*. The real *Pratyakṣa* is known as *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* or that which is apprehended by Ātman immediately and directly. According to this view sense perception is indirect and mediate, for the sensory object is apprehended by Ātman only through the medium of sense organs.

*Pramānas* in general are five: *matī, śruti, avadhi, manahparyāya*, and *kevala*. These five are already explained in connection with cognition. Of these *Matī* and *Śruti* are considered *parokṣa pramānas*. The other three are considered to be *pratyakṣa pramānas*. There is one interesting fact about these *Pramānas*. The standard of reality is distinctly experienced in its normal and super-normal aspects. The normal experience would be *Matī Jñāna*; the super-normal experience would include *Avadhi, Manahparyāya* and *Kevala*. These four would constitute direct knowledge by the Self, but our experience is also enriched by the testimony of others. Therefore the testimony of others transmitted through literature is also considered as one of the *Pramānas*. This is *Śruti Jñāna*. This is not given the supereminent place which it has in the other Hindu systems of thought. The *Vedas* form the ultimate *Pramāna* for the Brahmanical systems. Every other principle of knowledge is subordinated to the Vedic revelation which itself must be implicitly accepted. But the Jainas recognise *Śruti Jñāna* as only one of the *Pramānas* and even then it is only subordinate. Direct and Immediate Apprehension is the ultimate standard of truth.

The Pramānas are all distinctly human and they are not considered to be eternal. It is this humanistic element in the system that is specially interesting. Three of these five Pramānas have the possibility of being corrupted by adverse psychological conditions. Thus they will become misleading or corrupt Pramānas or *pramāṇābhāsas*. Thus Matī Jñāna may become *kumati*. This evidently refers to illusory and hallucinatory perceptions and erroneous inferences. Śruti may become *kuśruti*. This would be feeding ones intellect with fictitious philosophy and unreliable literature. False and misleading clairvoyance is the corrupt form of Avadhī which is technically called *vibhaṅga jñāna*; hence right *pramānas* would exclude these three corrupt forms of Kumati, Kuśruti, and Vibhaṅga. But in the case of the other two Pramānas there is no such possibility of falsification. Manahparyāya is the supernormal faculty acquired after great spiritual development, and Kevala is the ideal reached after complete emancipation. Hence in these two cases there is no chance of extraneous interference. The right forms of the former together with the latter two constitute the Pramānas.

From the short enumeration of the Pramānas given above it is clear that the Jaina doctrine of Pramānas is slightly different from that of the Hindu Systems in general. The Pramānas such as *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda*, etc. which are variously stated by the various systems of Hindu Philosophy are all comprehended by Matī Jñāna and Śruti Jñāna. Even in these two cases objective corroboration seems to be the most important criterion of the true Pramānas. In addition to these two normal sources of Knowledge they recognise the other three supernormal sources. Thus they recognised not merely the intellect but also the higher intuition which Bergson emphasises. Bergson is no doubt right in placing intuition over intellect. Intellect is the analytic process of understanding things. Hence it shares the artificial nature of the process of analysis. It is no doubt incapable of accounting for the vision of artist or the poet. The Daemon of Socrates and the Christ of St Paul are quite beyond the pale of intellectual analysis. The Reality like the Proteus of ancient myth slips out from the grip of intellect but is quite evident to the supernormal intuition. The existence of such a supernormal faculty in man we have an inkling of, through the lifting of the veil by recent psychic research. The normal personality is but a fraction of the total personality which is more of the subconscious nature. It is the sub-conscious self that seems to be the storehouse of spiritual power and wisdom. One who has learnt to tap the resources of this hidden self, becomes a genius in the field of art or morality. To him is given the open *seasame* to unlock the secrets of the universe. A philosophy of knowledge, therefore, must necessarily take cognisance of such a supernormal intuition.

But to recognise this is not to deprecate the intellect altogether. According to Bergson what is revealed by the intellect is quite untrustworthy. Such a summary condemnation of the intellect would be an unwarranted impeachment of modern Science. Intuition apotheosised at such a cost would be no more than a Philosophical fetish. A

more reasonable attitude would be to recognise both the intellect and intuition as adequate means of apprehending the nature of reality so long as they have corroboration by objective evidence. Rationalism which could not accomodate any supernormal faculty and mysticism which could not stand the glare of Reason, both are inadequate representation of the full nature of human personality whose powers are inexhaustible and whose depths are unfathomable. The Jaina doctrine of Pramānas is able to accomodate both from the lowest to the highest in the order of gradation

### JÑĀNA AND JÑEYA

#### KNOWLEDGE AND THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

The recognition of the distinction between the Pramānas and Pramāṇābhāsas implies an important philosophical principle—The existence of an objective reality which is beyond and beside knowledge. Knowledge is not the only form of reality. If that be the case Jaina philosophy would not be different from Advaita. Its whole philosophical claim as an independent system of thought rests on the admission of the independent existence of the objective universe besides consciousness. The world of objective reality is apprehended by perception or *daśana* and understood by intellect or *jñāna* which two are but the manifestations of *cetanā*, the intrinsic nature of the soul. Nowhere in the Jaina system is it even casually implied that the object of Knowledge is in any way modified or interfered with by the process of Knowing. In order that *daśana* may reveal the form and *jñāna* may discover the nature there must be an object postulated, an object which is logically prior to the intellectual process. This postulating of an independent object of Knowledge should not be interpreted to imply the passivity of the intellect. The continuous activity of the Jīva or soul is the central doctrine of Jaina thought. Hence the intellect is an active manifestation of consciousness but this activity has the power of revealing its own nature as well as *non-cetana* objects beyond. Thus the term Jñeya or the object of Knowledge includes both the self and the non-self, mental facts as well as physical facts. The example of a light is very often brought in to illustrate the nature of Knowledge. Just as light reveals itself as well as other objects which are illuminated so also Jñāna reveals the *tattvas* both Jīva and Ajīva. Hence it would be quite inconsistent to interpret the relation between *jñāna* and *jñeya*, Knowledge and its object, in any other way that would make both inseparable elements of any higher unity. No doubt as far as Jīva or soul is concerned the relation between Jñāna and Jñeya is very intimate. The soul is *jñānin*, the possessor of *jñāna* or knowledge. There can be no Jīva without *jñāna* for without it he would be *acetana* and indistinguishable from other *ajīva dravyas*, and there could be no knowledge without Jīva for being foundationless and off its moorings from life it will cease to have connection even with consciousness. Thus Jñāna and Jñānin, knowledge and self, are absolutely inseparable though distinguishable by name. But this very name Jñānin may also become *jñeya-padaītha*, the object of knowledge to his own *jñāna*. The, *Jñānin*, *Jñāna* and *Jñeya*, the self, knowledge,

and the self as object of knowledge all become different aspects of a single concrete unity

But Knowledge or Jñāna is also related to *ajīva padārthas* that is, physical objects can also be *jñeya padārthas*.—When physical objects are the objects of Knowledge the relation of Knowledge to its object is not the same as in the previous case that between Knowledge and self as object of Knowledge. Jñāna is distinctly alien to *ajīva padārthas* though these become as Jñeya related to Jñāna or Knowledge. The function of Jñāna or knowledge here is to reveal the *ajīva padārthas* in their true nature as *acetana* or physical. How could *cetana* reveal the nature of *acetana* things? This question is rejected as unreasonable for the simple reason that it is unanswerable for the question means why Jñāna should have its Jñāna nature. That Jñāna though alien to the nature of physical object—these latter being *acetana* can still be related to them and reveal their nature to Jñānin or the knowing self—is taken as the fundamental postulate of Jaiña Epistemology

Thus the close study of the philosophical foundation of Jaina Epistemology reveals the following two facts.

(1) The relation between knowledge and its objects, *jñāna* and *jñeya*, as far as *ajīva padārthas* are concerned is purely one of external relation.

(2) As a corollary of the first we have the independent existence of *jñeya padārtha* or objects of knowledge of course with the exception of self, which has an internal relation to Jñāna or Knowledge.

The distinction between internal relation and external relation requires explanation. The Russell-Bradley controversy as to the nature of relations is an interesting though an intricate topic of modern philosophy. But here we cannot deal with it in detail. It is enough to indicate what the terms mean. Bradley-Bosanquet school of modern idealism following the traditions of Hegel assume that all relations are grounded in the nature of the terms related. That is, the terms apart from the relations and the relation apart from the terms will not be the same. A and B having a relation R cannot be the same A and B if they cease to have that relation R. Change or cessation of a particular relation will lead to change or the nullification of the terms so related. A blind faith in this metaphysical doctrine has constrained the Hegelian Idealist to subscribe to many an absurd doctrine. The terms related to one another since their nature is tyrannically controlled by this relation are to be interpreted as members or elements of a higher organic unity. The members of a family therefore are the elements of the unity of family. Society itself is an organic unity like plant or an animal body having as its elements the different human personalities who constitute the society. Nay, even the whole universe is conceived as an organic unity or system having as its members both things and persons. The logical result of this doctrine is the complete subordination of human personality to this fetish of a higher unity beside which there is nothing real. Every

thing is degraded to the level of appearance and unreality. The political and moral consequences of such a metaphysical doctrine need not be portrayed in detail. It is enough to say that the catastrophe which destroyed the European civilisation is the necessary consequence of the culture and social organisation inspired by the philosophy of the Absolute.

But we have a healthy change introduced into modern thought by the invaluable contributions from B Russell. He the upholder of the opposite doctrine of external relations sufficiently exposed the inadequacy and the falsity of the rival doctrine. According to him two terms A and B may have a relation R and yet the nature of the terms may not be affected by the change of the relations. To exhibit the truth of the controversy we may cite the following illustration which is very useful to the reader though crude. You may have for example a chair by the side of a table. The two are in a certain spatial relations, say the chair is to the south of the table. If the relation is changed, (i.e.) if the chair is placed to the north of the table then according to the doctrine of internal relations both the terms the chair and the table must undergo change in their nature because of a change in the relations. This seems absurd to the unsophisticated observer. In this case he knows fully well that there is no change in the things themselves except the change of position. To persist in the belief that the things do change in consequence of the change of position is merely to surrender one's own reason to the false gods of philosophy. Russell holding the doctrine of external relations maintains that the things do not change their nature inspite of the change of position. This has an important and refreshing consequence. You may have a society of human beings without degrading the personalities to fractions of a unity or to appearance of a reality. And the one consequence that is relevant to us in this connection is that the relation of Knowledge to its object need not amount to the postulating of a higher unity of which these two are aspects. If that were the case this alleged higher unity must have as its members both persons and things *cetana* and *acetana dravyas*. The fundamental doctrine of Jainism like that of the Sāmkhya is the distinction and the alienability between Jīva and Ajīva.

This short digression into modern European thought we had for the following reason. The authors of an *Epitome of Jainism* in trying to expound the doctrine of Syādvāda attempt to make out that Jainism is a bold Idealistic interpretation of the universe as a set-off against the Realistic method. We are not going to quarrel about a name. Jainism may be characterised idealistic or realistic according to one's own tastes so long as the terms are clearly defined. But what we are concerned with is just the exposition of the doctrine of Syādvāda. Speaking of the ordinary way of thinking of *ajīvas*, the authors say

"They are continually betraying the phenomenal changes when brought into relation with other existences around them. How, then, can we think of them as individual things

in spite of the changes? The answer often unhesitatingly forwarded by philosophers is that we can combine diversity with unity in our conception of things by thinking them as individual entities each endowed with manifold qualities. They are substances according to philosophers, which possess various properties such as extension, solidity, weight, colour etc. Or they are substances or subjects to whom belong the capacities of sensation, feeling and perception etc. But a careful observation will show that such a device obviously fails to give us any real apprehension of existence—even though it may be the simplest individual existence, because in trying to give unity to a member of unconnected determinations by ascribing them to a common substance what we really do is to add to these determinations another determination, equally isolated and unconnected with the rest. Take away the other determinations, what will be left of your substance? It is impossible to explain the known by the unknown. So to apprehend the real unity of different qualities or to put in other words, to think them as one, what mind demands is, that we should think or have a rational notion of the relation of each to each and that we should discern how the existence of any one involves the existence of all the rest and how all are so connected with the particular quality would not exist except in and through the whole to which it belongs. To catch hold of such substance and not *substratum* as Locke had meant we must discern the principle from which this manifoldness of parts and properties necessarily arises and which has its very existence and being in them and linking together in thought differences which spring out of it. Such unity of substance is really a *unity in difference* which manifests itself and realises in these differences.

"In the realm of mind or in the spiritual life of conscious beings also, there are undoubtedly infinite multiplicity and diversity, but we must not overlook the fact that it is a multiplicity or diversity which is no longer of parts divided from each other but each of which exists and can be conceived of by itself in isolation or segregation from the rest or in purely external relations to them. Here on the contrary, the multiplicity or diversity is that of parts or elements each of which exists in and through the rest and has its individual being and significance only in its relation to the rest or each of which can be known only when it is seen in a sense to be the rest. We cannot, for example, take the combination of two external independent things in space and employ it as a representation of the relation of mind and its objects, for though thought be distinguishable from the object, it is not divisible from it. *The thinker and the object thought of are nothing apart from each other. They are twain and yet one. The object is only object for the subject, the subject for the object. They have no meaning or existence take individually and in their union they are not two separate things stuck together but two that have lost or dissolved their duality in a higher unity*" (*An Epitome of Jainism*, pages 106-109)

The subject and the object merging into a higher unity sounds more like idealistic rhetoric than philosophical logic. Here we have an echo of Bradley and Bosanquet. The

authors have drunk deep of Hegel but they have not discerned what is living and which is dead in Hegel. No doubt the Jaina Conception of Dravya is closely allied to the Hegelian dialectic but the Jaina metaphysics does not contemplate the Hegelian absolute. The Authors who do not spare the Indian Absolutist, Śāṅkara, for his misunderstanding of Syādvāda do not hesitate to make obeisance to his western counterpart. This inconsistency is quite glaring and the misrepresentation of Jaina doctrine is all the more surprising as it apparently proceeds from a Jaina writer. A more careful study of their own system and a little less of that hypnotic illusion by and the blind adoration to the German Idealism would have enabled our authors to see that the System they expound is a bold and masterly refutation of the philosophical Absolutism of ancient India.



## NAYAS

The next topic relating to Jaina Logic is about *nayas*. This is the second means of understanding things, the first being *pramānas*. All concrete things are extremely complex; they have innumerable qualities and relations. The Reals being such complex entities, they may be examined from different aspects. This apprehension of a thing from a particular point of view is known as *naya*—an opinion or an assertion from some one aspect. Every aspect of a thing in its own way reveals the nature of that thing. Hence *Naya* is a means of insight into the nature of Reality. Theoretically the possible *Nayas* are infinite in number since the Reals have infinite qualities and relations. But writers on Jaina Logic generally speak of seven (7) different *Nayas*. These are *Naigama*, *Samgraha*, *Vyavahāra*, *Rjusstūtra*, *Śabda*, *Samabhirūḍha* and *Evambhūta*. Let us try to explain these in order.

(1) **NAIGAMA NAYA.** This *Naya* seems to be somewhat obscure and is therefore differently interpreted by the Scholars. Pūjyapāda in his commentary on Sūtra 33 of Bk. 1 *Tattvārtha-Sūtra*, explains the *Naya* thus: *Naigama* is that which relates to the purpose or end of a course of activity. The illustrations given are—

(1) You see a person carrying water, firewood and other necessities for cooking meals and ask him “what are you doing?” “I am cooking meals” he replies. This answer refers to the purpose or end of a series of activity. The person is not actually in the act of cooking at the time of the answer.

(2) The Second illustration refers to a person who goes with an axe. When he is asked what he is about, he replies “I am to bring a wooden measure (*prastha*)” He is to cut a piece of bamboo perhaps and make a *prastha* out of it. Here again this measure is only the purpose or end to be realised.

(3) In each of the two examples *odana* and *prastha*: ‘food’ and ‘measure’, there is a central purpose which gives meaning to a course of conduct of some duration. The course of conduct is represented by different modes of activity at different stages. In spite of the difference, the whole series and also every individual item tend towards the ideal aimed at. So far therefore the general purpose or aim may be said to be present in all the different stages of the course of conduct. It is the general purpose that gives meaning to the different items of the series and connects them into a whole. This emphasis on the teleological element which is immanent in a course of purposive activity seems to be *Naigama Naya* point of view.

The same interpretation, with the same two illustrations of 'cooking' and making a 'measure' is adopted by Śrutasāgara, the authors of a *Vṛtti* on *Tattvārtha* called after him *Śrutasāgarīyam*. The same illustrations are again found in *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*, a treatise on Logic.

This Naigama Naya is further sub-divided into three according to the true relations of the teleological and interpreting idea. The two illustrations refer to some present course, hence they come under—

(1) Vartamāna Naigama. But there may be looking back to a past event. On the morning of Dipāvali day, you may say "To-day is the *parinirvāṇa-kāla* of Lord Mahāvira." But Lord Mahāvira does not attain Nirvāṇa on that day which you are actually speaking about. The event took place several centuries ago. Yet it was on a corresponding day of that year. Because of this correspondence an event true of the day centuries ago is also associated with all such corresponding days of the subsequent years. Thus we speak of the King's birth-day, the Darbar day every year. The assertion has meaning only because of a past event. This characteristic attribute of the present—the genuinely belonging to the past yet transferred to the present, because of an identical relation between the two ■ pertaining to.

(2) Bhūta Naigama, (Past Naigama). Instead of looking back to the past you may look forward to a remote future. Instead of detecting in the concrete present some element which was once associated with it, you may discover in it something which is *yet to be*. At the sight of a prince you may hail, "Here comes His Royal Highness," The Prince is but Lion of the Royal family. He is not yet King, but is going to be one. Similarly you may speak of every Bhavya Jīva a good soul as Siddha Jīva, a perfect soul. For somehow in the far off future Perfection will be the goal of all, for every one is God in the germ.

Such an assertion is true according to (3) *Bhāvi Naigama*—future Naigama.

The other way of interpreting this Naigama Naya is associated with Siddhasena who is quoted by Hermann JACOBI under his translation of the *Sūtra* 33 (referred to above) of Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha*. Śrī Devasūri who is quoted by Mallisena in his *Syāvāda-Mañjarī* also adopts this second view. But curiously, this is not so very prominent in Umāsvāti's own *Bhāṣya*, any how this method of interpreting the Naya starts with the examination of the relation between the universal and the particular, *Sāmānya* and *Viśeṣa*. For this *Nyāya* and *Variesika* systems are referred to as adopting this Naigama Naya in an *ekānta* manner, (i e), these two systems adopt this Naya so far as they go, but push it to an unwarranted length. Śāṅkara and Vedānta deny altogether *viśeṣas*—particulars. Buddhism denies *sāmānya*—universal outright. Against these two extremes the above systems recognise the importance of both. The universal by itself or the particular by self will not be able to account for a concrete thing. These will be empty abstractions. Again one cannot be derivative from and secondary to the other. The thing is an organic unity of

both Sāmānya and Viśesa, universal and particular. There can be no (*sāmānya*) universal apart from the particular and no particular (*viśesa*) apart from the universal and there can be no real thing apart from either. This seems to be the fundamental Jaina view of the Real.

The very same view is said to be adopted by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. Therefore both the Jainas and the others adopt the Naigama point of view. But wherein the Jainas differ from the others? It is there, no doubt. Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas adopt the Naigama view by maintaining that the concrete thing is the complex made up of the universal and the particular (*Sāmānyas* and *Viśeṣas*). No doubt they maintain that these two are different and therefore distinguishable. No doubt they believe each is in itself primary and not derivative. So far they agree with the Jainas. But, while the Jainas believe that the distinction between *Sāmānya*—universal and *Viśesa*—particular, is true only in a relative way, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas maintain that it is absolutely true. *Sāmānya* is quite different and distinct from *Viśeṣa*. It is because of this absolute difference between the two that in their hands the Naya becomes Naigamābhāsa. They are *kathāñcit bhinnah* and not *atyanta bhinnah*.

After explaining thus Naigama Naya, Śrī Devasūri enumerates three species of this Naigama distinction

1.—Differentiating two qualities one from the other, e.g., existence and thought are in soul *sat caitanyam ātmani*. Here Thought is differentiated from Existence.

2.—Differentiating two substances, e.g. Dravya is that which manifests through things and their modes : *vastu-paryāyah dravyam*.

3.—Differentiating a thing from its attribute., e.g. a sensual person has only a momentary pleasure. *ksaṇaikam sukhi viśayāsaktajīvah*.

Thus (1) existence is spoken to be separate from thought, (2) a thing from its mode and (3) a person as different from his pleasure. Contrast in all these cases is true only in a relative way. As we saw above the very same illustrations are reproduced by H. JACOBI in his translation

But when we attend to Malliṣeṇa we find evidently both the interpretations given in his *Syādvāda-Mañjarī*. He begins by explaining Naigama Naya in the same way as Devasūri or Siddhasena does. He refers the readers to an earlier portion of his book, where there is a discussion of the relation between *Sāmānya* and *Viśeṣa*. Hence he does not want to add anything further under this Naya and ends the passage by mentioning two well-known examples given in *pravacana*, the Divine word. What are the two examples? He just mentions two names; and they appear to be cryptic. But this need not be altogether helpless. His words are *pravacana-prasiddha-Nīlayana-Prastha-dṛṣṭāntadvaya*, etc., *Nīlayana* and *Prastha* are the words here. In *Pūjyapāda* we have *Odana* and *Prastha*. Instead of *food* and a *measure* we have a *house* and a *measure*. The rest is quite clear. The illustrations leave us in no doubt as to the meaning of the Naya.

House-building or making a measure refers to the purpose or the ideal. It relates to *samkalpa-mātra* as Pūjyapāda says.

The next question we have to face is "How does Mallisena manage to give one explanation and to bring in the illustrations pertaining to the other interpretation ? Here we must confess we are driven to conjecture. We do not know wherefrom he is quoting the examples. It may refer to an another from whom both Pūjyapāda and Mallisena draw their inspiration. What justification is there for Mallisena's attempt to bring the two views together ? The teleological element or purpose may be taken to be the common basis for both the views. In the case of house-building or measure-constructing the thing which is to be the Goal is indicated by the purpose of the individual. This purpose embodies the ideal nature of the thing which is the concrete realisation of the same. Similarly the distinction between the universal and particular is purely teleological. What is particular from one point of view may be universal from another. In fact the particular is drawn out of the universal. It is through the medium of the particular that the universal expresses its nature. If you remember this point then it is clear to us that the distinction entirely depends upon the purpose in view. It is this purposive nature that brings the two views together. What are apparently divergent have thus common foundation. Perhaps Mallisena had this in his mind when he interpreted the Naigama one way and illustrated it in the other way. This compromise is offered as a provisional suggestion.

(ii) SAMGRAHA NAYA : The next Naya is the class point of view. The nature of things as understood by the Jaina System is such that there is a similarity and identity among a number of individuals.

These individuals naturally fall into appropriate classes. When we consider them as individuals belonging to a class, our attention is directed to the underlying similarity to the exclusion of their individual and proper characteristics. From this underlying principle of classification we may consider the individuals as a whole and a Unity. Here again the unity is only relatively true. The unity here rests on the underlying similarity among the number of individuals brought under the same class. But there is a great danger in forgetting the elementary fact of this class point of view. The individuals forming the class though spoken of as a whole and unitary class are really distinct from one another and may be really differentiated by not only their intrinsic natures but also by intervals of Space and Times. To emphasise the unity at the cost of the plurality and difference would be a distinct metaphysical error. It is this erroneous application of Saṁgraha Naya that accounts for the system of Advaita Vedānta. Too much emphasis on the unity and the complete ignoring of the diversity is the characteristic of this system. A similar mistake is found in its western counterpart of Hegelian Idealism. Both agree in condemning the differences as appearances and Naya and in accepting the ultimate absolute as the one reality.

But Jaina thinkers noticed very early both the utility as well as the danger of this Saṃgraha Naya. This class point of view is quite useful and rational in its own way. It contributes to economy of thought by enabling us to deal with a number of things as one.

This is not merely justified by practical convenience but also by the philosophical principle of the common nature. The common nature by itself is but an abstraction. Hence to set it up as the reality and the only reality is doubly erroneous. So long as its relative nature is remembered the Naya has its own uses. But in the hands of the Sāṃkhyas and Mīmāṃsakas it becomes absolute and thus a Nayābhāsa.

This Saṃgraha Naya is of two kinds : *para-saṃgraha* or the ultimate class-view and *apara-saṃgraha* or the inferior class-view. Every existing thing partakes of the nature of Reality. Hence we may speak of all things as one in the Ultimate Reality or Existence. But the different classes of things, living and non-living, included in this ultimate Reality may themselves be spoken of as different classes. This is *apara-saṃgraha* or the inferior class view.

(iii) VYAVAHĀRA : Vyavahāra Naya means the popular and conventional point of view, which rests on sense-perception of the concrete present. This is the basis of the ancient materialistic systems of the Cārvākas and Bāṛhaspatyas. The whole Criterion of Reality is the Concrete present. The forgotten past and the far off future are unwarranted myths not justified by the only *pramāṇa* of sense-perception. Looking back into the past through memory and keeping into the future through ideal forecast are philosophical uncertainties. The same applies to the categories obtained by Intellectual analysis such as *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, Universal and Particular.

Sense-perception reveals to us a tree or a stone or a pot or a cloth. These are the real things supported by the Pramāṇas and sanctioned by Vyavahāra or convention. Whoever has perceived at any time either *Sāmānya* or *Viśeṣa* ? Why should philosophers trouble themselves about these metaphysical abstractions. The concrete reality of things is sufficient for our practical life and what is justified by this pragmatic criterion is so far theoretically true.

Here again the Jaina thinker recognises the partial truth of the principle. The tree in the compound, the stone on the path way, the pot with water and the cloth you wear are all real things. They are not appearances or illusions of *Māyā*. Their reality is corroborated by our concrete experience. To say this much is certainly acceptable and true. But to go beyond to condemn everything that is not included in the concrete present, to deny the past and the future, to reject the philosophical categories *in toto* and to surrender reason to sense-perception is the apotheosis of convention. Hence Jaina thought rightly rejects the unwarranted exaggeration of this Vyavahāra Naya though it recognises in it the soul of goodness, and an element of partial truth.

(iv) RJSŪTRA. This Rjsūtra is the extreme opposite of the Saṃgraha Naya. The latter denies all difference whereas Rjsūtra denies all continuity and identity.

Reality is concentrated to mathematical present, It is purely momentary. In this respect it is still narrower than the Vyavahāric present. At least for Vyavahāra view there is a tolerable duration, for, the present and the conventional things are real so far. But according to this Rjusūtra Naya a thing is what it is in the present mathematical moment. To speak of duration of a thing is rejected by this view as an unwarranted assumption. What we are absolutely sure of is just the present moment. The past moment is no more and the next moment is not yet. Hence a thing as being in the no more or in the not yet is sheer contradiction. If it is real at all it must be in the present moment. We at once recognise the identity between this Rjusūtra view and Buddhistic metaphysics. Its aim is as that of Buddhism to expose the pretensions of an unchanging metaphysical substratum of things. As a corrective to such a conception of changeless substratum, Buddhist metaphysics adopts Rjusūtra view and brings the centre of gravity to the present moment. Thus it enables to secure the balance between change and permanence. Change partakes of the nature of time duration. It shares with it the ephemerality. There is some truth in maintaining the reality of change and in concentrating it to one moment. To over emphasise the neglected element of change as a set off against Vedānta and to secure a habitation for it in the camp of Reality is certainly a commendable metaphysical venture. But to identify reality with mathematical moment, to emphasise change as the only real and to make it live in a metaphysical void is to overshoot one's mark. It is this erroneous and uncalled for accent on change to the detriment of the relating and the unifying principle of Reality without which, change will have no meaning. It is this Rjusūtrābhāsa that the Jama system asks us to beware of. If this principle is the sole criterion of Reality, then reality would end itself by committing suicide to employ a suggestive phrase of Bradley.

(v) ŚABDA-NAYA or the implication of Terms or names. The name has the function of calling to our mind the particular object which is referred to or implied by the name. Of course the implication need not necessarily be an individual object. An attribute, a relation and action may be referred to by appropriate words in the language. Thus the grammatical distinction of terms into parts of speech has an underlying logical foundation. The particular kind of meaning is associated with a particular part of speech. Thus the difference in meaning corresponds to the difference among the terms. Thus a sort of intimate relation exists between a term and its meaning. Variation in the term may introduce a corresponding variation in the meaning. Thus not only the difference of the parts of speech implies a broad difference among the meanings but also the inflexional variations in the same part of speech may be said to have corresponding variations, however, slight they be. This principle of correspondence between the terms and their meanings is the foundation of the science of grammar. We have already mentioned that there is a relation to logic implicitly present in this grammatical principle. Indian grammarians in their discussion of verbal implications very often pass beyond

their legitimate sphere and enter into logical and quasi-metaphysical discussions. Such an exaggerated notion about the verbal implication would be not only illogical but also conflicting with common sense and convention. Jaina logicians therefore raise a note of warning against such an unwarranted application of this principle and point out the logical danger in that one-sided emphasis of the relation between *śabda* and *ārtha*.

Their contention is this No doubt generally speaking the grammatical principle or *abda Naya* adopted by the Vaiyākaranas is sanctioned by usage. But to assume it to be an universal principle without an exception would be neglecting the difference between the relative and the absolute and identifying the partial truth with the whole and the complete one. Ordinarily each name has its own meaning. The term 'cow' is different from 'king' not merely in word but also in meaning. But this is also true. Words which are different in nature and origin may nevertheless refer to the same identical object. Exaggerated and universal application of the *Śabda Naya* of the grammarians cannot conveniently accommodate synonyms in the vocabulary. That there are synonyms and that they are distinct from one another literally no grammarian can afford to deny. Yet unswerving loyalty to his principle of *Śabda Naya* would constrain him to accept such an absurdity. The only way out of the difficulty is to accept the Jaina interpretation of *śabda-naya*, according to which the relation between terms and meanings is a relative principle. The illustrations generally offered are the synonyms, Indra, Śakra and Purandara, names referring to the one and the same individual, the Lord of the Devas. Similarly terms differing not merely in origin as the above but also in number, gender, person, case, etc., may still refer to the same individual fact. Thus *puṣyaḥ* (masculine) *tārā* (feminine), *nakṣatram* (neuter), in spite of difference of gender do refer to the same object, i.e. Star. Again in a sentence, terms referring to the same individual object may appear in different cases; and a verb, in different sense and person may refer to the same activity. This subordination of grammatical differences of inflexion to the logical implication of terms seems to be the essential principle of *śabda-naya* as understood by the Jainas. It is not necessary to repeat that the *Naya* in the hands of the grammarians because of *ekānta* application degenerates into false *Naya*—(*śabdābhāsa*).

(vi) SAMABHIRŪDA NAYA—The derivative difference of names. This Samabhirūda *Naya* is the differentiation of terms according to their roots. Thus it is only a special application of *Śabda-naya*. In becoming specialised it becomes narrower and more exaggerated than the above *Naya*. As a general rule the terms in a language have their own special radical signification. This radical signification is the reason for the particular nomenclature. The first appearance of the word was evidently suggested by such an implication of the root. Of course this does not mean the connotation of the name. Connotation is the ground of the application of the name whereas the significance of the root accounts for the origin of the name. The former is logical and universal whereas the latter may be purely subjective and even accidental. The science of history of

language may discover various principles subserving the origin of names in a vocabulary. To the historian of language this is certainly an important principle. To detect radical difference in the vocabulary and to trace the history of different terms from this original seed-difference is certainly a commendable pursuit. But this nuclear difference interesting to the historian of language is not so very important as to swallow up all the other grammatical and logical principles of implication. Here again the Naya is discovered to be a relative one by Jaina Logic which enjoins a necessary circumscription to the above claims put forward by the historian of language. For example, it is true that the terms *gau* (cow) is different from *indra*. This difference can be traced to their respective roots. Hence the difference in the roots must mean a corresponding difference in the terms and therefore in their meanings. Accurately speaking, says this Naya, the terms *Indra*, *Śakra* and *Purandara* respectively imply the 'all prosperous', 'the all powerful' and 'the destroyer of enemies'. These are the direct and legitimate signification sanctioned by their origin. To emphasise the original and the radical implication of a term is one thing and to suggest that the term in its ordinary application must necessarily and always mean the same original radical sense is quite a different thing. The passage from the radical and immediate difference to the current application and the general accepted sense is an unwarranted jump taken by this Naya.

(vii) EVAMBHŪTA NAYA—The last of the Nayas is a further specialisation of the previous one. This is merely the historical principle run mad. According to this principle the radical sense in general is not the appropriate implication of a term. Even the root signification must have different gradations and aspects. Of these various aspects and gradations in the manifestation of the thing, only one particular aspect is contemplated by the root of a term, and it is this contemplated aspect that is the legitimate meaning of the term, in its current usage. The very same thing in a different attitude must be designated by a different term altogether. Thus for example, the term *gau* implies an animal in motion. That which moves is a *gau* or 'cow'. The same term therefore should not be applied when the animal is at rest or lying down. Movement is fundamentally different from lying down and therefore the same term 'cow' should not be applied to an animal at two such fundamentally different attitudes. Fundamental difference in the logical implication must necessarily be indicated by literal difference on the terms. This is the contention of Evambhūta Naya. The term must just designate the particular aspect or attitude in the object referred to. If the term goes beyond that it will be a source of confusion and ambiguity. Language instead of revealing things as they are would only conceal them.

This grammatico-logical contention may be conceded partially. In a perfect vocabulary this ought to be the principle but the language that we use is not so evolved under the guidance of such a rigorous logical principle. Hence it would be an egregious blunder to identify, what actually exists, with what ought to be, logically. Therefore



this Evambhūta Naya interpreted without reference to concrete usage and convention al meaning would only end in meaningless verbiage.

These are the Seven Nayas referred to in Jaina logic. The first four are called *artha-nayas* inasmuch as they deal with objects of knowledge, whereas the other three are called *śabda-nayas* inasmuch as they pertain to terms and their meanings. The same seven are sometimes otherwise grouped. The first three come under *dravya-naya* whereas the other four come under *pariyāya-naya*. The former means the substantive aspect whereas the latter means the aspect of change or manifestation.

These Nayas have an important place in the Anekānta Vāda of the Jaina system. All human descriptions and predications are relative and circumscribed inasmuch as they issue forth from the limited and partial nature of the intellect. Not only in our every day speech but also in the language, of the metaphysical statements (if they) have their own context and relation universalising their meaning apart from their setting in the background, (they) would result in practical inconvenience and philosophical confusion. Jaina thinkers recognising the extreme complexity of reality are never wearied of emphasising the *anekānta* aspect. Multifaced reality may lead to 'multitude of descriptions'. Every one of them may be partially true but not one of them is really true. Philosophy is but the fable of the seven blind men and the elephant. Each one perceives a certain aspect of the real and congratulates himself that that is the only reality. When reality would not fit in with his own petty framework then there is the ruthless pruning and chopping to make it convenient. Then there is the denial of certain inconvenient things as appearance and illusion. System building in philosophy has always been the process of providing reality with a procrustean bed. But one who knows, smiles at the simplicity of human philosophising. The critical caution that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy was sounded several centuries before the Christian era by the Anekāntavādins.

Our account of the Nayas will be incomplete without a mention of the six Nayas which are generally employed in the examination of the nature of souls. According to Jaina Metaphysics Jiva or soul has the nature of consciousness or *cetanā*. When it is viewed in its pure state unlimited by extraneous conditions, it has its thought characteristics fully and perfectly developed. This state of its existence represents the Ideal of Perfection or Siddhahood. But even in this ideal state, the nature of the self does not lose its complexity. Even in its infinite radiance, the self does not lose its Dravya nature or dynamic constitution. It is not distinct and separable from its own infinite qualities. It is the richness of content that marks the Jaina conception of Perfection as against the nihilistic attitude of Vedānta which speaks of quality-less existence as the ultimate Reality. Existence apart from qualities would be an empty abstraction and is therefore all the more unfit to stand for the ultimate reality. It is this unalienable unity that exists between the Real and its qualities that may be said to be the central doctrine of the Jaina metaphysics.

This pure and perfect state of the self is a thing to be achieved. Ordinarily the existence of the self is *somewhat different*. Its infinitude is limited, its glory abated and radiance dimmed by alien conditions and limitations. By its own general weakness and disposition it weaves round itself material sheaths some subtle and some gross. These material sheaths form the encumbrances and limitations which make the cycle of births and deaths possible for the Jivas. In this state Jiva is generally an embodied consciousness or an organism. In its normal state it may be evident to the senses through its gross organic body. In its subtle state of interval from death to another birth even though it casts off its grosser sheath it is still endowed with a subtle Kārmic body which serves as the nucleus for building up its appropriate body of the next generation. Jiva in these states is said to be the conditional one, *Sopādhi jīva*, as differentiated from the unconditioned perfect self, *Nirupādhi jīva*.

Jiva in its Samsāric state is not only associated with a body of its own but with several other things living and non-living. The environment in which it lives, moves and has its being is generally wider than its own corporeal frame. Even in the case of animals and birds there is such a wider interest than the mere instinct of self-preservation. The parental instinct of helping and preserving the young ones and filial instinct of falling back upon the support of the parents from the prehuman biological foundation of the institution of family among human beings. When we come to human society this widening of the environmental horizon of the self becomes all the more marked. Several economical and social institutions such as owning property or belonging to a particular social order or a nation all these contribute to extending the personality so as to coincide with its environments. There is a personal pride and pleasure in extending one's own property. There is a sympathetic feeling of joy or sorrow with the prosperity or adversity of the family or the nation to which the individual belongs. The nature of the personality therefore is determined by the extent and diversity of interest. We feel offended when any injury is done to our possessions. We feel it a personal insult if any one who is near and dear to us is unfairly treated. The self which is by its own intrinsic nature a complex entity becomes all the more complex by identifying itself through its interest with its environment of things and persons. Under such circumstances it is an extremely difficult problem to define the exact nature of the soul and to point out its own appropriate boundary. Hence the necessity of the application of Nayas or points of view. These Nayas as already mentioned are specially designed for the purpose of explaining the nature and defining the limits of the self.

To start with there are two main aspects or Nayas: Nīścaya and Vyavahāra. The former represents the true and complete point of view. There is no distinction between *dravya* and its *gūṇas*. The self is looked at as a whole with all the wealth of its attributes. The latter represents the partial point of view. The complex nature of the self is analysed into its diverse qualities, and our attention may be directed to any particular attribute with which the self may be identified at the moment. Further the former

Nīścaya Naya is divided into Śuddha Nīścaya and Aśuddha Nīścaya Naya. Śuddha Nīścaya Naya holds the self in its pure and unconditioned *nirupādhi* state. Disentangled from all its material environment and limitation the self radiates in its pristine glory through all its wealth of infinite qualities. This aspect where the self is in its qualities and its qualities are pure and unalloyed expression of the nature of this self is the topic of Śuddha Nīścaya Naya. The second Aśuddha Nīścaya Naya contemplates the self as caught in the meshes of the material environment, the *sopādhi* state. The presence of *upādhi* makes it impure or *aśuddha*. Its intrinsic glory is dimmed but still it is viewed as a whole with its complete nature as expressed in its attributes though somewhat warped by alien influences. This is the self according to Aśuddha Nīścaya Naya.

Similarly the *Vyavahāra* point of view is divided into two main heads : *Sadbhūta Vyavahāra* and *Asadbhūta Vyavahāra*. The term *sadbhūta* implies the intrinsic nature of the thing. Here the question is not about the purity or the impurity of the thing. The term *Vyavahāra* as already explained implies the analysis and differentiation of attributes from the underlying *dravya*. *Jñāna* or thought is certainly an attribute of the self. To speak of *jñāna* as identical with self is to adopt *Sadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*. The Term *asadbhūta* implies the importation of alien qualities into the self. Some of the organic instincts and emotions are distinctly due to the physical constitution. Nevertheless such instincts and emotions are associated with the self from the point of view of *Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*. Similarly the Karmic constituents which are intrinsically physical may be said to belong to the self and modify its manifestations.

Each of these two again is divided into two other minor kinds *upacarita* and *anupacarita*. *Upacarita* is usage sanctified by convention but having no other intrinsic justification. It is a sort of metaphorical application; whereas *Anupacarita* is just the opposite of the above. It stands on its own intrinsic merit and has no metaphorical and transferred import. Thus finally we have 4 kinds of *Vyavahāra Naya* : 1. *anupacarita-sadbhūta-vyavahāra-naya*, 2. *upacarita-sadbhūta-vyavahāra-naya*, 3. *anupacarita-asadbhūta-vyavahāra-naya* and 4. *upacarita-asadbhūta-vyavahāra-naya*.

Now the first is mainly *vyavahāra* inasmuch as it analyses the attributes from the thing is *sadbhūta* inasmuch as it emphasises the genuine and intrinsic attributes and is *anupacārita* inasmuch as it is free from figurative and transferred implication. The illustration of this is the self is of the nature of *jñāna* or knowledge. The second Naya is *vyavahāra* for the reason stated above and *sadbhūta* for the same and *upacarita* because the epithet is figurative and transferred. When we speak of *Jñāna* or knowledge as *Pramāna* or the criterion of truth we are thinking of the objects of knowledge or *artha*. *Artha* itself may be spoken of as a manifestation of knowledge or *Jñāna-vikalpa*. To speak of *artha* or the object as a modification of knowledge is only figuratively true in the case of external objects. These being physical in nature are *acetana* and yet as object of knowledge may be spoken of as modification of *jñāna*. What intrinsically belongs to the self is transferred to its object because of the relation brought about by

the process of knowledge. The third Naya is Anupacarita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra. The only term that demands explanation is *asadbhūta* here. It refers to the identification of the Self with some alien properties. For example to consider one's own body as oneself which is generally done in ordinary life is Asadbhūta Vyavahāra. This is not merely figurative as the statement is sanctioned by the intimate interrelation that exists between the soul and the body. Hence 'this body is mine,' or 'I am this,' pointing to the body is a statement which is justified according to Anupacarita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya. The last Naya is the *upacarita* form of the same. Here the alien quality or the thing with which the self is identified lack that intimate relation that exists between the soul and its own body. To call the ornaments as one's own, to claim certain individuals as one's relating, to possess certain things as one's own property, in short to identify one's personality with alien things and persons is possible only in a figurative sense. Each personality is distinct from and alien to the others though all by co-existing together may partake of common environment and enter into definite relations. Still from the metaphysical point of view one's destiny is in one's own hands. Therefore the popular identification of the self with the other things said to be owned by it is a figurative and transferred predication or Upacarita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya. These four kinds of Vyavahāra Naya together with the two Nīścaya Nayas constitute the six *Nayas* which are specially employed to fathom the depth of human personality.

The object of these Nayas generally of the former seven and specially of the latter six is to reveal the intrinsic nature of personality in its comic environment. It is not merely a matter of theoretical interest that underlies these Nayas. Apprehension and understanding of the nature of reality must be a useful means in the hands of the self to reach the safe haven of Beatitude from which there is no return. But besides this practical aspect there is another aspect to the question. The truth that is apprehended by the Pramānas and the Nayas must be available for the general public, ever growing under the weight of sorrow and yearning to have that *Bliss* which they know only by faith and hope. Hence is the necessity for expressing the truth through Scripture. This Revelation of the truth through language is the Word or Syādvāda. This pertains to the principle of conditional predication which is *sevenfold*. This seven-fold predication is known as Saptabhaṅgi.

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## SAPTABHĀṄĪ

### SAPTABHĀṄĪ OR THE SEVEN MODES OF PREDICATIONS.

The Dialectic of Syādvāda is no less puzzling to Indian students of philosophy both old and new, than the Hegelian dialectic is to the European philosophers. Syādvāda and its counterpart appear at first sight self-conflicting and unwarranted. But they have an important principle,—nay the fundamental principle of reality as their substratum and justification. Closer examination reveals in them a clear grasp of truth. Every other theory of knowledge is fading into insignificance before the principle of conditional predication.

Everything existing from the bespangled heavens above to the inmost core of human personality is in a process of change and modification. If we trust ourselves to the imagination of the astronomer which enables him to look back through eons of the past cosmic history or to have a glimpse of the far off future we see the universe as a motion picture on the screen of existence. What is a twinkling star at present was once upon a time gigantic nebulous mass of several million miles diameter. Then by process of aggregation and condensing there is the formation of a denser nucleus which becomes larger and larger by the same process which in its turn leads to the evolution of an enormous quantity of heat. This leads to the formation of the fiery orb which by the same laws of motion gives birth to a number of incandescent masses. These held to the parent by the laws of gravitation form the planetary system. Thus our Sun itself is but a star among the starry systems.

Side by side with this evolution of a sun with its planetary system we have the converse drama enacted. Either due to a mysterious explosion or due to a clash of star with star there bursts into existence a new mass of nebula. The telescope reveals to human view not only the nursery of distant solar systems but also the decay and dissolution of the decrepit and defunct starry systems. The starry heavens are but the cosmic alphabet which spell the three sublime words birth, growth and decay.

Turn now to our own earth which is but a tiny speck in space when compared to the Sun and the Stars. Here also the same process. The formation of the crust of the earth is after terrible volcanic convulsions which had taken place in the early history of the earth. The geological changes are followed by the appearance of life on the surface, then the wonderful evolution of the plant and animal kingdoms are all indelibly written

on the different strata of the earth. This also repeats the same story. Then life itself is a mysterious though subtle process of combined building up and breaking up. Turn where you will you see the same thing. Reality is a complex process of change and everything in it is partaking of the same process.

Nothing is merely permanent; nothing is merely changing. The acorn grows to the oak; the seed is in the plant and the tree and yet it is not there as the seed. Everything lives by the process of death. The very loss leads to gain. This message of the organic reality is an important contribution to philosophy.

Hegel founded his metaphysics on Logic—nay identified both. But his Logic is not the mere scholastic logic on which his predecessor Kant built his system. Hegel's logic came as a disturber of peace to the then philosophic thought, but it ultimately led to the emancipation of thought from scholastic thralldom. He proclaimed boldly to the world that affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity 'is' and 'is not' are really identical and same, for they are but the aspects of the same reality. To one who is familiar with this dialectical process of thesis and antithesis reconciling in a higher synthesis, the following presentation of *saptabhangī* will lose its paradoxical nature and discover the underlying truth.

Long ago the Jainas recognised this complexity of existence. Any particular object which as the topic of assertion can very well take in two assertions—affirmative and negative. How can there be two apparently contradictory statements both true of a single fact? The nature of the fact is such is the answer. Every concrete assertion presupposes a question as to the exact nature of the object. This interrogation again rests on the desire to determine the thing from a particular point of view. Since the thing has several aspects and relations there may be several determinations. Hence is the possibility of apparently conflicting attributes inhering in the same and exhibited by the process of predication. Is that statue of marble or of plaster of Paris? If it is one, it is not the other. Is that the same gold bangle which you had last year? No, it is newly made though the same gold is used. Was Socrates a Greek or Roman? He was Greek and not Roman. What is the Kaiser now? He is and yet is not the Kaiser. These are familiar questions and answers. All these exhibit the possibility of predicating affirmation and negation of the same thing. *Is* and *is not*, can significantly refer to the same subject. The only thing we have to remember is that the point of view is different in each case. There is nothing mysterious, nothing incredible. When the same subject can have two such predicates no one predicate can monopolise the subject to itself. There will always be some aspect of the subject left out by this predicate; and this left out aspect can very well be expressed by the rival predicate. This implies that under no circumstances can we have a predication which is the only true predication about the subject. There can be no judgment absolutely true and excluding every other judgment about the same topic. Hence we have recourse to qualified assertions as the only avail-

able ones under the circumstances. These qualified or conditional assertions are primarily two affirmation and negation.

(1) Perhaps X is

(2) Perhaps X is not.

These two aspects are inherent in the same thing; hence we can say.

(3) Perhaps X is and *is not*, here we are contemplating the whole thing in its two aspects which are kept apart and attended to severally. But these two aspects are inherent in and expressive of one single identity. Hence they may be considered together jointly as expressing the single identity. In that case there is no chance of asserting two conjointly by a single predicate, for the simple reason that there can be no such predicate. Therefore we have to confess our inability to and proclaim the bankruptcy of vocabulary for having such an assertion. This fact becomes the fourth mode of predication.

(4) Perhaps X *is* indescribable

Remembering this helpless nature of our tongue, we may still qualify this by each of the first three predicates. Thus we have the last three modes of predications which are

(5) Perhaps X *is* though indescribable

(6) Perhaps X *is not* though indescribable.

(7) Perhaps X *is* and *is not* though indescribable

In their traditional form these are.—

(1) *Syādasti*

(2) *Syānnāsti*

(3) *Syādasti nāsti ca*

(4) *Syādavaktavyah*

(5) *Syādasti avaktavyah*

(6) *Syānnāsti avaktavyah*

(7) *Syādasti nāsti avaktavyah.*

These seven modes of predication are usually illustrated with reference to some object such as a *jar* or *ghaṭa*. Whether it is to have an affirmative predicate or negative one depends respectively on four aspects—its own form, matter, place and time leading to affirmation and alien form, matter, place and time bringing in negation to the jar. A jar is real or is affirmed with reference to *svarūpa*, *svadīvyā*, *svakṣetra*, *svakāla* and is unreal or is denied from the point of view of *pararūpa*, *paraśrava*, *parakṣetra* and *parakāla*. When we have affirmation and negation for their reasons, the subsidiary modes are derived from these two.

1. Then what is the *svarūpa* or intrinsic form of a Jar? And what is its *pararūpa*? When we hear the word *jar* uttered, the term invariably implies a certain definite group of attributes through which a particular object is designated by the term. These essential

attributes connoted by the term *Jar* will be its *svarūpa*. The attributes of any other object implied by any other term will be its *pararūpa*—will be alien to the *Jar*. Existence rests on *svarūpa* and non-existence on *pararūpa*. If existence is predicated of the *Jar* both from its own form as well as that of an alien thing like cloth (*pāṭa*) then the *jar* will lose its distinctive character and become one with cloth. If on the other hand non-existence is predicated from its own form as from alien nature then there will be no *jar* at all. Neither of these results stand to reason.

Again confining ourselves to the class of vessels we still find that a *jar* is different from a kettle. Is that vessel a *jar* or kettle? The *jar-form* is its *svarūpa* and the kettle form is its *pararūpa*. From the former the *jar* is, from the latter, it is not.

Again we may be concerned with jars alone. One individual *jar* has its individuality as *svarūpa*, and every other *jar* will be *pararūpa*. *Jar A* exists on account of *svarūpa* and does not on account of *pararūpa*. If non-existence is associated with *svarūpa* then there will be no *jar* at all; if existence follows from *pararūpa* then all *jars* will become one without distinction and there will be no separate individual ones.

Then *ghata-jar* is made by the potter. The mass of clay on the potter's wheel is not yet a *jar*. It is only the finished product that is a *jar*. This-finished for is its *svarūpa*; any other stage in its formation is its *pararūpa*. The former leads to affirmation the latter leads to negation.

2. What is its own matter? Clay is *svadravya*, and gold is *paradravya*. The *Jar* is of clay and is not of gold: *svadravyeṇa asti, paradravyeṇa nāsti*.

3. What is its own place or *svakṣetra*? The ground where the *Jar* is, is its *svakṣetra* and every other place is its *parakṣetra*. The *Taj* is in *Agra* (*svakṣetra*) and is not in *Delhi* (*parakṣetra*). If the *Jar* exists in *parakṣetra* also then there will be no place without a *Jar*. In the case of the *Taj* every place will have a *Taj Mahal*. If the thing is not even in its own place then there will be no *Jar* anywhere in the world. Either result will be unsatisfactory.

4. What is its own time or *svakāla*? The *Jar's* *svakāla* is the duration of the present in which it is intact. Its past when it was a mass of clay on the potter's wheel and its future when it will be a heap of broken shells will be its *parakāla*. Its existence in its own time and non-existence in other times will be quite evident. So also with every other object. Socrates existed at a particular age of Athenian History and is not existing now. If a thing exists in *parakāla* also as in *svakāla* then it will be eternal; if it does not exist in *svakāla*, as in *parakāla* then it will be nothing, for existence implies a relation to its time or duration.

Thus a thing is affirmed in its four-fold self-relation, form, matter, place and time, and is denied in its four-fold alien relation.

Now the *svarūpa*, etc., are determined with reference to the four-fold other-relation of *pararūpa*, etc. The self-relation apart from the other relation has no meaning. But



how are we to determine the four kinds of relation—*pararūpa*, *paradvaya*, etc. These must depend on their environmental relations and these latter again on others. Thus we pass on from our environment to others still wider without having any clear grasp of the self-relation. The distinction between a thing and its other rests on the sandy foundation of a vicious indefinite regress. Hence the affirmation and negation also fall to the ground.

This objection rests on misapprehension. The distinction between the fourfold self-relation and other-relation does not rest on an indefinite regress. The essential nature of a thing not only implies its *svarūpa* but differentiates itself from *pararūpa*. In experience we not only perceive a thing, but perceive it as distinct from other things. A *Jar* is seen not merely as a *Jar* but as a thing distinct from cloth by its side. Without this distinction there can be no perception of the *Jar* at all. The very process of self-assertion implies differentiation from non-self. Hence the change of indefinite regress is quite unwarranted.

Now, according to this theory *asti* and *nāsti* (is and is not) may be predicated of *prameya*, the objective aspect of knowledge or the process of apprehending an object. This dual predication must rest on *svarūpa* and *pararūpa* of *prameya*. What is its *svarūpa* and what is its *pararūpa*? *pararūpa* of *prameya* means non-*prameya*, anything other than *prameya* we have no means of knowing. Hence the theory must fail in this case.

No, says the Logician. The state of being apprehended by knowledge, *prameyatva* is the *svarūpa* of *prameya*. This implies in general the relation of object to the knower anything besides this relation; even the object will be distinct from *prameyatva* and hence will be the *pararūpa* in this context. Now this theory must be applicable to the ultimate existence or *mahāsattā*. If *is* and *is not* are to be predicated of this *Summum Genus*, what are its *svarūpa* and *pararūpa*? For the latter cannot be, as there can be no other form or matter or place or time not included in this. The *pararūpa* of *mahāsattā* need not imply the existence of other things besides itself, that would be self-contradictory. But still we can speak of its *pararūpa* when we contemplate something which falls short of the all-comprehensive universal. Any of its parts will be so far the negation of whole—its *pararūpa*.

Now *asti*, affirmation depends on self; *nāsti*, negation, on other things. *asti* which is conditioned by self can very well belong to a thing. But if *nāsti* which is conditioned by other than the *Jar* e. g. is also predicated of the *Jar*. Then it would imply that the *Jar* participates in the nature of its other—say cloth. This will lead to mere confusion.

This objection also is based on a misapprehension. Affirmation no doubt rests on the nature of the self the *Jar*. The negation resting on another thing—*pāṭa* (cloth) does not mean that the *Jar* also has the nature of a cloth. That would be absurd. The clear-cut boundary between things will vanish and with it all knowledge, *asti*—implies self assertion, *nāsti* implies alien-exclusion. A thing not only asserts its own individuality,

but also repulses anything alien to it. It is this element of repulsion that everything must have in order to be real that entitles it to have the negative predicate. Instead of leading to a confusion this element of differentiation is the only basis for self-assertion of a thing, *asti* and *nāsti*—assertion and exclusion are malienably present in the same thing. Wherever there is *asti*, there is *nāsti* and wherever there is *nāsti*, there is *asti* also.

Now this association of this two *asti* and *nāsti*—in the same thing appears quite unwarranted. For on the one hand when we perceive a *Jar* we see mere *asti* without *nāsti* and on the other hand in the case of certain impossible and unreal concepts such as asse's horns, sky-flower there is mere *nāsti* without *asti*.

This is not quite correct. In the case of any perceived object *nāsti* does not mean that the thing should not exist as such and yet be perceived. That would be meaningless. *Nāsti* means nothing more than that element of repulsion and differentiation which isolates a thing from its background and gives it a determinate and positive nature. In this sense *nāsti* is inseparable from *asti* and it is the sense in which it is used. As to the other case of impossible and unreal concepts where is the positive foundation, If sky-flower is quite real, nay if it has a slight positive basis it will cease to mean an unreal and an impossible thing. Its nature seems to be pure negation and nothing less than that. This cannot be, answers our Logician. How can there be any negation without any significance? A significant negation must have some positive basis; otherwise it will be mere nonsense. The elements constituting the concept are by themselves real and are justified by the canons of experience. We have seen horns in a cow, we have seen an ass or a horse. These are existing and real. But the fanciful combination of an ass with horns or a flower with sky is unreal. But for the experience of horns on the head of a cow or flower in a tree there can be no talk of an ass with horns or a flower in the sky. Without this positive basis of experience there will be no elements to make up even a fanciful complex. Thus even the fanciful ideas of *uncoin* and *centuar* must have some foundation in our experience. Again in the proposition *syādaṣṭi jīvaḥ*, the terms *asti* and *jīva* (life) must mean identically the same thing or different things. If the meanings are of the same nature then one cannot be predicated of the other as a pot cannot be the predicate of a Jar both being co-ordinate. Further *asti* or existence is predicable of everything real. If *asti* is identical with *jīva* then *jīva* also must be predicated of everything. But if *jīva* is different from *asti* then there is no chance of predicating *asti* of *jīva* for they are entirely different from each other. Further *jīva* being different from *asti* and *asti* being the predicate of everything, *jīva* cannot be related to anything real, (i.e.) *Jīva* would become unreal. You cannot maintain that *jīva* though different from *asti* can be said to have the predicate by a process of combination with it, for combination is impossible in the case of repelling elements.

The horns of this dilemma are blunted by *syādvāda*. These results need not frighten

the Logician to whom *astī* and *jīva* are identical from the *dravyārtha* view and different from *pariyāyārtha* view. They are different and yet identical. But for this dual nature there can be no predication at all \*

The primary modes of predication are three—*syādesti*, *syānmāsti*, *syādavaktavyah*. The other four are obtained by combining these three. Now according to Sāṅkhya philosophy everything is real and therefore exists. According to Buddhism everything is momentary and unreal. Both these views are rejected by the Jainas as extremes. The former is true according to the principle of *dravyārthika* point of view; the latter is true according to *pariyāyārthika* point of view. Hence each is true in its own way and is not true absolutely. Again reality is indescribable according to the Vedāntins who emphasise the *nuvacanīya* aspect of reality. Even this is only partially true, for otherwise even this predication “that Reality is indescribable” will be impossible.

The same seven modes of predication may be obtained in the case of following pairs of attributes; eternal and changing, one and many, universal and particular, etc. These pairs of opposites can very well be predicated of reality and these may yield the other derivative modes of predication. Thus practically every attribute by being affirmed and denied according to different aspects may bring about seven fundamental propositions true of real subject.

It may be said that after all this principle of *saptabhaṅgī* is a wanton indulgence in meaningless self-contradiction. This objection has been sufficiently answered above. This is not a case of wanton paradox or purposeless pun. If the words are wantonly misinterpreted or understood in an unwarranted sense then it may be charged with wanton quibbling, for example in the statement that this person has a new woollen shawl (*nava-kambala*) the term *nava* may be taken to mean also *nine*. Though the word is capable of such an interpretation still in this statement it does not mean that. In spite of the context if a person retorts that assertion by saying “this person cannot have nine shawls as he is very poor,” it would be wanton quibbling. There is no such wanton quibbling underlying *saptabhaṅgī*.

It is not wanton quibbling it must merely be an expression of doubt. To say a thing may be as well as may not be is to exhibit one's own doubt and ignorance. At the best therefore the doctrine is a mode of scepticism. This charge of scepticism is certainly unfounded. Doubt expresses absence of determinate knowledge. If the *prima facie* appearance of a thing leads you to two different interpretations of which alternatives we cannot choose the right one then there is doubt as to its nature. Since its exact nature is unknown scepticism may be the result. But in the case of the contradictory propositions forming the basis of *saptabhaṅgī* we have two different aspects each serving as the

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\*[This discussion from *Saptabhaṅgītarangī* reminds us of Bradley's discussion of the theory of Predication—in appearance and Reality.]

basis of one of the propositions. Hence there is neither doubt nor confusion in this case. Each assertion is definite and clear.

### ŚANKARA AND SYĀDVĀDA

#### THIBAUT'S TRANSLATION OF THE BHĀṢYA

"This doctrine we meet as follows.—Your reasoning, we say, is inadmissible 'on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold the same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many and such or not be so many and such, the third alternative expressed in the words 'they either are such are not such' results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative predications 'somehow it is' 'somehow it is not' and so ceases to be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion and to the result of the assertion; partly they are, partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the Tirthankara (Jīva) teach with any claim to authority and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate? Observation shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman. Again, if we apply the Jaina reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view they are not five, from which latter point of view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be described; but, as a matter of fact they are described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person. If you further maintain that the heavenly world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is employed in such statement will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release. And moreover it follows from your doctrine that sou,l

non-soul and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from all eternity, relapse all at 'once into the condition of absolute indetermination. As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories—being excluding non-being and *vice versa* non-being excluding being—the doctrine of the Arhat must be rejected”.

### RĀMĀNUJA AND SAPTABHANGI

THIBAUT'S TRANSLATION.—With the help of this they prove that all things—which they declare to consist of substance (*dravya*) and *paryāya* to be existing one and permanent in so far as they are substances, and the opposite is so far as they are *paryāyas*. By *paryāya* they understand the particular states of substances, and as those are of the nature of Being as well as Non-being, they manage to prove existence, non-existence and so on. With regard to this the *sūtra* remarks that no such proof is possible. ‘Not so, on account of the impossibility in one; i.e. because contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing, not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and particular states qualifying it—and (by the Jainas) called *paryāya*—are different things (*padārtha*) one substance cannot be connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that a substance qualified by the particular state, such as existence, should at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, i.e. non-existence. The non-permanency, further of a substance consists in its being the abode of those particular states which are called origination and destruction, how then should permanency, which is of an opposite nature, reside in the substance at the same time? Difference (*bhinnatva*) again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attributes; non-difference, which is the opposite of this, cannot hence possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference; not any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo can belong to one animal. But (the Jaina may here be supposed to ask the Vedāntin) how can you maintain that Brahman, although on only yet at the same time is the self of all? Because we reply, the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the supreme person, omniscient, omnipotent and so on. And that the body and the Person embodied and their respective attributes are of totally different nature (so that Brahman is not touched by the defects of this body), we have explained like wise. Moreover, as your six substances, soul and so on are not one substance and one *paryāya*, their being one substance and so on, cannot be used to prove their being one and also not one and so on. And if it should be said that those six substances are such (viz. one and several, and so on) each owing to its own *paryāya* and its own nature, we remark that then you cannot avoid contradicting your own theory of everything being an ambiguous nature. Things which stand to each other in the relation of mutual non-existence cannot after all be identical. Hence the theory of the Jainas is not reasonable”.

These two passages are quoted from the two great Hindu Commentators of *Vedānta Sūtras*, Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja. The Sūtra that is commented on नैकस्मिन्नसमवात् (Ch. I, Pāda 2, sū. 33)

The author of the *Vedānta Sūtras* as well as the commentators reject the *saptabhaṅgi-naya* on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes inhering in the same thing.

All that is said above by way of exposition and discussion would vindicate the claim of *saptabhaṅgi* against the charges brought against it by these scholars. Our account would be incomplete if these charges are not examined in this connection.

Now the author of the Sūtras does not give any detailed reasons besides the one contained in the Sūtra itself—that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes. *Asti* and *nāsti* being and non-being or affirmation and negation being contradictory epithets cannot be referred to the same thing. Hence the doctrine of such a predication is futile. This reasoning though short is interesting and suggestive. We have already pointed out the philosophical attitude adopted by the Jainas. A thing being of complex nature, having *dravya* and *pariṇāma* must be an identity in difference. Instead of rejecting the doctrine of reality for the reason given they seem to claim that the real is real only because of such a capacity to comprehend and reconcile the differences in itself. Here we are reminded of Bradley's polemic against 'the nature of things'. Though he admits the Hegelian doctrine of identity in difference he cannot forget the scholastic traditions about identity and difference. Every concrete thing or person is according to Bradley a Unity in diversity, and identity in difference a constant which is varying also. Now Bradley argues that such a nature implies self-contradiction and internal conflict. This is so because it is not possible for us to know how the difference could be derived from and related to an identity. Hence he condemns such things to the limbo of appearances.

We have been suggesting the similarity between the Hegelian doctrine of identity and the Jaina doctrine of *asti-nāsti*. But we must raise a note of warning that the Jaina doctrine does not accept wholesale Hegelian metaphysics. Unlike Bradley the greatest living representative of Hegelian absolutism the Jainas emphasize this important aspect of reality. The reason which is employed by Bradley to condemn a thing to be appearance is the very reason which serves the Jaina thinkers to proclaim the reality of the same.

The commentators deserve special attention. Hence we shall examine their criticism in detail. Śāṅkara's criticism is of three main stages. First, he tries to point out the intrinsic impossibility of this doctrine. Second, its practical futility. Third, its conflict with many other Jaina doctrines. Being and non-being cannot be predicated of the same thing just as it is impossible to predicate hot and cold of the same. Mutually contradictory and conflicting attributes cannot exist together of the same thing at the same

time This objection appears to be unanswerable but if we remember the two different aspect of self-relation and other relation we can very easily see that the objection does not hold good. Very often even in ordinary experience we have examples of co-existing attributes which are in the abstract self-contradictory. The branches of a tree may be in motion, but the tree as a whole may not budge an inch. Here the tree is moving and yet is not moving. The same individual person may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y. In this case we cannot reasonably ask how can the same individual be both father and son. The two conflicting attributes of fatherhood and sonhood are quite intelligible in the same individual. Similarly a class which is a genus with reference to its own species may itself be a species in relation to its own higher genus. We need not multiply instances. It would be quite idle to maintain the impossibility of incompatible attributes in one and the same thing. It is a matter of surprise to us modern readers how such an acute thinker like Śāṅkara should go without observing the particular aspect from which the rival presents his case.

After appealing to experience to substantiate his point Śāṅkara brings in the charge of indefiniteness against the doctrine of Saptabhaṅgī. On a previous occasion we replied to this charge of indefiniteness. It is enough here to show that if by definiteness Śāṅkara means unconditional and absolute assertion indefiniteness instead of being a defect would be certainly a meritorious point to the credit of Syādvāda. In the course of the discussion the critic indulges in certain epithets which we should now call "unparliamentary." We may pass it without notice partly because of its irrelevancy to the main argument and partly because of the fact that in his days such an intermixture of Logic and Rhetoric was perhaps accepted as a justifiable weapon of debate.

As to his second point the practical futility of the doctrine we have to say a word. His argument comes to this. Every theoretical doctrine has a practical bearing. This is all the more so in the case of Indian thinkers. All Indian philosophers in spite of their doctrinal differences accept this as the fundamental truth of philosophy that metaphysical research is the handmaid of ethico-religious ideal of securing the *summum bonum* of life. Hence any doctrine that is indefinite and ambiguous in its message is condemned by this pragmatic test. Since we have not accepted the theoretical charge of ambiguity, we need not tarry long at this practical consequence.

Next let us go to the application of Saptabhaṅgī to the other Jaina doctrines. Such as the five categories and the final release with the consequent heavenly bliss. Śāṅkara points out that according to this logic the five *astikāyas* may be five and may not be five. This result will not certainly non-pluss the Jaina logician. If they are severally referred to they are five. If they are referred to as an aggregate and a class they are one. If they are classified according to a different principle they may be two, living and non-living. Hence there is no fixed numerical characterisation of these categories. Variation in the number that may be used to designate these categories instead of implying self-contradic-

tion indicates only a variation in the point of view from which they are examined. As the climax of his criticism Śaṅkara asks his rival to say what would become of the heavenly world if it both exists and does not, both eternal and non-eternal. His rival will only answer as the author of *Saptabhaṅgi-taranginī* does—in the following manner. If as you say it must be one of those and not both you have the following difficulty. If the final release and heavenly bliss is eternal and existing where is the chance for *saṁsāra* and the attempt to obtain *mokṣa*. If the other alternative is the only truth what is the purpose of preaching such an ideal which is altogether impossible. "Man partly is and wholly hopes to be" is not mere poetry. It is genuine philosophy. Inasmuch as the final release is the goal towards which the whole creation moves it is true and real and inasmuch as it is *the goal* and is not yet an actualised fact it is not real and true. Why should this doctrine be so vehemently attacked passes our understanding.

When we go to Rāmānuja we have got a different method of argument altogether. He seems to accept the rival doctrine all the while protesting. He clearly sees the distinction between *dravya* and *pariyāya*, substance and mode. He also perceives that *pariyāya* means change and *dravya* permanency. He also correctly points out that the doctrine of Syādvāda is based upon these two different aspects *dravya* and *pariyāya*. The proper course for the critic having gone so far would be to accept the doctrine. Or if he wants to reject he must show that things do not have both these aspects *dravya* and *pariyāya*. Instead of doing either Rāmānuja attempts to defend the *sūtra* on a principle which is quite indefensible and unwarranted. What he proves is that *asti* and *nāsti* cannot be predicated of a thing from the *dravya* point alone. According to him the same substance cannot have both predicates. Certainly, it cannot have. Jaina Logic too proclaims the same thing. But if you take the thing in both its aspects—and it must be so taken to avoid empty abstractions—then it can and must have both the predicates.

Attempting to reject this doctrine of identity in difference Rāmānuja has the insight to perceive how his own doctrine of Vedānta is affected. In one sense the Vedāntic metaphysics is the doctrine of the one and the many. If reality could be one and the many at the same time Vedāntism would be sufficient argument in favour of Syādvāda. But unlike Śaṅkara who dismisses the Many as *māyā*, Rāmānuja as constrained by his metaphysical attitude accepts the reality of the many also. Then what becomes of the one in the many. He proposes the *pūrva-pakṣa* for the Jaina, "But how can you maintain that Brahma although one only yet at the same time is the self of all," He answers the *pūrva-pakṣa* thus—"The whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the Supreme Person and that the body and the person are of totally different nature." This is extremely dubious victory. If the body constituted by finite things and persons is really the manifestation or *parināma* of the Brahman and this what Rāmānuja believes, then his refuge is quite unsafe. For, his rival would be justified in asking whether the *parmāṇa* or the body is real or illusory. If the latter, his commen-



tary becomes an unnecessary reduplication of Śankara's and if the former he is bound to admit the Syādvāda point of view that the real is one from the point of view of the Person and many from the point of view of *parṇāma* or his body.

For a fuller discussion of the same we refer the reader to the excellent work *Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgīnī* from which we have freely drawn in this essay.

One other point and we may take leave of this topic. Bertrand Russell in his American lectures "On Logical atomism" develops Meinong's Theory of objective fact a very suggestive way. According to Meinong every proposition either true or false has an objective fact as the basis. For in order that there may be an intelligent assertion apart from its truth value there must be some objective basis. This doctrine implies two sets of objective facts, one for true propositions and other for false ones. Both being objective, what is the destined mark of each so that one stand for truth and the other for error? Thus the question of truth is pushed further without being answered and we have to admit objective facts which are false and erroneous. In order to avoid this result Russell proposes a modification in the doctrine.

He distinguishes between the meaning of a name and the fact implied by a proposition. Any individual object may be designated by a name. The name is a symbol referring to some particular object. This is a bare fact. There is no meaning in calling this true or false. It simply is. Truth or falsity refers to a proposition, a proposition becomes true or false because of an *objective fact*. The term *objective fact* is used in the sense of that which is other than the proposition that makes for its truth or falsity. Every objective fact may have two propositions of which one is true because it corresponds to the fact and the other is false because it has no corresponding fact. This theory of correspondence works well in the case of a true affirmative proposition (i.e.) of the pair of propositions based on each fact if the true one is affirmative, it is so because there is a corresponding fact. The negative proposition which is not corresponding to that fact is so far falsified by the fact. But take the following pair. Socrates is living and Socrates is not living. Here it is the negative proposition that is true and affirmative one is false. According to Russell's theory the negative proposition which is true must have a corresponding fact; otherwise it cannot be true. But what is the objective fact that is corresponding to this proposition—'*Socrates is not living.*' There seems to be none and yet there must be one. Therefore Russell brings in the theory of "*negative fact*" This suggestion raised a lot of discussion among the audience. But Russell himself leaves it undeveloped. He emphasises the fact that negative facts must be accepted as a fundamental postulate if the correspondence theory is to work.

Now what have we in the above doctrine of *Saptabhaṅgī*? Each thing is capable of having seven modes of predication and primarily two affirmative and negative. The affirmative proposition is determined by self, form, matter, place and time. The negative proposition rests on non-self relation of the same four, form, matter, place and time. In

this case both the propositions are true. A negative proposition in the case of self-relation and affirmative proposition in the case of non-self-relation would both be false. The proposition relating Socrates to his own time is true; the one relating him to any other time is false. To say that he is living now is such a false proposition. We are entitled to say only this that he is not living now.

Thus we have something like thus. A thing in its *svarūpa* (self-form), *svadṛavya*, (matter) *svakṣetra*, (place) *svakāla* (time) is the positive fact enabling the truth of an affirmative proposition. The thing in its *pararūpa* (non-self-form), *para-dravya*, *parakṣetra*, *parakāla* will constitute the negative fact. This will justify the negative proposition. This so offered only by way of suggestion for a possible explanation of what Russell calls 'negative fact.' Neither do we propose to develop Russell's theory nor do we want to imply that he was anticipated by Indian logicians of old. Any how the comparison is interesting and suggestive.

This Saptabhaṅgi is a powerful organ in the hands of Syādvāda and avoided the Nihilism of the Buddhists as well as the absolute monism of the Vedāntists, steering clear of the shallow of the Cārvākas and the ludicrous idealism of the Nayavādins

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## THE WORKS BY ŚRĪ KUNDAKUNDA-ĀCĀRYA

Prābhṛta-traya or Nāṭaka-traya, i e., the trilogy of

Pañcāstikāyasāra,

Pravacanasāra, and

Samayasāra or Samayasāra Prābhṛta.

Also Niyamasāra:

Ṣaṭ-prābhṛta or Ṣaṭpāhuda, consisting of Darśana Pāhūḍa, Sutta, Cāritta, Bodha, Bhāva, and Mokṣa Pāhūḍas. Rayanasāra; Bāraha Anuvekkhā;

(All these books have been printed.)

He is said to have written 84 Pāhudas. Some names are given below:—They are not as yet found in any library.

Jonisāra, Kriyāsāra, Ārahanāsāra, Kṣapanasāra. Baṁdhasāra, Tattvasāra, Aṁgasāra, Davvasāra, Karma Pāhuda, Paya Pāhuda, Vidyā Pāhūḍa, Ughāta Pāhuda, Drṣṭi Pāhuda, Siddhānta Pāhuda, Samavāya Pāhuda, Naya Pāhuda, Prakṛti Pāhuda, Cūṛṇi Pāhuda, Pamcavagga Pāhuda, Karma Vipāka Pāhuda, Vastu Pāhuda, Payodhara Pāhūḍa, Utpāda Pāhuda, Divva Pāhuda, Sikkhā Pāhuda, Jiva Pāhuda, Ācāra Pāhuda. Sahāva Pāhuda, Ālāpa Pāhuda, Cuti Pāhuda, Ṣaṭ Darśana Pāhuda, Nokamma Pāhuda, Samthāṇa Pāhuda, Nīṭya Pāhuda, Eyaṁta Pāhuda, Vihāya Pāhuda, Sālama Pāhuda

All the works of Śrī Kundakunda are in Prakṛit verse. But it is easy and beautiful. His *nāṭaka-traya* or Trilogy has been commented upon in Sanskrit by Śrī Amṛta Candra Ācārya and also by Śrī Jayasena Ācārya. There is also a commentary on *Niyamasāra* by Śrī Padmaprabha Maladhārī Deva. There is an excellent printed Hindi edition of this work by Jaina Dharma Bhūṣhaṇa Brahmachārī Sital Prasadji.

श्रीः

पञ्चास्तिकाय-समयसारः ।

PAÑCĀSTIKĀYA SAMAYASĀRA.

1.

इंदसदबंदियाणं तिहुअणहिंदमधुरविसदवकाणं ।

अंतातीदगुणाणं नमो जिणाणं जिदभवाणं ॥१॥

[इन्द्रशतबन्दिनेभ्यस्त्रिभुवनहितमधुरविशदवाक्येभ्यः ।

अन्तातीतगुणेभ्यो नमो जिनेभ्यो जितभवेभ्यः ॥१॥]

1. Obeisance to Jinas, possessed of attributes infinite, the conquerors who are beyond the influences of transmigration, worshipped by the hundred Indras ; revealers of the clear, sweet, and three-world-beneficial Word.

COMMENTARY—The three Lokas are Ūrdhva (upper), Madhyama (middle), and Adhah (lower). The Word is called beneficial, because it enables the people of the three worlds to realise their pure and perfect self. It is sweet because it draws towards itself the hearts of the faithful and the wise. It is called clear because it is free from defects such as, doubt, or self-contradiction etc. The hundred Indras are :—40 of the Bhavana Devas, 32 of the Vyantara Devas ; 24 of the Kalpavāsīs ; 2 of the Joytiṣka Devas, Sun and Moon ; 1 of the Human beings ; and 1 of the Animals.

One who is worshipped by such Indras in the *samayasaṅga* is certainly deserving of worship by the ordinary mortals. The reference shows the glory of Jina.

2.

Next, salutation to the Jināgama.

समणमुहुग्गदमट्ठं चटुग्गदिणिवारणं सणिच्चाणं ।

एसो पणमिय सिरसा समयमियं सुणह वोच्छामि ॥२॥

[अमणमुहोद्गतार्थं चतुर्गतिनिवारणं सनिर्वाणम् ।

एष प्रणम्य शिरसा समयमिमं शृणुत वक्ष्यामि ॥२॥]

2. I bow to the Śāstra that is revealed by Jinas, is the means of liberation from the four Gatis and leads to Nirvāna . Listen ! I describe that same truth is this work,

COMMENTARY—Samaya means system. It is of three kinds :—1) Śabda Samaya, the system of philosophy or scripture. 2) Arthasamaya, the system of reality ; and 3) Jñānasamaya, the system of knowledge

Saluting the Śabdasamaya or the scripture, the author goes to describe Arthasamaya, the facts of reality in order to attain true knowledge of the Jñānasamaya.

The four Gatis are :—1. Naraka : the Hell ; 2. Tiryak : the plant and the animal world 3. Manusya . Man ; 4 Deva : the Gods. These four Gatis constitute Samsāra.

The Āgama is saluted because of two great reasons : Its origin and its fruit. It is the word of God. It is revealed by Sarvajña. Its fruit is that it saves the soul from the four Gatis of Samsāra and leads it to Nirvāna, the unconditioned state of perfection where the self is completely realised.

### 3.

Then he mentions the three Samayas : Śabda, Artha, and Jñāna in the first half of the Gāthā, and the distinction between the Loka (the world) and the Aloka (the beyond) in the second half of the Gāthā :

सम्वाधो पञ्चहं समयो त्ति जिणुत्तमेहि पणत्तं ।

सो चेव हवदि लोओ तत्तो अमिओ अलोओ खं ॥३॥

[सम्वायः पञ्चानां समय इति जिनीलसः प्रज्ञप्तम् ।

स एव च भवति लोकस्ततोऽमितोऽलोकः खम् ॥३॥]

3. It is said by Jina that the group of five categories constitutes the system of reality ; the same is the world. And beyond that, is the immeasurable and infinite space (called Aloka.)

Arthasamaya or the system of reality is two-fold : Loka and Aloka. Loka is constituted by the five Astikāyas, or existences. Beyond that is the great and the infinite Aloka which is co-extensive with pure Space or Anantākāśa.

### 4.

Here the author enumerates the five existences. He describes the number of each and the general and special characteristics of the different Astikāyas.

जीवा पुगलकाया धम्माधम्मा तथेव आयासं ।

अत्थित्तम्हि य नियदा अणणसइया अणुमहंता ॥४॥

[जीवाः पुद्गलकाया धर्माधर्मो तथैव आकाशम् ।

अस्तित्वे च नियता अनन्यमया अणुमहान्तः ॥४॥]

4. Jivas or souls, Pudgalas or non-souls, Dharma and Adharma, the principles of rest and motion, and finally Space—these are the Astikāyas. They are eternal, uncreated

and of huge magnitude.

COMMENTARY—Since the atom or the material point is the unit of space, the spatial point is also called *anu* or Atom. Since the five entities, such as *Jivas*, etc., mentioned above are capable of occupying space, they are called *Kāyas* (corporeals); the term *Kāya* implies relation to many spatial points. Existences that can be so related to space are called by the Jainas, *Astikāyas*. It is evident that material objects constituted by physical molecules have such space quality. *Jiva* or soul is also considered to be an *Astikāya* because of its organic nature. *Jiva* exists as an organism and as such it is related to body and hence the spatial quality. *Dharma* and *Adharma* are the peculiar principles recognised by Jainas as corporeal. These are also *Astikāyas*. One is the principle of motion; the other is the principle of rest. They are pervading space and as such are *Astikāyas*. It is not necessary to point out that space is a multidimensional existence. Jainas have recognised the reality of space. They do not think that it is possible to reduce space to a "form of the mind" as the Idealists of Europe and India have done.

Since Time has neither potentially nor really the possibility of such space relations it is denied the name *Astikāya*. It is purely an entity of monodimensional series. Though it is not *Astikāya* it does not cease to be a real entity. Here also the Jainas differ from the Idealistic thinkers of the world in their attitude towards Time. Time is a reality and not a form of experience. Their views are more or less akin to the ideas of the Realism which is associated in England with thinkers like B. Russell.

## 5

Then the *Astikāyas* are described

जैसि अत्यिसहाओ गुणेहि सह पज्जएहि विविहेहि ।

ते होति अत्यिकाया निष्पण्णं जेहि तइलोकं ॥५॥

[विषामस्तिस्वभावः पुणः सह पर्यवैविधेः ।

ते भवन्त्यस्तिकायाः निष्पन्नं यैस्त्रैलोक्यम् ॥५॥]

5. Whatever things have the essential nature of manifesting themselves severally through their numerous qualities and modes are the *Astikāyas*. These fill the three worlds—they being the constituent parts of the world.

COMMENTARY—Since these are real, they are *astu*. Since they constitute the world or *Loka* they have the space quality, hence they are *kāyas*. *Astikāya* then implies existential nature as well as space quality.

## 6.

Next the description of the six *Dravyas*. The above five *Astikāyas* together with the Time (*Kāla*) form the six *Dravyas*.

ते चेव अत्थिकाया तेवकालियभावपरिणदा निच्चा ।

गच्छन्ति दवियभावं परियट्ठणलिंगसंजुत्ता ॥६॥

[ति चैवास्तिकायाः कालिकभावपरिणता नित्याः ।

गच्छन्ति द्रव्यभावं परिवर्तनलिङ्गसंयुक्ताः ॥६॥]

6. These five Astikāyas which though manifesting themselves diversely, maintain their permanency, constitute together with Kāla or time which has the quality of permanence in change, the Dravyas.

COMMENTARY—These five entities are being and becoming. They undergo change and yet maintain their identity. Thus they have the three characteristics of coming into existence, ceasing to exist, and also remaining permanent in spite of both. Creation, destruction, and yet continuity—these are the main qualities of Dravya. Kāla or time also has these three qualities, hence the Dravyas are six in number.

Dravya is fundamentally an organic unity. This view takes reality not merely in its aspect of change nor of permanency. It is permanency in change. Hegel is responsible for introducing such a conception of reality in modern thought. Jains in their conception of Dravya have anticipated such a modern idea, several centuries in advance. Of course the concept was not fully worked out because of other limitations peculiar to their age.

## 7.

These six Dravyas can move in the same place. They can also occupy the same space because of their mutual accommodating nature. Though they get thus interpenetrated still each preserves its own proper nature.

अण्णोणं पविसंता देता ओगासमणमणस्स ।

सेलंता वि य निच्चं सगं सभावं ण विजहंति ॥७॥

[अन्योन्यं प्रविशन्ति दहत्यवकाशमन्योन्यस्य ।

मितन्त्यपि च नित्यं स्वकं स्वभावं न विजहति ॥७॥]

7. These six Dravyas though mutually interpenetrating, and accommodating one another, and though getting mixed up in view of occupying the same space, yet they always maintain their identical nature without losing their respective qualities; general as well as special.

COMMENTARY—The six Dravyas are classified into three kinds :—1) *sakriya* 2) *sakriyanīṣkriya*, 3) *nīṣkriya*. *Sakriya* Dravyas are those that can be efficient causes. They can move about from place to place. They have the capacity of *āgamana* or motion. Such are *Pudgala*, or matter and *Jiva* or soul. *Sakriyanīṣkriya* Dravyas are those that condition movements, without themselves undergoing change or motion. These have

merely Avagāhana. The physical principles of Dharma and Adharma correspond to this description. Lastly, Niskriya Dravya is one which is capable of being neither the direct nor the indirect condition of change. Such is Space which has pure *avasthāna*.

8

After describing the general nature of Astikāyas in Gāthā No. 5, *jesim attisahāo* etc., the author proceeds to describe their distinctive characteristics and examines them from different points or *Nayas*

सत्ता सच्चपयत्या सविस्तरूवा अणंतपञ्जाया ।

भंगुप्पादधुवत्ता सप्पडिवक्खा ह्वदि एक्का ॥८॥

[सत्ता सर्वपदार्था सविस्तरूवा अनन्तपर्याया ।

भङ्गोत्पादध्रुव्यात्मिका सप्रतिपक्षा भवत्येका ॥८॥]

8. Substance is one (as a class). It is the inherent essence of all things. It manifests itself through diverse forms. It undergoes infinite modifications. It has the triple characteristics of creation, destruction and permanence. It also has the antithetical qualities, that is, it may be described by the opposites

COMMENTARY—The antithesis referred to is due to the fact that the substance may be described in each case by the opposite attribute. It is described as one from the class point. It may be described as many from the individual point. So with every adjective; *sarvapadaśtha* may have antithesis *ekapadaśtha*, *viśvarūpa* against *ekarūpa*, *anantaparyāya*, against *ekaparyāya*, etc. Such a description of the same thing by opposite attributes may be incompatible with the false position taken up by Ekānta philosophy, that is, the philosophical attitude which insists on a single point of view with reference to the extremely complex fact of reality. But such complex facts can be described by opposites without involving violent self-contradiction according to the Anekānta philosophy—philosophy of manifold aspects. Complex reality naturally claims complex attitude of the understanding. Any attempt to provide life and its problems with a simple ready-made framework must certainly end in failure, for conceptual analysis always implies selection and abstraction. The reality which is described by a concept will certainly be richer in content than the content of the idea. Hence is the possibility of describing the same fact of Life by distinct and sometimes diverse conceptual symbols. This means that life is always greater than Logic. It is this aspect that is expressed in the Jaina attitude of Anekānta. This *prima facie* contradiction suggested by the term Anekānta is in no way different from the Hegelian dialectic which could embrace contradictions. When the Jaina philosopher speaks of describing the same thing by opposite attributes, his view need not be assumed to be more violently shocking to the common sense attitude than Hegel's assertion that affirmation and negation are identical. Both the views in short are *apparently inconsistent*, but both emphasize an important aspect of reality.



## 9.

While describing the nature of Dravya the author goes to mention the qualified identity between Sattā and Dravya. These are the same from one aspect.

द्विविदि गच्छति तादं तादं सम्भाव-पञ्जयादं जं ।

द्विविं तं भणन्ति अण्णमूदं तु सत्तादो ॥६॥

[द्विविदि गच्छति तास्तान् सद्भावपर्यायान् यत् ।

द्विविं तद् भणन्ति अनन्यभूतं तु सत्तातः ॥६॥]

9. What flows, or maintains its identity through its several qualities and modifications, and what is not different from Sattā or Substance, that is called Dravya by the All knowing.

COMMENTARY—Here Sattā or substance is distinguished from Dravya. Dravya means that which flows or changes. While changing through its different qualities and modifications its essential nature persists. This kind of progressive development is associated with Dravya. But such development is also the characteristic of substance. Hence according to Jaina attitude Dravya is not entirely different from Sattā or substance. Therefore the opposite qualities mentioned above with reference to Sattā or substance are also applicable to Dravya which is not different in meaning.

According to this view there is no unchanging substance or Sattā in Jaina system. Such adamant existence cannot be identified with Dravya which is extremely volatile. Here also the similarity between Hegelian concept of 'thing' and the Jaina concept of Dravya is worth noticing. Sattā is not 'a thing in itself' behind Dravya. Sattā and Dravya are one and the same as Hegel mentioned. Thing in itself and experience are not absolutely distinct. Dravya refers to facts of experience. Sattā refers to existence or reality. One may be abstracted from the other but it is not different from the other as a fact.

## 10

Then he speaks of the other characteristics of Dravya.

द्वयं सत्त्वक्षणयं उत्पादव्ययधुवत्संसृज्यं ।

गुणपञ्जयासयं वा जं तं भणन्ति सत्त्वण्ण ॥१०॥

[द्वयं सत्त्वक्षणकं उत्पादव्ययधुवत्संसृज्यं ।

गुणपर्यायाभयं वा यत्तद्भणन्ति सर्वज्ञाः ॥१०॥]

10. Whatever has substantiality, has the dialectical triad of birth, death and permanence, and is the substratum of qualities and modes, is Dravya. So say the All-knowing.

COMMENTARY—Here the three characteristics of Dravya are described : First Dravya has the quality of *sat* or existence. Secondly, it has the quality of permanence through birth and death. Thirdly, it is the substratum of attributes and conditions. The quality of *sat* emphasises the substantial reality of Dravya. It is not merely the form of the intellect. It has an existence in *Rerum Natura*. The triple quality of dialectical change is the second attribute. *utpāda* is appearance, i.e., assuming new modification. This does not mean creation out of nothing. Creating by the fiat of a Will is not recognised by the Jainas. *Utpāda* therefore means that phase of the process of the development when a new form is assumed. *Vyaya* is losing the previous form. Here also it is different from absolute disappearance. It only means that phase in the process of development where the earlier form is replaced by the succeeding one. *Dhruva* refers to the persistence of the essential nature of Dravya which undergoes development and which makes both *Utpāda* and *Vyaya* simultaneously possible. In fact the process of development includes all the three phases. This fact is not only recognised by the scientists like Darwin and Spencer, but by the great French philosopher, Bergson, who raised it to an important philosophical principle. Lastly, Dravya is the substratum of qualities and modes. Attributes and modifications will have no basis if they do not rest on something real. This does not mean that Dravya is merely a prop, supporting an alien fact, the attribute. The attribute is the thing and the thing has the attribute. The attribute is the thing and the thing has the attribute, but still the Jainas do not admit that the attributes alone are sufficient to constitute a reality. For them *esse* is not *percipi*. Attributes in order to be objective and not merely psychical do require an objective basis. Such a basis Dravya is. Finally it is to be noted that these three characteristics are inseparable from one another. *Sattā* pre-supposes *Utpāda*, *Vyaya*, *Dhruvatva*, and also is the substratum. Similarly process of development implies *Sattā*, which again cannot be existing apart from qualities and modes. Neither of the three can exist apart from the other two. In short the three characteristics express the same essential nature of Dravya in three different ways.

## 11.

Then Dravya is examined from two points of view :

1) Dravyārthika Naya, the aspect of substance, and 2) Paryāyārthika Naya, the aspect of change or development.

उत्पत्तीव विनाशो द्रव्यस्य य णत्थि अत्थि सत्त्वभावो ।

विगमुत्पाद-ध्रुवत्वं कर्तेति तस्सेव पञ्जाया ॥११॥

[उत्पत्तिर्वा विनाशो द्रव्यस्य च नास्त्यस्ति सद्भावः ।

विगमोत्पादध्रुवत्वं कुर्वन्ति तस्यैव पर्यायाः ॥११॥]

11. Dravya in its reality can neither be created nor destroyed; it has only permanent substantiality. But through its modes, it secures the triple qualities of permanence, appearance and disappearance.

COMMENTARY—According to Dravyārthika Naya, Dravya, e.g., gold can neither be created nor destroyed. It exists and that is all. But the ornaments and other things made of gold are the Paryāyas or modes. These may change; one ornament may be melted and a new one be made. The disappearance of the previous ornament is Vyaya and the appearance of the new ornament is Utpāda, and yet all the while there is the same gold Dhruva. Dravya then has both the qualities, permanence and change, it is permanent as Dravya and changing as Paryāya.

### 12.

Then it is pointed out that there is no fundamental difference between Dravya and Paryāya, substance and its mode

पञ्जयविजुदं द्रव्यं द्रव्यविजुता य पञ्जया नस्ति ।

दोषं अणुणभूवं भावं समणा परूवेति ॥१२॥

[पर्ययवियुतं द्रव्यं द्रव्यवियुक्ताश्च पर्याया न सन्ति ।

द्वयोरनन्यभूतं भावं धमणाः प्ररूपयन्ति ॥१२॥]

12. There is neither substance without mode nor mode without substance. The one cannot be without the other, so say the Śramanas.

COMMENTARY—Though there is a difference between substance and its mode from the points of significance, quality and utility, yet the one cannot exist apart from the other as the difference is not fundamental. For example, an ornament which is the Paryāya of gold is different from gold in Samjñā or significance, in Laksana or attribute, and in Prayojana or utility. But still there can be no ornament apart from gold and gold apart from some form or mode of it. The relation between Dravya and Paryāya is the same as the relation between matter and form. No matter without form and no form without matter.

### 13

Next he establishes the identity of substance and qualities.

द्रव्येण विना न गुणा गुणेहिं द्रव्यं विना न संभवति ।

अव्यतिरिक्तो भावो द्रव्यगुणाणं हवति तस्मात् ॥१३॥

[द्रव्येण विना न गुणा गुणैर्द्रव्यं विना न संभवति ।

अव्यतिरिक्तो भावो द्रव्यगुणानां भवति तस्मात् ॥१३॥]

13. There is neither quality without substance nor substance without quality; hence

these two are not incompatible in their nature

COMMENTARY—Though the quality and the qualified are different in appellation, they are not really different in nature, as both refer to the same real fact.

14

Then he describes the *Pramāṇa Sapta-bhaṅgī* the seven forms of Predication about Reality.

सिद्ध्यति णत्थि उह्यं अव्वत्तत्वं पुणो य तत्तिदयं ।

दव्वं तु सत्तभंगं आदेसवसेण संभवदि ॥१४॥

[स्यादस्ति नास्त्युभयमवतव्यं पुनश्च तत्तितयम् ।

द्वयं तु सप्तभङ्गमादेशवशेन सम्भवति ॥१४॥]

14. According as *Dravya* is viewed from different aspects of reasoning it may be described by the following propositions :—1) Perhaps it is, 2) Perhaps it is not; 3) Perhaps it is both (is and is not), 4) Perhaps it is indefinable, 5) Perhaps it is and is indefinable; and 6) Perhaps it is not and is indefinable; and 7) Perhaps it is and is not and is indefinable.

COMMENTARY—*Sapta-bhaṅgī* or the seven-aspected logical predication is an important doctrine of *Jaina* logic. The same object may be described by seven distinct propositions. These are the seven possible ways of a *priori* description. We cannot have another proposition about an object which cannot be brought under any one of the seven propositions. The complex nature of a real object or *Dravya* is amenable to description by the above seven and only seven propositions. To have a complete description then, the thing must be taken in all the seven ways. In each case it is the same fact that is the subject of the propositions which are certainly diverse in nature. That only means that different and apparently conflicting ideas may be predicated of the same subject. This is possible only in *Anekānta* philosophy.

The different propositions are all beginning with the term *syāt* which means *perhaps*. The proposition aims, at the most, only at probable truth. *Jaina* logicians were evidently extremely cautious. With the consciousness of seven possible predications they would never assert anything categorically about anything. Absolute categorical assertion may be justified in *Ekānta* philosophy. But the *Jaina* thinker in his dread of such absolutist attitude never hesitated to emphasize his relativistic philosophy even at the cost of verbal redundancy.

The prefix *syāt* therefore saves the proposition from becoming an absolute assertion. The quality predicated is probably or perhaps true. The predication is accepted provisionally with the full recognition that the same may be denied and that other ideas may be affirmed of the subject.

1. The proposition *Syādaṣṭi Dravya* means that existence is affirmed of a thing

from the point of view of its own *dravya* or essence. Essential characteristic may be safely affirmed of a thing. The affirmation has meaning with reference to its own *ksetra* or place, i.e., you can say that "a thing is" when you refer to its place of existence. Similarly the proposition is significant with reference to its own *kāla*. You can affirm the existence of a being during its life-time. Again affirmation is significant if reference is to its *bhāva* or quality. The quality of a thing can be safely predicated of the thing. Hence the proposition *Syādaṣṭi Dravya* is an affirmation about the *Dravya* with reference to its own *Dravya*, (substance), *Ksetra* (place), *Kāla* (time) and *Bhāva* (quality).

2 *Syānnāṣṭi Dravya* (perhaps the thing is not). This proposition is a negation about a thing from the point of view of *para-dravya* (alien substance), *para-ksetra* (alien place), *para-kāla* (alien time) and *para-bhāva* (alien quality), i.e., you can have a negative proposition of a thing in the following manner :—

1. X is not Y (Para-*Dravya*).
2. X is not in Y (Para-*Ksetra*).
3. X is not now (Para-*Kāla*). i.e., it ceased to exist or it is not yet born.
4. X has not the quality Y, i.e., (Para-*Bhāva*.)

3. *Syādaṣṭmāṣṭi Dravya* (perhaps the thing is and is not). Both the conflicting predicates may be applied to the same subject, provided the following condition is satisfied. The affirmed predicate must refer to *sva-dravya* (its own substance), *sva-ksetra* (its own place), *sva-kāla* (its own time) and *sva-bhāva* (its own quality). And the predicate denied must refer to *para-dravya* (other substance), *para-ksetra* (other place), *para-kāla* (other time) and *para-bhāva* (other quality).

4. *Syādavaktavyam Dravya* (perhaps the thing is beyond description). There is no word which would bring out the implication of both the affirmation and negation of a thing at the same time. *Avaktavya* should not be interpreted to be absolutely indescribable for then *avaktavya* itself would become meaningless. It only refers to the impossibility of finding an idea which would include both the thesis and the antithesis at the same time.

5. *Syādaṣṭi-avaktavya* (perhaps the thing is and is beyond description). When reference is made to *sva-dravya*, *sva-ksetra* etc., the thing exists and hence the affirmation; and when reference is made at the same time to *sva-para-dravyas*, *sva-para-ksetra* etc., the thing becomes beyond description and when attention is directed to both the above-mentioned aspects, affirmation and indefinability will be the fifth *bhāga*, namely :—perhaps a thing is and is beyond description.

6. *Syānnāṣṭi-avaktavya* (perhaps a thing is not and is indefinable). Here the first reference is negation from the point of *para-dravya*, *para-ksetra*, etc. Secondly, the reference is to the indescribability and when both these characteristics, denial and indefinability are associated with the thing at the same time then the proposition "perhaps that it is not and is beyond description" becomes significant.

7. *Syādaṣṭi-nāṣṭi-avaktavya Dravya* (perhaps the thing is, is not and is indefinable).

Affirmation is with reference to *sva-dravya* etc. Negation is with reference to *para-dravya*. Indefinability when these two are taken at the same time. When all the three above characteristics are attended to together then the thing may be said to exist, and yet not to exist, and to be beyond description.

The seven principles are divided in the following manner.

1. *Pratyeka Bhāṅgas* (single principles).

- (a) *Syādaṣṭi*.
- (b) *Syānnāsti*
- (c) *Syādavaktavya*.

2. *Dvīsaṃyoga Bhāṅgas* (dual principle)

- (a) *Syādaṣṭināṣṭi*
- (b) *Syādaṣṭi-avaktavya*
- (c) *Syānnāṣṭi-avaktavya*.

3. *Trīsaṃyoga Bhāṅga* (triple principle).

- (a) *Syādaṣṭi-nāṣṭi-avaktavya*.

It is already mentioned that the Jainas accept only seven principles. Hence the following statement of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is condemned to be absurd.

सप्तषड्गीप्रसादेन शतषड्द्वयं जायते ।

“When seven principles are admitted then there may also be hundred” Jainas believe that the true nature of reality will be understood when it is viewed according to *Sapta-Bhāṅgi*.

15

There can be neither destruction of existing *Dravyas* nor creation of non-existing ones. Concepts of creation and destruction are applicable to substance only because of its qualities and modes. In this *Gāthā*, *Dravya* is shown to be permanent from *Dravyārthika Naya* and changing from *Paryāyārthika Naya*.

भावस्स णत्थि नासो णत्थि अभावस्स चेव उप्पादो ।

गुणपज्जयेसु भावा उप्पादवए पकुवन्ति ॥१५॥

[भावस्य नास्ति नाशो नास्ति अभावस्य चैव उत्पादः ।

गुणययिषु भावा उत्पादव्ययान् प्रकुर्वन्ति ॥१५॥]

15. There can be no destruction of things that do exist, nor can there be creation of things out of nothing. Coming into existence and ceasing to exist, things do have because of their attributes and modes.

COMMENTARY—For example, the atoms of gold that constitute the substance gold are subject to neither creation nor destruction. But there may be appearance and disappearance in the different forms and modifications of gold; the original form may be lost; and a new form may be assumed. One ornament may be destroyed and another

created What is true of inorganic things is also true of other Dravyas such as Jiva. Jiva as such is neither created nor can be destroyed. Its essence is eternal, but it may lose its original state of existence and come into a new state of life. Life then is continuity of existence through births and deaths. Thus Dravya as such is permanent and unchanging. But its forms and modes are perpetually changing. Hence Dravya may be described by both the attributes permanent and changing according to the respective aspects or Naya.

## 16.

Then Dravyas are further distinguished from their qualities and modes.

भावा जीवादीया जीवगुणा चेतना य उवओगो ।

सुरणरणारयतिरिया जीवस्स य पज्जया बहुगा ॥१६॥

[भावा जीवाद्या जीवगुणाश्चेतना चोपयोगः ।

सुरनरनारकतिर्यञ्चो जीवस्य च पर्यायाः बहुवः ॥१६॥]

16. Jiva and other Dravyas are reals. The qualities of Jiva are consciousness and *upayoga*, (perception and knowledge), which are manifold. The soul manifests in the following forms as Deva, as man, as a member of the Hell or as a plant or an animal.

COMMENTARY—The term *Upayoga* is used to denote Darśana and Jñāna. Darśana is perception and Jñāna is knowledge. Besides *upayoga* there is the quality of consciousness or thought or *cetanā*. *Cetanā* and *Upayoga* constitute the main qualities of Jiva. But according to Jaina thought, Jiva may be pure and perfect or impure and imperfect—Śuddha Jiva and Karma Jiva. Karma Jiva is not a distinct kind. It is the same Śuddha Jiva soiled by the Karma.

*Cetanā* or thought when associated with Śuddha Jiva would mean perfect thought to which there can be nothing opaque. *Upayoga* also will be Śuddha Jñāna—perfect perception and perfect knowledge. The whole of reality forms an object of perception to Śuddha Darśana and at the same time the whole reality is known to Śuddha Jñāna. Śuddha *Cetanā* and Śuddha *Upayoga*, consciousness, perfection, and understanding all perfect and pure, constitute the Svabhāva Guṇa—the intrinsic qualities of Jiva. These Svabhāva Guṇas are potentially present in all Jivas and explicitly manifest in Siddha Jiva or the Realised Self.

They very same Svabhāva-Guṇas get corrupt because of the interference of Karma. Then they become Vibhāva Guṇas of Jiva or the extrinsic qualities of Jiva. *Cetanā* and *Upayoga* become Aśuddha. The imperfect and the impure consciousness of man and other Samsāra states of Jiva is Aśuddha *Cetanā*. It is the Vibhāva Guna which must be got rid off before the self attains purity and regains its intrinsic Śuddha *Cetanā*. Similarly Śuddha Darśana and Śuddha Jñāna become Aśuddha in Samsāri Jivas. Sense, perception or Indriya Darśana and knowing or Aśuddha Jñāna are the forms of *Upayoga*.

which is corrupt This again is the Vibhāva Jñāna of Jīva The Vibhāva Guṇas accordingly are present in all Samsāri Jīvas, whereas the Svabhāva Guṇas are in the germ.

In a similar way Jīva has two main Paryāyas, Svabhāva or Śuddha Paryāya, Vibhāva or Aśuddha Paryāya The Siddha state, the state of purity and perfection, is the Svabhāva Paryāya, whereas all Samsāra states are Vibhāva Paryāyas

The distinction between qualities and modifications or states of existence may also be illustrated with reference to other Dravyas

17.

Next it is pointed out again that though things have origin and decay from the point of forms or modes, they have no change in essence.

मनुसत्तणेण णट्ठो देही देवो हवेदि इदरो वा ।

उभयत्थ जीवभावो ण णत्सदि ण जायदे अण्णो ॥१७॥

[मनुष्यत्वेन नष्टो देही देवो भवतीतरो वा ।

उभयत्र जीवभावो न नश्यति न जायतेऽण्यः ॥१७॥]

17. If a soul departs from the human state it becomes either a Deva or some other living being In either case (during death or birth), it does not lose its intrinsic nature.

COMMENTARY—When the original form is lost, the soul does not lose its own nature with the passing form and when it puts on a new form it does not get a new nature with its coming form. In spite of origin and decay of forms the soul maintains its nature and identity.

This view of soul rejects the two false views, Ksanika Ekānta and Nitya Ekānta. The former maintains that there is a different self at every moment as the Buddhist believes The Jaina view rejects this as untenable because it recognises the change with Paryāya or Guna and not with Dravya Nitya Ekānta view maintains that the self is absolutely permanent and unchanging, and that all changes are illusory This view also is rejected by the Jainas For them Jīva maintains its identity through the changes of Guna and Paryāya.

18

The same fact is again explained from the point of Nayas or principles of understanding

सो चेव जादि मरणं जादि ण णट्ठो ण चेव उप्पण्णो ।

उप्पण्णो य विणट्ठो देवो मणुसो ति पज्जाओ ॥१८॥

[स एव याति मरणं याति न नष्टो न चैवोत्पन्नः ।

उत्पन्नश्च विनष्टो देवो मनुष्य इति पर्यायः ॥१८॥]



18. Though the soul experiences both birth and death, yet it is neither really destroyed nor created. Origin and decay refer respectively to the disappearing Deva state or the appearing human state and these are only its Paryāyas or modes.

COMMENTARY—From the Dravyārthika principle there is neither birth nor death for the Jiva has an indestructible essence which cannot be annihilated even by the hand of Time. Origin and decay are applied to Jiva only from the point of Paryāyārthika Naya.

### 19.

Then the different states of existence and their time limits are described.

एवं सदो विणशो असदो जीवस्स णत्थि उप्पादो ।

तावदिओ जीवाणं देवो मणुसो त्ति गदिणामो ॥१९॥

[एवं सतो विनाशोऽसतो जीवस्य नास्त्युत्पादः ।

तावज्जीवानां देवो मनुष्य इति गतिनाम ॥१९॥]

19. Thus neither an existing thing is liable to death or destruction, nor a non-existing one can come into being. The Jiva has the Deva state or human state as the effect of the Gatnāma-karma and the duration of each state is conditioned by its own Nāma-karma.

COMMENTARY—The Ātmā in itself has neither beginning nor end, and yet it will take infinite forms. Each form of existence will be of a particular Gati. Gati is a general class of beings. Four such classes are recognised by the Jāmas, Manusya, Deva, Nāraka, and Tiryak Gatis. The birth of Ātmā into any one of these forms is entirely conditioned by a particular kind of Karma. This Karma which leads the soul to take forms according to the different Gatis is called Gatnāma-karma. The form and the duration of life are dependent upon the quality and the strength of this Nāma-karma.

When the particular Nāma-karma exhausts its efficiency, the particular form of life brought about by that Karma ceases to exist, and the soul puts on another form, that is, enters into another Gati, as determined by the new Nāma-karma acquired during the previous life. Thus Ātmā is like an actor who takes several parts on the stage. Forms are put off and put on while the actor is one and the same. Through all the changing forms the soul maintains its identity and nature for which there is neither birth nor death. And finally when the Ātmā gets liberated from the Karmas it still maintains its everlasting nature, of course, pure and perfect.

### 20.

It is pointed out that the soul which by liberation from Karma attains Moksa is not absolutely distinct from the soul which was in Samsāra.

For a gem purified is not fundamentally different from its own state before purifi-

cation. The gem is the same though free from dirt.

ज्ञानावरणादयो भावा जीवेन सुदृढ अणुबद्धा ।  
तेसिमभावं किञ्चा असूदपुण्वो हवदि सिद्धो ॥२०॥

[ज्ञानावरणाद्या भावा जीवेन सुदृढ अणुबद्धाः ।  
तेषामभावं कृत्वाभूतपूर्वो भवति सिद्धः ॥२०॥]

20. Jiva on account of his Bhāva Karma or an impure emotional state may get utterly bound by the Karmas such as Jñānāvaraniya (the knowledge-clouding Karma). (Then he becomes a Samsāri Jiva). But he may (through the realisation of his own nature) completely liberate himself from that bondage and then attains a state unknown to him before the state of perfection

COMMENTARY—Though gold, may be different from brass, yet it is mixed with it. In the same way Jiva pure in itself gets bound by Karmas. The initial condition is its own impure heart called Bhāva Karma. On account of this psychological state, the Dravya Karmas, or the different kinds of Karmic matter, are attracted and get deposited on the Jiva, thereby shrouding its light and glory.

When the Jiva is so bound by Karmas it undergoes a series of manifestations. But finally by realising its true nature it may liberate itself from Karmic shackles and get Nirvāna. When once this stage is reached there is no fear of coming back to Samsāra. Jīvas do not assume the doctrine of the *fall of man*. Every Jiva to begin with is a Karma-Jiva and Nirvāna is a unique state to be acquired anew and for the first time. The state of nature is not a state of freedom. It is a state of bondage. Jiva finds itself in chains; and by its own exertion secures freedom.

## 21.

Then it is stated that the Ātmā with the manifestation of Guna and Paryāya (attributes and modes) will lose its existing nature and assume a new state of existence according to the Paryāyārthika Naya.

एवं भावमभावं भावाभावमभावाभावं च ।  
गुणपञ्जयेहि संहिदो संसरमाणो कुणदि जीवो ॥२१॥

[एवं भावमभावं भावाभावमभावाभावं च ।  
गुणपर्ययैः संहितः संसरन् करोति जीवः ॥२१॥]

21. Thus the Jiva with its attributes and modes, roaming in Samsāra, may lose its particular form and assume a new one. Again this form may be lost and the original regained.

COMMENTARY—Dravya or substance has the quality of identity and difference. It is permanent while changing. Jiva Dravya is capable of taking different forms or Paryāyas.

This process of Paryāyic change is Samsāra. In the series of Samsāra with reference to a particular Jīva there is the passing away of old forms and the coming in of new ones. These changes of forms do not pre-suppose the loss of identity of the Jīva. The very same Jīva as an individual survives after each change thus maintaining its self identity. Samsāra for the Jaina is not the manifestation of a single self as the Vedāntin would have it. Infinite number of Jīvas each having its own Paryāyas constitute the total of Samsāra. At any particular moment the simultaneous and co-existing forms of different Jīvas will make up the Samsāra of that moment which means the organic world the mankind and the Devas and the Nārakas and animals and plants of that moment.

## 22.

After describing the Dravyas in general by way of introduction the author is going to speak about Kāla or time which is indispensably related to the five Astikāyas. Before going to the description of time, the author re-capitulates the five existences or Astikāyas in relation to which only time has relevancy and meaning.

जीवा पुद्गलकाया आवासं अस्थिकाइया सेसा ।

अमया अस्थित्तमया कारणभूता हि लोगस्स ॥२२॥

[ जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः आकाशमस्तिकायो सेषौ ।

अमया अस्तित्वमयाः कारणभूता हि लोकस्य ॥२२॥ ]

22. The souls, the material bodies, space, together with the remaining two, Dharma and Adharma, are the uncreated existences that constitute the world. These are the Astikāyas.

COMMENTARY—The infinite number of souls, the infinite number of physical bodies, space and the two physical principles of (Dharma and Adharma) of motion and rest :— these are the constitutive elements of the world. These are uncreated and eternal. Jains recognise the reality of space. To complete the world they also pre-suppose the two principles of motion and rest called by them Dharma and Adharma.

## 23.

Then Time is described. It is the instrument of change in the above five Astikāyas. This is real Time or absolute Time. From these changes we have the perception of duration and intervals which corresponds to relative or Vyavahārika Time. Real Time is also a matter of inference from the changes in the above Astikāyas.

सन्भावसंभावणं जीवाणं तह य पोगलानं च ।

परियट्टणसंभूदो कालो णियमेण पणत्तो ॥२३॥

[ सद्भावस्वभावानां जीवानां तथैव पुद्गलानां च ।

परिवर्तनसंभूतः कालो नियमेन प्रपन्नः ॥२३॥ ]

23 That on account of which these existences, the Jivas, material bodies, the Dharma and Adharma undergo changes is called real time or Kāla-Dravya

COMMENTARY—Time is of two kinds, real and relative. Birth, growth and decay of things are possible only because of the former absolute time. The relative Time is made up of conventional periods measured by unit based upon those changes. This is merely an aspect of real time which is constituted by Instants. This is unconditional and absolute

First of all the distinction between absolute and relative time reminds one of Newton's distinction. The idealist for whom the world of concrete experience is illusory may speak of time as a form of experience. But one who accepts the reality of the concrete world and its changes, must also admit the reality of Time. Jainas being realists do recognise the reality of time. If change is real, again, Time must also be real. It is the instrument of creative evolution as Bergson would say. And lastly the absolute or real time is constituted by instants which correspond to the points of space and particles of matter. In fact, these three classes of elements, points, instants, and particles have important function in the Jaina System of Philosophy. It is also worth noticing that modern realist led by the Mathematical Philosophers admits the doctrine that space is real and is made up of points. Time is real and is made up of Instants or moments, and the physical world is real and is made of particles. And these doctrines form the fundamental concepts of the Jaina view of the world.

## 24

Next the account of real time of which the conventional time is a form or mode,

ववगदपणवणरसो ववगददोर्गंधअट्टफासो य ।

अगुरुलहुगो अमुत्तो वट्टणलक्खो य कालो त्ति ॥२४॥

[व्यपगतपञ्चवर्णरसो व्यपगतद्विगन्धाष्टस्पर्शश्च ।

अगुरुलघुकोऽमूर्तो वर्तमानलक्षणश्च काल इति ॥२४॥]

24. What is without the five colours, and the five tastes, without the two smells, and eight contacts, what is neither heavy nor light and has the character of introducing changes in other things is time.

COMMENTARY—Time has meaning for and existence in the world. It is made up of Instants or *kālānus*. The Instants have neither colour, taste, nor touch. The qualities associated with physical objects cannot be applied to it. These constitute a 'continuous compact series'. The time series formed by Instants is one dimensional in the language of the Mathematicians, that is why Time is denied *Kāyatva* by the Jaina Philosopher. Time which is so constituted by Instants is called *Mukhyakāla* or absolute time. It is also described by the following terms—*Paramārthakāla*, the great unconditioned time, *Niscayakāla*, true time, *Dravyakāla*, real time. It is one of the six *Dravyas* or the Reals

## 25.

Then the account of relative Time which is measured by changes in the physical object or in the Jivas. This conventional Time is merely a *Parāya* of real time and is conditioned by the above changes.

समयो निमिसो कट्वा कला य नाली तदो दिवारत्तो ।

मासोदुअयणसंवच्छरो ति कालो परायत्तो ॥२५॥

[समयो निमिषः काष्ठा कला च नाली ततो दिवारान्तरम् ।

मासत्वयनसंवत्सरमिति काल परायत्तः ॥२५॥]

25 *Samaya*, *Nimisa*, *Kāṣṭha*, *Kalā*, *Nālī*, then (*Muhūrta*), day, month, season, *Ayana*, and, *Samvatsara* and other periods of Time are all *Vyavahāra* or conventional time. These are determined by other objects.

*Samaya* or moment (which is the manifestation of infinite number of ultimate distants).

*Nimisa* which is made up of innumerable such moments

*Kāṣṭha* which is equal to fifteen *Nimisas*

*Kalā* which is equal to thirty *Kāṣṭhas*.

*Nālī* which is a little over twenty *Kalās*:

*Muhūrta* which is equal to two *Nālīs*

*Day and Night*, equal to thirty *Muhūrtas*.

*Month* which is equal to thirty days

*Season* which is equal to two months.

*Ayana* Half year equal to three seasons.

*Samvatsara* a year which is equal to two *Ayanas*

COMMENTARY—The different periods enumerated in this *Gāthā* are the conventional periods measured by different units. These are artificial distinctions introduced into the continuous time series of real time. The units which determine the conventional distinctions are generally the changes in the objects of the physical world or of the organic world. Winking of the eyelid, the diurnal motion of the sun across the heavens (which is only apparent according to modern Astronomy) and the motion of the moon round the earth are some of the important changes of physical objects which have been traditionally associated with conventional period of measurements. Because of these conventional distinctions, relative Time is said to be *parāyatta* 'dependent on other things,' but still it is merely a form of real time which is an unconditioned *Dravya*. *Vyavahāra* *Kālā* is said to be conditioned in a way. It is called *kathāritu parāyatta*, somewhat conditioned.

26.

Then is explained what is meant by somewhat conditioned in the case of relative Time.

नस्थि चिरं वा क्षिप्यं मत्तारहितं तु सा वि खलु मत्ता ।

योगलद्वयेण विना तस्मात् कालो पदुच्चभवो ॥२६॥

[नास्ति चिरं वा क्षिप्यं मानारहितं तु सापि खलु मत्ता ।

पुद्गलद्वयेण विना तस्मात् कालः प्रतीत्यभवः ॥२६॥]

26. Duration of time either long or short is impossible apart from a standard of measurement. The standard of measurement also has no meaning apart from material objects. Hence conventional or relative time is brought about by extraneous conditions.

COMMENTARY—Vyavahāra Kāla or conventional time consists of periods of duration which may be either short or long. This distinction of length of periods is not intrinsic. It is entirely due to external conditions such as the moments of the physical bodies. Therefore though time as such is unconditioned Vyavahārikāla is certainly conditioned by alien objects. Thus Time as such is the instrument of change or Parināma in the five existences of the world, while itself has the Vyāvahārika Paryāyas measured by the changes of the other objects.

Here ends the Introductory Chapter of the Pañcāstikāya Prābhṛta.

CHAPTER I

27

After describing the Dravyas in general the author examines them in detail. He takes up Jiva Dravya first, for that is the most important.

जीवो ति हवदि चेदा उवजोगविसेसिदो पहू कत्ता ।

भोक्ता य देहमत्तो ण हि मुत्तो कम्मसंजुत्तो ॥२७॥

[जीव इति भवति चेतयितोपयोगविशेषितः प्रभुः कर्ता ।

भोक्ता च देहमात्रो न हि मुर्तः कर्मसंयुक्तः ॥२७॥]

27. The soul has the following attributes. It has Life, Consciousness, Upayoga, (knowledge and perception) and is Potent, performs actions, and is affected by their results, is conditioned by his own body, is incorporeal and is ordinarily found with Karma.

COMMENTARY—The author enumerates nine attributes. These attributes are true not only of Sopādhi Jivas, but also of Nirupādhi Jivas. The enumerated attributes refer to Sopādhi Jiva—the Jiva that has Upādhi or limitations. Of course the author implies also

the correlative nine attributes of the Nirupādhi Jiva or the liberated soul.

The attributes relating to Sopādhi Jiva are :—

- 1) *Life, i.e.,* living with Daśa-prāṇas or ten life principles.
- 2) *Cetanā* or consciousness, *i.e.,* the ordinary finite consciousness which is associated with will and emotion, *viz.,* acting and enjoying
- 3) *Upayoga.* Upayoga is the manifestation of *Cetanā* in the act of understanding. Jñāna and Darśana are the two Upayogas, Knowledge and Perception. These two modes of the understanding are intimately related to Karmic changes. The relation may be said to be in inverse *ratio*. They decrease in intensity and quality as the Karmic veil becomes thicker and stronger. If the Karmas decay or disappear then the Upayogas have the chance of fuller manifestation.

4) *Lordship* or the capacity to assume different states of existence in Samsāra. He is the architect of his own life.

5) *Katā* He is the doer of his own Karmas—both Dravya and Bhāva (Physical and mental Karmas).

6) *Bhoktā.* He is the enjoyer of the fruits of his own Karmas

7) *Dehamātra.* Being embodied he may be said to be of the same dimensions as the body.

8) *Amūrta* : is incorporeal, being spiritual by nature.

9) *Karma-samyuktah* is born with Karmas, being a Samsārī Jiva.

Similarly we have the nine corresponding attributes of the Nirupādhi Jiva or the liberated soul :—

1) Living the life of pure and perfect existence

2) Having the consciousness which is infinite in contentment.

3) *Śuddha Upayoga* : He has the pure modes of Kevala Jñāna and Kevala Darśana, perfect knowledge and perfect perception.

4) *Lord*. He is the true Lord because of the freedom acquired by annihilation of Karmas.

5) *He is the true Katā* or Doer, being independent of and undetermined by extraneous conditions ; Self-determined

6) *Is the enjoyer* of the eternal and infinite bliss begotten of the complete realisation of self.

7) *Is the approximate size* of the body possessed by him last.

8) *And yet is without form*, being spiritual and being free from all Karmas or physical qualities.

9) *And is Karma-nirmukta* is absolutely free from the bondage of Karma

Thus the author in a single *gāthā* describes the two kinds of Jivas, each with the nine qualities.

28.

कर्ममलविष्णुमुक्तो उद्धं लोगस्स अंतमधिगता ।  
 सो सव्वणाणदरसी लहदि सुहमणिदियमणंतं ॥२८॥  
 [कर्ममलविप्रमुक्त ऊर्ध्वं लोकस्यान्तमधिगम्य ।  
 स सर्वज्ञानदर्शी लभते सुखमन्निन्द्रियमनन्तम् ॥२८॥]

28. Ātmā which is free from the defect of Karma gets to the highest point of the universe, knows all and perceives all, and obtains the transcendental bliss everlasting

COMMENTARY—Of the nine attributes the attribute of lordship is taken first for explanation. It is known by experience and by the study of scriptures that Soul is the lord of his own attributes and states of existence. Impurity of the heart or false faith may lead him into Samsāra. The Lordship should not, therefore, be interpreted only with the reference to the fall from a high estate. Even when he is in the right path, the path that takes him to the never-before-experienced bliss, everlasting, he is the Lord of his own destiny. He is not to be imagined merely as a drift wood carried up and down by the waves in the Ocean of Samsāra. That would make him helpless in the hands of extrinsic Karmic forces. No. He is the Creator, the Karmas themselves owe their existence to his will. Hence he is his own Lord whether he walks the path of righteousness or chooses the other one. Ātmā is his own maker and Lord.

Jaina philosophy is peculiarly associated with its own cosmogony. Heavens and hells are arranged in an order. The soul that gets liberation quits the place, rises up to the summit of Loka where he retains his abode. This Dogma is referred to in the Gāthā. As the natural and inevitable result of self-realisation the true Lordship of the soul consists in inheriting the abode of bliss at the summit of the world.

29.

Then it is mentioned that this everlasting heavenly bliss is secured by Ātmā by his own efforts without any extraneous help.

जादो सयं स चेदा सवग्गहू सव्वलोगदरसी य ।  
 पप्पोदि सुहमणंतं अक्खाबाधं सगममुत्तं ॥२९॥  
 [जात. स्वयं स चेतयिता सर्वज्ञः सर्वलोकदर्शी च ।  
 प्राप्नोति सुखमनन्तमव्याबाधं स्वकममूर्तम् ॥२९॥]

29. Thus Ātmā becoming omniscient and all perceiving through its own effort obtains the infinite bliss which transcends sense experience which is free from any imperfection, which is spiritual and self-determined.

COMMENTARY—This Gāthā goes with the previous one and states that infinite bliss is



an acquisition of the self through its own exertions. This brings out the quality of Prabhutva or lordship, over one's own destiny

## 30

After the description of the attribute Prabhutva we have an account of Jivatva or Life characteristic. Here the author adopts the Vyāvahārika point of view and describes the characteristics of organic beings in Samsāra.

प्राणैर्ह चतुर्हि जीवदि जीवस्सदि जो हु जीविदो पुर्व्व ।

सो जीवो प्राणा पुण बलमिदियमाउ उस्सासो ॥३०॥

[प्राणैश्चतुर्भिर्जीवति जीवव्यति य. खलु जीवितः पूर्व्वम् ।

स जीवः प्राणाः पुनर्बलमिन्द्रियमायुरुच्छ्वासः ॥३०॥]

30. Whatever thing manifesting through four Prāṇas (or principles of organism) is living at present, will continue to live in the future, and was living in the past, that same is Jīva. Again the Prāṇas are Bala, or strength, Indriya or the senses, Āyuh, or the age and Ucchvāsa or respiration.

A living organism must have these four Prāṇas or life principles. You cannot think of a living being devoid of these characteristics. Hence the author trying to describe the nature of life as we know it, enumerates the four fundamental characteristics of organic life. These are :—

1. Balaprāṇa or strength which consists of
  - (a) Manobala or strength of mind.
  - (b) Vāgbala or strength of speech.
  - (c) Kāyabala or strength of body.
2. Indriya-prāṇas are the senses :
  - (a) Sparśa or contact sense through skin
  - (b) Rasa or taste through tongue.
  - (c) Ghrāṇa or smell through nose.
  - (d) Śabda or sound through ears.
  - (e) Cakṣu or vision through eyes
 Thus the Indriyas are five.
3. Āyuh Prāṇa which is the duration or age of life and it is one.
4. Ucchvāsa or respiration is one.

Thus the four Prāṇas become ten Prāṇas when details are taken into consideration. These Prāṇas need not all of them with all the details be present together in an organism, i.e., there may be an organism which has not all the five Indriyas. But there must be the four main characteristics. These Prāṇas are generated by the respective Karmas. The number and quality of the Prāṇas will be determined by the Karmic differences. These are considered to be the characteristics of soul, only from Vyāvahārika point. The

particular Vyavahāra point adopted here is called by the Jaina Philosopher, *anupacarita-asadbhūta-vyavahāranaya* i.e., non-conventional and relative aspect of attending to the unessential nature of a thing, i.e., these characteristics do not belong to Ātmā according to the principle of absolute reality or *Suddha Nīścayanaya*.

## 31-32.

Next he enumerates the general and special characteristics of Jīva, the characteristics both manifested and unmanifested

अगुरुलघुगा अणंता तेहिं अणंतेहिं परिणदा सव्वे ।  
 देसेहिं असंखादा सियलोगं सव्वमावण्णा ॥३१॥  
 केचित्तु अणावण्णा मिच्छादंसणकसायजोगजुदा ।  
 विजुदा य तेहिं बहुगा सिद्धा संसारिणो जीवा ॥३२॥  
 [अगुरुलघुका अनन्तास्तेरनन्तैः परिणताः सर्वे ।  
 देशैरसंख्याताः स्याल्लोक सर्वमापन्नाः ॥३१॥]  
 [केचित्तु अनापन्ना मिथ्यादर्शनकषाययोगयुताः ।  
 विद्युताश्च तैर्बहवः सिद्धाः संसारिणो जीवाः ॥३२॥]

31-32. The spiritual qualities of Jīva are infinite. Jīvas assume different forms through the manifestation of these infinite attributes. Taking the point of world-space some souls through their complete manifestation may fill the whole world. Others are not so fully manifested. These are filled with false faith-blinding emotions, erroneous knowledge and perception. The former class of souls are free from these defects and are called the perfect ones. And the latter are the Samsāri, Jīvas or the imperfect ones. Each class contains infinite number of individuals.

COMMENTARY—That spiritual principle on account of which the Jīva Dravyas continue to manifest through all their different forms is called Agurulaghutva-guna. On account of the explicit manifestations of these attributes Jīvas have the chance of becoming complete and perfect. The number of Jīvas is infinite. They have their abode only in the Lokākāśa. A soul developed to perfection is called Siddha. That stage represents absolute freedom from Karmas. The other class consists of Samsāri Jīvas. According to Jainas each class contains infinite number of individuals.

If we employ the terminology of modern philosophy we have to characterise the system as pluralistic. The souls are not only different and distinct in their Samsāric state but also in the perfect state. A soul may become perfect, may acquire by self-manifestation infinite number of qualities and still it preserves its own individuality. Individuality and perfection are not incompatible. Hence according to the Jaina system realisation of Paramātmā does not mean absolute nullification of self-identity. That means several Paramātmās or perfect souls may co-exist.

This attitude of uncompromising pluralism is evidently due to the extraordinary emphasis laid on individual conduct by the Jaina system. Bhakti and Jñāna are inadequate either severally or jointly to lead the soul to Mokṣa. Cāritra or conduct is the indispensable third to constitute Mokṣamārga. If individuality is merely phenomenal appearance, moral value will also become purely relative. Ultimate reality may be complete without conserving moral value which becomes merely an unessential characteristic confined to the world of appearance. Any system that attaches great importance to moral value, that believes that reality would be incomplete without the conservation of values, cannot afford to play with individuality and must necessarily be pluralistic explicitly or implicitly

## 33

Next he explains the characteristic that soul is of the same dimensions as its own body which is acquired through Karmas. He explains it by analogy.

जह पञ्चरायरणं खित्तं खीरे पभासयदि खीरं ।

तह देही देहत्थो सदेहमेत्तं पभासयदि ॥३३॥

[यथा पञ्चरागरत्नं क्षिप्तं खीरे प्रभासयति खीरम् ।

तथा देही देहस्य स्वदेहमात्रं प्रभासयति ॥३३॥]

33 Just as the lotus-hued ruby when placed in a cup of milk imparts its lustre to the milk, so Ātmā residing in its own body imports its lustre or intelligence to the whole body

COMMENTARY—Ātmā is in itself non-spatial hence it is not accurate to ask “Where does it reside in its body?” It pervades through the whole body. If it is located in any particular part of the body, the parts away from its residence will have to be somehow related to consciousness. The Jaina system avoids the whole difficulty by considering the soul to be completely pervading in its own body. This pervading is not to be interpreted as a sort of physical expansion. It is merely spiritual manifestation still the relation of consciousness is intimate with its own body which is physical and spatial. Ātmā is considered to be a Kāya. But this Kāyatva would not make it physical. It is distinctly defined to be spiritual.

## 34.

This characteristic of co-extensiveness with the body is true in its present as well as its past and future states or forms. Then the author mentions the substantiality of the soul, its distinctness from the body and the reason of its different states of existence.

सच्चत्थ अत्थि जीवो ण य एक्को एक्ककाए एक्कट्ठो ।

अज्झवसाणविसिट्ठो वेट्ठुदि मलिणो रजमत्तेहि ॥३४॥

[सर्वत्रास्ति जीवो न चैक एककाये ऐक्यस्य ।

अध्यवसानविशिष्टश्चेष्टते मलिनो रजोमलः ॥३४॥]

34. Jiva pervades the whole body. Still he is not one with the body though when functioning, he is identical with it. Impelled by gross emotions, stained by Karmas he puts on different forms in the cycle of Samsāra.

COMMENTARY—The term *sarvatra* is again interpreted to mean all the different bodies taken up by a soul during different births. Then the Gāthā will be interpreted slightly differently. The very same soul exists in all its different bodies. It is one with its body and yet distinct from them and so on. Again *sarvatra* may mean in all parts of the world. Then the interpretation will have to be as follows .—

*sarvatra* In all parts of the world

*atthi* Jiva exists

There are Jivas everywhere, i e., in all parts of the world

The Jivas *na ekko* are not identical as they are distinct entities *ekko* and yet they are one and identical, *ekkaṭṭho* as they are substantially similar to one another, etc., i e., they are one, from the generic point of view but different from the specific point of view. Though the Ātmā has continued to exist, and has an embodied existence from time immemorial, it is in its spiritual nature entirely distinct from its corporeal habitation. It puts on a body because of Karmas and thus it roams in the world of Samsāra.

### 35

Next, the characteristic of *amūta* or incorporeality This quality is real absolutely in the case of a Siddha Jiva who is free from all taint of matter, karmic and non-karmic, whereas the other Jivas, though in themselves *amūtas*, are ordinarily associated with Mūrta Dravyas or physical characteristics

जैसि जीवसहावो णत्थि अभावो य सच्चहा तस्स ।

ते हौंति भिण्णदेहा सिद्धा वचिणोयरमदीदा ॥३५॥

[येषां जीवस्वभावो नास्त्यभावरश्च सर्वथा तस्य ।

ते भवन्ति चिन्मदेहा सिद्धा बाणोच्चरमतीताः ॥३५॥]

35 Those Jivas which have not the life principles (Dravya Prānas or the sense organs) and yet are not altogether devoid of them (as the Bhāva Prānas are intact) are the ones that are free from corporeal limitation and they are the perfect ones beyond description.

COMMENTARY—The body is the limiting condition of Ātma Pradeśa or the dimension of Ātmā The size of the perfected soul is said to be little less than that of its last body for it is free from the *yoga*, the principle which brings about contraction and expansion or shrinking and diffusing It may be said to be merely an assemblage of pure

knowledge and other qualities of perfection.

36.

That Siddha state is shown to be neither the cause nor the effect of the Samsāra series. It being absolutely unconditioned cannot be an item of the conditioned series of causation.

ण कुदोचि वि उप्पण्णो जस्सा कज्जं णं तेण सो सिद्धो ।  
उप्पादेदि ण किञ्चि वि कारणमवि तेण ण स होदि ॥३६॥  
[न कुतश्चिदप्युत्पन्नो यस्मात् कार्यं न तेन स सिद्धः ।  
उत्पादयति न किञ्चिदपि कारणमपि तेन न स भवति ॥३६॥]

36 The Siddha is not to be born again at any time in Samsāra. Hence he is not to be an effect (he is not to be causally determined by anything else). Nor is he to bring about a change in anything else, therefore he is not a cause either.

COMMENTARY—Siddha has secured the absolute Amūrta State, the state of perfect spirituality and is incapable of maintaining causal relation with the Samsāra series. The latter is determined by Karmic conditions. The former is not so conditioned. The causal category which is true of the conditioned series is not to be applied to the unconditioned reality. The argument is the same as that employed by Kant with the reference to the Thing in itself. What is true of the experience need not necessarily be true of the *metaempirical*. The Siddha state then is transcendental Self.

37.

Then he states that the soul maintains its intrinsic nature and is real even in its Siddha or perfect state. Thus the Buddhist view of Nirvāna as the annihilation of self is condemned and rejected.

सस्सदमथ उच्छेदं भवमभव्वं च सुण्णसिद्धरं च ।  
विण्णानमविण्णानं ण वि जुज्जदि असदि सव्भावे ॥३७॥  
[शाश्वतमथोच्छेदो सव्यमभव्वं च शून्यमितरञ्च ।  
विज्ञानमविज्ञानं नापि युज्यते असति सद्भावे ॥३७॥]

37. That he is infinite in perfection and yet finite with reference to temporal life, that he is born into perfection and yet dead from Samsāra; that he is the *negation* of all extrinsic qualities and still the affirmation of his own intrinsic nature; that he has knowledge perfect and yet devoid of knowledge imperfect; these eight attributes will not be associated with him if 'Nirvāna' is interpreted nihilistically.

COMMENTARY—As we said above, this Gāthā defends the Jaina view of Self against the nihilistic interpretation of the Buddhists. Even in Siddha state the self does not lose

its 'sadbhāva', substantial reality

It is only perfection of the already existing true nature which is in the germ in the finite self. Complete evolution is no annihilation. There must be more of its real nature and not less

With this ends the Amūrta characteristic of Jiva.

38.

Next the characteristic of *cetanā*. The author notices the three forms of *cetanā* or consciousness.

कर्मणां फलमेवको एवको कज्जं तु णाणमध एवको ।

चेदयदि जीवरासी चेदयभावेण तिविहेण ॥३८॥

[कर्मणां फलमेक. एक. कार्यं तु ज्ञानमर्थकः ।

चेतयति जीवराशिश्चेतकभावेन त्रिविधेन ॥३८॥]

38. One kind of Jiva experiences merely the fruits of Karma, pleasure-pain Another experiences conative activity as well, still another has pure and perfect knowledge. Thus consciousness is manifested in three-fold awareness.

COMMENTARY—The first two states of experience are related to Samsāri Jiva, for they have reference to Karma; whereas the third has reference to pure *cetanā* Svabhāva, and hence is associated with the perfect one. The implicit recognition by the author of the three different aspects of consciousness feeling, activity, and knowledge, is worth noticing from the point of modern Psychology.

39.

Then he specifies the Jivas according to the three aspects of consciousness noticed above.

सब्बे खलु कम्मफलं थावरकाया तसा हि कज्जजुवं ।

पाणित्तमदिवकन्ता णाणं विदन्ति ते जीवा ॥३९॥

[सर्वे खलु कर्मफलं स्थावरकायास्तसा हि कार्ययुतम् ।

पाणित्वमतिक्रान्ता. ज्ञानं विन्दन्ति ते जीवा. ॥३९॥]

39. Indeed all fixed organisms like plants experience merely feeling, but the moving ones, the animals have besides feeling, conative experience Whereas those that transcend the organic conditions or Prāpas experience pure knowledge.

COMMENTARY—Plants are fixed and incapable of movement, and can therefore only suffer the environmental changes. They can only feel the mechanical and climatic stimuli around. The moving organisms because of their movement are capable of experiencing their own activity. In their experience then there is besides feeling, the consciousness of

activity, whereas to experience pure thought, there must be complete absence of physical and organic conditions. Such a being is certainly the Mukta Jiva.

After the wonderful discoveries of Dr. Bose with reference to plant life, it is not necessary to defend the proposition that plants are capable of feeling. Western science, though it recognised the organic nature of plants, was very much reluctant to admit the correlative organic characteristic of feeling in plants. This is only another phase of the Cartesian prejudice with reference to plants and animals. Descartes was responsible for the view that animals were skilfully created automata or machines. Darwin gave a death blow to this philosophical superstition; and Bose did the same service to the plant world and thereby distinctly established the fundamental unity of the organic world; and this is the thesis presupposed in the above Gāthā.

Thus ends the discussion of Cetanā characteristic of Jiva.

#### 40.

Then the quality of Upayoga or the instrument of knowledge Jñāna and Darśana—understanding and perception.

उचभोगो खलु द्विविहो जाणेण य दंसेणेण संजुत्तो ।

जीवस्स सत्त्वकालं अणणभूदं वियाणीहि ॥४०॥

[उपयोगः खलु द्विविधो ज्ञानेन च दशनेन संयुक्तः ।

जीवस्य सर्वकालमनन्यभूतं विजानीहि ॥४०॥]

40. Upayoga the instrument or means of knowledge is twofold—Jñāna or, understanding and Darśana or perception. It is inseparable from and always present in Jiva. So do thou learn its nature.

COMMENTARY—One of the commentators says that this Gāthā is addressed to a disciple who is a Naiyāyika. Perception and understanding are essentially related to Jiva. There can be no Jiva which has not perception and understanding, similarly the faculties cannot exist apart from the self. This is the view of the author. He rejects the view that the faculties are adventitious and acquired.

#### 41.

Then the author describes the different species of Jñāna which is one of the Upayogas referred to in the previous Gāthā

आभिजिसुदोघिमणकेवलानि जाणाणि पंचभेयाणि ।

कुमदिसुदविभंगाणि य तिण्णि वि जाणेहि संजुत्ते ॥४१॥

[आभिनिबोधिक्भुतावधिमन पर्ययकेवलानि ज्ञानानि पञ्चभेदानि ।

कुमतिभुतविभङ्गानि च त्रीण्यपि ज्ञानेः संयुक्तानि ॥४१॥]

41. Ābhinibodha (knowledge obtained by congenital mental capacity), Śruta (knowledge obtained by study), Avadhī (a kind of clairvoyant knowledge of events in different places and in different times), Manah Paryāya (telepathic knowledge of another's mind), and Kevala Jñānā (the perfect knowledge) These are the five kinds of right Knowledge. But, when the first three are associated with the error or Ajñāna, they form three kinds of erroneous knowledge, Kumati, Kuśruti, Vibhanga Avadhī, and are included in the forms of knowledge.

COMMENTARY—Matī Jñāna refers to sense perception and the inferential knowledge based upon it. Śruta Jñāna is knowledge based upon testimony obtained mainly through books. Avadhī Jñāna is an abnormal faculty of perception, but the perception is not conditioned by sense organs. It is supposed to comprehend things and events of different places and of different times. The faculty is able to project itself either to the past or to the future. This form of awareness is quite analogous to sense perception. This in a way corresponds to the clairvoyant capacity possessed by certain "mediums." Manah Paryāya is the capacity of knowing the ideas in another's mind. This corresponds in a way to telepathy of modern psychology. This gives an insight into mental facts of persons at a limited distance—the distance limit being conditioned by the strength and the quality of the faculty. This should not be confounded with inferential knowledge obtained from facial expression. And lastly Kevala Jñāna is the perfect knowledge which is associated with the Siddha State. The first two are distinctly conditioned by sense perception, whereas the other three transcend sense limitations. The last is absolutely free from any kind of physical conditions, whereas the other four are still associated with corporeal existence. Avadhī and Manah Paryāya are the super-normal faculties acquired under peculiar psycho-physical conditions. The normal and super-normal cognitive faculties which correspond to the revelations of modern psychic research are not facts to be passed over without notice.

#### 41\*1.

Then the five Jñānas are described in detail. First Matī Jñāna is taken.

मदिषाणं पुण तिविहं उवलद्धी भावणं च उवलोगो ।

तह चेव चदुवियप्पं दंसणपुल्लं हवदि णाणं ॥४१\*१॥

[मतिज्ञानं पुनस्त्रिविधं उपलब्धिभावना च उपयोगः ।

तथैव चतुर्विकल्पं दर्शनपूर्वं भवति ज्ञानम् ॥]

41\*1. Matījñāna is of three kinds —Upalabdhī or perception, Bhāvanā or memory, Upayoga or understanding. It is also said to be of four kinds. This Jñāna is always preceded by sense presentation or Darśana.

COMMENTARY—This Matījñāna is certainly consequent upon sense perception. It includes as the Śūtra says apprehension of the object, memory, and understanding, i e.,



all that is given to us through sense perception and all that we elaborate out of these sense-elements in memory and imagination. Though it is mainly of three kinds it is also considered to be of four different forms. For example the author of *Tattvārthasūtra* speaks of *avagraheṇvā-dhāranāḥ*. This four-fold division is not fundamentally different from the previous division. *Avagraha* implies the sense datum, e.g., Perceiving a thing to be white through the eyes is *Avagraha*. To attempt to determine what that white object is, is *ihā*. This *ihā* refers to the indecisive mental attitude where several alternative determinations are possible. Finally when the thing is determined, i.e., out of several alternatives when one is chosen because of certain special characteristics perceived in the white object then we have *avāya*. This implies the inferential element in all perception. This should not be confounded with mediate inference about other things through sense perception. The very same act of perception involves all these three stages. And lastly whenever we remember these things after sometimes it is called *dhāranā*. This *Matijñāna* consists of 336 forms when viewed according to different principles of Division

## 41\*2.

Then *Śrutajñāna*, knowledge by testimony and not by acquaintance. The objects of this knowledge may be *Mūrta* and *Amūrta*, Physical and non-physical.

सुवर्णाणं पुण जाणी भणंति लब्धी य भावणा चेव ।

उवओगणयवियप्पं जाणेण य वत्थु अत्थस्स ॥४१\*२॥

[श्रुतज्ञानं पुनर् ज्ञानिनः भणन्ति लब्धिश्च भावना चैव ।

उपयोगणयविकल्पं ज्ञानेन च वस्तु अर्थस्य ॥]

41\*2. The wise say that *Śruta Jñāna* is of four kinds—*Labdhi*, or association, *Bhāvanā* or attention, *Upayoga* or understanding of things and *Naya* or the aspects of their meaning

COMMENTARY—Of these four forms of *Śrutajñāna* or knowledge by testimony, the first is *Labdhi*. This corresponds to association of ideas. *Labdhi* is defined to be the process of getting the meaning of one idea through its associated idea. *Bhāvanā* is the direction of attention to one idea with a view to get at the associated idea. *Upayoga* is the process of understanding the meaning of ideas consequent upon *Bhāvanā*. *Naya* is viewing the meaning from different relations. The first three are concerned with the psychic process of acquiring knowledge through the ideas contained in books. The last is the way of understanding things from different aspects. This *Naya* plays a very important part in Jain system of thought. This and the *Sapta Bhaṅgi* mentioned above are the two pillars of Jain Logic. The *Nayas* also are of seven different kinds. In order to distinguish the seven *Nayas* these are called *Naya Sapta Bhaṅgi* as contrasted with *Pramāṇa Sapta Bhaṅgi*. *Naya* is defined in *Naya-Vivaraṇa* thus :

नीयते गम्यते येन श्रुतार्थाः स नो नयः ।

That by which the various aspects of the meaning of the scripture are understood is for us the Naya or principle. This Naya or principle of interpretation is mainly of two kinds: 1. Dravyārthikanaya, that pertaining to Dravya or substance, 2. Paryāyārthika Naya, that pertaining to modifications. Agam Dravyārthikanaya is further sub-divided into three kinds: 1. Naigama, 2. Samgraha, 3. Vyavahāra. The Paryāyārthika Naya is sub-divided into four kinds: 1. Rjusūtra, 2. Śabda, 3. Samabhirūdhā, 4. Evambhūta. These seven may be explained in detail,

### 1. Naigamanaya

Nigamah or Samkalpah or purpose — That which pertains to *nigamah* or purpose is Naigama-naya. It may be said to be the Teleological aspect of a continuous activity. When the purpose of the activity is taken to represent the whole series then it is Naigama-naya. It is defined in the Sūtra

अग्निवृत्तार्थे संकल्पनात्प्रगृही नैगमः ॥

Thus when a person who is drawing water or who is busy carrying firewood is questioned 'What are you doing?' He answers 'I am cooking.' Here he is not actually cooking but it is the purpose which accounts for his action of carrying firewood or drawing water, vide Pūjyapāda's Commentary, *Sarvārthasiddhi*, Sūtra 33 of Ch I. This Naya is misunderstood by M D Desai (*Nayakarnikā*) and by S C Vidyabhusana (*Nyāyāvatāra*).\*

These passages give an entirely different interpretation of this *naya*. It is very clearly explained and illustrated by Pūjyapāda in his *Sarvārthasiddhi*—Sūtra 33 of the first chapter. The same explanation and also the same illustrations are adopted by another commentator of the same Sūtra, Śrutasāgara, the author of *Śrutasāgarīyam*, an unpublished commentary on *Tattvārthādhigama*. My own explanation is based upon these authorities and also on the great work on Logic, *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*. I consulted *Syādvādamahārī* also of the Benares Edition, page 166 and Bombay Edition of Rāyachandra Jaina Granthmālā, page 198. Here also the same interpretation is found. If in a series of qualities or action any part is taken as the representative of the whole, this representative aspect is Naigama. The derivation given by Mr. Desai may also mean the same *naiko gamo yasyeti*—*Naigama*. "The particular that is not restricted to itself, but goes beyond itself to unify and represent the whole."

This representative character is of course not to be identified with either the mere universal or particular. It is different from both. When a person is making preparations to start on journey, we say 'He starts.' At the moment of the statement he is not starting, but is going to start. Similarly 'He dwells here,' need not mean that the person must be actually be in the residence at the moment;

### 2. Samgraha.

स्वजात्यविरोधेनैकत्वमुपनीय पर्यायानाक्रान्तभेदानविशेषेण समस्तग्रहणात्संग्रहः — (तत्त्वार्थसूत्र)

स्वजात्यविरोधेनैकत्वमुपनीयार्थानाक्रान्तभेदानस्मस्तग्रहणात्संग्रहः ।

\*Naigama Naya (vide) *Nayakarnikā* pages 7, 8 of introduction and 43

Also *Nyāyāvatāra* pages 27 and 47

Samgraha is the class view. When several things which are similar in essence and which are not incompatible with one another are brought together under one class concept we have Samgraha Naya. Thus the name pot refers to the whole class of individual objects which go by that name. Similarly the idea of Dravya. From the point of Dravya characteristic (Permanency through change) the term Dravya refers to several entities, living and non-living, which are all taken as one class.

### 3. Vyavahāra

संग्रहनास्तितानामर्थानां विधिपूर्वकमवहरणं व्यवहारः ॥ (Tatvārtha.)

संग्रहीतार्थानां विधिपूर्वकमवहरणं विभजनं भेदेन प्ररूपणं व्यवहारः ॥ (Prameya.)

Vyavahāra is the process of examining the objects which are brought together under one class according to the different rules of Logic. This would specially enquire into the several species which constitute the whole genus. Examination of the specific Dravyas, Jiva Dravya and Ajiva Dravya, which both belong to Dravya genus would be an illustration for Vyavahāra Naya.

### 4. Rjusūtra.

ऋजु प्रगुणं सुन्नयति तन्नयति इति ऋजुसूत्रः ॥ (Tatvārtha.)

ऋजु प्राञ्जलं (व्यक्त) वर्तमानक्षणमात्रं सुन्नयति (बोधयति) इति ऋजुसूत्रः ॥ (Prameya.)

That which clearly expresses a momentary state is Rjusūtra Naya. This would take into consideration only the present state of a thing 'It is very pleasant now.' This proposition predicates something which is true of the subject only at the moment of the predication. Such an aspect of a thing is Rjusūtra Naya.

### 5. Śabda Naya

लिङ्गसंख्यासाधनादिव्यभिचारनिवृत्तिपरः शब्दनयः ॥ (Tatvārtha.)

कालकारकलिङ्गसंख्यासाधनोपग्रहभेदादभिन्नम् अर्थ शपतीति शब्दो नयः शब्दप्रधानत्वात् ॥ (Prameya.)

Words though differing in tense, voice, gender, number and instruments may point to the same thing i.e. refer to the same meaning. This aspect of the identity of meaning in spite of differences noted above is Śabda Naya.

### 6. Samabhirūḍha

नानार्थसमभिरुद्भात् समभिरूढः ॥

This refers to merely synonyms which though interpreted according to their derivation may refer to the same identical thing.

### 7. Evambhūta.

That which describes a particular action or capacity of a thing. Though the thing has not that particular aspect at the time of judging, the name obtained because of that action is still applicable to the thing, according to this principle.

Again the Nayas are divided into six kinds. Thus we have Śad nayas Dravyārthika Naya is also called Nis̥caya Naya or the real aspect. Paryāyārthika Naya is called

Vyavahāra Naya or the relative aspect. The former is further sub-divided into *Śuddha* and *Asuddha*. Thus we have *Śuddha Nīścaya Naya* and *Asuddha Nīścaya Naya*. *Vyavahāra Naya* is divided into *Sadbhūta* and *Asadbhūta*. Each again determined as *Upacarita* and *Anupacarita*. Thus we have four kinds of *Vyavahāra Naya*:—

(1) *Upacarita Sadbhūta*, (2) *Anupacarita Sadbhūta* (3) *Upacarita Asadbhūta* (4) *Anupacarita Asadbhūta*. The term *Vyavahāra* is added to each at the end. These six Nayas are specially employed in the examination of the characteristics of *Ātman*.

(1) *Śuddhamīścaya Naya*. That the soul is identically the same whether in *Samsāra* or in *Moksa* because of its intrinsic characteristics of *Jñāna* and *Darśana* is a statement according to this *Naya*.

(2) *Asuddha Nīścaya Naya*: to believe that the soul is characterised by gross emotions in its *Samsāric* state is true according to *Asuddha Nīścaya Naya*.

(3) *Upacarita Sadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*. The opinion that the soul has the *cetanā* modification of *Matijñāna* etc., is true because of the *Upacarita Sadbhūta Vyavahāra*. That the soul has *Matijñāna*, is relative and figurative though pertaining to a quality which is in a way real.

(4) *Anupacarita Sadbhūta Vyavahāra*. That the soul has the modification of *Kevala Jñāna*.

(5) *Anupacarita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*. This corresponds to the inseparable accident of the scholastic logic, for example, this is my body. Body is identified with self according to this particular *Naya*.

(6) *Upacarita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*. This corresponds to the separable accident of scholastic logic, for example, this is my house. House is identified with the self according to *Upacarita Asadbhūta Vyavahāra Naya*.

These Nayas refer to the different relations that the several attributes have to the self. The soul owns these several attributes according to these several Nayas. That special aspect of possessing is different in different cases and the different Nayas define the several relations which may be real or relative, which may be pure or impure; which may be separable or inseparable and so on.

#### 41\*3.

Then *Avadhī* is described in detail.

ओहि तहेव घेष्यदु देसं परमं च ओहिसत्त्वं च ।

तिणिण वि गुणेण नियमा भवेण देसं तथा नियदं ॥४१\*३॥

[अर्वाधि तथैव गृह्यतां देशं परमं च अवधिसत्त्वं च ।

त्रयोऽपि गुणेन नियमात् सत्त्वेन देशं तथा नियतम् ॥]

41\*3 Thus *Avadhī* also is of three kinds. *Deśāvadhi*, *Paramāvadhi* and *Sarvāvadhi*.

All the three are conditioned by Psychic qualities. But Deśāvadhi is also conditioned by birth in the case of Deva and Nāraka.

COMMENTARY—Deśāvadhi is the very limited faculty of perceiving things beyond sense perception. It is able to apprehend only a limited number of things within a limited space and within a limited time. Paramāvadhi is the higher Avadhi Jñāna which is free from such limitations. But the last, Sarvāvadhi is the perfect faculty which perceives all reality. This is associated with the perfect self. These three faculties are respectively acquired by psychic development, i.e., as long as certain Psychic qualities are present these metemperical faculties spontaneously manifest themselves. But in the case of the last, when once it is acquired, it becomes permanent and everlasting. Whereas the first is also present as a matter of birth right in Devas and Nārakas, i.e. they need not acquire it by special Psychical effort and development. But in the case of man and some higher animals it is to be acquired by developing the psychical nature.

Thus Deśāvadhi is said to be of two kinds: Gunapratyaya and Bhavapratyaya, conditioned by Gunas or Psychic qualities and by Bhava or Birth. Gunapratyaya Deśāvadhi is associated with man and animals and Bhavapratyaya with Deva and Nāraka.

Gunapratyaya is again divided into six kinds,—

1. *Anugāmī* (the following)
2. *Ananugāmī* (not following)
3. *Vaiśyamāna* (the growing)
4. *Hīyamāna* (decaying or decreasing)
5. *Avasthita* (limited or bounded).
6. *Anavasthita* (unlimited or indefinite)

The first is that which enlightens the things while marching as the sun does.

The second is that which sticks to one and the same thing as the fixed idea of an insane person. In the first attention is continually flowing from things to things whereas in the second it is rivetted to the very same thing.

The third is that which begins like a spark of light and grows into a huge flame gradually lighting up a number of objects.

The fourth implies the opposite tendency in the faculty. Here the faculty gradually decreases like fire going out.

The fifth is the faculty that neither increases nor decreases but is limited and definite because of the *samyak* qualities of the soul.

The sixth is the opposite of the fifth. It is unlimited and indefinite. It is wavering hither and thither like a column of fire or water that is subject to heavy gust of wind.

Then the description of Manahpariyāya.



value of goodness.

2 The second stage is the stage of retrogression. A person may advance in the path of evolution and become a *Samyagdr̥ṣṭi* (the fourth *Gunasthāna*). This stage is the opposite of the first. It is only from this stage (the fourth) onwards that a person is capable of having either truth or goodness. But sometimes a soul, after reaching the fourth stage which is really the next step from the first, may have the misfortune of spiritual degeneration. He may slip down to the bottom of the ladder. This process of slipping down is the stage of *Sāsādana*.

It is only a transition period. The person will very soon settle down in the first stage. Hence the second stage does not really mean the next slip from the first. So also the third stage is the spiritual oscillation between first and fourth. It is also a transition stage.

3. The third stage represents the mixed quality. The characteristics of the first and of the fourth stage get inextricably mixed together. The spiritual character is indeterminate. A person cannot be brought under either the first class or the fourth class. Hence it is called *Miśraḡunasthāna*.

4 The fourth stage represents the beginning of the spiritual well being. Here is the possibility of truth and goodness. But still there is not active effort to elicit true thought and good conduct. The absence of this effort is associated with the right spiritual disposition. The ladder is called *Samyaktva*. A person who is in this stage and who is without the effort to exhibit the innate powers is *Asamyāta Samyagdr̥ṣṭi*.

5. The fifth stage represents partial effort to draw out the spiritual powers. In this stage a person has not only the desirable spiritual disposition but also makes some effort towards further development. He is called a *Deśanīti*.

6 The sixth stage represents whole-hearted effort. Complete and possible control over self is associated with the true bent of the spirit. But still the whole-hearted good will is not yet free from tempting desires and impulses. There is the chance of these impulses getting the mastery for there is not yet complete renunciation. Hence this stage is *Piamaṭṭa Samyāta*.

7 The seventh stage is called *Apiamaṭṭa Samyāta*. In this stage the tendency to be attached by the outer things is thoroughly overcome. Spiritual strength is firmly established. Spirit has conquered the body. This stage is the critical stage in the spiritual evolution. From here begins the double path of higher spiritual evolution. One path leads to absolute perfection. And the other relative perfection. The former is associated with the annihilation of Karmas. The latter with the suppression of them. The former is called *Kṣapaka Śrenī* the ladder of annihilation, the latter is called *Upaśama Śrenī*—the ladder of pacification of Karmas.

*Manahparyaya-Jñāna* appears only in a person who has reached this critical stage of higher spiritual evolution.

Hence it must be considered as an extraordinary psychic quality acquired only after reaching a high stage of spiritual evolution. Before proceeding to describe the characteristics of the other stages of evolution let us note the further qualities of Manahparyaya. This psychic capacity is peculiarly limited by time and space. Though it is higher than ordinary mental faculty, though it is supernormal still it should not be considered even a approaching Kevala Jñāna. Of the two kinds of mind-knowing Vipula Matī is considered to be greatly superior to the other. The limitations given are as follow —

*Rjumatī Manahparyaya* from the point of time has a lower limit as well as a higher limit. In its lower limit it may apprehend the thoughts of another individual during his lifetime or it may extend to two or three Bhavas or births before and after. The upper limit is upto seven or eight Bhavas or births before and after. From the point of view of space its lower limit is to the radius of a *Gavyūti* or about two leagues and the upper limit is the radius of one *yojana*. The second, *Vipulamati* has the lower time limit of seven or eight births whereas the higher is innumerable. Its lower distance limit is round a radius of one *yojana* and its higher distance limit is upto *Mānuṣottara* mountain and not beyond that. This *Mānuṣottara Sāla* is according to Jaina Geography the limit of human habitation.

When we examine the limitations described above it is clear to us that the latter *Vipula Matī* is decidedly the higher supernormal faculty. Therefore the commentator's interpretation of *vipula* as *kūṭila* or crooked really means Rhythmic or undulatory manifestation. Whereas the former is straight and direct. The rhythmic manifestation is naturally capable of greater efficiency. This is illustrated by several rhythmic movements in Nature, as in the heartbeat. This Psychic faculty evidently through this rhythmic or undulatory manifestation is able to achieve better and higher results than those of *Rjumatī*.

8. The eighth stage represents the acquisition of a spiritual weapon called the first *Śukla Dhyāna*. This is an instrument by help of which Karmas are to be destroyed. This is a unique Psychic force never before experienced by the Self. Hence it is *Apūra Karaṇa*. This stage is represented in both the ladders of development : *Upaśamaka* and *Kṣapaka*, i.e., self in this stage may be in the path of annihilation or in that of pacification of Karmas.

9. The ninth stage represents spiritual warfare. Equipped with the weapon of *Śukla Dhyāna*, Self—the warrior, destroys the grosser desires. This spiritual warfare is also associated with both the paths of development.

*Bādara Saṃpāṇāya* *Sampārāya* means warfare : *Bādara* means gross; warfare or conflict with gross desires and impulses of this soul.

10. The tenth stage is the stage of the same spiritual warfare when the subtle impulses of the soul get destroyed. This stage also has representatives in either ladder, i.e., as the result of the spiritual struggle the gross and subtle desires may either be rooted out or suppressed. One who roots them out is *Kṣapaka* and one who suppresses them is *Upaśamaka*.



*Sūksma Samparāya* : Conflict with subtler impulses.

11. The eleventh stage is the stage where spiritual peace is secured, but here peace is the result of suppression. Hence it may not be quite secure. The spiritual harmony may yet be disturbed. If it gets disturbed then there may be the misfortune of slipping down again. But the fall will be to the Apramatta Guṇasthāna from which the two Śrenis branched off.

12. The twelfth stage represents the corresponding step in the ladder of annihilation, i.e. after the destruction of subtle and gross desires with the help of Śukla Dhyāna the self may pass on to *Kṣīma-kasāyasthāna* which is the twelfth. This is just below the stage of perfection.

13. This stage is certainly the stage of Perfect Emancipation. Kevala Jñāna is reached but there is still *yoga* (*manavacanākāya* or mind, speech and body). Hence this stage is called Sayogakevali, the Kevali who has still *yoga*.

14. The last is the stage where even this *yoga* disappears. The stage immediately after the disappearance of *yoga* is called Ayogakevali. The Siddha state is considered to be a transcendental stage. Therefore it is considered to be beyond this classification of Guṇasthānas. It is purely metemperical and therefore description by difference of degree will have no meaning with reference to this transcendental Ego.

#### 41\*5.

Then the Kevala-jñāna—the ideal knowledge. This is the result of the destruction of the four Ghātiya Karmas, co-existence with infinite qualities such as infinite bliss the desire of all the faithful and the pure and that which makes even a Devendra discontented in his own glory.

प्राणं ज्ञेयनिमित्तं केवलप्राणं न होति सुदृष्टाणं ।

ज्येष्ठं केवलप्राणं प्राणाप्राणं च न तस्य केवलिनो ॥४१\*५॥

[ज्ञानं ज्ञेयनिमित्तं केवलज्ञानं न भवति श्रुतज्ञानम् ।

ज्ञेयं केवलज्ञानं ज्ञानाज्ञानं च नास्ति केवलिनः ॥]

41\*5. Kevala Jñāna is knowledge par excellence. It is not conditioned by objects of knowledge. It is not even Śrutajñāna which is consequent upon study. To the person who has acquired perfect knowledge there is no diversity of knowledge. So let it be known.

COMMENTARY—Kevala Jñāna completely comprehends all Dravyas and all their modifications. The author of *Tattvārtha Sūtra* says *sarva-dravya-paripāyēsu kevalasya*. The infinite number of Jiva Dravyas, the infinite number of Physical bodies, the two physical principles of rest and motion and infinite space and time all become transparent to Kevala Jñāna. There can be nothing which is not comprehended by this knowledge.

The contents of this knowledge constitute the whole of reality. This is not conditioned by objects. It is absolutely self-determined. Therefore all the Dravyas and the Paryāyas are at the same time evident to Kevala Jñāna. This unconditioned simultaneous comprehension of reality makes it fundamentally distinct from Matī Jñāna or Śruta Jñāna and also from the other two. The other four jñānas are limited in efficiency and extent. And Kevala Jñāna knows no such limitations. Again Matī, Śruta, and Avadhī, are subject to degeneration and corruption. But Manahpariyaya and Kevala do not have any such tendency. But the capacity of Kevala Jñāna is infinitely higher than even Manahpariyaya. In short it is the absolute and unconditioned wisdom.

41\*6

After describing the five kinds of right knowledge (*Samyagjñāna*), the author mentions the three Ajñānas or the kinds of wrong knowledge.

मिच्छता अण्णाणं अविरदिभावो य भावभाववर्णा ।

जेयं पडुच्च काले तह दुण्णय दुप्पमाणं च ॥४१\*६॥

[मिथ्यात्वाद् अज्ञानम् अविरतिभावः च भावभाववर्णात् ।

जेयं प्रतीत्य काले तथा दुर्गमः दुष्प्रमाणं च ॥]

41\*6. If. Mithyātva which veils the faculty of perception of and faith in reality appears, then knowledge gets vitiated and becomes Ajñāna and the regulative principle of conduct also becomes corrupt. Again during the process of investigating reality the standard of truth and the methods of reaching it all become misleading and untrustworthy.

COMMENTARY—Mithyātva is the condition of Ajñāna. Its presence in a soul is responsible for several undesirable consequences. This Mithyātva may be innate or acquired. In the case of persons who have congenital Mithyātva their faculty of understanding is also corrupt from birth. They have innate Ajñāna : Kumati and Kuśruti. But in the case of persons who acquired this Mithyātva after losing Samyaktva, their right knowledge turns into erroneous one. The effect of Mithyātva is not confined to corrupting the faculty of understanding. It indirectly affects conduct also, such a person because of his Ajñāna is incapable of choosing the right path. Evil becomes his good. And lastly, even if there is any effort after truth, it ends in mere illusion so long as there is the primary source of evil, Mithyātva, intact.

42

After describing Jñānopayoga he goes on to speak about Darśanopayoga, the faculty of perception.

दंसणमवि चक्खुजुदं अचक्खुजुदमवि य ओहिणा सहियं ।  
अणिअणमणंतविसयं केवलियं चावि पणत्तं ॥४२॥

[दर्शनमपि चक्षुर्युतमचक्षुर्युतमपि चावधिना सहितम् ।  
अनिधनमनन्तविषय केवल्यं चापि प्रज्ञप्तम् ॥४२॥]

42. Perception or Darśana is of four kinds Perception through visual sensations, perception through non-visual senses, again that through the faculty of Avadhi, or clairvoyance, and lastly through Kevala or infinite perception, which is unlimited and apprehends all reality Thus is it described.

COMMENTARY—Darśana or perception implies merely the awareness that a thing exists It corresponds to knowledge by acquaintance. Understanding the reality thus apprehended is Jñāna. In a rough way, Darśana and Jñāna may be said to correspond to the sensibility and understanding of Kant's system. Thus understanding and perception apprehend things gradually one after the other. But in the case of Kevalis the two faculties are co-extensive with the complete reality. The whole existence is perceived and understood at the same time, and as there is no reality beyond such faculty, it is not necessary for such a person to attend to things one after the other.

## 43

After describing Jñāna and Darśana the author, in order to clear the doubt of a Naiyāyika student for whom substance and quality are absolutely distinct, explains that the distinction is only relative; and he also mentions the diversity of Jñāna.

ण वियप्पदि जाणादो जाणी जाणाणि होति जेगाणि ।  
तम्हा दु विस्सरुवं भणियं दवियं ति जाणीहि ॥४३॥

[न विकल्प्यते ज्ञानात् ज्ञानी ज्ञानानि भवन्त्यनेकानि ।  
तस्मात्तु विश्वरूप भणित द्रव्यमिति ज्ञानिभिः ॥४३॥]

43. The soul is not distinct from its attribute of Jñāna or knowledge, and because the ways of knowledge are diverse the world of reality or the universe is also said to be multiverse by the wise

COMMENTARY—There can be no knowledge apart from the knower. Self and its knowledge are inseparable. Again knowledge is also intimately related to the objects known There are diverse forms of knowledge This implies that the objects of knowledge are also diverse Hence from the point of view of objects, they are both one and many: one because of the common Dravyatva and many because of the different ways of apprehending objects. The proposition that the reality is one and also many is not self-contradictory according to the Jaina system; hence the statement that reality is uni-

verse is not incompatible with 'the reality is a multiverse.' The point emphasized in the gāthā is mainly the inalienability of the attribute from the thing.

## 44

Then he points out the absurdity of the view that substance and the attribute are entirely distinct

जदि हवदि दव्वमण्णं गुणदो य गुणा य दव्वदो अण्णे ।

दव्वणान्ति यमच्चवा दव्वाभावं पकुवन्ति ॥४४॥

[यदि भवति द्रव्यमन्यद् गुणतश्च गुणाश्च द्रव्यतोऽन्ये ।

द्रव्यानन्तमथवा द्रव्याभावं प्रकुर्वन्ति ॥४४॥]

44. If the substance is entirely separate and distinct from its qualities, then it may change into infinite other substances or again if the qualities can exist separate from their substance, there will be no necessity for a substance at all (In either way the result would be absurd)

COMMENTARY—The relation of substance and its qualities is an extremely difficult problem for a metaphysician

Some would emphasize the qualities to the detriment of substance and some would emphasize the substance at the cost of qualities. In either case the result would be absurd because of the false emphasis

We may have the world of unchanging reality of Parmenides or a world of eternal flux of Heraclites, but both these worlds are so far removed from the world of our concrete experience. In our world of concrete experience things and qualities are of equal importance. In fact the distinction is not absolute

There can be no qualities apart from substance nor substance without qualities. If substance is deprived of all its qualities and if it is still the possible substratum of qualities then different groups of qualities may get associated with that substratum, *i.e.*, the same substance has the chance of becoming infinite other substances.

This is a manifest absurdity. Or again if the attributes can float themselves without any fixing substratum then they would by their own combination constitute a thing and the category of substance is no more necessary. To think of reality as identical with qualities apart from the qualified thing is also equally absurd. On account of internal contradiction the view that qualities may be different from substance is condemned. The argument adopted by the author reminds us of Burkley and Hume

Burkley's argument against Locke's doctrine of substance similarly emphasizes the absurdity of an unknown 'x' which is substance for Locke. This unknown 'x' may get several determinations and thus may become several distinct things. But Burkley's main argument is slightly different from the author's. His attack on substance is based upon

the absurdity of abstract ideas. Again Hume after reducing the world to a group of sense-presented ideas points out the absurdity referred to in the latter half of the Gāthā by his doctrine that anything may be the cause of anything else.

Similar tendencies are not altogether absent in Indian thought. You have the one sided emphasis both in Vedantism and Buddhism. The idea of Nirguna reality and the principle of Ksanika Vāda are the two rival doctrines; and both are condemned by the author, qualityless reality and the qualities bringing about a new reality every moment are both untenable according to the author.

## 45.

Next the author rejects the following views:—

1. That substance and qualities are absolutely identical.
  2. That they are absolutely different.
  3. That they are absolutely identical and different at the same time.
- Then he establishes their conditional or relative identity and relative difference.

अविभक्तमण्णत्तं दब्बगुणाणं विभक्तमण्णत्तं ।

णेच्छन्ति णिच्चयण्हू तच्चिव्वरीदं हि व तेसि ॥४५॥

[अविभक्तमन्यत्वं द्रव्यगुणानां विभक्तमन्यत्वं ।

नेच्छन्ति निश्चयज्ञास्तद्विपरीतं हि वा तेषाम् ॥४५॥]

45. Those that know the truth do not recognise any of the following views as to the relation of substance and quality: that they are absolutely identical and inseparable; that they are distinct and separate in every way; and lastly that they are both distinct and identical at the same time.

COMMENTARY—The doctrine maintained by the author is that substance and quality are not distinct and separable in *rarum-natura*; but only in thought, and there too, the distinction is only relative, *i.e.*, the quality cannot be thought of as absolutely independent of substance. Still it can be attended to as distinct from the thing. Hence it is that the three views mentioned in the Gāthā are rejected.

## 46

From the point of view of Vyapadeśa etc., substance and quality are in an aspect distinct

ववदेसा संठाणा संखा विसया य होन्ति ते बहुगा ।

ते तेसिमण्णत्ते अणत्ते चावि विज्जन्ते ॥४६॥

[व्यपदेशाः संस्थानानि संख्या विषयाश्च भवन्ति ते बहुकाः ।

ते तेषामन्यत्वे अन्यत्वे चापि विद्वन्ते ॥४६॥]

46. The difference between Dravya and Guṇa, substance and attribute, may be determined by appellation, form, number, or locality. These determinants are various. They hold good among things and their attributes whether these are considered different or identical.

COMMENTARY—These differences hold good not only among different things but also in the case of a single complex thing which is capable of internal distinction.

(1) The difference due to Vyapadeśa or name is of two kinds

1. *Śasphī Vyapadeśa*. This is the relation of the sixth case or the possessive relation.

2. *Kāraka Vyapadeśa* due to causal relation.

(1) Each of these may be true of different things or of the same thing. The Possessive relation among different things is illustrated thus 'Devadatta's cow.' The same relation is illustrated by a single complex thing. 'The branch of a tree.' or 'Jinas' attributes' Here the possessive relation is distinctly internal in the very same thing.

(2) *Kāraka* or causal relation. This is also *Vyapadeśa* difference, *i.e.* difference due to Nomenclature or appellation. *Kāraka-samjñā* also holds good between two different things or in the same identical complex thing *Kāraka* or causal relation is recognised to be of six forms, *i.e.* in a complete causal relation six elements are implied—

1. *Kartā* or agent or subject
2. *Karma*, the object or effect
3. *Karana*, the instrument.
4. *Nimitta*, the purpose.
5. *Sakāśa*, the place from which the effect issues.
6. *Adhikarana*, the place in which the cause operates.

The illustration given below implies all these six elements

(a) Causal relation among different things See the following sentence :—

देवदत्त = Devadatta (*Kartā* or subject or agent).

फलम् = a fruit (*Karma* or object).

अङ्गुलीन = with the hook (*Karana* or instrument).

धनदत्ताय = for Dhanadatta (*Nimitta* or purpose).

वृक्षात् = from the tree (*Sakāśa* or the place of issue)

वाटिकायाम् = from the orchard (*Adhikarana* or the place of operation)

अवचिनोति = plucks down

This sentence illustrates the different aspects of causal relation that may exist among different things. The proposition "Devadatta plucks a fruit for Dhanadatta from a tree in his orchard with a hook" relates several independent things Whereas the next illustration shows how the same causal relation with the six elements may exist in an identical thing.

तदेव आत्मा (कर्तृ) आत्मान् कर्मतापन्नम् आत्मना (करणभूतेन) आत्मने निमित्तम् आत्मनः सकाशात् आत्मनि अधिकरणभूते ध्यायति ।

“Ātmā about himself with his self-reflection for his own purpose drawing out of himself and yet reposing in himself contemplates.” Here the causal relation is with reference to the same complex thing.

(2) Samsthāna—the difference of figure or form. This determinant also is illustrated with the different things and with the same thing

(a) Tall Devadutta's tall cow : The Samsthāna determinant is applied to two different things.

(b) The tall branch of a tall tree. Here the determinant is applied to the branch and the tree which are not two separate things. *mūrtadīvyasa mūrtaguna*. Here also the determinant Mūrta or visual form refers to Dravya and Guna which are not separate and distinct.

(3) Samkhyā or number.

(a) Devadatta's 10 cows. The quantitative difference here is between two distinct things—Devadatta and Cows

(b) But the quantitative difference may exist internally in the same thing as the 10 branches of the tree or the infinite attributes of Dravya.

(4) Visaya or locative difference.

(a) 'In the cowshed is the cow' Here the Visaya or the locality is external or Bheda-Visaya.

(b) Abheda-Visaya or the internal locative relation. 'In the substance are the qualities'

Thus the difference due to Vyapadeśa, Samsthāna, etc., is seen among different things or in the same thing which is internally differentiated. Hence when one kind of relation is implied it need not be confounded with the other. If substance and attributes are said to be different, this difference need not be interpreted to make the two distinct and separate. Hence the relation between substance and attribute can certainly be from one aspect a relation of difference and still the two need not be absolutely distinct. In short the relation between substance and attribute may be one of identity and difference. That this relation of identity in difference is not self contradictory is supported by analogy. The illustrations of the same thing internally differentiated given above justify the attitude of the author.

#### 47.

Again he speaks of the relation of ownership or possession. This relation may exist between two different things or in the same thing internally differentiated. Hence by analogy he brings out the Ekatva—Nānātva aspect of the relation.

णाण घणं च कुन्वदि घणिणं जह णाणिणं च दुविधेहि ।

भण्णंति तह पुवत्तं एयत्तं चावि तच्चण्ह ॥४७॥

[ज्ञानं धनं च करोति धनिन यथा ज्ञानिन च द्विविधाभ्याम् ।  
अणन्ति तथा पृथक्त्वमेकत्वं चापि तत्त्वज्ञाः ॥४७॥]

47. Just as Dhana and Jñāna (wealth and wisdom) make the owners Dhani and Jñāni (the rich and the wise) thus expressing two ways of relationship (unity and diversity) so also the relation between substance and qualities implies both the aspects of identity and difference. Thus say those that know the truth

COMMENTARY—One who owns Dhana or wealth becomes on account of that ownership a Dhani—the rich. Here too, different things because of the relation of possession are brought together, *i.e.*, because of possession there is union and again because of possession the things uniting must be different. Things may exist as separate and distinct when the relation may unite them or there may be single thing which because of the relation may get differentiated. The illustration of Dhana, Dhani is of the former kind. The illustration for the latter is Jñāna, Jñāni. The person to start with is one, but on account of this relation of possession the single entity gets differentiated. In order to be called Jñāni one who possesses Jñāna or wisdom the possessed thing must be differentiated from the owner. Otherwise the relation of ownership will have no meaning. Hence we have to admit that the relation of ownership implies both unity and diversity whether the things related are different or identical in themselves. Thus the author concludes that the relation between substance and its qualities exhibits both these characteristics. It is not incoherent to associate both the characteristics with the relation

48.

Then he points out the absurdity that would result if Jñāna and Jñāni (the knower and knowledge) are taken to be entirely distinct and separate

णाणी णाणं च सदा अर्थतरिदा दु अणमणस्स ।

दोण्हं अचेदणत्तं पसजदि सम्मं जिणावसदं ॥४८॥

[ज्ञानी ज्ञानं च सदायान्तरिते त्वन्योन्यस्य ।

द्वयोरचेतनत्वं प्रसजति सम्यग् जिनावसत्त्वं ॥४८॥]

48. If self and its knowledge are always substantially distinct one from the other, then each will become non-conscious or non-spiritual entity. That view being self-contradictory would undoubtedly conflict with the truth revealed by Jina.

COMMENTARY—Soul and knowledge are called spiritual or conscious entities only because of their identity. If the two are entirely absolute and distinct they would cease to be spiritual. Soul would be deprived of thought and hence will cease to be a conscious being and knowledge or thought *per-se* would have no association with the thinker and hence will become again non-spiritual. Thinker without thought would



be blind and thought without thinker would be chimerical. The person who maintains such a view would contradict himself because of his own thought: the Jaina view is free from such a contradiction.

Here we have to notice one important thing. "Jināvamataṃ" is not to be taken as the reason for rejecting the opposite view.

The real standard of truth or Pramāṇa is not the principle of revelation. Though no doubt the Jaina system of thought is very often referred to as revealed by Jina, the system is acknowledged to be true not because it is revealed by a great spiritual being but because the revelation is borne out by the nature of Reality.

Jaina thinkers therefore attach more importance to absence of self-contradiction than to revelation.

A doctrine must not contradict any previously accepted truth.

"Pūrvāpara-virodha" is the main thing that is dreaded by the Jaina thinker. Hence the author's rejection of the opposite view because it is inconsistent with Jaina thought is really based upon the internal self-contradiction involved in the rejected view. If it is interpreted otherwise then the Jaina position would become self-contradictory. When the Jaina rejects the Vedas of Brahmanic thought, though they are claimed to be revelation from the divine being, on the ground that they involve internal inconsistency, he cannot have recourse to the very same method of depending upon revelation. For according to his principle even revelation must stand on logical evidence

#### 49.

If Self and thought be really distinct then the two would never be able to constitute a single spiritual being even by the process of combination

ण हि सो समवायादो अत्यंदरिदो दु णाणदो णाणी ।  
अण्णाणि ति य वयणं एगत्तपसाधगं होदि ॥४६॥

[न हि सः समवायादर्थात्तरितस्तु ज्ञानतो ज्ञानी ।

अज्ञानीति च वचनमेकत्वप्रसाधकं भवति ॥४६॥]

49. If the Self is entirely distinct in nature from thought then he cannot become, even by combination with thought, Jñāni or the thinker. 'Unthinking thing' will still be the name denoting the identity brought about by the combination of substance and quality which are in themselves unthinking things.

COMMENTARY—If Self and thought are in themselves unthinking things then by combination they would still be unthinking. Consciousness is not to be derived from nonconscious elements existing severally or in combination. If thought is an adventitious characteristic of the self then before the acquisition of thought he must have been either Jñāni or Ajñāni (thinking or unthinking). If he is thinking then the combination with Jñāna is un-

necessary and useless. But if he be unthinking then, is that attribute "unthinking" again innate or adventitious? If it is adventitious, then the self cannot acquire thought for this attribute is incompatible with his former acquisition. If the unthinking quality is innate than the thinking quality may as well be taken to be innate. Thought then is not an adventitious attribute of the self. Self is Jñāni not as a result of combination of self and thought. Even the perfect knowledge Kevala Jñāna is innate in the soul, though it is veiled for the time being by the Karmas.

## 50.

Then since there is no other relation than identity between substance and quality the explanation by the principle of combination is shown to be unwarranted and absurd.

समवत्ती समवायो अपृथग्भूतो य अजुदसिद्धो य ।  
 तस्मा दन्वगुणाणं अजुदा सिद्धि रिति निहिता ॥५०॥  
 [समवत्तित्व समवायः अपृथग्भूतत्वमयुतसिद्धित्व च ।  
 तस्माद्द्वयगुणानां अयुता सिद्धिरिति निहिता ॥५०॥]

50. The relation between substance and quality is one of co-eval identity, unity, inseparability, and of essential simplicity. That is why the unity of substance and qualities is said to be not the result of union or combination.

COMMENTARY—The terms Samavāya implies mainly unity and also union. Union implies the existence of independent elements which constitute the unity. The elements must be prior to the unity. Then unity will be the result of combination. The relation between Guna and Gunin is not one of combination.

Hence though the author designates the relation by the term Samavāya he strictly excludes the other implication of the term. The term means nothing more than oneness or unity. Dravya and Guna, substance and quality, are merely the different aspects of the same reality and as such they must exist together without beginning and without end.

This eternal co-existence is implied by the term Samavāya. This co-existence of Dravya and Guna is termed Samavāya or unity by the author. The very same relation implies inseparability of the two though they are different in name. Hence is the relation called *apṛthag-bhūtatvam*. Again since the unity is not brought about by combination of two independent elements it has *ayuta-siddhatvam*. Therefore the relation is one of unity and not of union.

## 51-52.

Then he establishes by analogy that substance and quality though distinguishable in thought are not distinct in nature.

वर्णरसगंधासा परमाणुपरुविदा विसेसेहि ।  
 दब्बादो य अण्णा अणत्तपगासगा होंति ॥५१॥  
 दंसणणाणि जहा जीवणिबद्धाणि णण्णभूदाणि ।  
 ववदेसदो पुघत्तं कुव्वंति हि णो सभावादो ॥५२॥

[वर्णरसगन्धस्पर्शः परमाणुप्ररूपिता विशेषैः ।  
 द्रव्यतत्त्व अनन्याः अन्यत्वप्रकाशका भवन्ति ॥५१॥  
 दशनज्ञाने तथा जीवनिबद्धे अनन्यभूते ।  
 व्यपदेशतः पृथक्त्व कुस्तः हि नो स्वभावात् ॥५२॥]

51-52. Colour, taste, smell and touch are the qualities of the primary atom. They are not said to be really distinct from their material substratum though they are undoubtedly distinguishable from it as regards name, form, etc. In the same way perception and understanding are really inseparable from the self and are not distinct from it, though from the point of name, form etc., they may be spoken of as distinct from the substratum Ego. In short, though distinguishable in thought the faculties are not really distinct.

COMMENTARY—The author establishes the proposition that distinction in thought does not necessarily imply distinctness in nature. What may be distinguished by comparison may in reality exist in essential unity. This result is obtained by the principle of analogy. In the case of matter the qualities are not distinct and separate from the substratum, though they may be referred to by different names, by different forms, and so on. Exactly in the same way are the conscious qualities of perception and understanding related to Jiva. As attributes they are distinct from the ego and may be distinguished by name, form, number, etc. But still they are not really distinct from it.

Distinctness necessarily presupposes an underlying identity between the things compared. Apart from this identity there can be no comparison and distinction. What are distinct must really be identical. Hence *distinction* in thought instead of presupposing distinctness in nature, implies identity. This view of the author is borne out by modern thought. Thus ends the section dealing with the attribute of *upayoga*.

### 53.

The next section deals with the three remaining qualities of Jiva: *kartṛtva*, *bhokṛtva*, and *karma-samyuktatva* acting, feeling and being associated with Karmas. In the beginning the author describes the nature and number of Jiva Dravya which is the substratum of all the nine attributes.

जीवा अणाइणिहणा संता णंता य जीवभावादो ।  
 सवभावदो अणंता पंचगुणव्यधाणा य ॥५३॥

[जीवा अनादिनिघनाः सान्ता अनन्ताश्च जीवभावात् ।

सद्भावतोऽनन्ताः पञ्चाशद्विगुणप्रधानाः च ॥१३॥]

53. Jivas according to their characteristics have neither beginning nor end, have beginning and end, have beginning but no end. Thus having these five fundamental qualities they are as existences infinite in number.

COMMENTARY—Jivas really are the agents, since they bring about different modes with the different names. They are described as 1) without beginning or end, 2) with beginning and end 3) and with beginning and no end

1 If we attend to the essential nature of Jivas (*pāṇāmika bhāva*), i.e., their thought or consciousness then they may be said to have neither beginning nor end; as spiritual existences they are eternal. Neither are they created nor can they be destroyed.

2 The very same Jivas from the Psychic qualities of Audayika, Aupaśamika, and Kṣāyopāśamika have both beginning and end

3. But from the Kṣāyika Bhāva they have beginning but not end. It cannot be said in the last case that because there is beginning there must also be an end. When they are free from Upādhis then they realise their true nature, then they become Siddhas. Jivas that are found with such characteristics are infinite in number. Again it cannot be said that in the case of these Jivas which really have neither beginning nor end the other characteristics would be inconsistent. The other characteristics are, having both beginning and end and having beginning but no end. These characteristics are true of Jivas because of Karmic entanglements. The presence of Karma with Jiva is the condition of Samsāric transformations and Jivas in Samsāric cycles have both birth and death. But in the last stage towards emancipation from Karmas, Jivas may be said to have only birth but no death. For there is spiritual immortality as the result of complete emancipation.

The five fundamental characteristics implied in this gāthā are the five Jiva-Bhāvas mentioned in the 62nd gāthā

These are 1) *audayika* 2) *aupaśamika* 3) *kṣāyopāśamika* 4) *kṣāyika* 5) *pāṇāmika-bhāvāḥ*

The last one is the attribute of consciousness. This conscious nature is eternal. Hence Jiva is *anādi-nidhana* without beginning or end. The first three bring about Samsāric changes of birth and death. Therefore from their aspect Jiva has both beginning and end. The fourth is the characteristic of emancipation. The emancipated Self has beginning but no end.

Though Jivas are truly eternal yet they are born and they die because of accidental conditions of Karmic associations. To be eternal and to have births and deaths are not

really conflicting

एवं सदो विनासो असदो जीवस्स होइ उप्पादो ।

इदि जिणवरेहि भणिदं अण्णोणविरुद्धमविरुद्धं ॥५४॥

[एव सतो विनाशोऽसतो जीवस्य भवत्युत्पादः ।

इति जिनवरं संनिमित्तमन्योन्यविरुद्धमविरुद्धम् ॥५४॥]

54. Thus Jivas that are, may die and those that are not may be born ; thus sayeth the Jina Though the statements (this Sūtra and the 19th) are apparently conflicting they are not really contradictory.

COMMENTARY—From Dravyārthika Naya, *i. e.*, from the aspect of essential nature, Jivas can have neither birth nor death. But from Paryāyārthika Naya, from the point of modifications, they have births and deaths. The two propositions are quite compatible with one another as they state two different aspects of Jiva. The other proposition with which this gāthā appears to conflict is the gāthā 19.

एव सदो विनासो असदो जीवस्स नत्थि उप्पादो ।

There is no death for the existing Jivas, nor birth of the non-existing ones.

This certainly appears to contradict the present Sūtra and the commentator establishes that the conflict is only apparent and not real.

## 55.

Then it is pointed out that the death of Beings that are and the birth of those that are not are the result of Gatīnāmakarma: the Karma that brings about for the soul different modes of existence.

जेरइयतिरियमणुया देवा इदि नाससंजुदा पयडी ।

कुच्वन्ति सदो नासं असदो भावस्स उप्पादं ॥५५॥

[नारकतिर्यङ्मनुष्या देवा इति नामसंयुता. प्रकृतयः ।

कुच्वन्ति सतो नाशमसतो भावस्योत्पादम् ॥५५॥]

55. Life in hell, life as plant or animal, as man or as Deva, these states of being are caused by their respective Nāma Karma Prakrits. These bring about death to the Jivas that are and birth to those that are not.

COMMENTARY—The different states of existence are the different modifications of Jiva brought out by *upādhi* or Karmic conditions. Those Karmas that determine the next individual state of Jiva are Nāma Karmas. These Nāma Karmas are the real causal conditions that lead the soul to manifest in a particular form. These forms appear and disappear. Birth and death are characteristics associated with these forms or modes. Just as waves may appear and disappear in the surface of ocean as the result of wind, while

the sheet of water is really unaffected, so Jiva remaining eternal and changeless in its real essence is the basis of the different waves of existence appearing and disappearing. And these waves in the ocean of life are brought about by *upādhis* or Karmic conditions. The characteristics of birth and death which are really true of the form of existence are also predicated of Jiva.

## 56.

After mentioning the Karmas as the condition of *Samsāric* cycle the author goes to describe their nature. Here he explains the origin of the five *Bhāvas* i. e., emotional states of consciousness.

उदयेण उवसमेण य क्षयेण दुर्हि मिस्तिर्दोह परिणामे ।

जुप्ता ते जीवगुणा बहुषु य अत्येषु चित्तिगुणा ॥५६॥

[उदयेनोपसमेन च क्षयेण च द्वाभ्यां मिथिताभ्यां परिणामेन ।

युक्तास्ते जीवगुणा बहुषु चार्थेषु विस्तीर्णा. ॥५६॥]

56 On account of the rise, suppression, annihilation, mixed suppression and annihilation of Karmas, by the intrinsic nature of self unconditioned by Karmas, Jiva has five *Bhāvas* or thought characteristics. These are fully described in the *Āgamas* [*satthesu* ?].

COMMENTARY—Karmas are considered to be physical in nature. These physical conditions determine the Psychic characteristics. Five different classes of Karmic conditions are mentioned. Each of these is the causal condition determining its corresponding *Bhāva* or thought state in Jiva.

These conditions are :

- 1 Udaya, or rise of Karmas ;
2. Upaśama, or suppression of Karmas ;
3. Kṣaya or eradication ,
- 4 Kṣayopāśama, the mixed process of eradication and suppression ;
- 5 Parināma, or the unconditioned thought

These five conditions (four physical and one spiritual) determine respectively the *Bhāvas*.

And these are :

1. Audayika *Bhāva* ;
2. Aupaśamika *Bhāva* ;
3. Kṣāyika *Bhāva* ,
4. Kṣāyopāśamika *Bhāva* ,
5. Pārīṇāmika *Bhāva*

The last one is unconditioned by Karmas. It is *Nirupādhi* character, whereas the other four are generated by the changes in physical conditions or *upādhis*. The last

Pārināmika Bhāva is not causally connected with Saṃsāra or Mokṣa. It is Niṣkriya Bhāva.

मोक्षं कुर्वन्ति मिथ्योपशमिकसायिकाभिधाः ।

बन्धमोदयिको भावो निष्क्रियः पारिणामिकः ॥

57.

Next it is pointed out how these Bhāvas or thought states are brought about.

कस्मिन् वेदयमानो जीवो भावं करेदि जारिसयं ।

सो तेन तस्स कत्ता हवदि त्ति य सासणे पडिदं ॥५७॥

[कस्मिन् वेदयमानो जीवो भावं करोति यावृक्षकम् ।

स तेन तस्य कर्ता भवतीति च शासने पठितम् ॥५७॥]

57. Being affected by the change in Karmic material Jīva experiences certain emotional states. Whatever emotional state thus appears in consciousness is due to the direct causal agency of Jīva. Thus say the Scriptures of Jains.

COMMENTARY—Jīva is said to be the direct and immediate cause of the several emotional states brought about by Karmic materials. The extrinsic cause is physical matter and the proximate cause is Jīva itself. Karmas are always spoken of as of two kinds : Dravya Karma and Bhāva Karma. Dravya Karma is distinctly physical. A peculiar combination of Paramānus constitutes Karma Pudgala or Karmic matter. Matter under such modification has a special attraction towards Jīvas ordinarily. Jīva in its world state is generally found in association with such Karmic matter. Karmic matter and conscious states are mutually determining each other. A change in Karmic matter may bring about a corresponding change in consciousness. This conscious change has a predominant affective tone. It is generally some form of emotion. This corresponding emotional state is Bhāva Karma. Since it is a psychic event it is immediately determined by mind itself. It is this fact that is emphasized by the author in this Gāthā.

The author recognises two distinct causal agencies as will be evident later on: *nimitta kartā* and *upādāna kartā*, Distant or remote cause and substantial cause. Jīva is the substantial cause of all its modifications, and matter may still be an extrinsic cause. Then Jīva is the Upādāna Kartā of the Bhāvas while Karmic matter is Nimitta Kartā.

58.

It is this fact that is mentioned in the next Gāthā. That Self is the immediate cause of the emotional state while Karmic matter is the indirect cause.

कस्मेण विणा उदयं जीवस्स ण विज्जदे उवसमं वा ।

सद्वयं सजीवसमियं तम्हा भावं तु कस्मकदं ॥५८॥

[कर्मणा विनोदयो जीवस्य न विद्यत उपशमो वा ।

सायिकः सायोपशमिकस्तस्माद्भावस्तु कर्मकृतः ॥१८॥]

58. The different forms of Bhāva Karmas such as, the rising, the sinking, the annihilating and partial annihilation and sinking cannot happen in the consciousness of a Jiva without corresponding changes in Dravya Karmas or Karmic matter. Therefore the Bhāvas such as Audayika which are brought about by the Bhāva Karmas may be said to be the effects of Dravya Karmas as well

COMMENTARY—A change in Dravya Karma or physical Karma immediately brings about a change in Bhāva Karma i.e., a corresponding change pure or impure in consciousness. This Bhāva Karma in its turn brings about its corresponding emotional state or Bhāva. It may be pleasant or unpleasant. The chain of causation is as follows.—Dravya Karma, Bhāva Karma and Bhāva. Karmic matter, Karmic thought and an affective state. The last affective state or Bhāva which is the immediate result of Karmic thought or Bhāva Karma may also be said to be the effect of Dravya Karma. For there can be no Karmic thought or Bhāva Karma in a Jiva which is not determined by Dravya Karma.

59

The next Gāthā is in the form of *pūrvapakṣa* from the disciple. An objection is raised against the doctrine that Ātmā is the sole and immediate cause of Bhāva Karma

भावो यदि कम्मकरो अत्ता कम्मस्स होदि किं कत्ता ।

ण कुणदि अत्ता किंचि वि मुत्ता अण्णं सगं भावं ॥१९॥

[भावो यदि कर्मकृतः आत्मा कर्मणो भवति कथं कर्ता ।

न करोत्यात्मा किंचिदपि मुक्त्वान्यत् स्वक भावम् ॥१९॥]

59. If these states of emotion or Bhāva are really brought about by Karmic matter how can Ātmā be said to be the cause of these Bhāvas? But the soul's agency is such that while giving up its own state it can effect entirely alien or non-mental changes (i.e., it is the cause of its own mental states which are also indirectly conditioned by Karmic matter).

COMMENTARY—As has been mentioned already Dravya Karma or Karmic matter and the nature of Jiva, both determine the occurrence of a Bhāva or an emotional state. Still Jiva is taken to be the causal agent or Kartā to these emotional state. If the Bhāvas are really due to Dravya Karma or Karmic matter then how can it be consistently held that Jiva is Kartā? But the answer is given thus Bhāva is Psychic change and as psychic change it can only be brought about by Jiva. Soul cannot have direct causal relation with material and non-mental things. Again if the Bhāvas have no causal relation to



Jīva then there is no reason why it should be bound by Karma. Karmic bondage necessarily presupposes the intimate relation between Jīva and its emotional states. Since there will be no logical ground for bondage in the absence of causal relation then there is no chance for Saṁsāra which is the result of Karmic bondage. This result contradicts our real experience for there is Saṁsāra. Therefore our original supposition that the soul is not causal agent for his emotional states is an impossible hypothesis. With this indirect demonstration, the author establishes that soul is the causal agent producing the emotional states which are also indirectly conditioned by Karmic matter.

The disciple who raises the *pūrvapakṣa* is evidently a believer in the Sāṁkhya system.

अकर्ता निर्गुणः शुद्धो नित्यः सर्वगताक्रियः ।

अमूर्तश्चेतनो मोक्षता जीवः कपिलशासने ॥

In answering *pūrvapakṣa* the author is really condemning the Sāṁkhya view represented by the above śloka.

60.

The answer is again strengthened by further detailed argument.

भावो कम्मणिमित्तो कम्मं पुण भावकारणं हवदि ।

ण दु तेसिं खलु कत्ता ण विणा भूदा दु कत्तारं ॥६०॥

[भावः कर्मनिमित्तः कर्म पुनर्भावकारणं भवति ।

न तु तेषां खलु कर्ता न विना भूतास्तु कर्तारम् ॥६०॥]

60. Bhāva or emotional states are conditioned by Dravya Karma or matter. And Karma in its turn is indeed conditioned by Karmic thought or Bhāva. Soul is not the essential cause in that case and still without essential cause those changes cannot happen.

COMMENTARY—The author here makes use of the distinction between Upādāna Kartā and Nimitta Kartā. Intrinsic or substantial conditions, extrinsic or alien condition Soul is the essential cause of Karmic thought, the emotional states of desire etc., Karmic matter is the essential cause of the changes in Karmic matter, i. e., the changes in each case form an independent series and yet the two series are corresponding and interrelated. Bhāva or the emotional states is distinctly a psychic change. As a mental fact it is immediately determined by the nature of consciousness. So is the change in Karmic matter. It is entirely determined by physical conditions. Matter cannot take the form of mental state nor the mind undergo a physical change. The author seems to suggest a kind of psycho-physical parallelism. But this parallelism is not merely the temporal correspondence of the two series. The parallelism is transcended and reconciled by the doctrine of *Nimitta kartā*. The author has in his mind such a sharp distinction between the thinking thing and unthinking thing as is associated with *cartisianism* and yet the two

are related by a peculiar conception of causal relation The unthinking thing may be the *nimitta kartā* of the thinking thing and conversely the thinking thing may be the *nimitta kartā* of the other, though certainly one cannot be the *upādāna kartā* of the other.

61.

The same view is further elaborated.

कुर्व्वं सगं सहावं अत्ता कत्ता सगस्स भावस्स ।  
ण हि पोगलकम्माणं इदि जिणवयणं मुणेयव्वं ॥६१॥  
[कुर्व्वन् स्वकं स्वभावम् आत्मा कर्ता स्वकस्य भावस्य ।  
न हि पुद्गलकर्मणामिति जिनवचनं ज्ञातव्यम् ॥६१॥]

61. Soul which brings about changes in himself is the *Upādāna* cause of such mental states. But not of changes in Karmic matter which are distinctly physical in nature Let the word of Jina be understood thus.

COMMENTARY—The author strengthens his argument by referring to Āgama or Śrūta. He draws the attention of the reader that this doctrine of causation is the right view upheld by the Scriptures

62.

Then it is explained that Jiva and Karmic matter are related to their respective changes according to the six aspects of causal relation.

कम्मं पि सगं कुव्वदि सेण सहावेण सम्मसम्पाणं ।  
जीवो वि य तारिसओ कम्मसहावेण भावेण ॥६२॥  
[कमपि स्वकं करोति स्वेन स्वभावेन सम्यगात्मानम् ।  
जीवोऽपि च तादृशकः कर्मस्वभावेन भावेन ॥६२॥]

62 Karmic matter itself through its own essential nature indeed brings about its own changes Jiva too in the same manner through its own impure states of thought that are conditioned by Karma brings about its own thought changes.

COMMENTARY—The author here emphasizes the fact that the mental states and the states of Karma form two independent series A change in the Jiva is entirely determined by the antecedent mental change In Karmic matter is determined by antecedent physical change. Similarly the mental change in the Jiva is entirely determined by the antecedent mental change In short Jiva is the primary condition of mental changes and Karmic matter of its own changes. The physical changes of Karmic matter cannot be attributed to Jiva nor the mental changes of Jiva to matter.

The *saṅkāṇaka* referred to by the commentator has reference to the six aspects of

causal relation already explained. These are (1) Kartā (2) Karma (3) Karana (4) Nimitta (5) Sakāśa and (6) Adhikarana. Each series of causal changes has by itself these six aspects i. e., the physical and the mental series are self-sufficient and complete.

63.

Having heard that the two causal series are independent the student ignorant of the principles of reasoning or the *Nayas* raises an objection.

कर्मं कर्मं कुब्जदि जदि सो अप्या करेदि अप्पाणं ।

किध तस्स फलं भुजदि अप्पा कर्मं च देदि फलं ॥६३॥

[कर्म कर्म करोति यदि स आत्मा करोत्यात्मानम् ।

कथं तस्य फलं भुङ्क्ते आत्मा कर्म च ददाति फलम् ॥६३॥]

63 If Karmic matter effects its own changes and similarly if Jiva brings about his own changes in himself why should he enjoy the results or fruits of Karma for which he is not responsible and how can Karma offer its fruits to him ?

COMMENTARY—If Karmic changes form an independent physical series and if mental changes similarly form an independent psychic series then why should Jiva be affected at all by physical changes and in what manner could the physical changes affect Jiva at all. The student asks for the justification why the two really independent series should affect each other at all.

64.

The *pūrvapakṣa* is answered by the seven following *gāthās*. This one states that the *Loka* is filled with matter.

ओगाढगाढणिचिदो योगलकायेहि सव्वदो लोको ।

सुहुमेहि बादरेहि य गताणतेहि विविधेहि ॥६४॥

[अवगाढगाढनिचितं पुद्गलकायै सर्वतो लोकः ।

सूक्ष्मबाहिरश्चानन्तानन्तविविधं ॥६४॥]

64 With material bodies of form perceptible and imperceptible, infinite of infinities in number, and of multifarious kinds by constitution, the world is in every respect filled without interspaces.

COMMENTARY—The author is trying to answer objection by showing first the possibility of connection between Jiva and Karmic matter. The world space is throughout filled with material bodies. Some of these are minute and some of these are perceptible to the senses. Of these minute forms some have the peculiarly necessary constitution which would make them fit to be Karmas. These are called Karma-varganās. Karma-varganās are physical molecules of a particular constitution which gives them the tendency to be

attracted by Jivas. They are otherwise known as Karma-prāyoga-pudgala. The world that is filled with such materials also contains Jivas. The Jivas and Karma-vargaṇās co-exist and by the mere fact of contiguity Jiva and Karmic matter are brought together. The settling of Karmic molecules in Jivas is evidently explained by the author as a necessary result of contiguous co-existence. He does not want to assume that Jiva has positive attraction towards Karmic matter. If any such active influence on the part of Jiva is presupposed, the author will be forced to acknowledge the inevitable causal interaction between matter and Jiva. The author does not want to encourage that view. Hence he explains the contact between Jiva and matter as due to local conditions. The commentator explains the principle of contiguity as

अञ्जनचूर्णपूर्णसमुद्गकनय, i.e.,

the principle that the casket filled with collyrium powder becomes black by mere contact. Thus by analogy the author hopes to explain how two distinct things, Jiva and matter, become related together.

#### 65.

How is it relevant to say that the world is filled with Karmic matter? How is it an answer to the above objection? The author in this gāthā shows the relation between the answer and the objection.

अत्ता कुणदि सभावं तत्थ गदा पोग्गला सभावोहं ।  
गच्छन्ति कम्मभावं अण्णणोगाहमवगादा ॥६५॥

[आत्मा करोति स्वभाव तत्र गता पुद्गलाः स्वभावाः ।  
गच्छन्ति कर्मभावमन्योन्यावगाहावगादाः ॥६५॥]

65. Jiva as determined by its own nature creates its own changes. But existing in the same place there is Karmic matter. This Karmic matter gets inseparably bound with Jiva and manifests as modes of Karma such as Jñānāvarāṇiṃya.

COMMENTARY—Here the author emphasizes the fact that Karmic matter is entirely self-determined in its modifications. So also is Jiva. Jiva according to Jaina belief has Samsāric changes from time immemorial, i.e., the series of Samsāric changes is without beginning. In this state it is destined to lose its pure thought and has the gross emotional qualities such as desire, anger, etc. While this Jiva is undergoing such emotional states determined by its own intrinsic psychic nature there is in the same place Karmic matter which as conditioned by those mental states undergoes modifications. These modifications are really determined by matter itself though externally conditioned by the mental states. The mental states of an impure character create a sort of adhesive quality in Jiva. The Karmic particles merely by proximity cling to Jiva which has the adhesive quality. Jiva gets adulterated with Karmic matters as milk and water. But this adulteration is not due

to direct causal action upon Jiva

66.

As a concomitant of the psychic state, Karmic matter undergoes modification in its own way.

जह पुगलदव्वाणं बहुप्पयारेहिं खंधणिव्वत्ती ।  
अकदा परेहिं दिट्ठा तह कस्माणं वियाणाहि ॥६६॥

[यथा पुद्गलद्व्याणां बहुप्रकारैः स्कन्धनिवृत्तिः ।  
अकृता परेदृष्टा तथा कर्मणां विजानीहि ॥६६॥]

66 Just as several molecular arrangements in matter are seen in diverse forms though uncaused by alien agency so also the manifestations in Karmic matter occur undetermined by alien cause. So do thou understand.

COMMENTARY—The author makes himself clear by the illustration. The mere presence of light from the sun or the moon is enough to create the fiery sunset or sunrise or the rainbow or the halo. These changes are all due to molecular arrangement in matter. The sunlight is not directly interfering with matter in producing changes. The changes are the necessary concomitants of the presence of light. Similarly the presence of emotional states of desire or aversion in Jiva has as its concomitant, the changes in Karmic matter. The rainbow of several iridescent colours is merely the concomitant of light, and the different manifestations of Karmic matter are also the concomitants of mental states as desire and aversion. From all these examples it is clear that the author wants to reject direct causal relation between the two series and yet he wants to make out that one series is the concomitant of other.

67.

The author explains why Jiva should enjoy the fruits of Karma of which he is not the cause essential. In answering this point the author employs the principles of Naya.

जीवा पुगलकाया अण्णाणोगादग्रहणपडिबद्धा ।  
काले विजुज्जमाणा सुहृदुक्खं देति भुंजति ॥६७॥

[जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः अन्योन्यावगादग्रहणप्रतिबद्धाः ।  
काले विजुज्यमानाः सुखदुःखं ददति भुञ्जन्ति ॥६७॥]

67. Jivas and Karmic materials are bound together strongly. But when the time for their separation comes they fall apart. Karmas offer their results of pleasure and pain and the Jivas enjoy them.

COMMENTARY—Jiva and matter in reality have only one causal function of generating

their own respective modes and yet because of the concomitants they may be said to be interdetermining from the Vyavahāra view. Jīva because of its emotional states of desire and hatred develops an inclination towards matter. This inclination is only the *nimitta* or an external condition Karmic matter so determined gets bound to Jīva. It is to be imagined that the material particles somehow cling to Jīva and cloud its intrinsic radiance. Changes may occur in molecules as determined by temporal conditions. There may be aggregation or disintegration in them. When such changes take place in Dravya Karma, Jīva experiences pleasure or pain. These are said to be offered by Karma from a relative point of view though as a matter of fact they are the modifications of Jīva. One of the commentators says that just as we experience the activity and the change in our body so also we experience the change in our Karmic body for both of them are physical. When we don't question ordinarily our experiencing bodily changes, we need not question the possibility of experiencing the changes of Karmic body. Thus ends the quality of *bhoktā*—the enjoyer. Jīva is shown to be the enjoyer.

## 68

Then the author has a *resume* of the nature of the relation between causality and affective experience

तन्हा कम्मं कत्ता भावेण हि संजुदोध जीवस्स ।

भोक्ता तु ह्वदि जीवो चेदगभावेण कम्मफलं ॥६८॥

[तस्मात्कर्म कर्तुं भावेन हि संयुतस्य जीवस्य ।

भोक्ता तु भवति जीवश्चेतकभावेन कर्मफलम् ॥६८॥]

68. According to Niscaya Naya or real aspect Karmic matter is the cause of its own changes. But from Vyavahāra Naya or relative aspect it is, in association with psychic states *audayika*, etc., also the cause of mental changes in Jīva. Lo ! from this point Jīva becomes the enjoyer because he is by nature consciousness.

COMMENTARY—The author makes a distinction between absolute point and relative point of view. Really Karmic matter is the cause of its own molecular changes. From the relative point it may also be said to be the cause of mental changes. Similarly with Jīva. It is its own cause and from the other point it is also the cause of material changes. It is by nature conscious. Experience presupposes mental changes. Jīva may be said to experience directly its own mental states and yet Vyavahārically it experiences or is affected by things desirable and undesirable. If the aspects of view are remembered then both the propositions are consistent. You may say Jīva enjoys its own state and also that Jīva enjoys physical objects of sense presentation. Therefore it may very well be conceded that the proposition that Jīva is the essential cause of its own mental state is compatible with the proposition that Jīva is the enjoyer of Karmic effects. He is the

Kartā as well as the Bhoktā, the doer and the enjoyer.

69.

The author again refers to the Lordship of the soul.

एवं कर्त्ता भोक्ता होज्जं अप्पा सगेहिं कम्मोहिं ।

हिंदि पारमपार संसारं मोहसंछण्णो ॥६९॥

[एवं कर्त्ता भोक्ता भवन्नात्मा स्वकैः कर्मभिः ।

हिण्डते पारमपारं संसारं मोहसंछन्नः ॥६९॥]

69. The soul which is thus the agent of its own Karma, and the enjoyer of the fruits thereof, as conditioned by its own Karma, gets blinded by the veil of ignorance and roams about in the world of *samsāra* which is limited for the faithful and unlimited for the unfaithful.

COMMENTARY—Jīva is the Lord of his own career, because he effects his own Karma, he enjoys the fruits thereof. He may roam about in the world of *Samsāra* as conditioned by his own actions, he may finally liberate himself from the bondage by walking the path of three jewels. Then he becomes free from his *upādhi*. This is the career of the Bhavya Jīva. Throughout the career of the Bhavya Jīva, Jīva has the characteristic of Lordship. Again the Abhavya devoid of the benefits of the Jewels is denied the above career. He is destined to roam about for ever in *Samsāra*. The Abhavya Jīva also in his own way is the Lord of his own career. Thus the career of Jīva is entirely self determined.

70.

Then it is shown how the soul which obtains the benefit of the three jewels is able to realise its true nature through its Lordship over its own career.

उवसंतखीणमोहो मगं जिणभासिदेण समुवगदो ।

जाणानुमग्गचारी णिव्वाणपुरं वज्जि धीरो ॥७०॥

[उपशान्तक्षीणमोहो मार्गं जिनाश्रितेन समुपगतः ।

ज्ञानानुमार्गचारी निर्वाणपुरं व्रजति धीरः ॥७०॥]

70. Suppressing or annihilating the veil of ignorance which clouds the faculties of perception and will, well equipped with the three jewels which constitute the path revealed by Jīna, the soul, the undaunted pilgrim that conquered the suffering and pain due to the environment, beckoned by the ideal of self-knowledge, wades through the path and reaches the divine city of perfection.

COMMENTARY—Jīva is co-eval with *Samsāra*. Ordinarily Jīva is associated with *Upādhis*. The most important of these is Mohaniya Karma. This is a sort of veil

of ignorance whose effect is twofold. It may interfere with the faculty of perception or with the faculty of Will. On account of this interference there may be false knowledge or wrong conduct. In the former case it is called Darśana Mohaniya, in the latter Cāritra Mohaniya. All the other Karmic Upādhis may be ultimately traced to the operation of this fundamental Karma. This Mohaniya or the veil of ignorance may sometimes get thin and transparent or may altogether be annihilated. On account of this happy occurrence Jiva may start on a very desirable career. On account of suppression or annihilation of Darśana Mohaniya, Jiva is able to apprehend the nature of true reality. And thus has faith in the ultimate Tattvas. The faith in and comprehension of Tattvas may lead to clear knowledge of reality. By this suppression and annihilation of Cāritra Mohaniya, Will may be right in its decision, for right volitional choice is the consequence of true knowledge. Right perception and faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct form the true path. These are the three jewels. Soul equipped with these three jewels must further conquer the environment. The suffering and pain due to environmental conditions should not touch Jiva in any way. After conquering the environment Jiva has to pursue the path of righteousness having as the goal complete self-knowledge. This pilgrim in the path of life finally reaches the city of Nirvāna which is the *Summum Bonum* of life according to Jainism.

## 71-2

Then the author summarises the characteristics of Jivāstukāya

एकको चेव महत्त्वा सो दुवियणो तिलस्सणो होदि ।

चटु-चकमणो भणिदो पंचगुणप्पधानो य ॥७१॥

छक्कापक्कमजुत्तो उवउत्तो सत्तभंगसम्भावो ।

अट्टासवो णवट्ठो जीवो दसठानगो भणिदो ॥७२॥

[एक एव महत्त्वा स द्विकल्पस्त्रिलक्षणो भवति ।

चतुश्चटु-क्रमणो भणितः पञ्चागुणप्रधानश्च ॥७१॥]

[षट्कापक्कमयुक्त उपयुक्तः सप्तभङ्गसङ्भावः ।

अष्टाश्वो नवार्थो जीवो दशस्थानगो भणितः ॥७२॥]

71-2. The great soul characterised by Upayoga may be said to be essentially identical and one, is again of two kinds, has three fundamental qualities, roams about in four Gatis, is marked by five primary emotional states; moves about in the world along the six directions; is capable of admitting seven-fold predication, has eight qualities, generates the nine Padārthas; manifests in ten states of existence, thus he is said to be

COMMENTARY—The author in the form of a *cālikā* or summary ingeniously describes Jiva. He employs numerical description from one to ten. When all Jivas are looked at



from their essential characteristics they are substantially one. From the point of Upādhis they may be said to be of two classes the perfect and the imperfect, has three primary qualities. The three characteristics may be the three aspects of consciousness: knowledge, will and emotion; or may be the three Jewels. Darśana, Jñāna and Cāritra; or may be the three characteristics of Dravya in general: permanence through birth and death, or may refer to three forms of existences, *substance*, *qualities* and *modes*. Jīva is again said to be subject to four Gatis. The Gatis are already mentioned. He is marked again by the five primary emotional states which are brought about by the five different changes of Karmic matter. These also have been dealt with above. 'Six' denotes the six directions of the world along which there may be possible movements for Jīva. 'Seven' denotes these seven fold predication applicable to Jīva. These are the seven propositions forming the Sapta-bhaṅgī, 'Eight' denotes the eight characteristics of Jīva. Saṁsāri Jīva has the eight Karmic characteristics, such as Jñānāvarana, Darśanāvarana, Mohantya, etc. The perfect Jīva has the eight infinite Gunas such as Ananta Jñāna, Ananta Darśana, Ananta Virya, Ananta Sukha, etc. 'Nine' denotes the nine Padārthas generated by Jīva in conjunction with matter. These are Jīva, Ajīva, Pāpa, Puṇya, Āsrava, Saṁvara, Nirjarā, Bandha, and Mokṣa.

'Ten' denotes the 10 states of existence. The ten states are the (1) liberated and (9) the unliberated nine, which are five Ekendriya Jīvas (Prthivīkāyika, Āpkāyika, Tejaskāyika, Vāyukāyika, and Vanaspatikāyika), and Jīvas with two, three, four and five sense organs respectively.

## 73.

The perfect and the liberated soul has nothing to gain by going from one place to another. Therefore he may stay in the very same place where he attains Nirvāna. But, according to Jaina view, he goes to the summit of the world. The author explains why he should do so.

पयडिडिदिअणुभागप्पदेसवंधेहि सव्वदो मुक्को ।

उडुं गच्छदि सेसा विदिसावज्जं गदि-जति ॥७३॥

[प्रकृतिस्थित्यनुभागप्रदेशवन्धैः सर्वतो मुक्तः ।

ऊर्ध्वं गच्छति शेषा विदिग्वर्जा गतिं यान्ति ॥७३॥]

73. When Jīva gets liberated from the bonds of Karma which are of different aspects of substance, duration, fertility, and extensivity, he reaches the summit of the upper world. Others who are in Saṁsāra move about in all the directions except the four diagonal corners.

COMMENTARY—This Gāthā refers to a religious dogma. The liberated Jīva or Siddha Jīva has the intrinsic movement upwards. It tends to move vertically upwards till it

comes to a stay at the summit of the Loka. For it cannot move beyond, because of the absence of the moving principle of Dharmāstikāya.

But Saṁsāri Jivas after death are said to have movements in six directions. They are denied the four diagonal courses. Along the cardinal points and up and down they can move. These are the *anulārenīs*, the ladder paths of disembodied Jivas.

The disembodied Jiva has still the *kāmana śarīra*—body constituted by Kārmic matter. This body is *sūkṣma*—subtle body. Is there any electro-magnetic condition which constrains the Kārmic body to move only in the six directions? We don't want to speculate.

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## CHAPTER II, ON PUDGALĀSTIKĀYA

74.

The author mentions the four different kinds of material objects.

खंधा य खंधदेसा खंधपदेसा य ह्येति परमाणू ।  
इदि ते चतुर्विधस्या पुगलकाया मुण्येयव्वा ॥७४॥

[स्कन्धाश्च स्कन्धदेशाः स्कन्धप्रदेशाश्च सन्ति परमाणवः ।  
इति ते चतुर्विकल्पाः पुद्गलकाया ज्ञातव्याः ॥७४॥]

74. These are the four basic modifications out of which the multifarious modes of matter are formed. Be it understood that matter exists in four main modes : *skandhas*, *skandhadeśas*, *skandhapradeśas* and primary atoms.

COMMENTARY—*Skandhas* are the aggregates of atoms. This class refers to complete molecular constitution. *Skandhadeśa* is said to be incomplete. But still it is an aggregate. Similarly *Skandhapradeśa*. These three are the differences in molecular constitution. The last class refers to the primary atom which is the unit constituting the other three classes. This is explained in the next *Gāthā*.

75.

The respective characteristics of these four classes are given below.

खंधं सयलसमत्थं तस्स दु अद्धं भणंति देसो ति ।  
अद्धद्धं च पदेसो परमाणू चेव अविभागी ॥७५॥

[स्कन्धः सकलसमस्तस्तस्य त्वद्धं भणन्ति देश इति ।  
अर्धाध्वं च प्रदेशः परमाणुश्चैवाविभागी ॥७५॥]

75. The complete molecule of matter is *skandha*; a half of it is *skandhadeśa*; a half of that half is *skandhapradeśa*; and what cannot be divided is primary atom: thus say (the learned).

COMMENTARY—The complete *skandha* refers to the molecule which has all the physical qualities without any exception. Any physical body perceived by us may be taken as an example of complete *skandha*. If the process of bisection is continued to infinity the limit of the series is the *paramāṇu*—that which cannot be divided further. Conversely starting from the atom an aggregate of two, three, etc., more atoms will generate *skandhas*. An aggregate of infinite number of atoms is the complete *skandha*. (Note the atomic basis of Physics)

## 76

Pudgala ultimately refers to the class of primary atoms. But the name is also applied to the derivative classes of *skandhas*

बादरसुहृमगदाणं खंधाणं पुग्गलो ति व्यवहारो ।  
ते होति छप्पयारा तेलोक्कं जेहि णिप्पणं ॥७६॥

[बादरसौख्यगतानां स्कंधानां पुद्गलः इति व्यवहारः ।  
ते भवन्ति षट्प्रकारास्त्रैलोक्यं यैः निष्पन्नम् ॥७६॥]

76. *Skandhas* are of two kinds. Those that can be perceived by the senses and the minute ones beyond sense perception. These also are called matter conventionally. These manifest themselves in six different modes by which the three worlds are completely filled.

COMMENTARY—The term *pudgala* is specially applicable to the primary atoms. These are the indestructible material basis of the world. The *skandhas* or molecules though derivative and secondary are also called by the same name *pudgala*. These molecules or *skandhas* have the characteristics of touch, taste, smell, sound and colour. They can increase or decrease being aggregates. They can grow or decay. They are minute or large. These *skandhas* or molecular aggregates are of six different kinds which are mentioned in the next *gāthā*. These aggregates or *skandhas* in their six different forms completely fill the three Lokas.

## 76\*1

The six different kinds of *Skandhas* are enumerated.

पुढवी जलं च छाया चर्जरिदियविसयकम्मपाओग्गा ।  
कम्मातीदा एवं छब्भेया योग्गला होति ॥७६\*१॥

[पृथिवी जलं च छाया चतुरिन्द्रियविषयकर्मप्रायोग्या ।  
कर्मातीता एवं षड्भेदाः पुद्गला भवन्ति ॥७६\*१॥]

76\*1. The *skandhas* or molecular aggregates exist in six different forms :— Earth,

water, shadow, the objects of the four senses except sight, and karmic matter, and molecules which are unfit to become karmic matter.

COMMENTARY—The six kinds of *skandhas* are otherwise called thus :—

1. Bādara-bādara—Solid.
  2. Bādara—Liquid.
  3. Sūksma-bādara—Apparently solid like a shadow.
  4. Bādarasūksma—Minute particles evident to the senses.
  5. Sūksma—Minute, not perceptible.
  6. Sūksma-sūksma—Very minute.
1. Is that which cannot become combined or one, when broken ; like wood or stone.
  2. Is the one whose parts become one again when broken ; as water, etc
  3. The larger cannot be broken, or divided or caught as shadow, lightning, darkness.
  4. Though minute yet evident to the senses as taste, smell, colour, etc.
  5. Minute and imperceptible as Karmic matter.
  6. Those below Karmic matters up to Skandhas made up of two atoms.

### 77.

Thus after describing the various *skandhas* the author explains the nature of Paramāṇus or primary atoms which are the constituent elements of Skandhas.

सर्वेसि खंवाणं जो अंतो तं वियाण परमाणू ।

सो सत्सदो असदो एवको अविभागि मुत्तिभवो ॥७७॥

[सर्वेषां स्कन्धानां योज्यस्तं विजानीहि परमाणुम् ।

स शाश्वतोऽशब्दः एकोऽविभागी मूर्तिमव. ॥७७॥]

77. Do you understand that whatever is the limit of all *skandhas* is the primary atom. That same is eternal, unsounding (silent), occupying one space point and of corporeal form.

COMMENTARY—The limiting unit of the process of division of molecules is the Paramāṇu or the primary atom. Since it cannot be further sub-divided it is called atom. Since it occupies a single point of space, it is one. Since it is the eternal and inalienable substratum of corporeal things, it is eternal. Since it is the constitutive basis of physical objects, it is the generator of physical things. Since it cannot by itself bring about sound vibrations, it is non-sounding or silent. These are the characteristics of the primary atom.

It may be noted here that, according to Jaina thought, matter is indestructible ; so

also is Jiva. It is not due to the creative fiat of a Will. It cannot be destroyed. Atoms are the constitutive element of physical bodies. Thus according to Jaina view, matter and space are objectively real. In this respect the view is quite similar to that of modern science. Again it is worth noting that the atom is described as non-sounding. Several Indian systems of thought associate sound with Ākāśa, a term which is quite ambiguous. It means either space or ether. But the Jaina thinkers distinctly explain sound as due to molecular impingement. Unless one molecule of matter strikes against another there is no possibility of Sound. An atom by itself is incapable of producing sound. Hence it is silent. Jaina physics of sound is also quite scientific.

## 78.

This primary atom is not of four kinds as some people would have such as earth, air, fire and water. But it is only one in nature though it is the constitutive basis of the four Dhātus or modes of physical existence. The atom has its own essential nature which is distinct from that of the four elements.

आदेशमेतमुक्तो धातुचतुष्कस्त कारणं जो दु ।

सो णेओ परमाणू परिणामगुणो सयमसद्दो ॥७८॥

[आदेशमात्रमूर्तः धातुचतुष्कस्य कारणं यस्तु ।

स ज्ञेयः परमाणुः परिणामगुण स्वयमशब्दः ॥७८॥]

78. Whatever thing by its very name implies, perceptual form ; is the essential cause of these four elements, is characterised by unthinking (?) *mūrta* nature and is unsounding; that is the atom ; so be it understood.

COMMENTARY—The author denies the qualitative difference of Paramānus. By the very name an atom implies the division of physical objects having the sense qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour. From the point of spaciality it is beginning, middle and end in one. From the general principle that substance and quality are inseparable, it follows that the spacial unit of atom is also the spacial unit of contract, or of smell, or of colour, i.e., the unit of space occupied by the atom is also the unit of space accommodating the sense colours. If the primary atom through its manifestation were to part with either smell or with the smell and taste or with smell, taste and colour then the very atom would be annihilated. Therefore the separability of the quality cannot be associated with the atom. Again fire, air, earth and water, have as their constitutive cause the atom. Wonderful are the qualities of primary atoms when their potential characteristics are taken into consideration. The non-manifested sense qualities become actual in the aggregates or Skandhas. But in the case of sound it can't be said that it is present in the atom even in *śakti* or potentiality for sound implies several molecules of several spacial units. Therefore such a characteristic cannot consistently belong to an

atom which has only one spacial unit Paramānu is called *mūrta* for another reason also; because it can be a perceptual object for *paramāvadhi*. It is called so not because it is perceived by our senses. It is distinctly transcending the capacity of our senses though it can be perceived by the Kevalin.

## 79.

Then he describes how sound is actually produced by atoms which are really without sound quality.

सहो खंघप्पभवो खंधो परमाणुसंगसंघादो ।

पुट्टे सु तेसु जायदि सहो उप्पादगो णियदो ॥७९॥

[शब्दः स्कन्धप्रभवः स्कन्धः परमाणुसंगसंघातः ।

स्पृष्टेषु तेषु जायते शब्द उत्पादको नियतः ॥७९॥]

79. Sound is generated by Skandhas. Skandhas themselves are the aggregates of atoms. When these aggregates strike one another sound is produced which may be natural or artificial (hence sound may be indirectly associated with atoms also).

COMMENTARY—If the Skandhas constituted by Primary atoms strike one another there is sound. If they strike of their own accord then there is natural or *svābhāvika* sound. If the striking is due to other agencies then it is *prāyogika* or purposeful sound. The illustrations of *svābhāvika* or natural sound are thunder of the clouds and the roar of the sea. *Prāyogika* or purposeful sound is again of two kinds: *bhāṣātma* or Language and *abhāṣātma*, non-language. The language sound again may be *akṣarātma* or *anaksarātma*, articulate and inarticulate. The articulate sound is made up of alphabetical sounds, the inarticulate is the language of animals.

Non-language sounds are of four kinds :

1. *Tata*, sound produced by stringed instruments.
2. *Vīṭata*, the sound produced by drum.
3. *Ghana*, sound produced by cymbals, etc.
4. *Susira*, sound produced by pipes and other wind instrument.

## 80

Further description of the primary Atom. That it is *ekapradeśa* or occupies one spacial point is specially referred to.

णिच्चो णाणवकासो ण सावकासो पदेसदो भेत्ता ।

खंधाणं पि य कत्ता पविहत्ता कालसंखाणं ॥८०॥

[नित्यो नानवकासो न सावकासः प्रवेशतो भेत्ता ।

स्कन्धानामपि च कर्ता प्रविभक्ता कालसंख्यायाः ॥८०॥]

80 The primary atom is eternal, is spacial, and yet non-spacial ; is the differentiating factor of *skandhas* and is also the cause of their changes. It is also the determinant of time and number.

COMMENTARY—Paramāṇu is associated with one space point. Since it is not capable of disintegration it is indestructible and eternal. Though it occupies only one space point since it is the substratum of colour and other sense qualities, it has spaciality accommodating qualities. But as it has only one space point and as it is without beginning, middle, or end, and as it cannot accommodate another space point, it may also be called non-spacial. Being the constituent element of *Skandhas* it may be said to be the determinant of the difference of *Skandhas*. For the same reason it is the substantial cause of *Skandhas*. By its own change of position it becomes the measure of time. A single instant of time corresponds to a single shift of an atom from one position to the immediately next. It is also the measure of number or quantity. Being the constitutive element of *Skandhas* it brings about quantitative difference of things (*dravya-samkhyā*). Since its associated space point is the constitutive element of space, it is indirectly the cause of quantitative difference of space (*ksetra-samkhyā*). Since its motion from point to point corresponds to duration of time, it is also the basis of quantitative difference of time (*kāla-samkhyā*). Again because it is the basis of modification of things through aggregation or disintegration it is also the condition of the quantitative difference of modes or (*bhāva-samkhyā*).

Thus according to Jaina view the primary atom is the direct unit of things and the indirect unit of space, time and change. The quantitative difference in these things and also the qualitative difference in physical objects may ultimately be traced to the constitutive of Paramāṇu.

### 81.

Further description of the qualities of Paramāṇu and its modes.

एयरसवर्णगंधं दोषासं सहकारणमसहं ।  
खंधंतरिदं द्रव्य परमाणुं तं वियाणेहि ॥८१॥

[एकरसवर्णगन्धं द्विस्पर्शं शब्दकारणमसहम् ।  
स्कन्धान्तरितं द्रव्यं परमाणुं तं विजानीहि ॥८१॥]

81 That substance which has a single taste, colour, and smell and two contacts ; which is the cause of sound, itself unsounding, which is different from *Skandhas* though constituting them is the Paramāṇu. So do thou learn.

COMMENTARY—The Primary atom is examined with reference to different sense qualities of physical objects. Five colours are recognised generally in external things of which only one colour can be associated with the Paramāṇu. According to Jaina view Paramāṇu is an object of perfect *avadhi* perception. Though an atom is metemperical



to a finite individual it is distinctly a Rūpa or Visual object for the super-normal faculty of Avadhī. If the description in the Gāthā is based upon such super-normal perception, unfortunately it cannot be verified by our experience. But still there is a way of imagining the truth. An atom may be associated with a single light wave. If it is not able to obstruct more than a single light wave of a particular wave length then it must manifest itself as having only one colour to a super-normal faculty. Whether it is actually so constituted as to behave in that fashion it is for the physicist to determine. We have here only to notice the uncompromising realistic attitude of Jaina thought.

Of the five different states ordinarily recognised, an atom can have only one. Of the two different smells it may have either. Of the eight contact qualities smooth and rough; heavy and light; are the qualities of Skandhas. These cannot be in the atom. The remaining four qualities may be present in an atom in pairs. The elements constituting the pair must be mutually compatible. *Snigdha* and *śīta*, *rūkṣa* and *usna*, may constitute the consistent pairs, i.e., viscosity or adhesiveness may co-exist with cold and hardness and repulsiveness may co-exist with heat.

This description would naturally introduce qualitative difference among atoms and yet according to the author there can be no qualitative difference among atoms as they are identical material units.

It is extremely interesting to notice the elaborate analysis of sense qualities which is even as minute as that of Modern Psychology. But the ancient Psychological analysis of smell is as halting as the modern one. Smell could be analysed only into disagreeable and agreeable. Several attempts made in recent years to go beyond this crude difference merely ended in failure where the modern scientists succeeded there the ancient thinkers also achieved success, i.e., in the analysis of the other senses. Another point worth noticing is the analysis of cutaneous sensations into eight elements. This is almost modern in its achievement. This indirect Psychological value is more important than the description based upon super-normal perception which unfortunately cannot be verified by Science in its present state.

## 82.

By way of summary, the author enumerates the different forms of corporeal existence. The description may also be taken as a sort of extensive definition of matter.

उबभोज्जमिदिहं य इन्द्रियाया मनो य कम्माणि ।

जं ह्वदि सुत्तमणं तं सत्त्वं पुग्गलं जाणे ॥८२॥

[उपभोग्यमिन्द्रियैश्चेन्द्रियाया मनश्च कर्माणि ।

यद्भूयति सुतमन्यत् तत्सत्त्वं पुद्गलं जानीयात् ॥८२॥]

82. Whatever is perceived by the senses, the sense organs, the various kinds of

*śarīras*, or bodies of Jīvas, the physical *manas* or brain, the Karmas, &c are *mūrta* objects. Understand that all these are *Pudgala* or matter.

COMMENTARY—The author enumerates the different states of matter. All objects of sense perception are corporeal. An object may be apprehended through any one of the senses. Therefore, anything that has the sense quality of colour, contact, smell, taste, or sound comes under this definition. Not only the objects of sense perception but also the sense organs are physical. Thirdly the different *śarīras* or the bodies of Jīvas are also physical. These are five in numbers: *Audārika*, *Vaikrīyaka*, *Āhāraka*, *Tajjasa*, and *Kārmana*. The author includes *dravya-manas* or mind under the same class. Evidently it means brain which is no doubt physical. *Dravya-karmas* are also material since they are constituted by physical atoms. And again he implies *no-karma-pudgalas*, organised matter forming part of organism. This *no-karma* matter refers to matter assimilated by the organism through the process of Metabolism. And by the word 'others' he refers to the several atoms and *Skandhas* not already enumerated. All these are material.

The five *śarīras* referred to in the *Gāthā* require elucidation.

1. *Audārika-śarīra* *Udāraṇa* means *sthūla* or gross. The *śarīra* is called *audārika* because it is constituted by *sthūla* or gross matter. It is also derived from *udara*, womb, that which is born from the womb is *audārika*. Any way *audārika-śarīra* refers to organic bodies, animal and human.

2. *Vaikrīyaka-śarīra* Term *vikrīyā* implies the wonderful bodily transformations that are associated with a *deva* or divine being. A *deva* can take any kind of body he pleases from minute to huge forms. That kind of *śarīras* is called *Vaikrīyaka-śarīra*.

3. *Āhāraka-śarīra* when a *yogin* during *tapas* has certain difficulties about intricate facts of reality, there shoots forth a kind of subtle body from him. This stretches out so far as to be in communion with another well-informed person, from whom the information sought for is secured by a sort of telepathic response. This shooting body from the *yogin* is *Āhāraka-śarīra*.

4. *Tajjasa-śarīra* This refers to the shining body or the light-body.

5. *Kārmana-śarīra*. This refers to the Karmic body of each Jīva. Every Jīva carries this Karmic body with itself when it roams through the cycle of *Samsāra*.

The first alone is the object of sense perception, and the others are subtle bodies. The succeeding one is subtler than the preceding one in order. cf. the *Sūtra*, *parasparāṇi sūkṣmam*, for further description of these *śarīras*, we refer the reader to *Tattvārtha-Sūtra* where the author describes the characteristics by several *Sūtras*. (*Sūtra* 36 to the end of 2nd chapter).

Thus ends the chapter on matter or *Pudgalāstikāya*.

## CHAPTER III, ON DHARMA AND ADHARMA.

## 83.

The author first describes Dharma or the principle of motion.

धम्मत्थिकायमरसं अवणणगंधं असहमप्फासं ।  
लोगोगाढं पुट्टं पिहलमसंखादियपदेसं ॥८३॥

[धर्मास्तिकायोऽरसोऽवर्णगन्धोऽशब्दोऽस्पर्शः ।  
लोकावगाढः स्पृष्टः पृथुलोऽसंख्यातप्रदेशः ॥८३॥]

83. Dharmāstikāya is devoid of qualities of taste, colour, smell, sound and contact. It pervades the whole world, it is continuous because of inseparability; has extension because of its co-existensiveness with space. Though in reality of *ekapiadeśa* yet in *vyavahāra* is of many *pradeśas*.

COMMENTARY—The author introduces important principles without which the world would be incomplete. Dharmāstikāya and Adharmāstikāya are distinctly peculiar to Jaina system of thought. The former is the principle of motion and the latter of rest. These terms are used in a technical sense by Jaina writers. Non-Jaina writers, both European and Indian, have many of them misunderstood these technical names. We shall reserve our discussion to the end of this chapter.

In the above Gāthā the author clearly describes the nature of Dharma or the principle of motion. Since it is non-corporeal or *amūṛta* it has no sense qualities which are generally associated with matter. The qualities of contact, colour, taste, smell and sound are not to be associated with Dharma. Therefore it is not physical. Again it is not an aggregate of simple elements as matter is. Therefore Dharma is continuous and non-composite. Its influence is co-extensive with the whole world. Therefore it may be said to be co-extensive with Lokākāśa without any gaps or intervals. It cannot be said to have manifested at any particular time of the World's History much less is it created. It is coeval with the world and co-extensive with space; and because of the latter character, it is an Astikāya.

## 84.

Next Gāthā describes the remaining qualities of Dharmāstikāya.

अगुरुलघुगेहिं सया तेहिं अणतेहिं परिणदं णिच्चं ।  
गदकिरियाजुत्ताणं कारणभूदं समयमकज्जं ॥८४॥

[अगुरुलघुकैः सदा तैः अनन्तैः परिणतः नित्यः ।  
गतिक्रियायुक्तानां कारणभूतः स्वयमकार्यः ॥८४॥]

84. Because it has the infinite manifestations of the incorporeal nature *agurulaghu*, and because of its dialectic nature of persistence through appearance and disappearance it is a real existence. Itself being unaffected by movement it conditions the motion of those that can move, matter and life

COMMENTARY—The author next establishes the substantial reality of Dharmāstikāya. It has the characteristic change and modification of all the primary entities though it is incorporeal. Therefore it is permanent and real. It is the indispensable condition of movement in physical objects as well as in living beings. But itself cannot be moved by any other thing because it is incapable of movement.

## 85.

The author explains by a well-known analogy how it is the condition of motion.

उदयं जह्मच्छाणं गमनापुगलहकरं हवदि लोए ।  
तह् जीवपुगलानं धम्मं दव्वं वियाणेहि ॥८५॥

[उदयं यथा मत्स्यानां गमनानुग्रहकरं भवति लोके ।  
तथा जीवपुद्गलानां धर्मं द्रव्यं विजानीहि ॥८५॥]

85. Just as water itself being indifferent or neutral, is the condition of movement of fishes so Dharma itself non-motive, is the *sine qua non* of motion of Jivas and Pudgalas.

COMMENTARY—The author explains the function of Dharmāstikāya by a very striking example. Water is the indispensable condition for the life of the fish. The fish lives and moves only in water. But water neither moves with the moving fish nor does it stimulate the fish to move. It is practically indifferent towards the moving fish. If the fish moves, it is due to its own intrinsic and spontaneous activity, and not to the causal agency of water. Such is the relation of Dharmāstikāya to objects of the world. If objects move from one place to another, the movement is due to the intrinsic condition of the object. But still Dharmāstikāya is the *sine qua non* of motion of the objects of the world, i.e., in short it is merely the condition, and not the generative cause, of motion.

## 86.

Next the author describes the Adharmāstikāya or the principle of rest.

जह्म हवदि धम्मदव्वं तह् तं जाणेह् दव्वमधमदव्वं ।  
ठिदिकिरियाजुत्ताणं कारणभूतं तु पुढवीव ॥८६॥

[यथा भवति धर्मद्रव्यं तथा तज्जानीहि द्रव्यमधमद्रव्यम् ।  
स्थितिक्रियायुक्तानां कारणभूतं तु पृथिवीव ॥८६॥]

86. The nature of Adharma is essentially similar to that of Dharma. But it is like the earth (which is the resting place of things) the *sine qua non* of rest for things in motion (both animate and inanimate).

COMMENTARY—Adharma or the principle of rest has all the characteristics associated with Dharma or the principle of motion. This is also devoid of sense qualities. This is also non-corporeal. This is in itself non-spacial and yet it is co-extensive with Lokākāśa. These characteristics it has in common with the principle of motion. But it has its own differentiating quality. In this respect it is compared with earth which is the resting place of things. Moving things whether animate or inanimate are not arrested and brought to rest by the earth. But if there is no earth to support, there will be no possibility of rest for the moving things. Similarly the Adharmāstikāya without interfering with motion itself is the condition of rest for the moving things.

87.

Then the author gives the reason why Dharma and Adharma are considered Astikāyas or existences.

जादो अलोलो गो जेसँ सन्भावदो य गमणठिदी ।

दो वि य मया विभत्ता अविभत्ता लोयमेत्ता य ॥८७॥

[जातमलोकलोकं ययोः सद्भावतश्च गमनस्थितौ ।

द्वावपि च मतो विभक्तावविभक्तौ लोकमात्रौ च ॥८७॥]

87. The two things which by their existence bring about the difference between the world and beyond, which are respectively the condition of motion and rest, which are different in function, but same in nature and *pradeśa*, are Dharma and Adharma. These are uncreated and of the same magnitude as Lokākāśa.

COMMENTARY—The existence of these two principles must be postulated as the necessary conditions of the world for without this there will be neither motion nor rest among things. There will be neither the world nor beyond. If the material particles and Jivas are not kept together as a system, then they will get scattered through the whole place resulting in sheer chaos. There will be no definite world. There will be neither the beyond or Aloka. The difference between Loka and Aloka is entirely due to the coherent system of molecules and Jivas, conditioned by these principles. Dharma and Adharma are said to be distinct because of the difference in function. The former is the condition of motion, the latter of rest. But they are quite similar in nature and are indistinguishable because of their non-exclusive co-existence in space. They are in themselves *niskriya-dravyas*. Non-active and non-functional and yet condition the things living and non-living in their motion and rest. For this reason they are limited entirely to the world. Their function will not be felt beyond the world for the simple reason that there are no things

beyond.

### 88.

Next the author points out that Dharma and Adharma are in themselves neutral, and indifferent condition respectively of motion and rest in other things.

य य गच्छति धर्मस्थी गमणं न करोति अणदवियस्स ।  
हवदि गदिस्स य पसरो जीवाणं पुग्गलाणं च ॥८८॥

[न च गच्छति धर्मास्तिको गमनं न करोत्यग्न्यद्रव्यस्थ ।  
भवति गतेः च प्रसरो जीवानां पुद्गलानां च ॥८८॥]

88. Dharmāstikāya does not move itself nor effect motion in other things. But it forms the condition of motion in living and non-living things.

COMMENTARY—Then it is determined that Dharma and Adharma being in themselves entirely neutral from the external condition of motion and rest respectively. Dharmāstikāya itself is incapable of movement nor can it be an efficient cause of motion in other things such as, physical objects and living beings. In what way can it be said to condition motion? certainly not like the horses that, while themselves running, indirectly cause the motion of persons on their back. Dharmāstikāya does not carry things, locomotion of things and persons is not brought about by Dharma for it is a *niskriya dravya*. But it behaves like water which by its mere presence is the condition of motion in fishes, i. e., Dharmāstikāya by its mere existence conditions motion without being the efficient cause of motion. Jivas and Padgalas have motion because of their own efficient causes and yet motion in them will be impossible, but for the external condition of Dharmāstikāya.

Similarly Adharma being neutral in itself is the external condition of rest. It is merely a *bahiranga-hetu*. Just as the earth is the standing place for horses and the shadow of a tree, the place of rest for the pilgrims, so Adharma is the non-efficient external condition of things at rest.

### 89.

Then the reason why Dharma and Adharma are merely neutral conditions (*udāsīna-hetu*)

विज्जदि जेसिं गमणं ठाणं पुण तेसिमेव संभवद्दि ।  
ते सगपरणामेहिं दु गमणं ठाणं च कुवन्ति ॥८९॥

[विद्यते येषां गमनं स्थानं पुनस्तेषामेव संभवति ।  
ते स्वकारिणामेस्तु गमनं स्थानं च कुर्वन्ति ॥८९॥]

89 To whatever things there is motion to the very same there can be rest, or cessa-

tion of motion, such things of their own spontaneous efficiency effect either motion or rest.

COMMENTARY—The author explains why these are called *udāsina-hetu*. He wants to emphasize that Dharma is not the intrinsic condition of motion nor Adharma of rest, i.e., he wants to deny that they are *mukhya-hetu*. What if they are the *mukhya-hetu* for motion and rest, then the things that are in motion must continue to be so for ever and the things that are at rest must remain in the same state for ever. But things do not behave in that fashion. Therefore it is inferred that these are only *udāsina-hetus* or neutral or external conditions. This only means that they are not efficient causes. Ordinarily we perceive that things moving come to rest and things at rest begin to move. That shows that both motion and rest are associated with single things. Since this fact prevails in nature we have to infer that motion and rest are not produced by Dharma and Adharma as *mukhya-hetu*. Motion and rest must be traced to the intrinsic and efficient nature of things themselves. That clearly shows that Dharma and Adharma are merely *bahiranga-hetus*.

#### NOTE

After taking to task the several writers who misunderstood the technical terms Dharma and Adharma, Mr. J.L. Jaini writes (on p. 25 of his *Outlines of Jainism*).

"Matter goes to struggle with the unwary or infatuated soul ; time times the conflict; space makes possible the arena ; Dharma keeps the combatants to struggle on ; and Adharma assists them when they are inclined to rest." Again on the same page: "Dharma and Adharma are the necessary conditions of its continuance in its endless vicissitudes, merit and demerit, high and low, happiness and misery, as far as disturbance and tranquillity. Of course, Dharma and Adharma are in their nature and *modus operandi* the same. It is the same sword in the hand of a devoted soldier or fanatic rebel."

I am afraid that Mr. Jaini is still thinking of Dharma and Adharma as quasi-moral instruments in the hands of a Jiva.

The terms should not in the least be associated with any kind of moral struggle and tranquillity. Motion and rest contemplated in this connection are distinctly physico-mathematical. They should not therefore be interpreted even metaphorically to mean anything more than that connotation. We have to remember the following points :—

1. Dharma and Adharma—are *amūrta-dravyas*. They have no sense qualities of colour, etc.
2. They are *ajīvas*—non-living.
3. They have spatial relation though in themselves *eka-pradeśi*.
4. They are *niṣkriyas*—non-active.
5. They are *bahiraṅga-hetu* or *udāsina-hetu* and not *mukhya-hetu*.
6. They are non-discrete and continuous.

There are some of the important common qualities emphasised by the Jaina Thinkers.

Of course that they are *astikāyas* need not be emphasised -

If we ponder over these qualities, then they can never be connected with moral struggle or evolution

The Jaina philosopher recognised, in the world, Matter, Life and Space. But are they enough ? No. There would be no world. The Atoms and Jivas may be scattered throughout the infinite space. Therefore there must be something else besides these three. That something must be able to maintain a coherent system of Jivas and atoms, must have the function of preventing the flying atoms, must limit the boundary of the world of things and persons. For the author distinctly says that without Adharma there will be only chaos, there will be no world. Therefore the Jaina Thinkers pointed the existence of a fourth entity which binds together things and persons. So the hypothesis of Adharma.

This is something like Newton's gravitation, but Adharma is slightly different. Its main function is to arrest things. But then there is this difficulty. If there were Adharma alone how could there be motion at all in things ? There would be an eternal paralysis of Reality. To remove this difficulty Dharma had to be posited. The function of Dharma is to guarantee motion within the limits imposed by Adharma. This is the reason for the second hypothesis

But the trouble is not yet over. If the two exist within a spatial limit one guaranteeing motion and the other rest, then the things in motion must be in motion for ever, and things at rest must be there for ever. But our experience is not of that kind. One and the same has motion or rest ; it may move or it may come to stay. Therefore Dharma and Adharma must be deprived of their causality. They can be only *bahuranga-hetu* or *udāsina-hetu*, i.e., they must be indifferent and neutral in themselves and yet must be indispensable to the completion of the world

This seems to be the logical development of the system. The most approximate modern conception answering to the description will be *Ether* of the physicist. But the Jaina systems require two such entities functionally different ; one acting like Newton's gravitation (*adharma*) and the other guaranteeing motion within the limits. It would not be quite accurate to think of centripetal and centrifugal forces, because *dharma* and *adharma* are *niskriyas*. Does it mean the duality of electro-magnetic influence of Ether ? The constitution of an atom is supposed to be a system of electrons (positive and negative). Had the Jaina thinkers any such idea about the whole world ? We can only contemplate. But of this much we are certain that *dharma* and *adharma* are parts of the physical system. They are two different entities without which the system of reality would be impossible and incomplete

Again Dr. Seal suggests that Dharma is "answering somewhat to Leibnitz's Pre-established harmony . . . it is the cause (or condition) of the system of movements, the fact of an order in the movements of Jiva and Pudgala," (Note E at the end of *Dravya Sangraha*, S.B.J. pp LVIII)



As the whole letter is not quoted, I am not in a position to know what Dr. Seal has to say about *adharmā*. With due deference to the great Philosopher I beg to state that he misses the point. Dharma need not necessarily be associated with simultaneous movements as I pointed out. Adharmā seems to be logically prior to Dharma in the construction of the system. Hence I am not able to appreciate this reference to Pre-established Harmony which has a special function in the system of a 'windowless monads.' There certainly is the idea of corresponding movements. Hence Dharma is not the 'system of movements.' Its meaning is distinctly *subsequent* to that of Adharma. How could Adharma be connected with Leibnitz's System? Then what is the force of that reference?

## CHAPTER IV, ON ĀKĀŚA OR SPACE

90.

In this Chapter the author describes the nature and characteristics of space. The term Ākāśa here means space and not Ether as it is very often interpreted in other systems of Indian philosophy.

सर्व्वेसि जीवाणं सेसाणं तह य पुग्गलाण च ।

जं देदि विवरमखिलं तं लोए हवदि आयासं ॥६०॥

[सर्व्वेषां जीवानां शेषाणां तथैव पुद्गलानां च ।

यद्दाति विवरमखिलं तल्लोके भवत्याकाशम् ॥६०॥]

90. What contains or accommodates completely all Jivas and Pudgalas and the remaining Dravyas is the world space or Lokākāśa.

COMMENTARY—Space is considered to be objectively real in Jaina system. Objectively real space is ordinarily considered to be self-contradictory and impossible. On the so-called impossibility of space idealism bases its arguments. But in recent years Mathematicians have clearly shown that space and time are not really self-contradictory. Euclidian space is quite possible and may be real.

Philosophical description of space as real is not the characteristic of the other Indian systems of Philosophy. The term Ākāśa is used in an ambiguous sense referring to either space or Ether. As Doctor Thibaut points out the consistent translation of the word Ākāśa is Ether. He invariably translates the term into Ether. For according to the Hindu creation theory, Ākāśa is the primeval substance from which the other elements appear. Therefore Ākāśa must mean some subtle form of matter and not the Mathematicians' space. But the Jaina thinkers reject the theory of creation. Therefore they found it possible to acknowledge the objective existence of space, space therefore is a fundamental element of the system of reality according to the Jaina view.

91.

The same point is further elaborated.

जीवा पुग्गलकाया धम्माधम्मा य लोगदोणण्णा ।

तत्तो अणण्णमण्ण आयासं अंतवदिरित्तं ॥६१॥

[जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः धर्माधर्मो च लोकतोऽन्ये ।

ततोऽन्यदन्वयाकाशमन्तव्यतिरिक्तम् ॥६१॥]

91. Life, matter, the principle of motion and that of rest and also Time, these are not distinct from the world. But that which is the same as the world, and also distinct

from it, is Ākāśa or space which is infinite.

COMMENTARY—The constituent elements of the world are the infinite number of Jivas, and the infinite physical objects, the principles of motion and rest, and space and time. Of these space contains the other five. The space which is co-extensive with these objects is called Lokākāśa. But that is only a part of the real space. Beyond the Loka there is Alokākāśa or Anantākāśa. This Anantākāśa is pure space. There are no objects animate or inanimate in this Infinite Beyond. Not a tiny molecule of matter nor a stray Jiva, would step beyond the limits of Loka. The system of objects is held together by the principles of Dharma and Adharma. And these principles are confined to Lokākāśa.

Thus we have to note that Mathematically pure space is recognised to be possible and real by Jaina thinkers. Arguments against pure space have already been said to be generally fallacious.

92.

Ākāśa thus accommodates the other Dravyas. Why should it not be taken also as the condition of motion and rest. The author shows why it cannot be such a condition.

आगासं अवगासं गमनद्विदिकारणोह देदि यदि ।

उदङ्गद्विपधाणा सिद्धा चिद्वृत्ति किञ्च तत्त्वं ॥६२॥

[आकाशमवकाशं गमनस्थितिकारणभ्यां ददाति यदि ।

उदङ्गवर्गतिप्रधानाः सिद्धाः तिष्ठन्ति कथं तत्र ॥६२॥]

92. If space, in addition to accommodating other things, conditions their motion and rest, then why do these Siddhas whose tendency is to go upwards come to stay at the summit of the world ?

COMMENTARY—The author evidently explains why it is necessary to postulate the existence of Dharma and Adharma. Cannot Ākāśa be credited with the functions of motion and rest in addition to its own function of accommodating things ? According to the author such a Hypothesis would be impossible. It would be conflicting with other facts for if it is also the condition of motion and rest, then wherever there is Ākāśa there should be free chance for motion and rest. But neither a single Jiva or a single atom of matter could step beyond the limit of Lokākāśa though there is Ākāśa beyond. Therefore the author concludes that space is not the condition of either motion or rest. These require independent principles as their condition. Ākāśa cannot be a substitute for Dharma and Adharma. This argument should be considered conjointly with the arguments in the previous Chapter for the necessity of Dharma and Adharma. We have to notice especially that one which points out the difference between Cosmos and Chaos to be based upon principles of state and motion. The Jaina system evidently considers the world incomplete and unreal without the statical and dynamical principles.

## 93.

The author strengthens the argument by showing that according to Jain faith the perfected ones come to a stay in the summit of the Loka.

जम्हा उवरिद्वानं सिद्धानं जिणवरेहिं पण्णत्त ।

तम्हा गमणद्वानं आयासे जाण नत्थि त्ति ॥६३॥

[यस्मादुपरिस्थानं सिद्धानां जिनवरैः प्रज्ञप्तम् ।

तस्माद् गमनस्थानमाकाशे जानीहि नास्तीति ॥६३॥]

93 Because the Siddhas or the perfected ones stay in the summit of the world—So it is revealed by the great Jina. Therefore there cannot be in space either the condition of motion or of rest

COMMENTARY—That the Siddhas reside in the summit of the world is one of the religious doctrines of Jains. If space be credited to be the condition of motion and rest it would contradict the scriptures. To avoid this internal contradiction space should not be supposed to be the condition of motion and rest. The argument *prima facie* is based upon a religious Dogma. But really it is another form of the same philosophical argument which maintained that without the principles of Dharma and Adharma there would be no distinction between Loka and Aloka. The argument in this Gāthā is merely the converse of the above. Since there is a definite Loka or Cosmos, and since there is space beyond, there must be something besides space which maintains the integrity of the system of things and persons. For space itself cannot have that function of maintaining the unity of the world.

## 94.

The author shows that the supposition about space is impossible by bringing in a really strong argument

जदि हवदि गमणहेद्व आगासं ठाणकारणं तेसि ।

पसजदि अलोगहाणी लोणस्स य अंतपरिवुड्ढी ॥६४॥

[यदि भवति गमनहेतुराकाशं स्थानकारणं तेषाम् ।

प्रसज्यलोकहानिर्लोकस्य चान्तपरिवृद्धिः ॥६४॥]

94. If space be the condition of motion and rest, of life and matter, then there would happen the disappearance of Aloka or the beyond and the destruction and dissipation of Loka or the world.

COMMENTARY—As a matter of fact the world is an integral system of things, living, and non-living, existing in space. That there is some force or power which holds the

constituent elements of the world together is a necessary pre-supposition even of modern science. It is really wonderful that Jaina thinkers several centuries ago felt the same intellectual necessity as to suppose a physical force which maintains the cosmic unity. The reason given for that Hypothesis is still more interesting. If there is no such power and if things living and non-living were left in space by themselves without a further principle to hold them together there would only be chaos, no systematic world. This argument must be considered very important for it gives us an insight into the scientific ideas of the ancients. The positive science of ancient Indians must have been fairly advanced in order to promulgate such physical theories as are contemplated by the author.

## 95.

If then space cannot be the determining condition of motion and of rest, the latter facts must be due to some other conditions. Therefore Dharma and Adharma must be admitted to be the necessary constituents of the system of reality.

तस्मा धम्मधम्मा गमणट्टिदिकारणाणि नागासं ।

इदि जिणवरेहिं भणिदं लोसहावं सुणंताणं ॥६५॥

[तस्माद्द्वर्धमो गमनस्थितिकारणे नाकाशम् ।

इति जिनवरं भणितं लोकस्वभावं शृण्वताम् ॥६५॥]

95. Dharma and Adharma alone are the condition of motion and rest respectively, and not Ākāśa or space. So was the nature of the Cosmos revealed by the great Jina to his audience (in Samavasaraṇa).

COMMENTARY—The author summarises his position as to the nature of Loka. He distinctly asserts that the coherence of the world is due to principles of Dharma and Adharma and not to space. The author further states evidently to strengthen his own case in the eyes of the faithful that such was the message delivered by the Jina to his audience, consisting of Ganadharas, and Cakradharas, and several others in Samavasaraṇa. The description of the world is as revealed by the Omniscient to his disciples.

## 96.

The author states that Lokākāśa or World Space, Dharma and Adharma, are all co-extensive and coincident. Hence they may be considered as one conventionally, as they are all incorporeal entities in the same locality. But they are in reality different from one another on account of their functional difference.

धम्मधम्मगासा अपुषब्भूदा समापपरिमाणा ।

पुषगुवलद्विविसेसा करेति एगत्तमण्णत्त ॥६६॥

[धर्माधर्माकाशान्यपृथग्भूतानि समानपरिमाणानि ।

पृथगुपलब्धिविशेषाणि कुर्वन्त्येकत्वमन्यत्त्वम् ॥६६॥]

96 Dharma, Adharma and space, are mutually interpenetrating and coincident Hence they are one from the point of locality ; they are of the same size and form, and constitute an inseparable unity . But from the difference of function they also exhibit their diversity.

COMMENTARY—This Gāthā is interesting for this reason that Dharma and Adharma being constitutive elements of the world are said to be confined to Lokākāśa. Their influence is not felt beyond the boundary of the world for their influence is fundamentally related to things material and spiritual These two mysterious physical principles are all pervading and co-extensive with the world space. Their existence cannot be inferred from their difference of locality There is no such difference. But yet they have fundamentally different functions and on account of these differences they are really diverse. In short they are one in *pradeśa* but different as *vastus* ; *e* , they have a unity of Locality with diversity of function and nature

This functional difference is emphasized by the author only because these three Dravyas are *amūrta* ones There is no other way of differentiating them unlike physical objects which can be distinguished by sense qualities and unlike Jivas which can be differentiated by conscious qualities Dharma and Adharma have to be determined only by their function in the economy of the physical realm.

Thus Ends the Chapter on Space.

## CŪLIKĀ

97.

Then the resume of the five Astikāyas and Dravyas They are described as Mūrta and Amūrta (Physical and non-physical) and Cetana and Acetana (conscious and non-conscious)

आगासकालजीवा धर्माधर्मा य मुक्तिपरिहीणा ।

मुक्त पुग्गलद्वय जीवो खलु चेदणो तेसु ॥६७॥

[आकाशकालजीवा धर्माधर्मो य मुक्तिपरिहीणा ।

मूर्तं पुद्गलद्वयं जीवः खलु चेतनस्तेषु ॥६७॥]

97. Space, Time, Life, Dharma and Adharma these are Amūrta Dravyas and are therefore without sense qualities Matter alone is Mūrta and has these qualities Again of these life alone is conscious.

COMMENTARY—In this Gāthā the author classifies the Dravyas according to two

principles. According to the first classification, they are grouped into Mūrtas and Amūrtas. Mūrta Dravya is one which has the sense qualities of contact, taste, smell, sound and colour. That which is devoid of these qualities is Amūrta. Here, space, time, Jiva in itself, Dharma and Adharma, are all Amūrtas. Matter alone is Mūrta. That which has the nature of consciousness is *cetana* and that which is otherwise is *acetana*. Space, time and matter, Dharma and Adharma are all *acetanas*. Jiva alone is *cetana* Dravya.

## 98.

Again the Dravyas are classified into *sakriyas* and *niskriyas*, active and non-active.

जीवा पुद्गलकाया सह सक्किरिया हवन्ति ण य सेसा ।

पुद्गलकरणा जीवा खंधा खलु कालकरणा दु ॥६८॥

[जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः सह सक्किया भवन्ति न च शेषाः ।

पुद्गलकरणा जीवाः स्कन्धाः खलु कालकरणास्तु ॥६८॥]

98. Jivas and physical objects become *sakriya* or causal agents when determined by certain condition. The rest are not causally active. Jiva is active because of Karmic matter. Skandhas or physical bodies are active because of time

COMMENTARY—According to this classification, Dravyas are either *sakriya* or *niskriya*. Any causal activity is described to be *sakriya*. If there is no such causal activity then it is *niskriya*. The activity contemplated here may be merely any change brought about by external conditions. Jivas and matter are *sakriya* Dravyas for they become *sakriya* under certain conditions; space, time, Dharma and Adharma are all *niskriyas* or non-active entities. The external condition of activity of Jiva is merely the group of Karmas. These are material. The external condition of the activity of matter is time. Temporal succession brings about changes either of aggregation or disintegration in physical objects. There can be no change in matter without time as there can be no change in Jiva without Karmic matter; but Jiva in perfect states can be free from Karmic matter. In this state the Siddha Jiva is practically *niskriya*, i.e., it is not subjected to causal category. But it cannot be so with matter for there is no chance for matter to exist independent of time. It must always be subject to change due to time. Therefore it is always *sakriya*.

One of the commentators relying on the religious dogma that Siddha Jiva gets to the summit of the world, speaks of Siddha also as *sakriya*. If at all there is any causal change, it is this initial change of locality. But in the perfect state it will be more accurately described as *niskriya* for already Jiva is described to be beyond causal series in its state of perfection. To be consistent with that attitude it is better to consider Siddha as *niskriya*.

## 99.

The difference between Mūrta and Amūrta is again described in other words.

जे खलु इन्द्रियेभ्यो विसया जीवेहि हुंति ते मुक्ता ।  
सेसं हवति अमुक्तं चित्तं उभयं समादयति ॥६६॥

[ये खलु इन्द्रियग्राह्या विषया जीवन्भवन्ति ते मूर्ताः ।  
शेषं भवत्यमूर्तं चित्तमुभयं समाददाति ॥६६॥]

99. All those objects that are apprehended or perceived by the senses are Mūrta objects. The rest are Amūrtas. Mind apprehends both Mūrta and Amūrta objects.

COMMENTARY—The author again tries to explain the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual objects. All those objects that are objects of the senses are Mūrta Dravyas. The term Mūrta, therefore, implies the inherence in the object of the sense qualities of colour, taste, smell, etc. Those objects that have not these characteristics are Amūrta Dravyas. According to this description Physical objects are distinctly Mūrta Dravyas. But Physical objects may exist in different forms. There may be of minute molecular constitution and the primary atoms. These are certainly not perceived by the senses and yet they also come under Mūrta category for they form the potential basis of the gross or physical objects which are evident to the senses. In short all those objects which are *pratyakṣa* to the senses are Mūrta objects and those objects which are known through *parokṣa* are Amūrtas. Under the Amūrta category come such facts as Dharma and Adharma and all Psychic states. (We have to note here that the term *pratyakṣa* is used in Vyavahāra sense.) Mind, which is in itself an Amūrta Dravya is able to know both Mūrta and Amūrta Dravyas. Mūrta Dravyas are apprehended *pratyakṣa* and Amūrta *parokṣa* or mediately.

Thus ends the *Cūlikā* or *Summary*.

## 100

In the treatment of *Pancāstikāya*, time has only a secondary place. Therefore the author gives a subordinate place to time and mentions about it in the summary. The section dealing about time, therefore, is merely a part of the *Cūlikā*; and it is not considered as an independent chapter by the author as well as the commentators.

कालो परिणामभवो परिणामो दन्वकालसम्भूदो ।  
दोषह एस सहावो कालो खणभंगुरो णियदो ॥१००॥

[कालः परिणामभवः परिणामो द्रव्यकालसम्भूतः ।  
द्वयोरेष स्वभावः कालः क्षणभङ्गुरो नियतः ॥१००॥]



100. Relative time is determined by changes or motions in things. These changes themselves are the effect of time absolute. The former time is ephemeral (having beginning and end) The latter is eternal, such are the characteristics of the two.

COMMENTARY—The author differentiates between relative time and absolute time. The different conventional periods from *samaya* or moment onwards are the relative time. The different periods of relative time are measured by changes in other things. Movement of Physical objects is mainly the unit of measuring the different periods of relative time. The changes which measure the periods of relative time are themselves the effect of real or absolute time. The periods of relative time have both beginning and end. But *dravyakāla* or real time is eternal, is without beginning or end.

The author takes up an attitude which is very familiar to common sense and science. The distinction is quite identical with Newtonian distinction between relative and absolute time. According to the author time is a real *Dravya*, it is not merely a form of mental activity. The idealistic thinkers both in the east as well as in the west have treated time as merely an appearance. But the Jaina thinkers evidently form an exception, for them, time is not an appearance but a reality. The main argument against the reality of time is the so-called self-contradiction, in the motions of continuity and infinity. Time has these characteristics of continuity and infinity and yet it is also constituted by instants or *dravyakālanus* as the Jaina writers call them. How can there be continuity constituted by primary elements of instants? This difficulty is not peculiar to time. It is common to space, as well as matter. In all these cases Philosophers emphasize the impossibility of obtaining continuity and infinity from simple elements. On account of this impossibility space, time and matter were condemned to be appearances.

But the problem has been taken up by the Mathematicians. The wonderful mathematical discoveries of the continental mathematicians such as Cantor, Peano and Frege have shown clearly the intrinsic fallacy in all the arguments against the reality of time and space. The problem is developed by mathematicians as a special case of 'transitive and continuous series.' To go into further details would be too mathematical. The discussion may very well be reserved to the general introduction. It is enough to note here the wonderful correspondence between the ideas of the author, and those of philosophical Mathematicians of our present day.

Another point worth notice is that time is the cause of changes or modifications in things. The author not only admits the reality of time but also recognises its potency. In this respect one is reminded of the great French Philosopher Bergson. Bergson has revealed to the world that time is a potent factor in the evolution of Cosmos. Changes and modifications in things are absolutely impossible without time, and that is just the view of the author.

## 101

In order to clear the doubt of the disciple of a different Sangha, who disbelieves the reality of time, the author emphasizes the existential nature of time.

कालो स्ति य ववदेसो सन्भावप्ररूपगो हवदि गिचवो ।

उपपणपद्वंसी अवरो दीहतरदुई ॥१०१॥

[काल इति च व्यपदेशः सद्भावप्ररूपको भवति नित्यः ।

उत्पन्नप्रध्वंस्यपरो दीर्घान्तरस्थायी ॥१०१॥]

101. The name time or Kāla denotes an existential fact. The thing so denoted—Time is real but the other relative time has from the point of present moment, origin and end almost simultaneously. But it may also be of long duration.

COMMENTARY—The author differentiates the real time from relative time. Real or absolute time is eternal existence. But relative time is merely of finite duration. But from the aspect of moment it has no duration at all. Origin and end are together in a single moment. It has *ksanikatva* as its nature as against *nityatva* of the other. But the *ksanikatva* may apparently disappear and relative time may have long duration. Even then it has both beginning and end and as such it is different from Dravya Kāla or absolute time.

## 102

Then the quantitative appreciation of time and the absence of *kāyatva* or Corpus for the same.

एदे कालागासा धम्माधम्मा य पुग्गला जीवा ।

लभमि दव्वसणं कालस्स तु णत्थि कायत्तं ॥१०२॥

[एते कालाकारो धर्माधर्मौ च पुद्गला जीवाः ।

लभन्ते द्रव्यसंज्ञां कालस्य तु नास्ति कायत्वम् ॥१०२॥]

102. Time, space, Dharma and Adharma, matter, and Jiva: these things are called Dravyas. Of these to time alone there is no *Kāyatva*.

COMMENTARY—In this Gāthā, the author emphasizes the fact that time has *astitva* or existence but not *kāyatva* spaciality. It is one of the six Dravyas. The name Dravya is applicable to all those existences which have continuity through origin and decay. Time has such a nature. Therefore it shares the name Dravya with the other things herein enumerated.

But the other Dravyas are also called *Astikāyas* because they have extension or *bahupradeśa*. But time has no such *bahupradeśa*. Therefore it is not an *Astikāya*.

This nature of time is described in mathematical terms by the author elsewhere (*Piṇvacanasāra*). Time has *ūrdhva-pracaya* whereas the other Dravyas have *tiryak-pracaya*. In the language of Modern Mathematics the former term corresponds to mono-dimensional assymetrical series, the latter multi-dimensional series. According to Mathematical Philosophy extension is multi-dimensional series. Kāyatva, therefore, is generated by *tiryak-pracaya* but *ūrdhva-pracaya* cannot be associated with extension since it is unilateral. Therefore time is not an Astikāya. More of this in the general introduction.

## 103.

The fruit of contemplating upon these facts—Pañcāstikāya.

एवं पचयणसारं पञ्चस्थित्यसंग्रहं वियाणिता ।

जो मुयदि रागदोसे सो गाहदि दुःखपरिमोक्षं ॥१०३॥

[एव प्रवचनसारं पञ्चास्तिकायसंग्रहं विज्ञाय ।

जो मुञ्चति रागद्वेषौ स गाहते दुःखपरिमोक्षम् ॥१०३॥]

103. Thus one who with the knowledge of, and faith in this short summary of Pañcāstikāya—the essence of the Divine word—gives up desire and aversion (towards worldly things) realises freedom from sorrow:

COMMENTARY—Here the author indicates the path to eternal bliss. The path consists of the three jewels or *ratna-traya*. Right faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct.

सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारिद्राणि मोक्षमार्गः ।

and *samyag-darśanam* is defined to be *Tattvārtha-śraddhānam*. The Tattvas are the existence described in short in Pañcāstikāya or the reality itself may be considered as a system of Pañcāstikāyas. One who believes in the nature of reality, one who tries to understand its constituent elements must next try to realise his own true nature. When faith and knowledge get the co-operation of effort or *cāritra*, then there is the surity of heavenly bliss.

## 104.

Then the manner of obtaining such a freedom.

मुणिऊण एतदट्टं तदणुगमणुज्जदो णिहदमोहो ।

पसमियरागदोसो हवदि हदपरावरो जीवो ॥१०४॥

[ज्ञात्वैतदर्थं तदनुगमनोच्चतो निहतमोहः ।

प्रशमितरागद्वेषो भवति हतपरापरो जीवः ॥१०४॥]

104. Whoever knowing this truth (that self is the greatest reality) endeavours to

form. The Mūla-Tattvas or the primary elements, are Jiva and its non-living environment. By the combination and separation of Jiva and Ajiva are generated, the other Tattvas and Padārthas which are derivative and secondary. The central actor in the Drama is Jiva. And the culmination of the development is Mokṣa. The second book therefore is concerned with the career of life from Samsāra to Mokṣa.

## 106.

First the author takes up Mokṣamārga or the path to Liberation as he wants to describe it in short.

सम्मतज्ञानयुक्तं चारित्तं रागदोषपरिहीणं ।  
मोक्षस्तु हृदि सगो भव्यानां लब्धबुद्धीनाम् ॥१०६॥

[सम्यक्त्वज्ञानयुक्तं चारित्र्यं रागद्वेषपरिहीणम् ।  
मोक्षस्य भवति मार्गो भव्यानां लब्धबुद्धीनाम् ॥१०६॥]

106. Right conduct uninfluenced by the desire or aversion, together with right faith and right knowledge, forms the path to Liberation to those faithful Jivas who realise self knowledge through the five attainments or Labdhus.

COMMENTARY—Here the author indicates the path to Mokṣa or the three jewels. The Gāthā is merely the paraphrase of the very first Sūtra of *Tattvārthādhigama*.

Three elements constitute the path. Darśana or belief, Jñāna or knowledge, and Cāritra or conduct. But all the three must be of the right sort. Belief in the true nature of reality is Darśana, which is right. This Samyag Darśana is considered to be the result of suppression or eradication of that particular Karma called Darśana Mohanīya whose function is to blind that faculty of belief or Darśana. The understanding of the nature of these Tattvas, the constitutive categories of reality, is Samyag Jñāna. The term *samyak* implies the absence of doubt and error. Conduct as conditioned by right belief and right knowledge is Samyak Cāritra or right conduct.

These form the indispensable elements of the *mokṣa-mārga*. Unless all the three are present there would be no path.

In this Gāthā the author indicates eight main conditions of the path.

1. The co-operation of right belief and right knowledge, without these there would be no path.
2. Conduct is the main constituent element; not any conduct but only right conduct.
3. This implies that there should be no *rāga* or *dvesa*, Desire or aversion, the presence of these would nullify the Mārga.
4. Conduct of that kind forms the path to Mokṣa or liberation, but does not lead to Bandha or bondage.

## BOOK II

## NINE PADĀRTHAS.

105.

The six Dravyas and the five Astikāyas are of two kinds, life and non-life. These two things, life and non-life, form the two primary elements among seven Tattvas and nine Padārthas. Besides these two, other Tattvas and Padārthas are derivative. They are due to the combination or separation of these two primary Tattvas, Life and non-life. On account of combination occur the following Padārthas, *Punya* (virtue), *Pāpa* (vice), *Āsrava* (incoming of Karma) and *Bandha* (bondage). These four which lead to *Saṃsāra*. Originating by their separation the following Padārthas occur: *Samvara* (prevention of incoming Karma), *Nirjarā* (withering away of existing Karma) and *Moksa* (emancipation from all Karma or Freedom). Of these Moksa Tattva is the most important, being the *summum Bonum* of life. The path to this goal is described by the author who begins by praying to the last of the Jinas, Lord Mahāvīra who revealed the path.

अभिवन्दिषुण शिरसा अपुण्णभवकारणं महावीरं ।

तेसिं पयत्थमंगं मगं मोक्षस्स वोच्छामि ॥१०५॥

[अभिवन्ध शिरसा अपुनर्भवकारणं महावीरम् ।

तेषां पयार्थमङ्गं मां मोक्षस्य वक्ष्यामि ॥१०५॥]

105. Bowing my head in reverence to Mahāvīra, the saviour of the world, I describe those two primary Padārthas life and non-life, and the various derivative Padārthas and also the path to Moksa.

COMMENTARY—This *namaskāra-śloka* is *madhya-mangala* (Salutation for the middle of the books). The author worships Vardhmāna Mahāvīra, the last of the Tirthakaras; he is considered to be the revealer of the true path. All Śāstras are traced to Mahāvīra as the originator.

In the second book the author is concerned with the career of life. In the first book, he described in detail the nature of the constitutive elements of the world. In the second book he is going to follow the spiritual evolution. Evolution or development implies a struggle and the primary conditions of struggles are Jiva and Ajiva, life and non-life. Jiva is situated in an environment of Ajiva or non-living things. Of the Ajivas matter is of primary importance. The struggle is mainly between life and matter. According to the Jaina doctrine the struggle is without beginning. The spiritual evolution consists in progressive emancipation of Jiva from physical shackles.

The reality therefore is looked at from a different angle of vision. The different aspects of the struggle and evolution form the Tattvas and the Padārthas. The author is no more concerned with Astikāyas and Dravyas. The very same group appear in another

the worldly souls ?

By way of reply to this objection from the disciple the Master says : "You have seen this in your experience—that a hero watches for an opportunity for vanquishing his enemy. Whenever the enemy is in his minimum strength on account of several reasons, the hero without losing the chance carefully prepares for the struggle making use of his mature deliberation and select instruments. Thus is the enemy vanquished "

Similarly Samsāri Jīva embarrassed by ancient as well as fresh 'Karmic enemies patiently waits for an opportune moment. As a natural consequence of Karmic matter duration may come to an end, or its intensity and fertility may be declining to minimums. At that moment the Bhavya Jīva which is patiently aspiring for spiritual greatness, strikes with vehemence and vanquishes the enemy. This suppression of Karmas at their weakest moment is Kṣayopāśama Labdhi No. 1.

After this initial assertion of spiritual independence there may appear a change of disposition in the nature of Jīva which may thereafter be hankering for good. This hankering for good may manifest in good and useful conduct (*punya*); and as such it may be the condition for *Punya-Karma-Āsrava*. Nevertheless the declension of the disposition towards good is *Viśuddha Labdhi* No. 2.

Then with this changed disposition Jīva may have the good fortune to obtain a master who would instruct him in the path. This instruction may lead to the removal of ignorance and error and to the acquisition of *Jñāna*. This may guarantee progress for the Jīva along the rungs of spiritual ladder. This good fortune of obtaining instruction is *Upadeśa eśanā Labdhi* No. 3.

The duration and intensity of some Karmas may go on mutually aggravating each other to their maximum. After reaching the maximum they have to decline of their own accord. This declining stage of Karmas after reaching maximum is another opportunity known as *Prāyogyatā Labdhi* (co-relative of Karmic glow) No. 4.

Again after reaching a certain stage in the spiritual development—*Guṇasthānas*, there may appear certain psychic instruments, e. g., *Śukladhyāna*. This attainment of spiritual instruments and other supernormal powers is known as *Karaṇa Labdhi* No. 5.

These are the Labdhis or attainments which a Jīva by good fortune may secure

These Labdhis are not to be confounded with what are known as *Nava Kevala-Labdhis*. Nine attainments about the time of *Kevala Jñāna*.

At the *Kevala* stage of development the following facts happen to the person.

1. The all penetrating *Kevala Jñāna* which is the result of annihilation of the veil of knowledge.
2. The all illuminating perception or *kevala darśana* or *kṣāyika darśana*; which is also the concomitant of the destruction of the veil of perception.
3. The all-merciful attitude of great spiritual Harmony known as *kṣāyikā abhaya-dāna*.

5. The path so constituted is the right and the reliable one; and as such it is distinct from several *mithyā-mārgas* or false paths.

6. The path is available only to Bhavya Jivas or the good matured ones and not to Abhavyas of intrinsic evil disposition.

7. Even among the Bhavyas only to those who secured five attainments or the *pañca labdhis* but not to those who had not those attainments.

8. Only those who have eradicated completely all Kaṣāyas or the gross emotions which have the tendency to stain the purity of self; but one in whom such emotions are still present cannot walk the path of righteousness.

The three elements constituting the *path* are the three jewels, or *ratnatraya*. This Ratnatraya is spoken to be of two kinds: Nīścaya Ratnatraya and Vyavahāra Ratnatraya. The former is from the absolute point of view and the latter is of relative point of view. When the Ratnatraya is distinctly based upon self then it is Nīścaya Ratnatraya. Darśana, Jñāna and Cāritra, all have reference to self and self alone. This Nīścaya Ratnatraya first implies the belief in the ultimate nature and importance of self, i. e., the belief that Paramātmā is nothing but self. Again consequent upon this firm belief there must be knowledge of self. Complete knowledge of self is the next element of the Nīścaya Ratnatraya. The knowledge of all other Tattvas centres round the Personality. Knowledge of the Person therefore is knowledge *par excellence*. And lastly realisation of the Paramātmā or the great Person would be Cāritra *par excellence*.

Vyavahāra Ratnatraya is constituted by Darśana, Jñāna and Cāritra which are based upon *para-tattvas* or objective ideals. Belief in an objective divinity independent of our Self for example, would be Vyavahāra Darśana. Knowledge of such alien entities would be Vyavahāra knowledge and attempting to realise our ideals and aspirations through the help of such alien personalities either through sacrifices or propitiations is Vyavahāra Cāritra. These three constitute Vyavahāra Ratnatraya.

The five Labdhis referred to in the Gāthā are, (1) Kṣayopāśama-Labdhī, (2) Deśanā-Labdhī, (3) Prāyogya-Labdhī, (4) Viśuddha-Labdhī, and (5) Karaṇa-Labdhī. (*Gommaṣāsāra*, Jivakānda, Gāthā 650)

खयजवसमियवितोही देसणपाउमाकरणलढी य ।

चत्तारि वि सामण्णा करणं पुण होदि सम्भत्ते ॥

[क्षयोपशमिकविशुद्धिः देशनाप्रायोग्यकरणलब्धिश्च ।

चतस्रोऽपि सामान्याः करणं पुनः भवति सम्यक्त्वे ॥]

To Saṁsāri Jiva there is continuous fruition of old and existing Karmas and combination with novel and incoming Karmas. On account of this Karmic encircling there should be no chance for such a Jiva to realise its pure and perfect form independent of Karmic effects. Then how can we talk of Mokṣa or Emancipation for Saṁsāri Jivas or

2. Anantānubandhi Māna
3. Anantānubandhi Māyā.
4. Anantānubandhi Lobha.
5. Samyaktva.
6. Mithyātva
7. Samyak Mithyātva.

These seven constitute the *sapta prakṛtis*. The Prakṛtis 1 to 4 are sub-divisions of Chāritra Mohaniya and the other three of Darśana Mohaniya.

If these get abated, then there is the chance for Samyag Darśana or right belief.

107.

Then the description of the nature of the three Jewels or Ratnatraya.

सम्मतं सद्गृह्यं भावाणं तेसिमधिगमो णाणं ।  
 चारित्तं समभावो विसयेषु विरुद्धमग्गाणं ॥१०७॥  
 [सम्यक्त्वं अद्वानं भावानां तेषामधिगमो ज्ञानम् ।  
 चारित्र्यं समभावो विषयेषु विरुद्धमार्गिणाम् ॥१०७॥]

107. Belief in the real existences or Tattvas is the right faith. Knowledge of their real nature without doubt or error is right knowledge. An attitude of neutrality without desire or aversion towards the objects of the external world is right conduct. These three are found in those who know the path.

COMMENTARY—The Gāthā may be interpreted either as referring to Vyavahāra Ratnatraya or to Nīścaya Ratnatraya. The description of the three jewels may be consistent with the relative path or with the 'absolute path.

In describing Samyag Darśana and Samyak Jñāna right belief and knowledge, the author indicates the nine Padārthas which are the objects of the said belief and knowledge. The Second Book mainly treats of the nine Padārthas; and the description of the Ratnatraya may be considered as an indirect introduction to the Padārthas which are :—

1. Jiva=life.
2. Ajiva=non-life.
3. Pāpa=sin.
4. Punya=virtue.
5. Āsrava=flow-in of Karmas
6. Saṁvara=the prevention of the incoming Karmas
7. Nirjarā=eradication of Karmas
8. Bandha=bondage.
9. Moksa=liberation or emancipation.

The first two are the primary Padārthas and the others are derivative.



4. Even after relinquishing all kinds of good and nourishment, in order to maintain the *śarīra* for a time there is the incoming or assimilation of subtle physical principles. This is *ksāyika-lābha* gain or income after *ksāyika* state.

5. Then this happy events introduced by Indras such as showing flowers over head is *ksāyika-bhoga*. This is the consequence of complete annihilation of Bhogāntarāya Karma.

6. Similarly the introduction of *śīhāsana* (Lion thrones), *chattra*, *cāmara*, etc., (umbrella, etc.,) is *ksāyika-upabhoga* which is the consequence of destruction of Upabhogāntarāya Karma

7. Then the realisations of Omnipotence, *ananta-vīrya*, which is the result of complete eradication of Viryāntarāya-Karma.

8. Then by this complete destruction of the seven *mūla prakṛtis* (fundamental Karmas) happens *ksāyika samyaktva*, Absolute Belief in the true nature of Reality.

9. And finally *ksāyika cāritra*. This implies the absolutely self-determined thought activity of the pure and perfect person Siddha or Arhat. This thought activity is again the consequence of absolute emancipation from all *upādhis*.

The former class of Labdhis is always referred to as *pañca labdhi's* and the latter as *nava kevala-labdhis* in Śāstras in order to avoid confusion. Therefore it is not necessary to emphasise the difference further.

It is enough to remember that Pañca Labdhis have reference to Saṃsāri Jiva, and Nava-kevala-Labdhi to Mukta Jiva.

### 106\*1.

Then Vyavahāra Samyag Darśana is described:

एवं जिणपण्णत्ते सद्वहमाणस्स भावदो भावे ।

पुरिसस्साभिणिबोधे वंसणसहो हवदि जुत्तो ॥१०६\*१॥

[एवं जिनप्रज्ञप्तान् श्रद्धतः भावतः भावान् ।

पुरुषस्याभिनिबोधे वसन्तशब्दः सवति युक्तः ॥१०६\*१॥]

106\*1. If a person who thus with great interest believes in the Padārthas revealed by Jina obtains Maṭi Jñāna. Then in his case the term Dārśanika 'he is a believer' has relevancy.

COMMENTARY—To believe in the real nature of Ātma and other Padārthas is Vyavahāra Samyaktva, Conventional or relative belief. This is the popular means of attaining salvation. The real immediate condition of salvation is the suppression or Annihilation of the *sapta prakṛtis* or seven fundamental kinds of Karmic matter.

These are :

1. Anantānubandhi Krodha.

Mokṣa or Dravya Mokṣa. In all these cases the Bhāva aspects refer to Jiva and the Dravya aspects to matter.

109.

Then the duality of Jiva, the first of the Padārthas.

जीवा संसारत्वा निष्वादा चेदणप्पगा दुविहा ।  
उचओगलक्खणा वि य देहादेहप्वीचारा ॥१०९॥

[जीवाः संसारत्वा निर्वृत्ताः चेतनात्मका द्विविधा ।  
उपयोगलक्षणा अपि च देहादेहप्रवीचाराः ॥१०९॥]

109. Having the nature of consciousness, characterised by Upayoga—faculties of perception and understanding, Jivas are of two kinds . One incarnate of the world, and the other, Liberated of heaven

COMMENTARY—Cetanā or conscious nature and its manifestation through perception and understanding are the intrinsic characteristics of all Jivas which are of two classes, Samsāri Jivas and Mukta Jivas. The former has the limitation of Upādhis, Samsāri Jivas are always associated with some kind of body, gross or subtle. The Mukta Jiva is free from such bodily limitations, because of complete emancipation from material conditions Karmic and non-Karmic. As a result of Upādhis, Cetanā and Upayoga of the former get limited and encircled and as a result of the destruction of Upādhis the very same become perfect and pure in the case of Siddhas

The five kinds of Śāstras have already been mentioned.

110.

Samsāri souls are again twofold—fixed ones and the moving ones. The fixed ones or the *stihāvara* Jivas are here described

पुढवी य उदयमगणी वाजवणप्फदिजीवसंसिदा काया ।  
देति खलु मोहबहुलं फासं बहुगा वि ते तेसि ॥११०॥

[पृथिवी चोदकमग्निवायुर्वनस्पतिः जीवसंश्रिताः कायाः ।  
देवति खलु मोहबहुलं स्पर्शं बहुका अपि ते तेषाम् ॥११०॥]

110. Vitalised by Jivas are the following bodies:—Earth, water, fire, air and also plants. These are many in number. They yield to their respective Jivas only one kind of feeling, contact ; and that too associated with highly intensified stupor of ignorance

COMMENTARY—This Gāthā refers to *ekendriya* Jivas: Jivas having only one sense. These as a result of their Karmic intensity may degenerate to such an extent as to be associated with the five kinds of physical objects enumerated above. Earth, water, fire,

## 108.

Of the nine Padārthas or categories Mokṣa is the most important, as it is the goal of life. Hence Ratnatraya which is the means to realise the goal was first described. Then the nine categories or Padārthas are enumerated in detail.

जीवाजीवा भावा पुण्यं पापं च आसवं तेसि ।

संवरणिज्जरब्धो मोक्षो य हवन्ति ते अट्टा ॥१०८॥

[जीवाजीवौ भावौ पुण्यं पापं चासवस्तयोः ।

संवरनिर्जरब्धौ मोक्षश्च भवन्ति ते अर्थाः ॥१०८॥]

108. Life and non-life (Jīva and Ajīva) are the two primary Padārthas. Out of these appear righteousness (Punya), sin (Pāpa), their source or inflow (Āsrava), their prevention (Saṁvara), their partial annihilation (Nirjarā), Bondage (Bandha) and Salvation (Mokṣa). These are the nine Padārthas

COMMENTARY—Of these Jīva or life alone has consciousness. Ajīva is so called because of the absence of consciousness. These are the five Dravyas mentioned previously: matter, space, condition of motion and that of rest, and finally time. These five constitute the non-life. Life and non-life are the root Padārthas. Seven other Padārthas enumerated above originate from the different relations of Jīva to Pudgala or matter.

Purity of thought in self is the subjective righteousness or Bhāva Punya. As conditioned by this there is the corresponding objective righteousness of Karmic matter, or Dravya Punya. Similarly evil thought or the impurity of the heart is known as subjective sin or Bhāva Pāpa. As the result of this there is the Karmic matter or Dravya Pāpa, whose nature is vicious. The appearance of lust, desire and aversion, is the subjective influx of Karmas, Bhavāsrava. As the concomitant of these affective states Karmic matter flows in towards the soul, which flowing is Dravyāsrava or the physical current of Karmas. Suppressing the states of lust, desire and aversion by the principle of renunciation is the subjective inhibition or prevention which is Bhāva Saṁvara. This refers to the closing up of the spring of evil thought as the concomitant of this Psychic inhibition of evil, there appears the withering away of Karmic matter which is Dravya Nirjarā. Moha or spiritual stupor, desire and aversion: these bring about a characteristic proneness, towards Karmic matter in the nature of Jīva. This proneness towards the Karmic environment is of the nature of Psychic disposition which spins out a cocoon of evil thoughts enshrouding the self. This is Bhāva Bandha. On account of this disposition there results the settling in of Karmic matter on the Jīva. This is objective bondage or Dravya Bandha. Lastly, realisation of the purest and perfect self after complete emancipation from evil is the subjective salvation or Bhāva Mokṣa. The absolute annihilation of Karmic matter and the liberation of Jīva from the physical shackles is the objective

[Amṛtacandra has an additional Gāthā No. 111 here]

112

These have monosensic and non-Psychic vitalism.

एदे जीवणिकाया पंचविहा पुढविकाइयादीया ।  
मणपरिणामविरहिता जीवा एगेंदिया भणिया ॥११२॥

[एते जीवणिकाया पञ्चविधा पृथ्वीकायिकायाः ।  
मनःपरिणामविरहिता जीवा एकेन्द्रिया भणिताः ॥११२॥]

112. These Jivas such as the earth-bodied ones are of five different castes. All of them are devoid of mental states. They have a single sense. So are they described in the scripture.

COMMENTARY—The author points out that these Sthāvara Jivas are utterly devoid of Psychic states. They have only one kind of feeling of contact. This description indicates a difference between the botanical and the zoological realms and the *sūkṣma ekendriyas* or the microscopic organisms of the four kinds also share the nature of the plant world.

113

Though devoid of mental states they are not non-conscious in essence. Really they are to be considered as unconscious but not non-conscious. The author explains by illustration their unconscious nature.

अंडेसु पवडुंता गम्भत्या माणुसा य मुच्छगया ।  
जारिसया तारिसया जीवा एगेंदिया जेया ॥११३॥

[अण्डेषु प्रवर्धमाना गर्भस्था मानुषाश्च सूच्छा यताः ।  
यादृशस्तादृशा जीवा एकेन्द्रिया ज्ञेयाः ॥११३॥]

113 Just as life or *cetanā* is associated with unconsciousness in the following cases eggs, foetus growing in mother's womb and the man in a trance so also the monosensic organisms are unconscious, though having life or *Cetanā*. Thus be it understood.

COMMENTARY—The author establishes that these monosensic beings have life and also potential *cetanā* or consciousness. It is ordinarily acknowledged that there is life and consciousness in the germ in the case of eggs, foetuses, and in men in trance. Here unconsciousness is no objection to the belief of their living nature. Similarly these monosensic organisms though devoid of consciousness have life and potency for consciousness.

air and plants. These kinds of physical objects are used as bodies by these Jīvas.

There is no difficulty in understanding the organic nature of the plant world. Especially after the discoveries of Dr. Bose, it is not necessary to elaborately defend that plants are living organisms. But the organic nature of the other four kinds, earth, water, fire and air, is somewhat obscure. The commentators themselves do not help us in the difficulty, so much so, that some of the European Scholars who have studied Jainism have come to the conclusion that Jainism is very primitive, since it believes in the existence of souls in material and inorganic things. This argument of the existence of primitive beliefs in Jaina system is brought forward in favour of the antiquity of Jainism. Certainly it is very pleasing to be assured of a hoary past; but it is no compliment to Jainism if its beliefs are identified with the primitive notions of the Hottentot.

It is almost incredible to believe that Jaina thinkers with their uncompromising dualistic attitude accepted the doctrine that *acetana* physical objects had souls of their own. The definitions of Jīva and Pudgala are clearly unmistakable. There is no possibility of any confusion. Mutually they are as much contradictory to a Jaina thinker as to a Cartecian philosopher.

The clue to the difficulty is supplied by the doctrine that the four kinds of *ekendriya* Jīvas associated with fire, air, earth and water are *sūkṣma ekendriya* Jīvas, i.e., microscopic organisms having only one sense. That the Jainas believed in the existence of microscopic organisms needs no elaborate evidence. The rules of conduct prescribed for Jaina Grhasthas and Yatis are sufficient testimony. Again this interpretation is further strengthened by the following point. All the five kinds of Sthāvara Jīvas are considered to have four kinds of Prāṇas or life principles.

1. Feelings of Contact.
2. *kāyabala-prāṇa* or strength of body.
3. *uchvāsa-nīśvāsa-prāṇa* or respiration.
4. *āyuh-prāṇa* or duration of life.

To suppose that these four Prāṇas are associated with really inorganic bodies would be inconsistent with the other aspects of the system. Therefore it is incumbent upon us to emphasize that the Jīvas associated with inorganic bodies are mainly *sūkṣma ekendriya* Jīvas or microscopic organisms, for it is only with an organism that Prāṇas can be consistently associated.

This does not remove all our difficulties. Whether there can be organisms associated with fire is still an unintelligible problem. We don't want to dogmatise on the matter. Evidently for the sake of symmetry fire is added on to the enumeration of the other kinds of physical forms. We can only confess that the doctrine for want of sufficient light from the commentators remains a very obscure part of Jaina thought leading to strange conjectures. Where there is scope for speculation we beg to offer our own Hypothesis as an alternative interpretation.

सुरणरणारयतिरिया वण्णरसप्फासगंधसद्दुह ।  
जलचरथलचरखचरा बलिया पंचेदिया जीवा ॥११७॥

[सुरनरनारकतिर्येञ्चो वर्णरसस्पर्शगन्धशब्दज्ञाः ।  
जलचरस्थलचरखचरा जलिन. पञ्चेन्द्रिया जीवाः ॥११७॥]

117. Devas, human beings, hell beings, and higher animals: all these have five senses; colour, taste, smell, touch and sound. Some of the animals are water animals, some land animals and some birds of the air. There are very strong ones also among these.

COMMENTARY—The classification of Jivas according to sense organs is based more upon the behaviour of insects and animals, than on the structure. In the case of bisensic insects given in Gāthā 121, the classification seems to be correct. Taking the sea snail for example it has touch all over the body and very sensitive in the tentacles on the head. It has no tongue but the base of the respiratory organs determines the kind of water that should enter the respiratory chamber. The mobile lips of the snail also act as gustatory organs. There is no special auditory organ but there is an organ in the foot, called the otocyst which enables the creature to keep its balance in the water. This evidently corresponds to the semicircular canals of the human ear whose function is to determine the positions of our body in space. Generally they have some sensitive parts to light also, but this is not considered as an eye by the author. Cowrie, conch, and mother of pearl do have similar structures and ordinary earth-worms also have the sense of contact and some kind of gustatory sense. In their case also the skin is sensitive to light, but it is treated as insignificant.

Next in the case of organisms with three senses the enumeration contains some dubious specimens. The louse and the bug have the sense of touch, taste and smell. Ants also have these three senses. But some of them have sight also. But ordinarily their sense of smell is the most predominant. Lord Avebury, Sir John Lubbock, after several years of patient observation comes to the conclusion that ants become aware of objects in the environment only through smell. But in the case of caterpillars and scorpions there are eyes. But anyhow they are included under this class.

In the next class are included the mosquitoes, flies, bees, etc. These insects have clearly four senses: contact, taste, smell and sight. But in the case of some for example, beetle and the bee, a peculiar humming sound is produced. Naturalists suppose that these insects must respond to sound and they have some organ in the abdomen which is supposed to be responsive to sound vibrations. Whether what they experience is sound or some other vague sensation of contact nobody can be certain. Therefore we may take the author's description as almost accurate. Lastly, many of the higher animals and human beings are included under the next class, five sensed organisms. They have also sense of hearing to boot. But the distinction between other higher animals and human

## 114.

Then the author by way of illustration enumerates some of the organisms having two sense organs.

संयुक्कमादुवाहा संखा सिप्पी अपादगा य किमी ।

जाणंति रसं फासं जे ते बेइंदिया जीवा ॥११४॥

[संयुक्कमादुवाहाः शङ्खः शुक्लयोऽपादकाः च कृमयः ।

जानन्ति रसं स्पर्शं ये ते द्वीन्द्रियाः जीवाः ॥११४॥]

114. Sea snail, cowrie shell fish, conch shell fish, mother o'pearl and earth-worm are organisms which have two senses, touch and taste. Hence are they bisensic.

## 115.

Then author enumerates some of the organisms having three senses.

जूगागुंभीमक्कुणपिपीलया विच्छियादिया कीबा ।

जाणंति रसं फासं गंधं तेइंदिया जीवा ॥११५॥

[यूगाकून्भीमत्कुणपिपीलिका वृश्चिकादयः कीटाः ।

जानन्ति रसं स्पर्शं गन्धं त्रीन्द्रियाः जीवाः ॥११५॥]

115. The louse, the bug, the red and ordinary scorpion, the ant and other insects having three senses are triaesthetic.

## 116

Then the author enumerates some of the organisms having four senses.

उद्दंशमसयममिखयमधुकरभमरा पतंगमादीया ।

रूपं रसं च गंधं फासं पुण ते विजाणंति ॥११६॥

[उद्दंशमशकमक्षिकामधुकरीभ्रमराः पतङ्गमाद्याः ।

रूपं रसं च गन्धं स्पर्शं पुनस्ते विजानन्ति ॥११६॥]

116. Again, the gadfly, the mosquito, the fly, the bee, the beetle and the dragon fly and the butterfly: these organisms experience, touch, taste, smell and sight; hence they are quadraesthetic—have four senses.

## 117.

Then the beings with five senses, are enumerated.

Geography and cosmogony form an important branch of Jaina Literature. It is one of the four Anuyogas. Jainas recognise four main departments of their Scripture (1) Prathamānuyoga, dealing with the life of the Tirthankaras and the other great personalities. (2) Karanānuyoga, dealing with the structure and constitution of Loka, the cosmos. (3) Caranānuyoga, dealing with principles of conduct prescribed for the householder as well as Sannyāsi (4) Dravyānuyoga dealing with the metaphysical aspects of reality. Jainas, whenever they speak of Jivas and other Dravyas, always assume the special constitution of the world according to their religious dogma. If more detailed knowledge of these things is desired reference must be made to treatises on Lokasvarūpa or the form of the world.

## 119.

Jivas described according to the different Gatī Mārganās, are not to be supposed to maintain that state permanently. Jivas undergo several modifications assuming different states of existence with the different durations of life. Thus do they roam about in Samsāra.

स्त्रीणे पुण्वणिबद्धे गदिणामे आउसे य ते वि खलु ।

पापुण्णंति य अण्णं गदिमाउस्स सलेसवसा ॥११६॥

[स्त्रीणे पूर्वनिबद्धे गतिनाम्नि आयुषि च तेषां खलु ।

प्राप्नुवन्ति चान्यां गतिमायुष्कं स्वलेस्यावसात् ॥११६॥]

119 When the existing Karmas determining the Gatī and the age of a Jiva, decay, then that Jiva gets into another Gatī with a different duration of life as determined by its last conative state or aspiration known as *Leśyā*

COMMENTARY—The Gatī or state of existence of a particular Jiva is determined by a particular Karma known as Gatīnāmakarma. So is the duration of particular Jiva determined by Āyuh Karma. When these two Karmas exhaust themselves to the very last, then age of the Jiva will come to an end; and Jiva has to change its state of existence i.e. it will have to enter into another Gatī with a different duration of life. This entrance into the next state is generally determined by Karmas acquired during the lifetime. But the fundamental factor which immediately determines the passage into the other stage must be determined by Gatīnāmakarma and Āyuh Karma of the succeeding stage. Jiva before quitting a particular Gatī acquires these two fresh Karmas determined by the last conative state or *leśyā*. The term *leśyā* is used not in its usual sense. In this place it implies merely the particular activity of *yoga* or *mana*, *vacana*, *kāya* manifesting in the last desire or aspiration of life. This *leśyā* may be pure or impure according to the ideal aimed at. And according to its value it forms the two Karmas in their pure form or impure form. According to the determining antecedent Karmas the Jiva incarnates in a particular place



beings is that the latter have a well developed consciousness. These are *sāmanaska pañcendriya* Jivas, where as the other *pañcendriya* Jivas are devoid of mind. Evidently the distinction implies the presence of self-consciousness in the one class and the absence of the same in the other.

## 118.

Then the author enumerates the several subspecies of the four fundamental kinds of Jivas already differentiated according to the four Gatis.

देवा चउष्णिकाया मनुया पुण कम्मभोगभूमीया ।

तिरिया बहुप्पयारा जेरइया पुढविभेयगदा ॥११८॥

[देवाश्चतुष्णिकाया. मनुजाः पुन. कर्मभोगभूमिजाः ।

तिर्यञ्च. बहुप्रकारा. नारका. पृथिवीभेदगताः ॥११८॥]

118. Devas are of four classes. Human beings are of two classes: inhabitants of Karma Bhūmi and those of Bhoga Bhūmi. Animals are of numerous kinds. Hell beings of seven according to their respective regions.

COMMENTARY—This Gāthā presupposes the peculiar Jaina cosmogony. According to the Jainas, Loka is arranged in three orders the lower world, the middle world and the upper world. In the upper world there are different regions one above the other, so also in the lower world. The different regions of the upper world are inhabited by Devas; the different regions of the lower world one below the other are inhabited by beings thrown into hell. The conception is something analogous to that of Dante.

This Gāthā classifies Jivas according to the principle of Gati, i.e., the principle of Gatimārganā. But the previous Gāthās had the classification according to the principle of sense organs or Indriya Mārganā

Devas are said to be of four kinds: (*Vide Tattvārtha Sūtra*, Chapter IV) Bhavanavāsīs, Vyantaras, Jyotiskas, Kalpavāsīs, or Vamānikas. Each class is further subdivided into several species. Each sub-class has its own special characteristics, physical and psychical; and has the characteristic periods of life. It is not possible to enter into the details.

The hell beings are seven, according to the hells inhabited by them. The seven hells are: Ratna-prabhā, Śarkarā-prabhā, Vālukā, Pañka, Dhūma, Tamah, and Mahā-tamah. The hell beings again have their respective characteristics of suffering, age, and other Psycho-physical characteristics with graduated intensity. These two classes of beings are only of doctrinal importance to us.

Coming to human beings and animals the principle of classification is much simpler. The animals are recognised to be of numerous species, and human beings again are divided into two classes, those born in Karma Bhūmi and those born in Bhoga Bhūmi. This classification is again only the result of the peculiar geography of the Jaina system.

the essence of soul. Whatever in the midst of these manifests as consciousness that they call by the name Jiva.

COMMENTARY—The sense organs and the various bodies are associated with Jiva only from the conventional point of view. The very same characteristics are really its accidental adjuncts : Senses such as touch, taste, etc and bodies such as earth body etc., are not Jiva, because they have nothing in common with the thought which is the true nature of Jiva. But in the midst of these sense organs and physical conditions there is the principle of consciousness which sheds light upon itself and other objects, i. e. which manifests as knowledge of the subject and the object. That thinking thing is said to be Jiva or soul.

122.

Then the author mentions the special characteristics of Jiva, characteristics which distinguish Jiva from material and other Dravyas

जाणदि पस्सदि सव्वं इच्छदि सुखं बिभेदि दुक्खादो ।  
कुव्वदि हिदमहिदं वा भुंजदि जीवो फलं तेसि ॥१२२॥  
[जानाति पश्यति सर्वमिच्छति सौख्यं बिभेति दुःखात् ।  
करोति हितमहितं वा भुङ्क्ते जीवः फलं तयो ॥१२२॥]

122. What knows and perceives the various objects, desires pleasure and dreads pain, acts beneficially or harmfully and experiences the fruit thereof—that is Jiva.

COMMENTARY—In this Gāthā the characteristic behaviour of Jiva is described. What is mentioned to be consciousness in the previous Gāthā is here indicated by several purposeful activities which have meaning only with reference to consciousness. Perception and understanding of objects are the function of Jiva or consciousness. This function cannot be associated with matter. So also is the tendency to desire pleasure and to avoid pain. It is distinctly the nature of life to continue beneficial activity and to discontinue harmful activity. Such conduct can have reference only to Jiva. Inorganic mechanical activity can never exhibit such purposive nature. These various instances of purposeful activity as against mechanical activity clearly mark out Jiva from the other Dravyas. The whole gāthā then may be taken as the definition of Jiva through its behaviour.

123.

The author summarises the characteristics of Jiva Padārtha in the first half of the Gāthā and introduces the other Padārthas in the second half.

एवमभिगमम जीवं अण्णेहिं वि पज्जएहिं बहुणेहिं ।  
अभिगच्छदु अज्जीवं णाणंतरिदेहिं लिणेहिं ॥१२३॥

with a particular body and with particular Psycho-physical development. Thus he may have a pleasant life or drag on a miserable existence.

## 120.

But the Samsāric cycle is not eternal for Jiva. On account of *labdhis*, or lucky spiritual attainments, a Jiva may realise the three jewels. Then it may free itself from Karmic matter as gold is purified from drops. Then it is the pure self.

एदे जीवणिकाया देहप्पविचारमस्सिदा भणिदा ।

देहविहूणा सिद्धा भव्वा संसारिणो अबव्वा य ॥१२०॥

[एते जीवणिकाया देहप्रवोचारमाश्रिताः भणिताः ।

देहविहीनाः सिद्धाः भव्याः संसारिणोऽभव्याश्च ॥१२०॥]

120. These different classes of Jivas are again said to be of two kinds: incarnate ones and discarnate ones. The latter are Siddhas; whereas (the former) are the Samsāri souls who are again of two species *bhavyas* and *abhavyas*.

COMMENTARY—Here the author summarises the nature of Jivas. The first principle of division is the possession of a body. All the incarnate ones are said to be Samsāri Jivas and all the discarnate once are Siddha Jivas or pure souls. But the former class is again sub-divided, the principle of division being the capacity to become perfect. Those Samsāri Jivas which have this capacity under special opportunities are called Bhavyas, whereas those Samsāri Jivas which have no such capacity are called Abhavyas.

This distinction of Samsāri Jivas into Bhavyas and Abhavyas corresponds to Drummond's division of souls into organic and inorganic. The organic souls, given the proper opportunity, have the capacity to develop and attain spiritual perfection; whereas inorganic ones have no such capacity of spiritual growth. This is one of the Jaina religious dogmas whose metaphysical basis is not quite clear. Most probably the distinction is as arbitrary as that of Drummond's.

## 121.

The five senses and the six bodies examined above are not essential elements of Jiva.

ण हि इंदियाणि जीवा काया पुण छप्पयार पण्णत्ता ।

जं हवदि तेसु णाणं जीवो त्ति य तं परूवंति ॥१२१॥

[न हीन्द्रियाणि जीवाः कायाः पुनः षट्प्रकाराः प्रज्ञप्ताः ।

यद्भवति तेषु ज्ञानं जीव इति च तत्परूपयन्ति ॥१२१॥]

121. The five senses and the six kinds of bodies mentioned above: these are not of

This Gāthā is said to be the condemnation of the Advaitic view that everything is Brahma.

## 125.

In this Gāthā the author explains what *acetanatva* or non-consciousness means

सुहृदुखजाणना वा हिदपरियम्मं च अहिदभीरुत्तं ।  
जस्स ण विज्जदि णिच्च तं समणा वेति अज्जीवं ॥१२५॥

[सुखदुःखज्ञानं वा हितपरिकर्मं वाहितभीरुत्वम् ।  
यस्य न विद्यते नित्यं तं श्रमणा द्रवन्त्यजीवम् ॥१२५॥]

125 Wherever such attributes of life are never found as the feeling of pleasure and pain, desiring only the beneficial activity and avoiding the harmful activity that the wise ones call Ajiva or non-life.

COMMENTARY—What is *acetanatva*, the characteristic of Ajiva Padārthas ? That which has not got the fundamental characteristics of life. These characters are feeling pleasure, pain, continuing beneficial activity and avoiding harmful activity. Whatever is devoid of these characteristics is Ajivas. This may be taken as negative definition.

## 126.

Though matter in the form of *kāma* and *no-kāma* is intimately related to Jīva yet it is quite distinct in nature

संठाणा संघादा वर्णरसस्फासगंधसहा य ।  
पोग्गलद्वव्यप्रभवा होति गुणा पज्जया य बहू ॥१२६॥

[संस्थानानि संघाता वर्णरसस्पर्शगन्धशब्दाश्च ।  
पुद्गलद्रव्यप्रभवा भवन्ति गुणाः पर्यायाश्च बहवः ॥१२६॥]

126. Form, structure, colour, taste, touch, smell and sound, these are associated with matter. They are agam of various kinds. They are either attributes or modes of matter.

COMMENTARY—The physical attributes are colour, taste, smell, sound and touch. Each of these is again of many kinds. Configuration or form is innumerable according to the different forms of physical objects. Combination or structure is of infinite kinds. The structure of *skandhas* from two atoms onwards is referred to. These are modes of matter. These modifications may be organic related to life or inorganic. Just as the inorganic matter is distinct from life so also this organic matter distinct from it though associated with it.

[एवमभिगम्य जीवमन्येऽपि पर्यायैर्बहुकैः ।

अभिगच्छत्वजीवं ज्ञानान्तरितैर्लिङ्गैः ॥१२३॥]

123. Thus having seen the nature of Jiva through the numerous and distinct characteristics, well do thou grasp the nature of non-life that is absolutely of non-thinking nature.

COMMENTARY—The author generalises the characteristics of Jiva. Jiva and its modifications were studied under different principles of Gunasthāna and Mārgaṇasthāna. In all these multifarious changes there is the one constant character of Jiva: consciousness or thought. Thought may exist in its impure form in Saṃsāra and in its pure and perfect form in Mokṣa. Whether pure or impure *ceṭanā* is the fundamental nature of life. Before introducing the other Padārthas the author emphasizes the fact that consciousness should not be associated with Ajīva or non-life. The absence of consciousness is the mark of Ajīva. Its activity or change is purely mechanical and non-teleological. We are asked to remember this fundamental nature of Ajīva before the author describes the Ajīva Padārtha or non-life.

Thus ends the chapter on Jiva Padārtha.

## CHAPTER ON AJĪVA PADĀRTHA

### 124.

Then the author enumerates the different Ajīva Padārthas, taking absence of consciousness as the mark of Ajīva.

आकाशकालपुद्गलधर्माधर्मेषु णत्थि जीवगुणा ।

तेसिं अचेदणत्तं भणिदं जीवस्स चेदणदा ॥१२४॥

[आकाशकालपुद्गलधर्माधर्मेषु न सन्ति जीवगुणाः ।

तेषामचेतनत्वं भणितं जीवस्य चेतनता ॥१२४॥]

124. Space, time, matter, the principle of motion and that of rest: these have no life principle in them. They are absolutely without consciousness. There is thought or consciousness only in Jiva.

COMMENTARY—Consciousness is not the only reality. There are several *acetana* or nonconscious entities which are grouped under Ajīva Padārtha. In this respect Jaina thought is fundamentally distinct from the idealism which admits the reality of only one thing, consciousness. One tendency in philosophic thought tries to reduce everything to consciousness. The other tendency tries to maintain that matter alone is real and everything is unreal and derivative. Both these extremes are avoided by Jaina thought. There are conscious entities as well as non-conscious entities constituting the system of reality.

128-30. To a Jiva in Samsāra desire and aversion will naturally occur. On account of these states Karmic matter clings to the Jiva. The Karmic bondage leads the Jiva through the four Gatis or states of existences. Entering into the Gati, Jiva builds up its own appropriate body; being embodied he gets the senses. Through the sense, objects of the environment are pursued. From perception appears desire or aversion towards those objects and from desire the cycle begins again. Thus desire brings Karma, Karma leads to *gati*, *gati* means body, body implies senses, senses lead to perception; and perception again to desire or aversion and so on *ad infinitum*. But the cycle ends in the case of Bhavya Jiva whereas it is unending to the Abhavyas. But it has no beginning in either case. Thus is it taught by the Jina, the conqueror of Samsāra.

COMMENTARY—The author describes the causal series that constitute the cycle of Samsāra. Jiva according to Jaina doctrine is enshrouded by Karmic conditions from eternity. On account of this association with Karmic matter Jiva experiences the emotional states of desire, etc. These emotional states are conditioned by the Karmic *upādhis*. But these states in their turn bring about the acquisition of fresh Karmic matter. The acquisition of Karmic matter means that the Jiva should manifest in any one of the four *gatis*. Manifestation means embodied existence. Body implies sense organs. Sense organs again are the windows for the soul to apprehend the environment. Awareness of the objects in the environment generates the affective states in the soul. These affective states once again begin the series of the above mentioned causal series.

Thus by the mutual interaction between mind and matter there appears the cycle of *samsāra*. In the case of the fortunates ones who are capable of spiritual emancipation this whirlinig comes to an end. But in the case of the unfortunate ones who are incapable of spiritual salvation the cycle goes on for ever.

## CHAPTER ON PUNYA AND PĀPA OR VIRTUE AND VICE.

### 131.

After describing the veil of Samsāra which is the condition of the nine categories or Padārthas the author examines Punya and Pāpa and their respective Psychic antecedents.

मोहो रागो दोसो चित्तपसादो य जस्स भावस्मि ।

विज्जदि तस्स सुहो वा असुहो वा होदि परिणामो ॥१३१॥

[मोहो रागो द्वेषश्चित्तप्रसादश्च यस्य भावे ।

विद्यते तस्य सुमो वा असुमो वा भवति परिणामः ॥१३१॥]

131. Whatever Jiva has in himself Moha, corrupting the faculty of belief, desire and aversion, or the purity of thought is subject to the hedonic state of happiness or misery.

127.

If form, structure and other characteristics are not to be associated with Jīva, then what is the real nature of Jīva.

अरसमरूढमगन्धमव्वत्तं चेदणागुणमसहं ।

जाण अतिगग्गहणं जीवमणिद्विद्वसंठाणं ॥१२७॥

[अरसमरूपमगन्धमव्यक्तं चेतनागुणमशब्दम् ।

जानीह्यल्लिङ्गग्रहणं जीवमनिदिष्टसंस्थानम् ॥१२७॥]

127. Understand that life has no sense qualities of taste, smell, colour, touch and sound. It has no form either. It has only thought or consciousness.

COMMENTARY—The several sense qualities associated with matter are not present in Jīva. Jīva or life is not to be apprehended through sense perception. Its nature is not to be inferred through any of its sense qualities for it has no such attributes. Again it has no form corresponding to that of physical objects. Jīvas is formless being spiritual. Such are the characteristics of life and consciousness.

Thus ends the Ajīva Padārtha.

128-30.

After describing the primary categories of life and non-life, the author goes to seven other derivative Padārthas, originating from either the synthesis or analysis of the two primary ones. Jīva and Karmic matter are the primary generating categories for the rest. Hence these two are taken up here for examination.

जो खलु संसारस्थो जीवो ततो दु होदि परिणामो ।

परिणामादो कम्मं कम्मादो होदि गदिसु गदी ॥१२८॥

गदिसधिगदस्स देहो देहादो इदियाणि जायन्ते ।

तेहि दु विसयग्गहणं ततो रागो व दोसो वा ॥१२९॥

जायदि जीवस्सेवं भावो संसारचक्कवालस्मि ।

इदि जिणवरेहि मणिदो अणादिणिघणो सणिघणो वा ॥१३०॥

[यः खलु संसारस्थो जीवस्ततस्तु भवति परिणामः ।

परिणामात्कर्म कर्मणो भवति गतिषु गतिः ॥१२८॥

गतिमधिगतस्य देहो देहादिन्द्रियाणि जायन्ते ।

तैस्तु विषयग्रहणं ततो रागो वा द्वेषो वा ॥१२९॥

जायते जीवस्यैव भावः संसारचक्रवाले ।

इति जिनवरैर्मणितोऽनादिनिघन सनिघनो वा ॥१३०॥]

by Jiva through the sensations of touch, etc., therefore the *karmas* are physical and *mūrta*.

COMMENTARY—The fruit of Karma is either a desirable or an undesirable object, pleasant or unpleasant to the Jiva. This object is experienced through sense perception. Senses are physical, objects apprehended through the sense organs are also physical. Therefore the Karmic effects are physical and *mūrta*. Cause and effect are identical. Therefore the author concludes that the Karmas themselves are physical and *mūrta*, since their effects are physical. Of course this refers to Dravya Karmas.

134.

Karmas past or present are physical and *mūrta*. *Saṁsāri* Jiva, because of its Karmas, is also physical and *mūrta*. Hence there is the chance for fresh accretion of Karmas. Hence the liability to continued bondage.

मुक्तो फासदि मुक्तं मुक्तो मुक्तेण बंधमणुहवदि ।  
जीवो मुक्तिविरहितो गाहति ते तेहि उगगहति ॥१३४॥

[मूर्तः स्पृशति मूर्तं मूर्तो मूर्तेन बन्धमनुभवति ।  
जीवो मूर्तिविरहितो गाहति तानि तैरवगाहते ॥१३४॥]

134. Past Karma which is physical in nature comes into contact with the present Karma which is also physical in nature.

Thus existing Karmic matter enters into combination with incoming Karmic matter. Jiva though in itself spiritual and *amūrta* is certainly corporeal (in its *samsāric* state) because of its coeval Karmas. Therefore it absorbs the fresh Karmic matter and is absorbed by that (because of mutual attraction of molecules)

COMMENTARY—In this Gāthā the author explains how there could be a contact between Jiva and Karma which are *Amūrta* and *Mūrta* respectively. That there is the possibility of combination among physical molecules is accepted by all and it is a fundamental presupposition of Jain thought that Jiva is in *samsāra* to start with, i. e. it is from time immemorial associated with Karmic matter. Because of this associated Karma, Jiva itself has body and is *Mūrta*. Because of this intimate association with Karmic matter there is the chance for fresh bondage and *Saṁsāra*. The Gāthā must be taken as an explanation of the perpetuity of the *Saṁsāric* cycle. Given the initial presupposition that Jiva in its natural state exists in Karmic bondage then we can understand the reason for the *Saṁsāric* cycle from bondage to *Gati* and *Gati* to bondage and so on. The series of causality is certainly assumed to be infinite, i. e., without beginning, though it may come to an end with the emancipation. An infinite past is not a mathematical impossibility. Therefore though it is admitted that the series may come to an end it need not necessarily have a beginning. Through the infinite causal interaction therefore, a Jiva may acquire



COMMENTARY—The Psychological conditions determining virtue and vice are described. *moha* is the mental state brought about by the ripening of Darśana Mohaniya Karma. The Karma that clouds the faculty of perception and belief. *rāga* and *dveṣa* desire and aversion, are the result of Chāritra Mohaniya. The Karma that misleads the will, while the former misleads cognition. Thus when cognition and will are determined by the Karmic conditions, they may manifest in Volitional states marked by virtue or vice. If the objects of cognition and will are desirable and good, then the mental state is *śubha parimāma*. If it is undesirable and bad then the mental state is *aśubha parimāma*. In the former case there results happiness to the individual whereas in the latter misery.

## 132.

Next the author describes the subjective states of good and evil, *bhāva puṇya pāpa* and their corresponding *karmic* conditions or *dravya puṇya pāpa*.

सुहृपरिणामो पुण्यं असुहो पापं ति हृदि जीवस्स ।  
दोहं पोगलमेत्तो भावो कम्मत्तणं पत्तो ॥१३२॥

[सुहृपरिणामः पुण्यमसुहृ. पापमिति भवति जीवस्य ।  
द्वयोः पुद्गलमात्रो भावः कर्मत्व प्राप्तः ॥१३२॥]

132. Good will or pure thought is righteousness. Bad will or evil thought is sin. Conditioned by these two mental states of the Jīva, the classes of Karmic molecules which are physical in nature undergo modifications and manifest as Dravya-karmas such as Jñānāvarāṇi.

COMMENTARY—Pure thought is Bhāva Puṇya. This conditions Dravya Puṇya, the Karmic matter facilitating the purity of the heart. Evil thought is Bhāva Pāpa, sinning in the heart. This conditions the Dravya Pāpa which aggravates the evil disposition of the soul. Thus from the Psychic conditions which are *amūta* their result the different Karmic modifications which are physical and *mūrta*. Thus the Bhāva Karmas and the Dravya Karmas are mutually interacting.

## 133.

He establishes that *karmic* matter is physical in nature and therefore is *mūrta*.

जम्हा कम्मस्स फलं विसयं फासेहि भुंजदे नियदं ।  
जीवेण सुहं दुक्खं तम्हा कम्माणि सुत्ताणि ॥१३३॥

[यस्मात्कर्मण. फलं विषयं स्पर्शभुञ्जते नियतम् ।  
जीवेन सुख दुःखं तस्मात्कर्माणि सूतानि ॥१३३॥]

133. Because the fruits of Karma, the objects of happiness or misery, are experienced

COMMENTARY—Noble ideals are associated with noble objects deserving of worship and devotion. These are what are known as the *pañca paramesthis*. *Arahantas*, *Siddhas*, *Sādhus*, *Ācaryās* and *Upādhyāyas*. The term *Arahanta* denotes perfected being who is still in the world, i. e., who has still his bodily state. It corresponds to the term *sayogakevali*, the person who attained Kevalajñāna or perfect knowledge and who still has *yoga* or *mana*, *vacana* and *kāya*. The term *Siddha* represents the perfect soul, without the *yoga* or *mana-vacana-kāya*. *Sādhu* represents the great ones who are on the path of perfection. It represents mainly the *yatis* who have attained great spiritual advancement through *tapas*. *Ācārya* represents the organiser of the *Sangha*, the chief of a group of ascetics as well as the householders. The term *Upādhyāya* represents the great religious teachers whose function it is to instruct the people, lay and ascetic, about the chief tenets of religion and also about the rules of conduct. Reverence and devotion to these great ones and a desire to follow the path marked out by them constitute the noble aspiration which leads to *Punya*.

## 137.

Then *anukampā* or charity is described

तिसिदं बुभुक्षितं वा दुहिदं दद्रू ण जो दु दुहिदमणो ।  
पडिवज्जदि तं किवया तस्सेसा होदि अनुकंपा ॥१३७॥

[तृपितं बुभुक्षितं वा दुःखितं दृष्ट्वा यस्तु दुःखितमना ।  
प्रतिपद्यते तं कृपया तस्यैवा भवत्यनुकम्पा ॥१३७॥]

137. If anyone moved at the sight of the thirsty, the hungry and the miserable, offers relief to them, out of pity, then such behaviour of that person is love or charity.

COMMENTARY—This is the second condition generating *puṇya bhāva* or the good will. The act of charity implies two things. The feeling of sympathy at the sight of the needy and the sufferers, and secondly active relief to them. Mere feeling of sympathy is ineffective. Active relief as the result of the feeling of sympathy is essential to charity. This kind of charity is common to the ordinary mortals and it manifests in only temporary relief. But in the case of the wise ones, *anukampā* or charity manifests in a higher form at the sight of the struggling souls in the ocean of *Samsāra* and they manifest a generous sympathy and help them towards emancipation. Thus *anukampā* is of two kinds, lower and higher according as its result is temporary and superficial or radical and permanent.

## 138.

After describing the ideals and aspirations forming the positive condition of good will, the author describes its negative condition, i.e., the impure emotions that are to be

fresh Karmas though in itself it is spiritual and Amūrta.

Thus ends the chapter on Punya Pāpa Padārthas.

### CHAPTER ON ĀSRAVA PADĀRTHA

135.

Āsrava means the fountain source of righteousness or sin. First the Punyāsrava or the spring of virtue is taken for description

रागो जस्स पसत्थो अणुकंपासंसिदो य परिणामो ।

चित्ते णत्थि कलुस्सं पुणं जीवस्स आसवदि ॥१३५॥

[रागो यस्य प्रशस्तोऽनुकम्पासंभितश्च परिणामः ।

चित्ते नास्ति कालुष्यं पुण्य जीवस्यास्रवति ॥१३५॥]

135 Whatever Jiva has desires high and noble, thoughts based on love and sympathy and in whose mind there are no evil impulses towards the same, the pure Karmic matter flows in as conditioned by the above mentioned springs of righteousness.

COMMENTARY—Noble desires and thoughts of charity are the springs of right conduct—Bhāva Punyāsrava, as conditioned by these springs there flows Punya Dravya Karma, pure Karmic matter into the soul: noble desires and pure thoughts, those springs of subjective righteousness may be followed by objectively evil deeds if they have not the co-operation of Samyag Darśana or right belief. But if those springs are saturated with right belief then there is no conflict between subjective states and subjective conduct. The subjectively pure springs of conduct have the chance of being succeeded by series of right conduct till the attainment of heavenly bliss. In short subjective purity unaccompanied by right belief will still keep the soul tied to the wheel of life whereas the same in association with the right belief will gradually lead the soul to Nirvāṇa.

136.

Then the noble desires are illustrated.

अरहंतसिद्धसाधुसु भत्ती धम्मम्मि जा या खलु चेद्दा ।

अनुगमणं पि गुरूणं पसत्थरागो त्ति वुच्चंति ॥१३६॥

[अर्हत्सिद्धसाधुषु भक्तिधर्मे या च खलु चेष्टा ।

अनुगमनमपि गुरूणां प्रशस्तराग इति वृचन्ति ॥१३६॥]

136. Love and devotion towards Arahanta, Siddha and Sādhus, Irving according to the rules of conduct household and ascetic, and faithfully following the Masters, these are said to be the noble ideals.

[संसारव त्रिलेश्या इन्द्रियवशता चार्तरौद्रे ।  
ज्ञानं च दुष्प्रयुक्त मोहः पापप्रदा भवन्ति ॥१४०॥]

140. The different animal instincts, the different soul-soiling emotions, the tempting senses, suffering and wrath, undesirable thoughts and corruption of the faculties of perception and will these constitute the spring of evil.

COMMENTARY—*samyñā* are the instincts; these are—

*āhāra samyñā*—Preying instinct.

*bhaya samyñā*—The instinct of fear.

*maithuna samyñā*—The sexual instinct.

*parigraha samyñā*—The acquisitive instinct.

These instincts are liable to generate evil. Next, *Leśyā* or the soul-soiling tints. These are six in number—

*kṛṣṇa* or the black

*nīla* or the blue.

*kāpota* or the grey.

*pīta* or the yellow.

*padma* or the lotus-hued

*śukla* or the white.

These *leśyās* or the tints of the soul, perhaps denote a peculiar kind of *aura* of each soul corresponding to its grade of spiritual development and ethical purity. Very often these tints are associated with the different emotional states present in Jīva. Therefore this Psychic *aura* is not a fixed and permanent adjective of a Jīva. They change and appear as concomitants of Psychic conditions. We have to assume that these colours are apprehended only by an occult and supernormal vision. It would be simply absurd to associate these colours as the intrinsic colours of the Jīva itself for that would make the Jīva a *mūrta* and *rūpi dravya*—a material thing. That would be quite inconsistent with the Jaina system

Of the six *leśyās* or the tints the first three *kṛṣṇa*, *nīla* and *kāpota*: the black, blue and grey are associated with the darker emotions which constitute the springs of evil.

The next constituent of the spring of evil is yielding to the temptations of the senses. Spiritual development depend upon controlling the senses. The soul is very often compared to the charioteer and the sense to restive steed. If the charioteer is led away by the horses, that means danger and destruction, because there would be no good in life much less the possibility of spiritual emancipation.

*āra* or suffering refers to the painful feeling experience when desirable things and persons are lost and when undesirable and unpleasant ones are got. This experience is also the fountain of evil. *raudra* refers to wrath or misplaced enthusiasm in cruelty, deceit, theft and sensuality. Evil thoughts consist in shunning good objects and apprehending and

avoided in every way to secure the purity of the heart or Śubha Parīṇāma.

क्रोधो व जडा माणो माया लोभो व चित्तमासेज्ज ।  
जीवस्स कुणदि खोहं कलुसो त्ति य तं बुधा वेत्ति ॥१३८॥

[क्रोधो वा यदा मानो माया लोभो वा चित्तमासाद्य ।  
जीवस्य करोति क्षोभं कालुष्यमिति च तं बुधा ब्रुवन्ति ॥१३८॥]

138. Whenever anger, pride, deceit and covetousness, appear in the mind of a Jiva, they create disturbing motion, interfering with calmness of thought. This emotional agitation of thought is called impure thought by the wise

COMMENTARY—Impurity of thought is explained to be the interference of thought and will by grosser emotions, enumerated in the Gāthā. Freedom from such emotional interference is also a necessary condition of righteousness. Thus noble desires (*praiśasta* *āga*), charity (*ānukampā*) and freedom from impurity of the heart (*citta-akāluṣya*) : these three constitute the spring of righteousness or Puṇyāśrava.

### 139.

Then the springs of evil or Pāpāśrava.

चरिया पमादबहुला कालुस्सं लोलदा य विसयेसु ।  
परपरितापपवादो पावस्स य आसवं कुणदि ॥१३९॥

[चर्या प्रमादबहुला कालुष्यं लोलता च विषयेषु ।  
परपरितापापवादः पापस्य चात्तवं करोति ॥१३९॥]

139. Inordinate taste for worldly things, impure emotions, hankering for and indulging in sensual pleasures, causing anguish to fellow beings, and slandering them openly or covertly these constitute the springs of evil

COMMENTARY—The five above mentioned ignoble thoughts constitute the subjective side of the springs of evil (*bhāva-pāpa āśrava*) conditioned by these mental states impure Karmic matter flows into the Jiva. And this inflow is the objective side of the evil or *āśrava pāpa-āśrava*, i.e., there is the acquisition of undesirable and dark physical conditions by Jiva on account of the above mentioned impurities of thought.

### 140.

Again the subjective springs of evil are described in detail.

सण्णाओ य तिलेस्सा इंदियवसदा य अट्टरुहाणि ।  
णाणं च दुप्पज्जं मोहो पावप्पदा होति ॥१४०॥

ideal Moksa. Both the doorways of *punya* and *pāpa* have to be blocked. Shunning action that leads to misery is natural. But action which leads to pleasure and which stimulates desire is also a hindrance towards self attainment and therefore must be avoided. It is this sentiment that is expressed in the next Gāthā

जस्त ण विज्जदि रागो दोसो मोहो व सव्वदन्वेसु ।

णासवदि सुहं असुहं समसुहदुक्खस्स भिक्खुस्स ॥१४२॥

[यस्य न विद्यते रागो द्वेषो मोहो वा सर्वद्वेषेषु ।

नास्त्विति शुभमशुभ समसुखदुःखस्य भिक्षोः ॥१४२॥]

142. If a Bhikṣu looks upon happiness and misery as same, if he is free from desire, aversion, and stupor of perception and will, then Karmas both beneficial and harmful do not approach that being.

COMMENTARY—There are three fundamental states of consciousnesses, *subha parināma*, *aśubha parināma*, *buddha parināma*, pleasant and beneficial, unpleasant and harmful, and pure and perfect respectively. The last alone is the ultimate ideal. The other two have to be transcended.

#### 143.

Next the author describes the mental states conducive to *saṃvara* or the prevention of Karmas.

जस्त जदा खलु पुण्णं जोगे पापं च णत्थि विरदस्स ।

संवरणं तस्स तदा सुहासुहकदस्स कम्मस्स ॥१४३॥

[यस्य यदा खलु पुण्य योगे पापं च नास्ति विरतस्य ।

संवरणं तस्य तदा शुभाशुभकृतस्य कर्मणः ॥१४३॥]

143. As long as a person pure in life, is really free from action conducive to pleasure or pain through either thought, speech or body, so long is he protected from Karmas, beneficial and harmful; that is, they are prevented from approaching him.

COMMENTARY—Effective states of desire and aversion, and activity of thought, speech or body are the conditions that attract Karmas good and bad towards the soul. When those conditions are removed, there will be Karmas approaching the Jīva; that is complete Saṃvara—a protective wall round the self shutting out all Karmas is established. This Saṃvara again is twofold. Bhāva Saṃvara and Dravya Saṃvara. The subjective exclusion of thoughts and desires that may lead to bondage, and the objective exclusion of Karmic matter from self. Thus ends the Saṃvara Padārtha.

attending to evil ones. And lastly Mohaniya that spirit-paralysing stupor in its dual form corrupts the faculties of perception or will; Draśana Mohaniya and Cāritra Mohaniya. In either form it is a source of evil.

These are the subjective conditions of evil. Bhāva Pāpa-āsrava, the inner springs of sin, whereas these bring about the inflow of the dark *karmic* matter.

This inflow is the Physical or objective side of evil i.e., the Dravya-Pāpa-Āsrava. Karmic material of an undesirable kind flows towards the soul as the result of the above mentioned Psychic conditions.

Thus ends the chapter on Āsrava.

## CHAPTER ON SAMVARA PADĀRTHA

### 141.

The category that denotes the process of suppressing or blocking, the springs of good and evil treated in the previous chapter, is *samvara*. The author considers first Pāpa Samvara or the prevention of evil.

इन्द्रियकषायसङ्गा निम्नाहिदा जेहि सुदुःसगम्भि ।

जावत्तावत्तेहि पिहियं पापासवच्छिद् ॥१४१॥

[इन्द्रियकषायसङ्गा निम्नीता यैः सुष्ठुमात्रैः ।

यावत्तावत्तेषां पिहितं पापासवच्छिद् ॥१४१॥]

141. To whatever extent the five senses, the four taints of emotions, the four instinctive appetites, are suppressed by a person, well established in the path or righteousness, to such extent the door way for the entrance of evil is closed for that person.

COMMENTARY—The volitional suppression of the above mentioned Psychic tendencies is Bhāva Samvara or the subjective inhibition of the evil. This condition is the antecedent of the physical arrest of the inflow of the Karmic matter which is Dravya Samvara. This Samvara or the inhibition of the springs of evil is possible only to that person who has the three jewels or Ratnatraya, right belief, right knowledge and right conduct. One who has not adopted the path cannot succeed in the attempt to block the spring of evil.

### 142.

Evil thoughts and sin are the cause of misery as they lead to suffering in the world as well as in hell, hence they ought to be avoided. Noble thoughts and the consequent happiness of Deva state in Svarga or Devaloka is also insignificant when compared with heavenly bliss. To one whose ideal is self-realisation therefore, the happiness of Devaloka is also worthless. He should shun that course also. Pleasure consequent upon *punya*, and pain of *pāpa* are both imperfect and undesirable by the side of the ultimate

tion, eating with a limit or a little less than the normal is *avamodarya*.

(3) *vṛtti-parisamkhyāna* : In order to control the will which would by nature hanker after all the objects of taste, limiting the number of items of Dharma, or in the case of Bhiksus, resolving in one self to accept food only from a particular house is *vṛtti-parisamkhyāna* or numbering or limiting the items of food.

(4) *rasa-parityāga* : In order to control the flesh, to get rid of drowsiness and sleep, to promote clearness of thought, abstaining from fatty and sweet substances is *rasa-parityāga* or relinquishing sweet essences.

(5) *vivikta-śayyāsana* : To have ones bed, in separate and vacant rooms or caves or on rocks free from insect pests is *vivikta-śayyāsana* or lonely bed. The place must be free from insect pests in order that the person may have peace of mind, preparatory to meditation and separate beds of course to avoid temptations of the flesh.

(6) *kāyakeśa* getting the body ensured to pain and suffering by standing in the sun, living under a tree and sleeping in the open in the winter cold, etc., is *kāyakeśa* or mortification of the body. This will harden the body and make the person fit for the arduous task of religious life. How is this *kāyakeśa* different from what is known as *pariśaha-jaya* or the victory over troubles? The latter means overcoming the suffering due to the natural environment; whereas the former is voluntary training of the body. If it is voluntary why is it called outer *tapas*? Because it pertains mainly to physical objects.

Next Inner *tapas*. Because the object is mainly to control the mind. These are called inner *Tapas*.

(1) *prāyaścitta* is removing the evil ideas that are born of intoxication of worldliness.

(2) *vinaya* is humility towards Gurus and masters.

(3) *vaiyāvṛtiya* Personal attendance and other kinds of service to Munis who are weary, sick or infirm

(4) *svādhyāya* is quickening of thoughts by concentration of attention.

(5) *vyutsarga*, renouncing the belief that this body is mine, is *Vyutsarga* or isolation of self.

(6) *dhyāna*, calm meditation on the self after controlling the vagaries of thought is *Dhyāna*.

#### 145.

Meditation on self is shown to be the main condition of *Nirjarā*

जो संवरेण युक्तो अष्टद्वयसाधनो हि अप्पाणं ।

मुनिः श्रद्धादि नियतं पाणं सो संवुणोति कम्मरयं ॥१४५॥

[यः संवरेण युक्तः आत्मार्थप्रसाधको ह्यात्मानम् ।

ज्ञात्वा ध्यायति नियतं ज्ञानं संवुनोति कर्मरजः ॥१४५॥]



## CHAPTER ON NIRJARĀ PADĀRTHA

144.

The author describes the nature of Nirjarā or the withering away of Karmas.

संवरजोगेहि जुदो तवेहि जो चिट्ठदे बहुबिहेहि ।  
कम्माणं णिज्जरणं बहुगाणं कुणदि सो णियदं ॥१४४॥

[संवरयोगाभ्यां युक्तस्तपोभिर्यश्चेष्टते बहुविधैः ।  
कर्मणां निर्जरणं बहुकानां करोति स नियतम् ॥१४४॥]

144. That mighty personality which after closing the springs of Karmas, good and evil, and equipped with the faculty of pure thought, controls its life according to manifold forms of *tapas*, will undoubtedly be able to rid itself of Karmas manifold.

COMMENTARY—The faculty of pure thought, protected from all Karmas, associated with twelve kinds of *tapas*, and leading to immortality, to annihilation of all Karmas, is the subjective side of Nirjarā or Bhāva Nirjarā. As a concomitant of this there appears the annihilation of Karmic dust, that clouds the divine beam of pure self.

The means for obtaining Nirjarā is *tapas* which is of two main forms, outer and inner. Each of these is again of six different kinds. These are:—

(a) Outer *tapas* consisting of—

- (1) *anaśana*.
- (2) *avamodarya*.
- (3) *ṛtti-parisaṃkhyāna*.
- (4) *rasaparityāga*.
- (5) *vivikta-layyāsana*.
- (6) *kāyakkleśa*.

(b) Inner *tapas* consisting of—

- (1) *prāyaścitta*.
- (2) *vinaya*.
- (3) *vaiyāvṛtya*.
- (4) *svādhyāya*.
- (5) *vyutsarga*.
- (6) *dhyāna*.

(1) *anaśana* is abstaining from food. To obtain control over the senses and will, to root out desires and appetites, to destroy Karmas, to facilitate meditation and to study peacefully the scriptures, fasting is the means; and fasting in order to secure such results is *anaśanavrata*.

(2) *avamodarya* : To sustain control of the will and the senses, to regulate disorders of *vāta*, *pitta*, and *ślesma*, the humours of the body, to secure self knowledge, and medita-

जं सुहमसुहमुदिणं भावं रक्तो करेदि जदि अप्पा ।  
सो तेण ह्वदि बद्धो योगलकम्मेण विविहेण ॥१४७॥

[यं शुभमशुभमुदीर्णं भावं रक्तः करोति यद्यात्मा ।  
स तेन भवति बद्धः पुद्गलकर्मणा विविधेन ॥१४७॥]

147. When Ātman out of desire, aversion and corruption of knowledge and will, experiences affective states pleasant and unpleasant, then because of the very same states the self gets bound by Karmic matter of various kinds

COMMENTARY—Bandha is of two kinds Bhāva Bandha and Dravya Bandha The former refers to the appropriate psychological conditions that bring about the actual bondage with Karmic molecules The latter is Dravya Bandha On account of desire the Ātman experiences happiness or misery Such emotional states create in the Ātman a disposition peculiarly favourable for the Karmic molecules to settle in This Psychological disposition is the intrinsic condition of bondage

148

The two aspects of bondage, internal and external, are again described.

जोगणिमित्तं ग्रहणं जोगो सणवयणकायसंभूदो ।  
भावणिमित्तो बंधो भावो रतिरागदोसमोहजुदो ॥१४८॥

[योगनिमित्तं ग्रहणं योगो मनोवचनकायसंभूतः ।  
सावनिमित्तो बन्धो भावो रतिरागद्वेषमोहयुतः ॥१४८॥]

148. Combination of Karmic matter with Jiva is due to Yoga Yoga is the action of mind, speech and body. The opportunity for combination is created by Bhāvas or the affective states and such affective states are due to desire, aversion and perverse cognition

COMMENTARY—Here is described bondage both internal and external, Psychical and physical. The Karmic matter that flows towards the soul is the manifold Karmic Skandhas around the Jiva. This attraction of Skandhas is due to *yoga*, i.e., the Karma Skandhas get aggregated and intermixed with Jiva because of the activity of *yoga*, or of *mana-vacana-kāya*, mind, speech and body

Bandha then is the state of being so bound by Karmic matter. This Karmic formation around the Jiva is occasioned by the Psychological dispositions known as *bhāva*. Bhāva is the emotional state of desire or aversion, or perverse cognition and will All these states are brought about by Mohaniya, that fundamental Karma responsible for spiritual delusion Yoga is the external condition of bondage since it brings about

145 Clinging to the ideal of self realisation, being fortified against Karmas through Saṁvara, the Yogin, who truly understands the words of the master, and meditates upon Self—Pure thought with controlled senses, will completely wash off the Karmic dust.

COMMENTARY—The main condition for annihilating Karmas is stated here. The person is to be equipped with Saṁvara or fortification round the self against Karmas, desirable and undesirable. The springs of Parīṇāma, *śubha* and *aśubha*, are to be completely blocked. Instead of diverting ones attention to environmental objects, thought is to be fixed on Self. This reflection upon the Self is to be made secure enough by controlling the senses. If a person under such circumstances meditates upon the Self, according to the instructions from the Masters, he is sure to attain purity of self by completely washing off the Karmic dust by the flood of Dhyāna.

Then the divine glory of the self will shine without interruption.

#### 146.

The origin, nature and effect of meditation.

जस्स ण विज्जदि रागो दोसो मोहो व जोगपरिकम्मो ।

तस्स सुहासुहुड्हणो भाणमओ जायए अगणी ॥१४६॥

[यस्य न विद्यते रागो द्वेषो मोहो वा योगपरिकर्म ।

तस्य शुभाशुभदहनो व्यानमयो जायते अग्निः ॥१४६॥]

145 In the person that has neither desire nor aversion, and that is free from ignorant attachment to sense pleasures and from the activity of thought, speech and body, there flames forth the fire of meditation that burns out all Karmas beneficial as well as baneful.

COMMENTARY—Dhyāna or meditation is thought directed towards the pure self. This is the means of self realisation. Ignorance that stupifies the faculties of perception and will must be got rid of. There should be neither attachment nor hatred towards the objects of the environment. Then there should be unruffled peace, in thought, speech and body. Meditation attended by such circumstances manifests as the fire that destroys the rubbish heap of Karmas. It is this fire of meditation that reveals the sterling beauty of pure Self. This is Nirjarā.

Thus ends the Chapter on Nirjarā

### CHAPTER ON BANDHA PADĀRTHA

#### 147.

The nature of Bandha or Karmic bondage is described.

- (3) *mohanīya*,
- (4) *vedanīya*,
- (5) *antarāya*,
- (6) *āyuh*,
- (7) *nāma*,
- (8) and *gotra*.

- (1) Jñānāvaraṇīya is the veil round the pure consciousness.
- (2) Darśanāvaraṇīya is that which corrupts the faculty of perception and also of belief.
- (3) Mohanīya is a sort of spiritual intoxication interfering with cognition and will.
- (4) Vedanīya is the feeling of pleasure and pain.
- (5) Antarāya is the frustration of the useful efforts of righteously minded persons.
- (6) Āyuh determines the duration of life that a Jiva has in a particular state of existence.
- (7) Nāma determines the generic and the specific characteristics of a Jiva, i.e. on account of this Nāma Karma a Jiva is born as a particular organism in a particular Gati.
- (8) Gotra determines the value of life for example in a human being This Karma determines the birth of a Jiva in a higher status or in a lower status

These eight Karmas are of various sub-divisions which we need not enumerate in detail. These eight effects, though they are supposed to be due to the above four conditions, are ultimately due to Bhāvas Pratyayas or the disposition of the heart. The author wants to emphasize the fact that if the *bhāvas* or the Psychic dispositions are absent then even if the Dravya Pratyayas or the external conditions are present still, there will be no bondage of the eightfold kind, hence the intrinsic condition of bondage is Bhāva or Psychic.

Thus ends the chapter on Bandha Padārtha

## CHAPTER ON MOKṢA PADĀRTHA

### 150-51

Moksa or emancipation is begun with the description of Bhāva Moksa or the inner perfection of the soul. This Bhāva Moksa leads to the annihilation of the four Ghātiyā Karmas. The very same Bhāva Moksa again is the great Saṁvara or the absolute obstruction to Karmas.

directly the combination of Karmic matter with Jiva. But the internal condition is the *bhāva* or the disposition of the self.

## 149.

Again the conditions of bondage from another point of view are described.

हेतु चतुर्विधोऽविविक्तस्त्वन्यथा कारणं भणितं ।  
तेसि पि य रागादी तेसिमभावे न ब्रजन्ति ॥१४९॥

[हेतुश्चतुर्विक्तोऽविविक्तस्य कारणं भणितम् ।  
तेषामपि च रागादयस्तेषामभावे न ब्रजन्ते ॥१४९॥]

149 The eight kinds of Karmas are said to be caused by the four external conditions or Dravya Pratyayas. But these conditions themselves are the result of desire, etc., or Bhāva Pratyayas. Without these intrinsic conditions there will be no bondage.

COMMENTARY—In some Philosophical works of Jainas, the eight Karmas, are traced to the four causal conditions *mithyātva*, *avirati*, *kaśāya* and *yoga*. Our author here shows that these four conditions themselves are the result of the Psychological disposition effected by the emotional states of desire, etc. Hence he insists on recognising these Psychological states as the real and intrinsic condition of bondage. Whereas the above four are only subsidiary and external conditions. Without the ultimate condition of *rāga* there can certainly be no Karmic bondage. The external conditions are called Dravya Pratyayas because they are directly associated with Karmic matter and the ultimate Psychological conditions are called Bhāva Pratyayas because they refer to the disposition of Ātman.

The conditions of bondage are enumerated thus in *Tattvārtha-sūtra*. Chapter VIII, Sūtra 1.

मिथ्यादर्शनाविरतिप्रमादकषाययोगा बन्धहेतवः ॥

It is to be noted by that five conditions of bondage are enumerated here whereas the *Gāthā* mentions only four. For the fifth and additional condition *pramāda* is also included in the above mentioned four.

*Mithyātva* is the opposite of right faith or *Samyag Darśana*. This *Mithyātva* may manifest in the form of belief in false doctrines and disbelief in the true one. *Avirati* is the opposite of right conduct or *Samyakcāritra*. This may manifest in an enthusiasm for the evil conduct and a hesitation for righteousness. *Kaśāya* refers to the grosser emotions such as anger, pride, deceit, etc., and *yoga* refers to the uncontrolled and useless activity of *mana-vacana-kāya*. These are the four Dravya Pratyayas' or external conditions generating the eight Karmas which are—

(1) *jñānāvaranīya*,

(2) *darśanāvaranīya*,

152. The meditation that is completely determined by right belief, right knowledge and right conduct and that is not related to objects alien to the self becomes the cause of Nirjarā or annihilation of Karmas to the Yogi that is in the path of self realisation

COMMENTARY—The great meditation on the self is shown to be the condition of complete Nirjarā or the absolute annihilation of the existing Karmas. In the previous Gāthā, Bhāva Moksa was described. On account of this Bhāva Mokṣa the person becomes a Kevalī with the four infinite qualities equipped with the infinite perception and infinite knowledge. The self no more becomes attached to any other alien ideal. The only object of attraction and adoration is the perfect self-consciousness. When meditation thus manifests in self rapture because of self purity and self perception, then it leads to the eradication of the remaining Karmas, *i.e.*, it is the causal condition of complete Nirjarā

153

Dravya Mokṣa or the absolute emancipation is next described.

जो संवरेण जुक्तो णिज्जरमाणोऽथ सत्त्वकम्माणि ।

वचगद्वेदाज्जसो मुयदि भवं तेण सोक्खो ॥१५३॥

[य. सवरेण युक्तो निर्जरन्मथ सत्त्वकर्माणि ।

व्यपगतवेदायुक्तो मुञ्चति सत्त्वं तेन स मोक्ष. ॥१५३॥]

153. When a Jiva being rid of the four Ghātiya and being equipped with absolute repulsiveness to Karmas succeeds in eradicating the remaining Karmas, then he becomes freed from Vedaniya and Āyus and finally from Nāma and Gotra. This eradication of the latter four Karmas means absolute and complete Moksa or Dravya Moksa.

COMMENTARY—This Gāthā speaks of Dravya Moksa or the final and complete emancipation. After attaining Bhāva Moksa mentioned in the previous Gāthā, Jiva has to obtain absolute emancipation from Karmic or physical conditions for the attainment of Kevalajñāna is still associated with the bodily condition. The person is merely Sayogi Kevalin. No doubt he got rid of the four Ghātiya Karmas which lead to the corruption and degeneration of Ātman. Because they injure the soul they are called Ghātiya Karmas. These are Jñānāvaraṇiṇi, Darśanāvaraṇiṇi, Mohaṇiṇi and Antarāya. But still there are the other four Karmas known as Aghātiya Karmas—Vedaniya, Āyuh, Nāma and Gotra. These four also must be annihilated. When a Bhāva Moksa Jiva has the perfect Dhyāna, then Vedaniya and Āyuh first wither away and finally Nāma and Gotra also. Then the Mukta Jiva becomes Ayogi Kevali or a Siddha. Ātman has attained its intrinsic spiritual purity and is absolutely free from any kind of association with the matter. This state is Dravya Moksa.

Thus ends Mokṣa Padārtha.

हेतुमभावे नियमा जायदि णाणिस्स आसवणिरोधो ।  
 आसवभावेण विणा जायदि कम्मस्स दु णिरोधो ॥१५०॥  
 कम्मस्साभावेण य सव्वण्हू सर्वलोकदरसी य ।  
 पावदि इदियरहिदं अब्बाबाहं सुहमणंतं ॥१५१॥

[हेतुमभावे नियमाज्जायते ज्ञानिनः आस्रवनिरोधः ।  
 आस्रवसावेन विना जायते कर्मणस्तु निरोधः ॥१५०॥  
 कर्मणासभावेन च सर्वज्ञः सर्वलोकदर्शी च ।  
 प्राप्नोतीन्द्रियरहितमव्याबाधं सुखमनन्तम् ॥१५१॥]

150-51. If the causal condition of Karmas disappears in the case of wise man through the control of senses and thought, then the springs of Karmas get blocked. When the springs of Karmas thus get blocked, the Dravya Karmas get repulsed. When the Dravya Karmas completely disappear, then the person becomes all-knowing and all-perceiving, and attains the state of infinite bliss which transcends the sense feeling and which is untouched by the sorrows of life.

COMMENTARY—Through the instrumentality of the five Labdhis a Bhavyātmā obtains the three jewels. On account of this acquisition he is able to get rid of the four-fold condition of Karma, *mithyāya*, *avihātī*, *kaśāya* and *yoga*, both in their subjective and objective aspects. When he gets rid of Dravya and Bhāva Pratyayas or Karmic adjuncts, then he attains the great Saṁvara or repulsiveness to Karmas. This Saṁvara leads to the annihilation of Karmic shackles. Thus ascends the ladder of higher life which leads to destruction of ignorance. This brings on the inner purity. Finally through second *śukla Dhyāna* or the great meditation, the Ghātiya Karmas get burnt away. Then the self rises to eternal wisdom, eternal perception, infinite bliss, and infinite power. This is *ananta-catuṣṭaya*, the four infinite qualities. This is Bhāva Moksa, the spiritual freedom. When this Bhāva Moksa is attained the inevitable destruction of Dravya Karmas follows. With the attainment of Bhāva Moksa the person becomes a Kevalin worshipped by men and Devas. He becomes really Paramātmā.

### 152.

Then we have the description of Dhyāna or meditation which is the direct cause of repulsing and eradicating all Karmas.

दंसणंणाणसमगं भाणं णो अण्णदव्वसंजुत्तं ।  
 जायदि णिज्जरहेदु सभावसहिदस्स साधुस्स ॥१५२॥  
 [वशंनज्ञानसमग्रं ध्यानं नो अन्यदव्यसयुक्तम् ।  
 जायते निर्बराहेतुः स्वभावसहितस्य साधोः ॥१५२॥]

mined by the other. But the self which has the higher jewel is absolutely self conditioned and is called *svasamayī*.

जीवो सहावणियदो अणियदगुणपज्जओध परसमओ ।

जदि कुणदि सगं समयं पब्भस्सदि कम्मबन्धादो ॥१५५॥

[जीवः स्वभावनियत अनियतगुणपर्यायोऽय परसमयः ।

यदि कुस्ते स्वकं समयं प्रपश्यति कर्मबन्धात् ॥१५५॥]

155. The Jiva that is associated with the essential qualities is called *Svasamayī* or the self-determined, whereas that which is associated with accidental and unessential qualities and modes is called *Parasamayī* or the other determined. The Jiva that has the former, i.e., the essential nature as its ideal, is able to get itself freed from Karmic bondage.

COMMENTARY—The *ratnatraya* which is self-determined has corresponding stages of development to the spiritual evolution of Jiva. *abheda-ratnatraya* is certainly *svasamayī*, but the early stages of this *Ratnatraya* when compared to the last stage of perfection would be considered as *parasamayī*. It is not even necessary to mention the fact that faith in alien deity, etc., is distinctly *parasamayī*, i.e., when *Samyaktva* itself in its earlier stage requires to be transcended much more therefore *Mithyātva*. But a person while still with Karmic bondage may have the thought 'I am *Siddha*', 'I am *Suddha*' i.e. I am the realised, I am the pure. This contemplation is also called *abheda-ratnatraya*, the pure jewel by convention. Such subtle distinctions in the nature of the path of Self-realisation can only be understood by the great Ones.

### 156

Then the duality of the outer path or *parasamaya* and also the duality of the other-determined or *parasamayī*

जो परदव्वम्मि सुहं असुहं रागेण कुणदि जदि भावं ।

सो सगचरित्तभट्ठो परचरियचरो हवदि जीवो ॥१५६॥

[यः परद्वये शुभमशुभं रागेण करोति यदि भावम् ।

स स्वचरित्तभट्टः परचरित्तचरो भवति जीवः ॥१५६॥]

156 That Jiva which through desire for outer things experiences pleasurable or painful states loses his hold upon Self and gets bewildered and led by outer things. He becomes the other determined.

COMMENTARY—The author describes here the characteristics of the self that is still determined by the other. According to this view even the traditional worship of Jaina orthodoxy would not escape this sweeping condemnation by the author. All that would be merely *paracarita*, conduct determined by the other. This other determined conduct



This is the end of the second Book of the great work dealing with Sapta Tattva and Nava Padārthas.

### CŪLIKĀ

Next the Resume or the *cūlikā* dealing with Jina, the great Victor and the perfect Brahma who is the ideal of Moksa Padārtha. This Cūlikā supplements the ideas already mentioned about heaven and the path. The author indicates here, the importance of conduct leading to self realization. Self and self alone is the goal. Anything other than self as an ideal would lead away the self from the path. All these facts are emphasized in the Cūlikā.

#### 154.

The intrinsic nature of Jiva is described, thus indicating the path to Mokṣa.

जीवसहावं णाणं अप्यदिहददंसणं अणणमयं ।

चरियं च तेसु णियदं अत्थित्तमणिदियं भणियं ॥१५४॥

[जीवस्वभाव ज्ञानमप्रतिहतदर्शनमनन्यमयम् ।

चारित्र्यं च तयोर्नियतमस्तित्वमनिर्वृतं भणितम् ॥१५४॥]

154. Unlimited perception and unlimited knowledge are inseparable from the nature of Jiva. Permanently associated with that nature, spotless conduct is the path to Mokṣa because it is the immediate antecedent.

COMMENTARY<sup>1</sup>—The characteristic of Mokṣa is described here. Right conduct which is always associated with the intrinsic nature of self is the path to Mokṣa. The intrinsic nature of Jiva is existence which is inalienable from Jñāna and Darśana. Inalienability implies that the nature of Jiva manifests generically and specifically through knowledge and perception. The existence which is associated with such characteristics and which has the dialectic nature of activity is the intrinsic conduct of self. It is irreproachable because it is not influenced by either desire or aversion. That same conduct is the path to emancipation.

Conduct in Samsāri Jiva is of two kinds, intrinsic conduct and extrinsic self-determined or other determined. Self-determined conduct is that which is based upon the intrinsic nature of self. The other determined conduct is that which is due to the influence of non-self. The path then is related to self and is uninfluenced by non-self; hence it is the means to the realisation of self.

#### 155.

That Jewel or *ratnatraya* is internally distinguished as lower and higher, the lower aspect is associated with the ideal only indirectly whereas the higher is directly associated with it. One who has the lower jewel is known as *parasamayi* or the self that is deter-

stood to be constituted by perception and knowledge that thought is purely self-determined. Jiva that has that thought alone is said to have absolute self realisation.

159.

Next the very same *svasamaya* is described in a different way.

चरियं चरदि सगं सो जो परदव्वप्पभावरहिदप्पा ।

इंसणणाणवियप्पं अवियप्पं चरदि अप्पादो ॥१५९॥

[चरितं चरति स्वकं स य परद्व्यात्मभावरहितत्वा ।

इंसणज्ञानविकल्पमविकल्पं चरत्यात्मनः ॥१५९॥]

159. Whatever Yogindra being entirely free from affective states related to other things and firmly established in its own intrinsic nature, perceives himself to be identical with that which perceives and knows is said to have self-determined activity.

COMMENTARY—Thus in order to instruct the disciple both according to Dravyārthika and Paryāyārthika Nayas the two paths are described: Nis̥caya Ratnatraya or the real jewel and Vyavahāra Ratnatraya or the relative jewel. The real and the relative are related to one another as the ideal or end and the means to realise the same. Thus the ultimate goal is the real jewel.

160.

Next is the description of Vyavahāra Moksamārga or the relative path which is the means for the realisation of the ultimate end

धम्मादीसद्दहणं सम्मत्तं णाणसंगपुव्वगदं ।

चेट्ठा तवस्सि चरिया व्यवहारो सोवसम्मगो त्ति ॥१६०॥

[धर्मादिश्रद्धान सम्यक्त्वं ज्ञानमङ्गपूर्वगतम् ।

चेष्टा तपसि चर्या व्यवहारो मोक्षमार्ग इति ॥१६०॥]

160 Belief in the Padārthas such as Dharma and in their respective value is Right belief. Understanding the Scriptures which are divided into Angas and Pūrvas is Right knowledge. Conduct according to the twelve kinds of Tapas is Right conduct. These three from the Vyavahāra point of view form the path to Moksa.

COMMENTARY—On account of the suppression or the partial eradication of the seven Karmas called *mūla-prakṛtis* there may appear to a man, perception of and belief in the several Padārthas and their values. Such a belief resulting from the apprehension of the nature of reality is called Vyavaharically the right belief. It is right belief only Vyavaharically, because it is the means to emancipation and thus to the absolute and the real belief. But this Vyavahāra Samyaktva should not be confounded with false belief which

must be transcended by one who perceives the ideal of Self.

## 157.

Next the author points out that the other determined-conduct is only the means to bondage and not to Nirvāna

आसवदि जेण पुण्णं पावं वा अप्पणोघ भावेण ।  
सो तेण परचरित्तो हवदि त्ति जिणा पव्वन्ति ॥१५७॥

[आसवति येन पुण्य पापं वात्मनोऽयं भावेन ।  
स तेन परचरित्रः भवतीति जिनाः प्रवृण्यन्ति ॥१५७॥]

157. On account of the pleasurable or the painful states of the Ātman there may flow in Punya Karma or Pāpa Karma. Such an Ātman on account of such states becomes the other determined. So say the Jinās.

COMMENTARY—Conduct that is determined by outer things leads to bondage and blocks the way to liberation, for, the pleasurable mental states is the spring of Punya Karma and the painful mental state of Pāpa Karma, i.e., both merit and demerit in their subjective and objective aspects lead the soul to Karmic bondage. Therefore if a Jīva experiences those mental states which form the springs of those Karma then for that very reason his conduct becomes other determined. He therefore becomes the other determined one.

## 158.

Then the author describes the characteristics of the self-determined Jīva or the Purusottama.

जो सव्वसंगमुक्को णणमणो अप्पणं सहावेण ।  
जाणदि पस्सदि णियदं सो सगचरियं चरदि जीवो ॥१५८॥

[यः सर्वसंगमुक्तः अनन्यमनः आत्मानं स्वभावेन ।  
जानाति पश्यति नियतं स स्वकचरितं चरति जीवः ॥१५८॥]

158. That Jīva which being free from relations to others, and from alien thoughts through its own intrinsic nature of perception and understanding, perceives and knows its own eternal nature to be such, is said to have conduct that is absolutely self-determined

COMMENTARY—Here is the description of conduct that is self determined First there should be no kind of relation to outward things through affective states. On account of this freedom, thought is reflected upon Self The fundamental faculties of Jīva are perception and understanding. If the self is perceived or intuited and under-

162 Whatever perceives its own self-identical nature, knows its own subjective and objective nature, and experiences its own immediate existence, is identical with the very activity of perception, knowledge and conduct

COMMENTARY—Cāritra, Jñāna and Darśana (conduct, knowledge, and perception) constitute the Ātman. These are also the path to Nirvāna. Hence the intrinsic nature and function of the Self are the real path, i.e. the real path is nothing but a real Self.

## 163

The Saṃsārī Jivas do not as a matter of course all attain Mokṣha, only some of them are said to have that privilege

जेण विजाणदि सर्व्वं पेच्छदि सो तेण सोक्खमणुह्वदि ।

इदि तं जाणदि भविलो अभव्वसत्तो ण सह्वदि ॥१६३॥

[येन विजानाति सर्व्वं पश्यति स तेन सौख्यमनुभवति ।

इति तज्जानाति मण्योऽमण्यसत्त्वो न श्रद्धसे ॥१६३॥]

163. Because of the fact that the Self perceives and understands all things without limit it also enjoys infinite bliss. This fact that infinite knowledge and infinite bliss are inseparable is understood only by the Bhavya. The Abhavya cannot appreciate that, much less believe in it

COMMENTARY—All Saṃsārī Jivas are not fit to obtain the state of self-realisation. Here happiness is the absence of any kind of hindrance to the intrinsic activity of the self. Perception and understanding are the intrinsic nature of the self. Hindrance to the nature of the self therefore would be a kind of obstruction to either perception or knowledge. The perfected self is all knowing and all perceiving, i.e. has no limit to its nature of perception and understanding. The absence of hindrance naturally manifests in its positive aspect as infinite bliss. The logical consequence of Kevala Jñāna is Ananta Sukha. This truth is appreciated and accepted only by the faithful. The unfaithful ones are incapable of appreciating this truth. Therefore the path to salvation is available only to the former. Therefore only some of the Saṃsārī Jivas but not all are fit to walk the path to Mokṣa

## 164

Darśana, Jñāna and Cāritra when conditioned by other things than Self may in a way lead to bondage. But if they are determined absolutely by the self then they form the direct antecedent of emancipation

दंसणणाणवरित्ताणि मोक्खमग्गो त्ति सेविदव्वाणि ।

सावूहि इदं भणिदं तेहिं दु बंधो व मोक्खो वा ॥१६४॥

is neither the means to Moksa nor is the instrument of the right belief.

Angas and Pūrvas are the parts of Śrutas or the Scriptures. Understanding these is considered to be right knowledge Vyavahārically. It is only the means for obtaining the real knowledge of reality through direct apprehension. This Vyavahāra knowledge is also distinct from false knowledge possessed by persons of alien faith.

Again right conduct from the Vyavahāra point of view is life according to the twelve kinds of Tapas. This Tāpasic self-control again cannot be associated with persons who are not enthusiastic about the ideal of self-realisation. Thus Vyavahāra Ratnatraya is shown to be the means of Nīścaya Ratnatraya.

[The seven *prakṛtis*, the twelve kinds of *tapas*, have been explained elsewhere and for Angas and Pūrvas the reader is referred to Weber's *History of Jaina Sacred Literature* and to the *Outlines of Jainsm* by J.L. Jami.]

### 161.

Next the description of Nīścaya Moksa Mārga or the real path to realise which the previous one the Vyavahāra Moksa Mārga, is the means

णिच्छयणयेण भणितो तिहि तेहि समाहिदो हु जो अप्पा ।  
ण कुणदि किंचि वि अणं ण मुयदि सो भोक्खमगो त्ति ॥१६१॥  
[निश्चयनयेन भणितस्त्रिभिस्तैः समाहित. खलु यः आत्मा ।  
न करोति किंचिदप्यन्यन् न मुञ्चति स भोक्षमार्ग इति ॥१६१॥]

161. Whatever Ātmā through the three-fold jewel well-established in itself neither perceives alien things as its own, nor gives up its own intrinsic nature, that Ātmā is indeed called the absolute path to Salvation.

COMMENTARY—Belief, knowledge and conduct so long as they are based upon other things besides self would only constitute the relative jewel. But if the same three are based upon intrinsic nature of self then they would form the real jewel. The former is the means of obtaining the latter.

### 162.

According to the principle that the thing and its qualities are not distinct, the Ātmā is described to be identical with the constitutive elements of perception, knowledge and conduct.

जो चरदि णादि पेच्छदि अप्पाणं अप्पणा अणणमयं ।  
सो चारित्तं णाणं दंसणमिदि णिच्छिदो होदि ॥१६२॥  
[यश्चरति जानाति पश्यति आत्मानमात्मनानन्यमयम् ।  
स चारित्र ज्ञान वर्धनमिति निश्चितो भवति ॥१६२॥]

166

The above mentioned reverence and devotion as they some times lead to bondage, do not constitute the path to Moksa

अरहंतसिद्धचेदियपवयणगणजाणभत्तिसंपण्णो ।

बंधदि पुणं बहुसो ण ह्नु सो कम्मवस्यं कुणदि ॥१६६॥

[अर्हत्सिद्धचैत्यप्रव चनगणज्ञानभत्तिसंपन्नः ।

बध्नाति पुण्य बहुशो न खलु स कर्मक्षय करोति ॥१६६॥]

166 The person who has reverence and devotion towards Arahanta, Siddha, their images, Sangha, and congregations will invariably get bondage with Punya karma, hence he can never achieve absolute annihilation of Karma

COMMENTARY—The author minimises the importance of popular form of religious devotion and worship. The traditional Jaina religion always emphasizes the value of faith and devotion towards the objects worthy of reverence. But our author views the popular faith from a higher point. From the true philosophical point of view such Bhakti will only lead to Punya-karma and its consequent divine happiness. But Punya-karma is still thralldom though the shackles are made of gold and Deva happiness is still Samsāri. Therefore Karmic annihilation cannot be achieved by the person who has such faith and devotion alone.

167.

The main obstacle in the path of self-realisation or Svasamaya is said to be *rāga* or affection.

जस्स ह्रिये णुमत्तं वा परदब्बहिं विज्जदे रागो ।

सो ण विजाणदि समयं सगस्स सव्वागमधरो वि ॥१६७॥

[यस्य हृदयेऽणुमात्रो वा परदब्धे विद्यते रागः ।

स न विजानाति समयं स्वकस्य सर्वागमधरोऽपि ॥१६७॥]

167. If in the heart of a Yogin there is an iota of affection towards alien objects (even in an Arahanta) then, though he be well versed in all the Śāstras, he would be incapable of appreciating his true Self or Paramātmā through immediate experience.

COMMENTARY—Devotion to external ideals may be useful up to a certain stage of development. The ideal of Vitarāga is distinctly related to self. Absolute freedom from attachment is the meaning of Vitarāga. Complete absence of *rāga* is certainly inconsistent with attachment and devotion to Arahanta or Siddha. So far as self is concerned

[दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्ग इति सेवितव्यानि ।

साधुभिरिदं भणितं तैस्तु बन्धो वा मोक्षो वा ॥१६४॥]

164. Since Darsana, Jñāna and Cāritra constitute the Mokṣa Mārga, they are adored by the wise. If they are determined by non-self they may lead directly to bondage or indirectly to Mokṣa. But if they are determined by Self then they may lead to Mokṣa.

COMMENTARY—Intuition, knowledge and conduct produce effects according as they are determined by the associated things. If they are associated with external things, they may get associated with desire and aversion and thus may bring about Karmic bondage. But if they are associated with intrinsic and pure nature of the self, then they may directly and immediately bring about liberation. A king for example because of his defective instruments political and military may lead to the strengthening of the enemy instead of annihilating him, or for example, *ghee* which is by nature of soothing effects may when associated with fire aggravate the *heat*. Similar is the case with the three jewels.

165.

Next the characteristic of Sūksma Parasamaya, or the subtle non-self or other determinedness.

अण्णाणादो णाणो जदि मण्णदि सुद्धसंपयोगादो ।

हवदि त्ति दुक्खमोक्खं परसमयरदो हवदि जीवो ॥१६५॥

[अज्ञानात् ज्ञानी यदि मन्यते शुद्धसंप्रयोगात् ।

भवतीति दुःखमोक्षः परसमयरतो भवति जीवः ॥१६५॥]

165. If an Ātman through ignorance believes that through awe and reverence to Arahanta and others he may attain emancipation from misery then he is only the lover of non-self or Parasamaya.

COMMENTARY—Arahanta and Siddha are free from every kind of imperfection and are full of all good qualities. Love and devotion towards these may certainly be desirable but still by themselves they can never bring about Karmic liberation. The hope to obtain salvation only through devotion is Parasamaya. The person who has that hope is Parasamayi, the other determined one. The other determined means to be away from the ideal of self. When love and devotion to the perfect beings cannot take us nearer the goal, we need not even mention the utter uselessness of ignorant worship of alien deities with all the Samsāric paraphernalia. Thus the author emphasizes the fact that even the love and devotion towards the perfect beings form a subtle kind of obstacle in the way of self-realisation.

[तस्मान्निवृत्तिकामो निःसङ्गो निर्ममश्च भूत्वा पुन ।  
सिद्धेषु करोति भक्तिं निर्वाणं तेन प्राप्नोति ॥१६६॥]

169. Therefore he who aims at Nirvāṇa must not say "I love this, this is mine", Then he can very well be devoted to his own true self which is Siddha or the perfect one Through that same self-realisation he will attain Nirvāṇa.

COMMENTARY—The great soul that understands the truth of the previous causal sequence from desire to turmoil of the mind, and from thence to Karma, and finally to Saṁsāra, struggles to escape from the attraction of the environment and from the idea of ownership of alien things. When the relation of self to alien things either through attraction or owning is severed, then there is no possibility of desire springing up in the heart. No desire means no spiritual discord, spiritual harmony repels Karmas; prevention of Karmas means disappearance of Saṁsāra. Absence of Saṁsāra certainly implies its opposite Mokṣa, hence the person that longs for spiritual perfection and Karmic emancipation must never say "This I love. This is mine"

#### 170.

The attitude of worship towards Arahanta and others, though it interferes with the immediate realisation of perfection is not altogether valueless, for it may ultimately lead to Nirvāṇa.

सपयत्यं तित्थयरं अभिगदबुद्धिस्स सुत्तरोइस्स ।  
दूरतरं गिन्वाणं संजमतवसंपडत्तस्स ॥१७०॥

[सपदार्यं तीर्थकरमभिगतबुद्धेः सूत्रोचिनः ।  
दूरतरं निर्वाणं संयमतपःसंप्रयुक्तस्य ॥१७०॥]

170. One may understand the true nature of Tirthankara, who is the basis of nine Padārthas. One may have interest in and devotion to the Scripture One may have self control and penance With all these if one is not capable of realising his own true self, to him Nirvāṇa is beyond reach.

COMMENTARY—Even though a person is well versed in Āgamas and well acquainted with the nature of reality, if he is ever much filled with devotion and worship to objective ideas, he will only secure the happiness of Svarga as the immediate fruit thereof. Nirvāṇa or Mokṣa is very remote and he can obtain that only by a tedious process of spiritual development. The immediate and direct antecedent of Mokṣa is the realisation of the true self, worship of and devotion to any other ideal however worthy it may be is only a circuitous path to reach the goal.



these ideal personalities are indeed external. The right ideal must be to attain perfect Siddha state oneself. This realisation of Siddha state cannot be reached by having attachment to external objects ; hence the author emphasizes the importance of effort to transcend even this subtle kind of attraction however worthy the object of the ideal be, self and self alone must be the final and the ultimate ideal of spiritual evolution. To have Bhakti which is a subtle attraction and then to believe that somehow the final good will be Moksa is to forget the importance of self-effort towards self realisation. According to the author then the traditional religious reverence, is only a stepping stone for the higher spiritual goal. He who shrinks from transcending the traditional orthodoxy is unfit to live in the higher plane. He is infected with the delusion that what is only a means is an end in itself; that what is merely relative is the absolute ; and that what is of temporary value has eternal value.

## 168.

The author enumerates the train of several evils that may be generated by that little iota of affection, above referred to.

धरिदुं जस्स ण सक्कं चित्तुग्गमं विणा दु अप्पाणं ।  
 रोधो तस्स ण विज्जदि सुहासुहकदस्स कम्मस्स ॥१६८॥  
 [धर्तुं यत्नं न शक्यश्चित्तोद्गमं विना त्वात्मानम् ।  
 रोधस्तस्य न विद्यते सुभासुभकृतस्य कर्मणः ॥१६८॥]

168. To whomsoever there is no ability to bear the turmoil of the mind apart from and independent of the pure contemplation of self to him there is no possibility of preventing the Karmas born of pleasure and pain.

COMMENTARY—There can be no devotion to Arahanta and others apart from an affective state, when there is affection the disturbance of the mind cannot be avoided. With the agitation of the heart the calm of the self is lost and if the calm of the self is disturbed, it is not possible to prevent the appearance of pleasure and pain ; and there is no escape from happiness and misery there can be no emancipation from Saṃsāra. Affection however little is therefore the cause of this series of undesirable events.

## 169.

One who has the ideal of Moksa must therefore completely eradicate every kind of desire from his heart.

तम्हा णिव्वुदिकामो णिस्संगो णिम्ममो य हविय पुणो ।  
 सिद्धेसु कुणदि भत्तिं णिव्वाणं तेण पप्पोदि ॥१६९॥

very happiness will scorch the soul, hence the great person, who longs for freedom from Samsāra must rid himself of any kind of attachment, must become a Vitarāga. Then will he be able to conquer the misery of Life and inherit the kingdom of Nirvāna.

This is the meaning of the above Sūtra and the same is the purport of the whole book, *Pañcāstikāya*, i.e., it is not only the *sūtra-tātparya* but also *śāstra-tātparya*. This aims to apprehend the nature of Jñeśvara, the great victor, the all-knowing of infinite qualities and the Vitarāga or the non-attached.

It is called *prābhṛta* 'well filled with the meaning' because it treats about the nine Padārthas and thus describes the nature of the systems of reality. Since it deals with the Dravyas or the existences it is also called *Dravyānuyoga*. It clearly explains the five Astikāyas the six Dravyas, seven Tatvas, and the nine Padārthas. It also examines the nature of bondage and of the bound, of liberation and the liberated. Lastly in the Cūlikā or the appendix there is a clear distinction between the absolute path and relative path, and also the indication of the fact that non-attachment is the direct and immediate condition of Nirvāna. Non-attachment and perfect peace of the heart is the central doctrine emphasized by an embodied in this *Pañcāstikāya Prābhṛta*. This Vitarāgatva or the state of non-attachment is available only to that Bhavya or the right believer who appreciates the comparative merits of the two paths, relative and absolute, Vyavahāra and Niscaya, but not to one who is incapable of appreciating the various aspects of truth and who clings to only a particular and fractional aspect as the whole truth, i.e. one who believes in Ekānta aspect of reality is incapable of appreciating the ideal of Vitarāga and the difference between the absolute path and the relative path. He is far away from the goal. The true believer will certainly understand the compatibility and the harmony between the two paths and thus will try to realise the ideal of non-attachment or Vitarāgatva as the immediate condition of Moksa.

## 173.

The author ends the Work indicating his object in this composition.

मग्गप्पभाषणद्धं पवयणभत्तिप्पच्चोदिदेण सया ।

भणियं पवयणसारं पंचत्थियसंगहं सुत्तं ॥१७३॥

[मार्गप्रभाषणार्थं प्रवचनभक्तिप्रचोदितेन सया ।

भणित प्रवचनसारं पञ्चास्तिकायसंग्रहं सूत्रम् ॥१७३॥]

173 For the purpose of explaining the Moksa Mārga, this work by the name of *Pañcāstikāya* containing the essentials of divine revelation is composed by me as actuated by Bhakti or devotion towards the divine Word.

## 171.

Again the author emphasizes the fact that worship of the Arahanta and others cannot be the immediate antecedent of Mukti.

अरहंतसिद्धचेदियपवयणभक्तो परेण नियमेण ।

जो कुणदि तवोकम्मं सो सुरलोगं समादियदि ॥१७१॥

[अहंत्सिद्धचैत्यप्रवचनभवतः परेण नियमेन ।

यः करोति तपःकर्म स सुरलोकं समावत्ते ॥१७१॥]

171 The person who has love and reverence towards Arahanta and Siddha, their representations and the divine Word or Āgama, however well he is engaged in the best form of Tapas so long as he is incapable of apprehending the true greatness of self on account of attachment to external ideals, will inevitably through his efforts enter only the world of the Devas

COMMENTARY—Whether now or hereafter the direct and immediate condition of Moksa is the apprehension of true self and not attachment to external ideals. The person who has not grasped the self through all his efforts associated with worship and reverence will only secure the happiness of Devas This is merely a higher state of Saṁsāra and not Moksa.

## 172.

Then the author mentions the direct and immediate path to Mokṣa, thereby indicating that, that is the meaning of the present Work.

तम्हा णिव्वुदिकामो रागं सवत्थ कुणतु मा किञ्चि ।

सो तेण वीदरागो भविओ भवसायरं तरदि ॥१७२॥

[तस्मान्निवृत्तिकामो राग सर्वत्र करोतु मा किञ्चित् ।

स तेन वीतरागो भव्यो भवसागर तरति ॥१७२॥]

172 Because of this truth that even the subtle attachment to external ideals hinders Nirvāṇa, let not the person who desires Moksa have any kind of attachment to things, living or non-living, desirable or undesirable, then he becomes the *vitārāga*, the non-attached Thus will he be able to sail across the ocean of Saṁsāra.

COMMENTARY—The essential ingredient of the direct and immediate path to Moksa is the state of *Vitārāga* or non-attachment. Attachment to alien persons and things deserving worship is something like burning sandal wood. It may smell sweet nevertheless it will burn. The subtle attachment to external ideals may lead to happiness but the

श्री

श्रीमत्-कुन्दकुन्दाचार्य-प्रणीतः

## पञ्चास्तिकायसंग्रहः

श्रीमद्-अमृतचन्द्राचार्य-विरचित-तत्त्वप्रदीपिका-समेतः

सहजानन्दचैतन्यप्रकाशाय महीयते ।  
नमोऽनेकान्तविश्रान्तमहिम्ने परमात्मने ॥१॥  
दुर्निवारनयानौकविरोधध्वंसनौषधिः ।  
स्यात्कारजीविता जीयाज्जैनी सिद्धान्तपद्धतिः ॥२॥  
सम्यग्ज्ञानामलज्योतिर्जननी द्विनयाश्रया ।  
अथातः समयव्याख्या संक्षेपेणाभिधीयते ॥३॥  
पञ्चास्तिकायषड्द्रव्यप्रकारेण प्ररूपणम् ।  
पूर्वं मूलपदार्थानामिह सूत्रकृता कृतम् ॥४॥  
जीवाजीवद्विपर्यायरूपाणां चित्रवर्त्मनाम् ।  
ततो नवपदार्थानां व्यवस्था प्रतिपादिता ॥५॥  
ततस्तत्त्वपरिज्ञानपूर्व्वेण त्रितयात्मना ।  
प्रोक्ता मार्गेण कल्याणी मोक्षप्राप्तिरपश्चिमा ॥६॥

अथ सूत्रावतारः—

इदंसदर्वदियाणं तिहुअणहिदमधुरविसदवकाणं ।  
अंतातीदगुणाणं णमो जिणाणं जिदभवाणं ॥१॥  
इन्द्रशतवन्दितेभ्यस्त्रिभुवनहितमधुरविशदवाक्येभ्यः ।  
अन्तातीतगुण्येभ्यो नमो जिनेभ्यो जितभवेभ्यः ॥१॥

अथात्र 'नमो जिनेभ्यः' इत्यनेन जिनभावनमस्काररूपमसाधारणं शास्त्रस्यादौ मङ्गल-

COMMENTARY—The author explains the purpose of this writing his work. The Moksa Mārga or the path is revealed by Jina. But Divine revelation or the Śāstra is elaborate and extensive. In order to exhibit the path to the believers this short summary of the divine Word is written with the name of *Pañcāstikāya Samgraha*.

Thus ends Book II of *Pancāstikāya*.

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मभिप्रेत. । अध तस्यैवार्थसमयस्य द्वैविध्यं लोकालोकविकल्पात् । स एव पञ्चास्तिकायसमवायो यावांस्तावांल्लोकस्ततः परमितो ऽनन्तो ह्यलोकः, स तु नाभावमात्रं किन्तु तत्समवायातिरिक्तपरिमाण-मनन्तक्षेत्रं खमाकाशमिति ॥३॥

**जीवा पुद्गलकाया धम्माधम्मा तद्देव आगासं ।**

**अस्थितस्मिह य नियदा अण्णमइया अणुमहन्ता ॥४॥**

जीवाः पुद्गलकाया धर्माधर्मौ तथैव आकाशम् ।

अस्तित्वे च नियता अनन्यमया अणुमहान्तः ॥४॥

अत्र पञ्चास्तिकायानां विशेषसज्ञा सामान्यविशेषास्तित्वं कायत्वं चोक्तम् । तत्र जीवाः पुद्गला धर्माधर्मौ आकाशमिति तेषां विशेषसज्ञा अन्वर्था प्रत्येया । सामान्यविशेषास्तित्वं च तेषामुत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यमय्यां सामान्यविशेषसत्तायां नियतत्वाद् व्यवस्थितत्वादवसेयम् । अस्तित्वे नियता-नामपि न तेषामन्यमयत्वम्, यतस्ते सर्वदैवानन्यमया आत्मनिर्वृत्ताः । अनन्यमयत्वे ऽपि तेषामस्ति-त्वनियतत्वं नयप्रयोगात् । द्वौ हि नयौ भगवता प्रणीतौ—द्रव्यार्थिकः पर्यायार्थिकश्च । तत्र न खल्वेक-नयायत्तादेशना किन्तु तदुभयायत्ता । ततः पर्यायार्थदिशादस्तित्वे स्वतः कथंचिद्विज्ञे ऽपि व्यवस्थिता द्रव्यार्थदिशात्स्वयमेव सन्तः सतो ऽनन्यमया भवन्तीति । कायत्वमपि तेषामणुमहत्त्वात् । अणवो ऽत्र प्रदेशा मूर्तामूर्ताश्च निर्विभागाशास्तैर्महान्तो ऽणुमहान्तः प्रदेशप्रचयात्मका इति सिद्धं तेषां कायत्वम् । अणुभ्यां महान्त इति व्युपत्त्या द्व्यणुकपुद्गलस्कन्धानामपि तथाविधत्वम् । अणवश्च महान्तश्च व्यक्तिशक्तिरूपाभ्यामिति परमाणूनामेकप्रदेशात्मकत्वे ऽपि तत्सिद्धिः । व्यक्त्यपेक्षया शक्त्यपेक्षया च प्रदेशप्रचयात्मकस्य महत्त्वस्याभावात्कालाणूनामस्तित्वनियतत्वे ऽप्यकायत्वमनेनैव साधितम् । अतएव तेषामस्तिकायप्रकरणे सतामप्यनुपादानमिति ॥४॥

**जेसिं अस्थि सहाओ गुणोहं सह पज्जएहं विविहेहं ।**

**ते होंति अस्थिकाया णिप्पणं जेहं तइलोककं ॥५॥**

येषामस्ति स्वभावः गुणैः सह पर्ययैर्विविधैः ।

ते भवन्त्यस्तिकायाः निष्पन्न यैस्त्रैलोक्यम् ॥५॥

अत्र पञ्चास्तिकायानामस्तित्वसंभवप्रकारः कायत्वसंभवप्रकारश्चोक्तः । अस्ति ह्यस्तिकायानां गुणैः पर्यायैश्च विविधैः सह स्वभावो आत्मभावो ऽनन्यत्वम् । वस्तुनो विशेषा हि व्यतिरेकिणः पर्याया गुणास्तु त एवान्वयिनः । तत एकेन पययिणः प्रतीयमानस्यान्येनोपजायमानस्यान्वयिना गुणेन ध्रौव्यं

४. P पोगल, धम्माधम्मा, आयासं ।

५. P विविधेहि, तेलोकक ।

मुपात्तम् । अनादिना संतानेन प्रवर्तमाना अनादिनैव सतानेन प्रवर्तमानैरिन्द्राणां शतैर्वन्दिता ये इत्यनेन सर्वदैव देवाधिदेवत्वात्तेषामेवासाधारणनमस्कारार्हत्वमुक्तम् । त्रिभुवनमूर्ध्वाधोमध्यलोकवर्ती समस्त एव जीवलोकस्तस्मै निर्व्याबाधविशुद्धात्मतत्त्वोपलम्भोपायमिधायित्वाद्वितं, परमार्थ-रसिकजनमनोहारित्वान्मधुरं, निरस्तसमस्तशङ्कादिदोषास्पदत्वाद्विशदं वाक्यं दिव्यो ध्वनियेषा-मित्यनेन समस्तवस्तुयाथात्म्योपदेशित्वात्प्रेक्षावत्प्रतीक्ष्यत्वमाख्यातम् । अन्तमतीतः क्षेत्रानवच्छिन्नः कालानवच्छिन्नश्च परमचैतन्यशक्तिविलासलक्षणो गुणो येषामित्यनेन तु परमाद्भुतज्ञानातिशय-प्रकाशनादवाप्तज्ञानातिशयानामपि योगीन्द्राणां बन्धत्वमुदितम् । जितो भव आजवज्जवो यैरित्येन तु कृतकृत्यत्वप्रकटनात् एवात्येषामकृतकृत्यानां शरणमित्युपदिष्टम् । इति सर्वपदानां तात्पर्यम् ॥१॥

समणमुहुरागदमदुं चतुर्गतिनिवारणं सणिग्वाणं ।

एसो पणमिय सिरसा समयमियं सुणह वोच्छामि ॥२॥

श्रमणमुखोद्गतार्थं चतुर्गतिनिवारणं सनिर्वाणम् ।

एष प्रणम्य शिरसा समयमिमं शृणुत वक्ष्यामि ॥२॥

समयो ह्यागमः । तस्य प्रणामपूर्वकमात्मनाभिधानमत्र प्रतिज्ञातम् । युज्यते हि स प्रणन्तुम-भिधातुं चाप्तोपदिष्टत्वे सति सफलत्वात् । तत्राप्तोपदिष्टत्वमस्य श्रमणमुखोद्गतार्थत्वात् । श्रमणा हि महाश्रमणाः सर्वज्ञवीतरागाः । अर्थः पुनरनेकशब्दसंबन्धेनाभिधीयमानो वस्तुतयैकोऽभिधेयः । सफलत्वं तु चतसृणां नारकतिर्यग्मनुष्यदेवत्वलक्षणानां गतीनां निवारणत्वात् पारतन्त्र्यनिवृत्ति-लक्षणस्य निर्वाणस्य शुद्धात्मतत्त्वोपलम्भरूपस्य परपरया कारणत्वात् स्वातन्त्र्यप्राप्तिलक्षणस्य च फलस्य सद्भावादिति ॥२॥

समवाओ पंचण्हं समओ त्ति जिणुत्तमेहि पणत्तं ।

सो चेव हवदि लोओ तत्तो अमिओ अलोओ खं ॥३॥

समवादः (समवायो वा) पञ्चानां समय इति जिज्ञोत्तमं प्रज्ञप्तम् ।

स च एव भवति लोकस्ततो ऽमिओ ऽलोकः खम् ॥३॥

अत्र शब्दज्ञानार्थरूपेण त्रिविधमभिधेयता समयशब्दस्य लोकालोकविभागश्चाभिहितः तत्र च पञ्चानामस्तिकायानां समो मध्यस्थो रागद्वेषाभ्यामनुपहतो वर्णपदवाक्यसन्निवेशविशिष्टः पाठो वादः शब्दसमयः शब्दागम इति यावत् । तेषामेव मिथ्यादर्शनोदयोच्छेदे सति सम्यगवायः परिच्छेदो ज्ञानस-मयो ज्ञानागम इति यावत् । तेषामेवाभिधानप्रत्ययपरिच्छिन्नानां वस्तुरूपेण समवायः संघातोऽर्थसमयः सर्वपदार्थसार्थ इति यावत् । तदत्र ज्ञानसमयप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं शब्दसमयसंबन्धेनार्थसमयो ऽभिधातु-

अन्योन्यं प्रविशन्ति ददत्यवकाशमन्योन्यस्य ।

मिलन्त्यपि च नित्यं स्वकं स्वभावं न विजहति ॥७॥

अत्र षण्णां द्रव्याणां परस्परमत्यन्तसकरे ऽपि प्रतिनियतस्वरूपादप्रच्यवनमुक्तम् । अत एव तेषां परिणामवत्त्वेऽपि प्राप्तिरित्यवमुक्तम् । अत एव च न तेषामेकत्वापत्तिर्न च जीवकर्मणोर्व्यवहारनया-  
देशादेकत्वे ऽपि परस्परस्वरूपोपादानमिति ॥७॥

सत्ता सव्वपयत्था सविस्सरूपा अणंतपज्जाया ।

भंगुप्पादधुवत्ता सप्पडिवक्खा ह्वदि एक्का ॥८॥

सत्ता सर्वपदार्था सविश्वरूपा अनन्तपर्याया ।

भङ्गोत्पादध्रौव्यात्मिका सप्रतिपक्षा भवत्येका ॥८॥

अत्रास्तित्वस्वरूपमुक्तम् । अस्तित्वं हि सत्ता नाम सतो भावः सत्त्वम् । न सर्वथा नित्यतया सर्वथा क्षणिकतया वा विद्यमानमात्रं वस्तु । सर्वथा नित्यत्ववस्तुनस्तत्त्वतः क्रमभुवां भावानाम-  
भावात्कृतो विकारवत्त्वम् । सर्वथा क्षणिकस्य च तत्त्वतः प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभावात् कृत एकसतानत्वम् ।  
ततः प्रत्यभिज्ञानहेतुभूतेन केनचित्स्वरूपेण ध्रौव्यमालम्ब्यमानं कार्याचिक्क्रमप्रवृत्ताभ्यां स्वरूपाभ्यां  
प्रलीयमानमुपजायमानं चैककालमेव परमार्थतस्त्रितयीमवस्थां विभ्रान् वस्तु सदवबोध्यम् । अत एव  
सत्ताप्युत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यात्मिकाऽवबोद्धव्या, भावभाववतोः कथंचिदेकस्वरूपत्वात् । सा च त्रिलक्षणस्य  
समस्तस्यापि वस्तुविस्तारस्य सादृश्यसूचकत्वादेका । सर्वपदार्थस्थिता च त्रिलक्षणस्य सदित्यभिधानस्य  
सदिति प्रत्ययस्य च सर्वपदार्थेषु तन्मूलस्यैवोपलम्भात् । सविश्वरूपा च विश्वस्य समस्तवस्तुविस्तार-  
स्यापि रूपैस्त्रिलक्षणैः स्वभावाः सह वर्तमानत्वात् । अनन्तपर्याया चानन्ताभिर्द्रव्यपर्यायव्यक्तिभिस्त्रि-  
लक्षणाभिः परिगम्यमानत्वात् । एवभूतापि सा न खलु निरङ्कुशा किन्तु सप्रतिपक्षा । प्रतिपक्षो  
ह्यसत्ता सत्तायाः, अत्रिलक्षणत्वं त्रिलक्षणायाः, अनेकत्वमेकस्या, एकपदार्थस्थितत्वं सर्वपदार्थस्थि-  
तायाः, एकरूपत्वं सविश्वरूपायाः, एकपर्यायत्वमनन्तपर्यायाया इति । द्विविधा हि सत्तामहासत्ता-  
वान्तरसत्ता च । तत्र सर्वपदार्थसार्थव्यापिनी सादृश्यास्तित्वसूचिका महासत्ता प्रोक्तैव । अन्या तु  
प्रतिनियतवस्तुवर्तिनी स्वरूपास्तित्वसूचिकाऽवान्तरसत्ता । तत्र महासत्तावान्तरसत्तारूपेणासत्ता-  
वान्तरसत्ता च महासत्तारूपेणासत्तेत्यसत्ता सत्ताया । येन स्वरूपेणोत्पादस्तत्तथोत्पादैकलक्षणमेव,  
येन स्वरूपेणोच्छेदस्तत्तथोच्छेदैकलक्षणमेव, येन स्वरूपेण ध्रौव्यं तत्तथा ध्रौव्यैकलक्षणमेव, तत  
उत्पद्यमानोच्छिद्यमानावतिष्ठमानानां वस्तुनः स्वरूपाणां प्रत्येकं त्रैलक्षण्यभावादत्रिलक्षणत्वं  
त्रिलक्षणायाः । एकस्य वस्तुनः स्वरूपसत्ता नान्यस्य वस्तुनः स्वरूपसत्ता भवतीत्यनेकत्वमेकस्या ।  
प्रतिनियतपदार्थस्थिताभिरेव सत्ताभिः पदार्थानां प्रतिनियमो भवतीत्येकपदार्थस्थितत्वं सर्वपदार्थ-  
स्थितायाः । प्रतिनियतैकरूपाभिरेव सत्ताभिः प्रतिनियतैकरूपत्वं वस्तूनां भवतीत्येकरूपत्वं सविश्व-



विभ्राणस्यैकस्याऽपि वस्तुन. समुच्छेदोत्पादध्रौव्यलक्षणमस्तित्वमुपपद्यत एव । गुणपर्यायैः सह सर्व-  
थान्यत्वे त्वन्यो विनश्यत्यन्य. प्रादुर्भवत्यन्यो ध्रुवत्वमालम्बत इति सर्वं विप्लवते । ततः साध्वस्तित्व-  
सम्भवप्रकारकथनम् । कायत्वसम्भवप्रकारस्त्वयमुपदिश्यते । अवयविनो हि जीवपुद्गलधर्माधर्माकाश-  
पदार्थास्तेषामवयवा अपि प्रदेशाख्याः परस्परव्यतिरेकित्वात्पर्याया उच्यन्ते । तेषां तैः सहानन्यत्वे  
कायत्वसिद्धिरुपपत्तिमती । निरवयवस्यापि परिमाणोः सावयवत्वशक्तिसद्भावात्  
कायत्वसिद्धिरनपवादा । न चैतदाशङ्क्यम् पुद्गलादन्येषाममूर्तत्वादविभाज्याना सावयवत्वकल्पन-  
मन्यायम् । दृश्यत एवाविभाज्ये ऽपि विहायसीद घटाकाशमिदमघटाकाशमिति विभागकल्पनम् ।  
यदि तत्र विभागो न कल्पेत तदा यदेव घटाकाशं तदेवाघटाकाशं स्यात् । न च तदिष्टम् । ततः  
कालाणुभ्यो ऽन्यत्र सर्वेषां कायत्वाख्यं सावयवत्वमवसेयम् । त्रैलोक्यरूपेण निष्पन्नत्वमपि तेषामस्ति-  
कायत्वसाधनपरमुपन्यस्तम् । तथा च—त्रयाणामूर्ध्वाधोमध्यलोकानामुत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यवन्तस्त-  
द्विशेषात्मका भावा भवन्तस्तेषां मूलपदार्थानां गुणपर्याययोगपूर्वकमस्तित्व साधयन्ति । अनुमीयते च  
धर्माधर्माकाशाना प्रत्येकमूर्ध्वाधोमध्यलोकविभागरूपेण परिणमनात्कायत्वाख्यं सावयवत्वम् । जीवा-  
नामपि प्रत्येकमूर्ध्वाधोमध्यलोकविभागरूपेण परिणमनात्लोकपूरणावस्थाव्यवस्थितव्यक्तेः सदा  
सन्निहितशक्तेस्तदनुमीयत एव । पुद्गलानामप्यूर्ध्वाधोमध्यलोकविभागरूपपरिणतमहास्कन्धत्व-  
प्राप्तिव्यक्तिशक्तियोगित्वात्तथाविधा सावयवत्वसिद्धिरस्त्येवेति ॥५॥

ते चेव अस्तिकाया तेकालियभावपरिणदा णिच्चा ।

गच्छन्ति दवियभावं परियट्ठर्णालिगसंजुत्ता ॥६॥

ते चैवास्तिकायाः त्रैकालिकभावपरिणता नित्याः ।

गच्छन्ति द्रव्यभावं परिवर्तनलिङ्गसंयुक्ताः ॥६॥

अत्र पञ्चास्तिकायाना कालस्य च द्रव्यत्वमुक्तम् । द्रव्याणि हि सहकर्मभुवा गुणपर्यायाणा-  
मनन्यतयाधारभूतानि भवन्ति । ततो वृत्तवर्तमानवतिष्यमाणाना भावाना पर्यायाणां स्वरूपेण  
परिणतत्वादस्तिकायाना परिवर्तनलिगस्य कालस्य चास्ति द्रव्यत्वम् । न च तेषां भूतभवद्भविष्यद्भा-  
वात्मना परिणममानानामनित्यत्वम् यतस्ते भूतभवद्भविष्यद्भावावस्थास्वपि प्रतिनियतस्वरूपा-  
परित्यागान्नित्या एव । अत्र कालः पुद्गलादिपरिवर्तनहेतुत्वात्पुद्गलादिपरिवर्तनगम्यमानपर्या-  
यत्वाच्चास्तिकायेष्वन्तर्भावार्थं स परिवर्तनलिग इत्युक्त इति ॥६॥

अण्णोणं पविसंता देता ओगासमण्णमणस्स ।

मेलन्ता वि य णिच्चं सगं सभावं ण विजहंति ॥७॥

गुणपर्यायिवच्च । गुणपर्यायिवच्चेत्सच्चोत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यवच्चेति । सद्धि नित्यानित्यस्वभावत्वाद्  
ध्रुवत्वमुत्पादव्ययात्मकतां च प्रथयति, ध्रुवत्वात्मकैर्गुणैरुत्पादव्ययात्मक. पर्यायैश्च सहैकत्वं  
चाख्याति । उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्याणि तु नित्यानित्यस्वरूप परमार्थं सदावेदयन्ति, गुणपर्यायाश्चात्मलाभ-  
निबन्धनभूतान् प्रथयन्ति । गुणपर्यायास्त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकित्वाद् ध्रौव्योत्पत्तिविनाशान् सूचयन्ति,  
नित्यानित्यस्वभाव परमार्थं सच्चोपलक्षयन्तीति ॥१०॥

**उत्पत्ती व विनाशो दव्वस्स य णत्थि अत्थि सब्भावो ।**

**विगमुप्पादधुवत्तं करेति तस्सेव पज्जाया ॥११॥**

उत्पत्तिर्वा विनाशो द्रव्यस्य च नास्त्यस्ति सद्भावः ।

विगमोत्पादध्रुवत्वं कुर्वन्ति तस्यैव पर्यायाः ॥११॥

अत्रोभयनयाभ्यां द्रव्यलक्षणं प्रविभक्तम् । द्रव्यस्य हि सहक्रमप्रवृत्तगुणपर्यायसद्भावरूपस्य  
त्रिकालावस्थायिनो ज्ञादिनिघनस्य न समुच्छेदसमुदयो युक्तौ । अथ तस्यैव पर्यायाणां सहप्रवृत्ति-  
भाजा केषाचित् ध्रौव्यसंभवे ऽप्यपरेषां क्रमप्रवृत्तिभाजा विनाशसंभवसंभावनमुपपन्नम् । ततो  
द्रव्यार्थापिणायामनुत्पादमनुच्छेद सत्त्वभावमेव द्रव्यं, तदेव पर्यायार्थापिणायानां सोत्पादं सोच्छेदं चाव-  
बोद्धव्यम् । सर्वमिदमनवद्य च द्रव्यपर्यायाणामभेदात् ॥११॥

**पज्जयविजुदं दव्वं दव्वविजुत्ता य पज्जया णत्थि ।**

**दोण्हं अणणभूदं भावं समणा परूवेति ॥१२॥**

पर्यायवियुतं द्रव्यं द्रव्यवियुक्ताश्च पर्याया न सन्ति ।

द्वयोरनन्यभूत भाव श्रमणाः प्ररूपयन्ति ॥१२॥

अत्र द्रव्यपर्यायाणामभेदो निर्दिष्टः । दुग्धदधिनवनीतघृतादिवियुतगोरसवत्पर्यायवियुतं द्रव्यं  
नास्ति । गोरसवियुक्तदुग्धदधिनवनीतघृतादिवद्द्रव्यवियुक्ताः पर्याया न सन्ति । ततो द्रव्यस्य  
पर्यायाणां चादेशवशात्कथंचिद्भेदे ऽप्येकास्ति त्वनियतत्वादप्योन्याजहृद्वृत्तीनां वस्तुत्वेनाभेद  
इति ॥१२॥

**दव्वेण विणा ण गुणा गुणेहि दव्वं विणा ण संभवदि ।**

**अव्वदिरित्तो भावो दव्वगुणाणं हवदि तम्हा ॥१३॥**

द्रव्येण विना न गुणा गुणैर्द्रव्यं विना न संभवति ।

अव्यतिरिक्तो भावो द्रव्यगुणानां भवति तस्मात् ॥१३॥

११. J वयमुप्पाद<sup>०</sup> । P करंति ।

१२. P परूवति ।

रूपाया । प्रतिपर्यायिनियताभिरेव सत्ताभिः प्रतिनियतैकपर्यायाणामानन्त्य भवतीत्येकपर्यायित्वमनन्त-  
पर्यायायाः । इति सर्वमनवद्य सामान्यविशेषप्ररूपणप्रवणनयद्वयायत्तत्वात्तद्देशनायाः ॥८॥

**द्वियदि गच्छति तां तां सन्भावपञ्जयां जं ।**

**द्वियं तं भणन्ति अण्णभूदं तु सत्तादो ॥९॥**

द्रवति गच्छति तांस्तान् सद्भावपर्यायान् यत् ।

द्रव्यं तद् भणन्ति अनन्यभूतं तु सत्तातः ॥९॥

अत्र सत्ताद्रव्ययोरर्थान्तरत्वं प्रत्याख्यातम् । द्रवति गच्छति सामान्यरूपेण स्वरूपेण व्याप्नोति  
तास्तान् क्रमभुवः सहभुवश्च सद्भावपर्यायान् स्वभावविशेषानित्यनुगतार्थया निरुक्त्या द्रव्यं व्याख्या-  
तम् । द्रव्यं च लक्ष्यलक्षणभावादिभ्यः कथंचिद्भेदे ऽपि वस्तुतः सत्ताया अपृथग्भूतमेवेति मन्तव्यम् ।  
ततो यत्पूर्वं सत्त्वमसत्त्वं त्रिलक्षणत्वमत्रिलक्षणत्वमेकत्वमनेकत्वं सर्वपदार्थस्थितत्वमेकपदार्थस्थितत्वं  
विश्वरूपत्वमेकरूपत्वमनन्तपर्यायित्वमेकपर्यायित्वं च प्रतिपादितं सत्तायास्तत्सर्वं तदनर्थान्तरभूतस्य  
द्रव्यस्यैव द्रष्टव्यम् । ततो न कश्चिदपि तेषु सत्ताविशेषो ऽवशिष्येत यः सत्तां वस्तुतो द्रव्यात्पृथक्  
व्यवस्थापयेदिति ॥९॥

**द्वयं सत्त्वलक्षणं उत्पादव्ययध्रुवत्तसंजुतं ।**

**गुणपञ्जयासयं वा जं तं भणन्ति सव्वण्हू ॥१०॥**

द्रव्यं सत्त्वलक्षणं उत्पादव्ययध्रुवत्वसंयुतम् ।

गुणपर्यायाश्रयं वा यत्तद् भणन्ति सर्वज्ञाः ॥१०॥

अत्र त्रेधा द्रव्यलक्षणमुक्तम् । सद्द्रव्यलक्षणम् । उक्तलक्षणायाः सत्ताया अविशेषाद् द्रव्यस्य  
सत्स्वरूपमेव लक्षणम् । न चानेकान्तात्मकस्य द्रव्यस्य सन्मात्रमेव स्वं रूपं यतो लक्ष्यलक्षणविभागा-  
भाव इति । उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्याणि वा द्रव्यलक्षणम् । एकजात्यविरोधिनि क्रमभुवां भावानां सताने  
पूर्वभावविनाशः समुच्छेदः, उत्तरभावप्रादुर्भाविश्च समुत्पादः, पूर्वोत्तरभावोच्छेदोत्पादयोरपि  
स्वजातेरपरित्यागो ध्रौव्यम् । तानि सामान्यादेशादभिन्नानि विशेषादेशादभिन्नानि युगपद्भावीनि  
स्वभावभूतानि द्रव्यस्य लक्षणं भवन्तीति । गुणपर्याया वा द्रव्यलक्षणम् । अनेकान्तात्मकस्य वस्तुनो  
ऽन्ययिनो विशेषा गुणा व्यतिरेकिणः पर्यायास्ते द्रव्ये योगपद्येन क्रमेण च प्रवर्तमानाः कथंचिद्भिन्नाः  
कथंचिदभिन्नाः स्वभावभूता द्रव्यलक्षणतामापद्यन्ते । त्रयाणामप्यमीषां द्रव्यलक्षणानामेकस्मिन्भि-  
हिते ऽन्यदुभयमथादेवापद्यते । सच्चेदुत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यवच्च गुणपर्यायवच्च । उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यवच्चेत्सच्च

९ P भणन्ति हि ।

१०. P सव्वण्णु ।

वस्थया प्रादुर्भवत्सु नश्यति च नवनीतपर्यायो धृतपर्याय उत्पद्यते, तथा सर्वभावा-  
नामपीति ॥१५॥

भावा जीवादीया जीवगुणा चेदणा य उवओगो ।

सुरणरणारयतिरिया जीवस्स य पज्जया बहुगा ॥१६॥

भावा जीवाद्या जीवगुणाच्चेतना चोपयोगः ।

सुरनरनारकतिर्यञ्चो जीवस्य न पर्यायः बहवः ॥१६॥

अत्र भावगुणपर्यायाः प्रज्ञापिताः । भावा हि जीवादयः षट् पदार्थाः । तेषां गुणाः पर्यायाश्च  
प्रसिद्धाः । तथापि जीवस्य वक्ष्यमाणोदाहरणप्रसिद्धयर्थमभिधीयन्ते । गुणा हि जीवस्य ज्ञानानुभूति-  
लक्षणा शुद्धचेतना, कार्यानुभूतिलक्षणा कर्मफलानुभूतिलक्षणा चाशुद्धचेतना, चैतन्यानुविधायि-  
परिणामलक्षणः सविकल्पनिर्विकल्परूपः शुद्धाशुद्धतया सकलविकलतां दधानो द्वेधोपयोगश्च । पर्याया-  
स्त्वगुरुलघुगुणहानिवृद्धिनिवृत्ताः शुद्धाः, सूत्रोपात्तास्तु सुरनारकतिर्यङ्मनुष्यलक्षणाः परद्रव्यसम्बन्ध-  
निवृत्तत्वादशुद्धाश्चेति ॥१६॥

मणुसत्तणेण णट्ठो देही देवो हवेदि इदरो वा ।

उभयत्थ जीवभावो ण णस्सदि ण जायदे ण्णो ॥१७॥

मनुष्यत्वेन नष्टो देही देवो भवतीतरो वा ।

उभयत्र जीवभावो न नश्यति न जायते अन्यः ॥१७॥

इदं भावनाशाभावोत्पादनषेधोदाहरणम् । प्रतिसमयसम्भवदगुरुलघुगुणहानिवृद्धिनिवृत्तस्वभाव-  
पर्यायसंतत्यविच्छेदकेनैकेन सोपाधिना मनुष्यत्वलक्षणेन पर्यायेण विनश्यति जीवः, तथाविधेन देवत्व-  
लक्षणेन नारकतिर्यक्त्वलक्षणेन वान्येन पर्यायेणोत्पद्यते । न च मनुष्यत्वेन नाशे जीवत्वेनापि  
नश्यति, देवत्वादिनोत्पादे जीवत्वेनाप्युत्पद्यते, कितु सद्बुच्छेदमसदुत्पादमन्तरेणैव तथा विवर्तत  
इति ॥१७॥

सो च्चेव जादि सरणं जादि ण णट्ठो ण च्चेव उप्पण्णो ।

उप्पण्णो य विणट्ठो देवो मणुसो त्ति पज्जाओ ॥१८॥

स च एव याति सरणं याति न नष्टो न चैवोत्पन्नः ।

उत्पन्नश्च विनष्टो देवो मनुष्य इति पर्यायः ॥१८॥

अत्र द्रव्यगुणानामभेदो निर्दिष्टः । पुद्गलपृथग्भूतस्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णवद्द्रव्येण विना न गुणाः संभवन्ति । स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णपृथग्भूतपुद्गलवद्गुणैर्विना द्रव्यं न संभवति । ततो द्रव्यगुणानामप्यादेश-  
वशात् कथंचिद्भेदे ऽप्येकास्तित्वनियतत्वादन्वोन्याजहद्वृत्तीनां वस्तुत्वेनाभेद इति ॥१३॥

**सिय अत्थि णत्थि उह्यं अव्वत्तव्वं पुणो य तत्तिदयं ।**

**दव्वं खु सत्तभंगं आदेसवसेण संभवदि ॥१४॥**

स्यादस्ति नास्त्युभयमवक्तव्यं पुनश्च तत्त्रितयम् ।

द्रव्यं खलु सप्तभङ्गमादेशवशेन संभवति ॥१४॥

अत्र द्रव्यस्यादेशवशेनोक्ता सप्तभङ्गी । स्यादस्ति द्रव्यं, स्यान्नास्ति द्रव्यं, स्यादस्ति च नास्ति च द्रव्यं, स्यादवक्तव्यं द्रव्यं, स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यं च द्रव्यं, स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यं च द्रव्यं, स्यादस्ति च नास्ति चावक्तव्यं च द्रव्यमिति । अत्र सर्वथात्वनिषेधको ज्ञेकान्तद्योतकः कथंचिदर्थे स्याच्छब्दो निपातः । तत्र स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैरादिष्टमस्ति द्रव्यं, परद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैरादिष्टं नास्ति द्रव्यं, स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैः परद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैश्च क्रमेणादिष्टमस्ति च नास्ति च द्रव्यं, स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्र-  
कालभावैः परद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैश्च युगपदादिष्टमवक्तव्यं द्रव्यं, स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैर्युगपत्स्वपरद्रव्य-  
क्षेत्रकालभावैश्चादिष्टमस्ति चावक्तव्यं च द्रव्यं, परद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैर्युगपत्स्वपरद्रव्यक्षेत्रकाल-  
भावैश्चादिष्टं नास्ति चावक्तव्यं च द्रव्यं, स्वद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैः परद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैश्च युगपत्स्व-  
परद्रव्यक्षेत्रकालभावैश्चादिष्टमस्ति च नास्ति चावक्तव्यं च द्रव्यमिति । न चैतदनुपपन्नम्, सर्वस्य  
वस्तुनः स्वरूपादिना अशून्यत्वात्, पररूपादिना शून्यत्वात् । उभाभ्यामशून्यशून्यत्वात्, सहावाच्य-  
त्वात्, भङ्गसंयोगार्पणायामशून्यावाच्यत्वात्, शून्यावाच्यत्वात्, अशून्यशून्यावाच्यत्वाच्चेति ॥१४॥

**भावस्स णत्थि णासो णत्थि अभावस्स चेव उप्पादो ।**

**गुणपज्जयेसु भावा उप्पादवए पकुव्वन्ति ॥१५॥**

भावस्य नास्ति नाशो नास्ति अभावस्य चैव उत्पादः ।

गुणपययिषु भावा उत्पादव्ययान् प्रकुर्वन्ति ॥१५॥

अत्रासत्प्रादुर्भावत्वमुत्पादस्य सदुच्छेदत्व विगमस्य निषिद्धम् । भावस्य सतो हि द्रव्यस्य न  
द्रव्यत्वेन विनाशः, अभावस्यासतो ऽन्यद्रव्यस्य न द्रव्यत्वेनोत्पादः । किन्तु भावाः सन्ति द्रव्याणि  
सदुच्छेदमसदुत्पादं चान्तरेणैव गुणपययिषु विनाशमुत्पादं चारभन्ते । यथा हि घृतोत्पत्तौ गोरसस्य  
सतो न विनाशः न चापि गोरसव्यतिरिक्तस्यार्थान्तरस्यासत् उत्पादः किन्तु गोरसस्यैव सदुच्छेद-  
मसदुत्पादं चानुपलभमानस्य स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णादिषु परिणामिषु गुणेषु पूर्वावस्थया विनश्यत्सूत्ररा-

जीवस्य देवादिपर्यायिष्वेकस्मिन् स्वकारणनिवृत्तौ निवृत्तेऽभूतपूर्वं एव चान्यस्मिन्ननुत्पन्ने नासदुत्पत्तिः, तथा दीर्घकालान्वग्नि ज्ञानावरणादिकर्मसामान्योदयनिवृत्तिसंसारित्वपर्याये भव्यस्य स्वकारण-निवृत्तौ निवृत्ते समुत्पन्ने चाभूतपूर्वं सिद्धत्वपर्याये नासदुत्पत्तिरिति । किं च—यथा द्राघीयसि वेणु-दण्डे व्यवहिताव्यवहितविचित्रचित्रकिर्मीरताखचिताधस्तनार्धभागे एकान्तव्यवहितसुविगुद्धोर्ध्वार्ध-भागे ऽवतारिता दृष्टिः समन्ततो विचित्रचित्रकिर्मीरताख्याप्तिं पश्यन्ती समनुमिनोति तस्य सर्वत्रा-विगुद्धत्व, तथा क्वचिदपि जीवद्रव्ये व्यवहिताव्यवहितज्ञानावरणादिकर्मकिर्मीरताखचितवहुतरा-धस्तनभागे एकान्तव्यवहितसुविगुद्धवहुतरोर्ध्वभागे ऽवतारिता बुद्धिः समन्ततो ज्ञानावरणादिकर्म-किर्मीरताख्याप्तिं व्यवस्थन्ती समनुमिनोति तस्य सर्वत्राविगुद्धत्वम् । यथा च तत्र वेणुदण्डे व्याप्तिज्ञानाभासनिबन्धनविचित्रचित्रकिर्मीरतान्वयः, तथा च क्वचिज्जीवद्रव्ये ज्ञानावरणादिकर्म-किर्मीरतान्वयः । यथैव च तत्र वेणुदण्डे विचित्रचित्रकिर्मीरतान्वयाभावात्सुविगुद्धत्व, तथैव च क्वचिज्जीवद्रव्ये ज्ञानावरणादिकर्मकिर्मीरतान्वयाभावादाप्तागमसम्यगनुमानातीन्द्रियज्ञान-परिच्छिन्नात्सिद्धत्वमिति ॥२०॥

**एवं भावमभावं भावाभावं अभावभावं च ।**

**गुणपञ्जयेहिं सहिदो संसरमाणो कुणवि जीवो ॥२१॥**

**एवं भावमभावं भावाभावमभावभावं च ।**

**गुणपर्यायैः सहितः संसरन् करोति जीवः ॥२१॥**

जीवस्योत्पादव्ययसदुच्छेदासदुत्पादकर्तृत्वोपपत्त्युपसहारो ऽयम् । द्रव्यं हि सर्वदाविनष्टानुत्पन्न-माम्नातम् । ततो जीवद्रव्यस्य द्रव्यरूपेण नित्यत्वमुपगम्यस्तम् । तस्यैव देवादिपर्यायरूपेण प्रादुर्भवतो भावकर्तृत्वमुक्तं; तस्यैव च मनुष्यादिपर्यायरूपेण व्ययतो ऽभावकर्तृत्वमाख्यातं; तस्यैव च सतो देवादिपर्यायस्योच्छेदमारभमाणस्य भावाभावकर्तृत्वमुदितं, तस्यैव चासत् पुनर्मनुष्यादिपर्याय-स्योत्पादमारभमाणस्याभावभावकर्तृत्वमभिहितम् । सर्वमिदमनवद्यं द्रव्यपर्यायाणामन्यतरगुण-मुख्यत्वेन व्याख्यानात् । तथा हि—यदा जीव पर्यायगुणत्वेन द्रव्यमुख्यत्वेन विवक्ष्यते तदा नोत्पद्यते, न विनश्यति, न च क्रमवृत्त्यावर्तमानत्वात् सत्पर्यायजातमुच्छिनत्ति, नासदुत्पादयति । यदा तु द्रव्य-गुणत्वेन पर्यायमुख्यत्वेन विवक्ष्यते तदा प्रादुर्भवति, विनश्यति, सत्पर्यायजातमतिवाहितस्वकाल-मुच्छिनत्ति, असदुपस्थितस्वकालमुत्पादयति चेति । स खल्वय प्रसादो ऽनेकान्तवादस्य यदीहणो ऽपि विरोधो न विरोधः ॥२१॥ इति षड्द्रव्यसामान्यप्ररूपणा ।

अत्र कथंचिद्व्ययोत्पादवत्त्वे ऽपि द्रव्यस्य सदाविनष्टानुत्पन्नत्व ख्यापितम् । यदेव पूर्वोत्तर-  
पर्यायिविवेकसपक्षादितामुभयीमवस्थामात्मसात्कुर्वाणमुच्छिद्यमानमुत्पद्यमानं च द्रव्यमालक्ष्यते,  
तदेव तथाविधोभयावस्थाव्यापिना प्रतिनियतैकवस्तुत्वनिबन्धनभूतेन स्वभावेनाविनष्टमनुत्पन्न वा  
वेद्यते । पर्यायास्तु तस्य पूर्वपूर्वपरिणामोपमर्दोत्तरोत्तरपरिणामोत्पादरूपाः प्रणाशसम्भवधर्माणो  
ऽभिधीयन्ते । ते च वस्तुत्वेन द्रव्यादपृथग्भूता एवोक्ताः । ततः पर्यायैः सहैकवस्तुत्वाज्जायमानं त्रिथ-  
माणमपि जीवद्रव्य सर्वदानुत्पन्नाविनष्ट द्रष्टव्यम् । देवमनुष्यादिपर्यायास्तु क्रमवर्तित्वादुपस्थिताति-  
वाहितस्वसमया उत्पद्यन्ते विनश्यन्ति चेति ॥१८॥

**एवं सदो विनाशो असदो जीवस्स गत्थि उत्पादो ।**

**तावदिओ जीवाणं देवो मणुसो त्ति गदिणामो ॥१९॥**

**एवं सतो विनाशो ऽसतो जीवस्य नास्त्युत्पादः ।**

**तावज्जीवानां देवो मनुष्य इति गतिनाम ॥१९॥**

अत्र सदसतोरविनाशानुत्पादौ स्थितिपक्षत्वेनोपन्यस्तौ । यदि हि जीवो य एव म्रियते स एव  
जायते, य एव जायते स एव म्रियते, तदैव सतो विनाशो ऽसत उत्पादश्च नास्तीति व्यवतिष्ठते ।  
यत्तु देवो जायते मनुष्यो म्रियते इति व्यपदिश्यते तदवधृतकालदेवमनुष्यत्वपर्यायनिर्वर्तकस्य देव-  
मनुष्यगतिनाम्नस्तन्मात्रत्वादविरुद्धम् । यथा हि महतो वेणुदण्डस्यैकस्य क्रमवृत्तीन्यनेकानि पर्वाण्या-  
त्मीयात्मीयप्रमाणावच्छिन्नत्वात् पर्वान्तरमगच्छन्ति स्वस्थानेषु भावभाजिज परस्थानेष्वभावभाजिज  
भवन्ति, वेणुदण्डस्तु सर्वेष्वपि पर्वस्थानेषु भावभागपि पर्वान्तरसबन्धेन पर्वान्तरसबन्धाभावादभाव-  
भागभवति; तथा निरवधित्रिकालावस्थायिनो जीवद्रव्यस्यैकस्य क्रमवृत्तयोऽनेके मनुष्यत्वादिपर्याया  
आत्मीयात्मीयप्रमाणावच्छिन्नत्वात् पर्यायान्तरमगच्छन्तः स्वस्थानेषु भावभाजः परस्थानेष्वभाव-  
भाजो भवन्ति, जीवद्रव्य तु सर्वपर्यायस्थानेषु भावभागपि पर्यायान्तरसबन्धेन पर्यायान्तरसबन्धा-  
भावादभावभागभवति ॥१९॥

**णाणावरणादीया भावा जीवेण सुट्ठु अणुबद्धा ।**

**तेसिमभावं किच्चा अभूदपुव्वो हवदि सिद्धो ॥२०॥**

**ज्ञानावरणाद्या भावा जीवेन सुट्ठु अनुबद्धाः ।**

**तेषामभावं कृत्वाभूतपूर्वो भवति सिद्धः ॥२०॥**

अत्रात्यन्तासदुत्पादत्व सिद्धस्य निषिद्धम् । यथा स्तोककालान्वयिषु नामकर्मविशेषोदयनिवृत्तेषु

अत्र व्यवहारकालस्य कथंचित्परायत्तत्वं द्योतितम् । परमाणुप्रचलनायत्तः समयः । नयनपुट-  
घटनायत्तो निमिषः । तत्संख्याविशेषतः काष्ठा कला नाली च । गगनमणिगमनायत्तो दिवा रात्रः ।  
तत्संख्याविशेषतः मासः, ऋतुः, अयनः, सवत्सरमिति । एवंविधो हि व्यवहारकालः । केवलकालपर्याय-  
मात्रत्वेनावधारयितुमशक्यत्वात् परायत्त इत्युपमीयत इति ॥२५॥

णत्थि चिरं वा खिप्पं मत्तारहिदं तु सा वि खलु मत्ता ।

पोगलदब्बेण विणा तम्हा कालो पडुच्चभवो ॥२६॥

नास्ति चिरं वा क्षिप्रं मात्रारहितं तु सापि खलु मात्रा ।

पुद्गलद्रव्येण विना तस्मात्कालः प्रतीत्यभवः ॥२६॥

अत्र व्यवहारकालस्य कथंचित् परायत्तत्वे सदुपपत्तिरुक्ता । इह हि व्यवहारकाले निमिषम-  
यादौ अस्ति तावत् चिर इति क्षिप्र इति संप्रत्ययः । स खलु दीर्घह्रस्वकालनिबन्धनं प्रमाणमन्तरेण  
न सभाव्यते । तदपि प्रमाण पुद्गलद्रव्यपरिणाममन्तरेण नावधार्यते । ततः परपरिणामद्योत-  
मानत्वाद्व्यवहारकालो निश्चयेनानन्याश्रितो ऽपि प्रतीत्यभव इत्यभिधीयते । तदत्रास्तिकायसामान्य-  
प्ररूपणायामस्ति कायत्वाभावात्साक्षादनुपन्यस्यमानो ऽपि जीवपुद्गलपरिणामान्यथानुपपत्त्या  
निवचयरूपस्तत्परिणामायत्ततया व्यवहाररूप कालो ऽस्तिकायपञ्चकवल्लोकरूपेण परिणत इति  
खरतरदृष्टश्चाभ्युपगम्यत इति ॥२६॥

इति समयव्याख्यायामन्तर्नीतषड्रव्यपञ्चास्तिकायसामान्यव्याख्यानरूपः पीठबन्धः समाप्तः॥

अथामीषामेव विशेषव्याख्यानम् । तत्र तावत् जीवद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यानम् ।

जीवो स्ति हवदि चेदा उवओगचिसेसिदो पहू कत्ता ।

भोत्ता य देहमेत्तो ण हि मुत्तो कम्मसंजुत्तो ॥२७॥

जीव इति भवति चेतयितोपयोगविशेषितः प्रभुः कर्ता ।

भोक्ता च देहमात्रो न हि मूर्तः कर्मसंयुक्तः ॥२७॥

अत्र संसारावस्थस्यात्मनः सोपाधि निरुपाधि च स्वरूपमुक्तम् । आत्मा हि निश्चयेन भावप्राण-  
धारणाज्जीवः, व्यवहारेण द्रव्यप्राणधारणाज्जीवः । निश्चयेन चिदात्मकत्वात्, व्यवहारेण चिच्छक्ति-  
युक्तत्वाच्चेतयिता । निश्चयेनापृथग्भूतेन, व्यवहारेण पृथग्भूतेन चैन्यपरिणामलक्षणोपयोगेनोप-  
लक्षितत्वादुपयोगविशेषितः । निश्चयेन भावकर्मणा, व्यवहारेण द्रव्यकर्मणामान्वयव्यवसनमन्वय-  
निर्णयमोक्षणेषु स्वयमीशत्वात् प्रभुः । निश्चयेन पौद्गलिककर्मनिमित्तात्मपरिणामानां, व्यवहारेण-



जीवा पुद्गलकाया आयासं अत्थिकाइया सेसा ।

अमया अत्थित्तमया कारणभूदा हि लोगस्स ॥२२॥

जीवाः पुद्गलकाया आकाशमस्तिकायौ शेषौ ।

अमया अस्तित्वमयाः कारणभूता हि लोकस्य ॥२२॥

अत्र सामान्येनोक्तलक्षणानां वर्णनां द्रव्याणां मध्यात् पञ्चानामस्तिकायत्व व्यवस्थापितम् । अकृतत्वात् अस्तित्वमयत्वात् विचित्रात्मपरिणतिरूपस्य लोकस्य कारणत्वाच्चाभ्युपगम्यमानेषु षट्सु द्रव्येषु जीवपुद्गलाकाशधर्माधर्माः प्रदेशप्रचयात्मकत्वात् पञ्चास्तिकायाः । न खलु कालस्तदभावादस्तिकाय इति सामर्थ्यादवसीयत इति ॥२२॥

सम्भावसम्भावाणं जीवाणं तह य पोग्लानं च ।

परियट्ठणसंभूदो कालो णियमेण पणत्तो ॥२३॥

सद्भावस्वभावानां जीवानां तथैव पुद्गलानां च ।

परिवर्तनसंभूतः कालो नियमेन प्रज्ञप्तः ॥२३॥

अत्रास्तिकायत्वेनानुक्तस्यापि कालस्यार्थापन्नत्वं द्योतितम् । इह हि जीवानां पुद्गलानां च सत्तास्वभावत्वावस्ति प्रतिक्षणमुत्पादव्ययध्रौर्व्यैकवृत्तिरूपः परिणामः । स खलु सहकारिकारण-सद्भावे दृष्टः, गतिस्थित्यवगाहपरिणामवत् । यत्तु सहकारिकारणं स कालः । तत्परिणामान्यथानुपपत्तिगम्यमानत्वादनुक्तो ऽपि निश्चयकालो ऽस्तीति निश्चीयते । यस्तु निश्चयकालपर्यायरूपो व्यवहारकालः स जीवपुद्गलपरिणामेनाभिव्यज्यमानत्वात्तदायत्त एवाभिगम्यत एवेति ॥२३॥

ववगदपणवणरसो ववगददोगंधअट्ठफासो य ।

अगुरुलहुगो अमुत्तो वट्ठणलक्खो य कालो त्ति ॥२४॥

व्यपगतपञ्चवर्णरसो व्यपगतद्विगन्धाष्टस्पर्शश्च ।

अगुरुलघुको ऽमूर्तो वर्तनलक्षणश्च काल इति ॥२४॥

स्पष्टम् ॥२४॥

समओ णिमिसो कट्ठा कला य णाली तदो दिवारत्ती ।

मासोदुअयणसंवच्छरो त्ति कालो परायत्तो ॥२५॥

समयो निमिषः काष्ठा कला च नाली ततो दिवारात्रम् ।

मासतर्द्वयनसंवत्सरमिति कालः परायतः ॥२५॥

इदं सिद्धस्य निरुपाधिज्ञानदर्शनसुखसमर्थनम् । आत्मा हि ज्ञानदर्शनसुखस्वभावः संसारावस्थायामनादिकर्मक्लेशसंकोचितात्मशक्तिः परद्रव्यसंपर्केण क्रमेण किञ्चित् किञ्चिज्जानाति पश्यति, पर-प्रत्यय मूर्तसबद्धं सव्याबाधं सान्तं सुखमनुभवति च । यदा त्वस्य कर्मक्लेशाः सामस्त्येन प्रणश्यन्ति, तदाऽनर्गलासंकुचितात्मशक्तिरसहायः स्वयमेव युगपत्समग्रं जानाति पश्यति, स्वप्रत्ययममूर्तसबद्ध-मव्याबाधमनन्तं सुखमनुभवति च । ततः सिद्धस्य समस्त स्वयमेव जानतः पश्यतः, सुखमनुभवतश्च स्वं, न परेण प्रयोजनमिति ॥२६॥

पारोहिं चतुर्हि जीवदि जीविस्सदि जो हु जीविदो पुवं ।

सो जीवो पाणा पुण बलमिदियमाउ उस्सासो ॥३०॥

प्राणेश्चतुर्भिर्जीवति जीविष्यति यः खलु जीवितः पूर्वम् ।

स जीवः प्राणाः पुनर्बलमिन्द्रियमायुरुच्छ्वासः ॥३०॥

जीवत्वगुणव्याख्येयम् । इन्द्रियबलायुरुच्छ्वासलक्षणा हि प्राणाः । तेषु चित्सामान्यान्वयिनो भावप्राणा, पुद्गलसामान्यान्वयिनो द्रव्यप्राणा । तेषामुभयेषामपि त्रिष्वपि कालेष्वनवच्छिन्न-सतानत्वेन धारणात्संसारिणो जीवत्वम् । मुक्तस्य तु केवलानामेव भावप्राणानां धारणात्तदव-सेयमिति ॥३०॥

अगुरुलहुगा अणंता तेहिं अणंतेहिं परिणदा सव्वे ।

देसेहिं असंखादा सिय लोगं सव्वमावण्णा ॥३१॥

केचित्तु अणावण्णा मिच्छादंसणकसायजोगजुदा ।

विजुदा य तेहिं बहुगा सिद्धा संसारिणो जीवा ॥३२॥

अगुरुलघुका अनन्तास्तेरनन्तैः परिणताः सर्वे ।

देशैरसंख्याताः स्याल्लोकं सर्वमापन्नाः ॥३१॥

केचित्तु अनापन्ना मिथ्यादर्शनकषाययोगयुताः ।

विद्युताश्च तैर्बहुवः सिद्धाः संसारिणो जीवाः ॥३२॥

अत्र जीवानां स्वाभाविकं प्रमाणं मुक्तामुक्तविभागश्चोक्तः । जीवा ह्यविभागैकद्रव्यत्वाल्लोक-प्रमाणैकप्रदेशाः । अगुरुलघवो गुणास्तु तेषामगुरुलघुत्वाभिधानस्य स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठत्वनिवन्धनस्य स्वभावस्याविभागपरिच्छेदाः प्रतिसमयसंभवत्षट्स्थानपतितवृद्धिहानयो जन्ताः । प्रदेशास्तु अवि-भागपरमाणुपरिच्छिन्नसूक्ष्मांशरूपा असंख्येयाः । एवविधेषु तेषु केचित्कर्तृचिच्छिन्नलोकपूरणावस्था-

णात्मपरिणामनिमित्तपौद्गलिककर्मणां कर्तृत्वात्कर्ता । निश्चयेन शुभाशुभकर्मनिमित्तसुखदुःख-  
परिणामानां व्यवहारेण शुभाशुभकर्मसंपादितैष्टानिष्टविषयाणां भोक्तृत्वाद्भोक्ता । निश्चयेन लोक-  
मात्रोऽपि विशिष्टावगाहपरिणामशक्तियुक्तत्वान्तामकर्मनिर्वृत्तमणु महच्च शरीरमधिष्ठिष्ठं व्यव-  
हारेण देहमात्रं । व्यवहारेण कर्मभिः सहैकत्वपरिणामान्मूर्तोऽपि निश्चयेन नीरूपम्बभावत्वान्न हि  
मूर्तं । निश्चयेन पुद्गलपरिणामानुरूपचैतन्यपरिणामात्मभिः, व्यवहारेण चैतन्यपरिणामानुरूप-  
पुद्गलपरिणामात्मभिः कर्मभिः सयुक्तत्वात्कर्मसंयुक्त इति ॥२७॥

**कम्ममलविप्पमुक्को उड्ढं लोगस्स अंतमधिगता ।**

**सो सव्वणाणदरिसी लहदि सुहमणिदियमणंतं ॥२८॥**

कर्ममलविप्रमुक्त ऊर्ध्वं लोकस्यान्तमधिगम्य ।

स सर्वज्ञानदर्शी लभते सुखमनिन्द्रियमनन्तम् ॥२८॥

अत्र मुक्तावस्थस्यात्मनो निरुपाधिवस्वरूपमुक्तम् । आत्मा हि परद्रव्यत्वात्कर्मरजसा साकल्येन  
यस्मिन्नेव क्षणे मुच्यते तस्मिन्नेवोर्ध्वगमनस्वभावत्वात्लोकान्तमधिगम्य परतो गतिहेतोरभावाद-  
वस्थितः केवलज्ञानदर्शनाभ्यां स्वरूपभूतत्वादमुक्तो ज्ञान्तमतीन्द्रियं सुखमनुभवति । मुक्तस्य चास्य  
भावप्राणधारणलक्षण जीवत्वं, चिद्रूपलक्षणं चेतयितृत्वं, चित्परिणामलक्षण उपयोगः, निर्वर्तित-  
समस्ताधिकारशक्तिमात्रं प्रभुत्व, समस्तवस्त्वसाधारणस्वरूपनिर्वर्तनमात्रं कर्तृत्वं, स्वरूपभूत-  
स्वातन्त्र्यलक्षणसुखोपलम्भरूप भोक्तृत्व, अतीतानन्तरशरीरपरिमाणवागाहपरिणामरूप देहमात्रत्व,  
उपाधिसबन्धविविक्तमात्यन्तिकममूर्तत्वम् । कर्मसंयुक्तत्व तु द्रव्यभावकर्मविप्रमोक्षान्न भवत्येव ।  
द्रव्यकर्माणि हि पुद्गलस्कन्धा भावकर्माणि तु चिद्विवर्ताः । विवर्तते हि चिच्छक्तिरनादिज्ञानावर-  
णादिकर्मसंपर्ककूणितप्रचारा परिच्छेद्यस्य विश्वस्यैकदेशेषु क्रमेण व्याप्रियमाणा । यदा तु ज्ञाना-  
वरणादिकर्मसंपर्कं प्रणश्यति तदा परिच्छेद्यस्य विश्वस्य सर्वदेशेषु युगपद्व्यापृता कथंचित्कौटस्थ-  
मवाप्य विषयान्तरमनाप्नुवन्ती न विवर्तते । स खल्वेष निश्चितः । सर्वज्ञसर्वदर्शित्वोपलम्भः । अयमेव  
द्रव्यकर्मनिबन्धनभूतानां भावकर्मणां कर्तृत्वोच्छेदः । अयमेव च विकारपूर्वकानुभवाभावादौपाधि-  
कसुखदुःखपरिणामानां भोक्तृत्वोच्छेदः । इदमेव चानादिविवर्तखेदविच्छित्तिसुस्थितानन्तचैतन्य-  
स्यात्मनः स्वतन्त्रस्वरूपानुभूतिलक्षणसुखस्य भोक्तृत्वमिति ॥२८॥

**जादो सयं स चेदा सव्वण्हू सव्वलोगदरसी य ।**

**पप्पोदि सुहमणंतं अवाबाधं सगममुत्तं ॥२९॥**

जातः स्वयं स चेतयिता सर्वज्ञः सर्वलोकदर्शी च ।

प्राप्नोति सुखमनन्तमव्याबाधं स्वकममूर्तम् ॥२९॥

जेसि जीवसहावो णत्थिं अभावो य सव्वहा तस्स ।

ते होति भिण्णदेहा सिद्धा वचिगोयरमदीदा ॥३५॥

येषां जीवस्वभावो नास्त्यभावश्च सर्वथा तस्य ।

ते भवन्ति भिन्नदेहाः सिद्धा वागोचरमतीताः ॥३५॥

सिद्धानां जीवत्वदेहमात्रत्वव्यवस्थेयम् । सिद्धानां हि द्रव्यप्राणधारणात्मको मुख्यत्वेन जीवस्वभावो नास्ति । न च जीवस्वभावस्य सर्वथाभावो ऽस्ति भावप्राणधारणात्मकस्य जीवस्वभावस्य मुख्यत्वेन सद्भावात् । न च तेषां शरीरेण सह नीरक्षीरयोरिवैक्येन वृत्तिः, यतस्ते तत्संपर्कहेतुभूतकषाययोगविप्रयोगादतीतानन्तरक्षरीरमात्रावगाहपरिणतत्वे ऽप्यत्यन्तभिन्नदेहाः । वाचां गोचरमतीतश्च तन्महिमा, यतस्ते लौकिकप्राणधारणमन्तरेण शरीरसबन्धमन्तरेण च परिप्राप्तनिर्वाणध्वस्वरूपाः सततं प्रतपन्तीति ॥३५॥

ण कुदोचि वि उत्पण्णो जम्हा कज्जं ण तेण सो सिद्धो ।

उत्पादेदि ण किंचि वि कारणमवि तेण ण स होदि ॥३६॥

न कुतश्चिदप्युत्पन्नो यस्मात् कार्यं न तेन स सिद्धः ।

उत्पादयति न किंचिदपि कारणमपि तेन न स भवति ॥३६॥

सिद्धस्य कार्यकारणभावनिरासो ऽयम् । यथा संसारी जीवो भावकर्मरूपयात्मपरिणामसंतत्या द्रव्यकर्मरूपया च पुद्गलपरिणामसंतत्या कारणभूतया तेन तेन देवमनुष्यतिर्यग्नारकरूपेण कार्यभूत उत्पद्यते न तथा सिद्धरूपेणापीति । सिद्धो ह्युभयकर्मक्षये स्वयमुत्पद्यमानो नान्यतः कुतश्चिदुत्पद्यत इति । यथैव च स एव संसारी भावकर्मरूपामात्मपरिणामसतति द्रव्यकर्मरूपां च पुद्गलपरिणामसंततिं कार्यभूतां कारणभूतत्वेन निर्वर्तयन् तानि तानि देवमनुष्यतिर्यग्नारकरूपाणि कार्याण्युत्पादयत्यात्मनो न तथा सिद्धरूपमपीति । सिद्धो ह्युभयकर्मक्षये स्वयमात्मानमुत्पादयन्नान्यत्किंचिदुत्पादयति ॥३६॥

सस्सदमध उच्छेदं भव्वमभव्वं च सुण्णमिदरं च ।

विण्णाणमविण्णाण ण वि जुज्जदि असदि सबभावे ॥३७॥

शाश्वतमथोच्छेदो भव्यमभव्यं च शून्यमितरं च ।

विज्ञानमविज्ञानं नापि युज्यते असति सद्भावे ॥३७॥

अत्र जीवाभावो मुक्तिरिति निरस्तम् । द्रव्यं द्रव्यतया शाश्वतमिति, नित्ये द्रव्ये पर्यायाणां प्रतिसमयमुच्छेद इति, द्रव्यस्य सर्वदा अभूतपर्यायैः भाव्यमिति, द्रव्यस्य सर्वदा भूतपर्यायैरभाव्यमिति, द्रव्यमन्यद्रव्यैः सदा शून्यमिति, द्रव्यं स्वद्रव्येण सदाऽशून्यमिति, क्वचिज्जीवद्रव्ये जनतं ज्ञानं

प्रकारेण सर्वलोकव्यापिनः, केचित्तु तदव्यापिन इति । अथ ये तेषु मिथ्यादर्शनकषाययोगैरनादिसंतति-  
प्रवृत्तैर्युक्तास्ते संसारिणः, ये विमुक्तास्ते सिद्धाः, ते च प्रत्येक बहव इति ॥३१-३२॥

जह पञ्चरागरयणं खित्तं क्षीरे पभासयदि खीरं ।

तह देही देहस्थो सदेहमेत्तं पभासयदि ॥३३॥

यथा पञ्चरागरत्नं क्षिप्तं क्षीरे प्रभासयति क्षीरम् ।

तथा देही देहस्थः स्वदेहमात्रं प्रभासयति ॥३३॥

एष देहमात्रत्वहृष्टान्तोपन्यासः । यथैव हि पद्मरागरत्नं क्षीरे क्षिप्तं स्वतो ऽव्यतिरिक्तप्रभा-  
स्कन्धेन तद्व्याप्नोति क्षीरं, तथैव हि जीवो ज्ञादिक्षायमलीमसत्वमूले शरीरे ऽवतिष्ठमानः  
स्वप्रदेशैस्तदभिव्याप्नोति शरीरम् । यथैव च तत्र क्षीरे ऽग्निसंयोगादुद्वलमाने तस्य पद्मरागरत्नस्य  
प्रभास्कन्ध उद्वलते पुनर्निविशमाने निविशते च, तथैव च तत्र शरीरे विशिष्टाहारादिवशादुत्सर्पति  
तस्य जीवस्य प्रदेशाः उत्सर्पन्ति पुनरपसर्पति अपसर्पन्ति च । यथैव च तत्पद्मरागरत्नमन्यत्र प्रभूत-  
क्षीरे क्षिप्तं स्वप्रभास्कन्धविस्तारेण तद्व्याप्नोति प्रभूतक्षीरं, तथैव हि जीवो ऽन्यत्र महति शरीरे  
ऽवतिष्ठमानः स्वप्रदेशविस्तारेण तद्व्याप्नोति महच्छरीरम् यथैव च तत्पञ्चरागरत्नमन्यत्र स्तोकक्षीरे  
निक्षिप्तं स्वप्रभास्कन्धोपसंहारेण तद्व्याप्नोति स्तोकक्षीरं, तथैव च जीवो ऽन्यत्राणुशरीरे ऽवतिष्ठ-  
मानः स्वप्रदेशोपसंहारेण तद्व्याप्नोत्यणुशरीरमिति ॥३३॥

सर्ववत्थ अत्थि जीवो ण य एक्को एक्ककाय एक्कट्ठो ।

अञ्जभवसाणविसिट्ठो चेद्वदि मलिणो रजमलेहि ॥३४॥

सर्वत्रास्ति जीवो न चैक एक्काये ऐक्यस्थः ।

अध्यवसानविशिष्टश्चेष्टते मलिनो रजोमलैः ॥३४॥

अत्र जीवस्य देहादेहान्तरे ऽस्तित्वं, देहात्पृथग्भूतत्वं, देहान्तरसंचरणकारणं चोपन्यस्तम् । आत्मा हि  
संसारवस्थायां क्रमवर्तिन्यनवच्छिन्नशरीरसताने यथैकस्मिन् शरीरे वृत्तः तथा क्रमेणान्येष्वपि शरीरेषु  
वर्तते इति तस्य सर्वत्रास्तित्वम् । न चैकस्मिन् शरीरे नीरे क्षीरमिवैक्येन स्थितो ऽपि भिन्नस्वभाव-  
त्वात्तेन सहैक इति तस्य देहात्पृथग्भूतत्वम् । अनादिबन्धनोपाधिविवर्तितविविधाध्यवसायविशिष्ट-  
त्वात्तन्मूलकर्मजालमलीमसत्वाच्च चेष्टमानस्यात्मनस्तथाविधाध्यवसायकर्मनिर्वर्तितेतरशरीरप्रवेशो  
भवतीति तस्य देहान्तरसंचरणकारणोपन्यास इति ॥३४॥

आत्मनश्चैतन्यानुविधांयी परिणाम उपयोगः । सो ऽपि द्विविध — ज्ञानोपयोगो दर्शनोपयोगश्च । तत्र विशेषग्राहि ज्ञानं, सामान्यग्राहि दर्शनम् । उपयोगश्च सर्वदा जीवादपृथग्भूत एव, एकास्ति त्व-निर्वृत्तत्वादिति ॥४०॥

**आभिनिबोधिमणकेवलाणि णाणाणि पञ्चभेयाणि ।**

**कुमदिसुदविभङ्गाणि य तिण्णि वि णाणेहि संजुत्ते ॥४१॥**

आभिनिबोधिकश्रुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानि ज्ञानानि पञ्चभेदानि ।

कुमतिश्रुतविभङ्गानि च त्रीण्यपि ज्ञानैः संयुक्तानि ॥४१॥

ज्ञानोपयोगविशेषाणां नामस्वरूपाभिधानमेतत् । तत्राभिनिबोधिकज्ञानं श्रुतज्ञानमवधिज्ञानं मन पर्ययज्ञानं केवलज्ञानं कुमतिज्ञानं कुश्रुतज्ञानं विभङ्गज्ञानमिति नामाभिधानम् । आत्मा ह्यनन्त-सर्वात्मप्रदेशव्यापिविशुद्धज्ञानसामान्यात्मा । स खल्वनादिज्ञानावरणकमविच्छन्नप्रदेशः सन्, यत्तदा-वरणक्षयोपशमादिन्द्रियानिन्द्रियावलम्बाच्च मूर्तामूर्तद्रव्यं विकलं विशेषेणावबुध्यते तदाभिनिबोधिक-ज्ञानम्, यत्तदावरणक्षयोपशमादनिन्द्रियावलम्बाच्च मूर्तामूर्तद्रव्यं विकलं विशेषेणावबुध्यते तत् श्रुत-ज्ञानम्, यत्तदावरणक्षयोपशमादेव मूर्तद्रव्यं विकलं विशेषेणावबुध्यते तदवधिज्ञानम्, यत्तदावरणक्षयो-पशमादेव परमनोगत मूर्तद्रव्यं विकलं विशेषेणावबुध्यते तन्मनःपर्ययज्ञानम्, यत्सकलावरणात्यन्तक्षये केवल एव मूर्तामूर्तद्रव्यं सकलं विशेषेणावबुध्यते तत्स्वाभाविकं केवलज्ञानम् । मिथ्यादर्शनोदयसह-चरितमाभिनिबोधिकज्ञानमेव कुमतिज्ञानम्, मिथ्यादर्शनोदयसहचरितं श्रुतज्ञानमेव कुश्रुतज्ञानम्, मिथ्यादर्शनोदयसहचरितमवधिज्ञानमेव विभङ्गज्ञानमिति स्वरूपाभिधानम् । इत्थं मतिज्ञानादि-ज्ञानोपयोगाष्टकं व्याख्यातम् ॥४१॥

**दंसणमवि चक्खुजुदं अचक्खुजुदमवि य ओहिणा सहियं ।**

**अणिधणमणंतविसयं केवलियं चावि पणत्तं ॥४२॥**

दर्शनमपि चक्षुर्युतमचक्षुर्युतमपि चावधिना सहितम् ।

अनिधनमनन्तविषयं कैवल्यं चापि प्रज्ञप्तम् ॥४२॥

दर्शनोपयोगविशेषाणां नामस्वरूपाभिधानमेतत् । चक्षुर्दर्शनमचक्षुर्दर्शनमवधिदर्शनं केवलदर्शन-मिति नामाभिधानम् । आत्मा ह्यनन्तसर्वात्मप्रदेशव्यापिविशुद्धदर्शनसामान्यात्मा । स खल्वनादि-दर्शनावरणकमविच्छन्नप्रदेशः सन्, यत्तदावरणक्षयोपशमाच्चक्षुरिन्द्रियावलम्बाच्च मूर्तद्रव्यं विकलं सामान्येनावबुध्यते तच्चक्षुर्दर्शनम्, यत्तदावरणक्षयोपशमाच्चक्षुर्वैजितेतरचतुरिन्द्रियानिन्द्रियाव-

क्वचित्सान्तं ज्ञानमिति, क्वचिज्जीवद्रव्ये ऽनन्तं क्वचित्सान्तमज्ञानमिति—एतदन्यथानुपपद्यमानं मुक्तौ जीवस्य सद्भावमावेदयतीति ॥३७॥

**कम्माणं फलमेवको एवको कज्जं तु णाणमध एवको ।**

**चेदयदि जीवरासी चेदगभावेण तिविहेण ॥३८॥**

कर्मणां फलमेकः एकः कार्यं तु ज्ञानमथैकः ।

चेतयति जीवराशिश्चेतकभावेन त्रिविधेन ॥३८॥

चेतयितृत्वगुणव्याख्येयम् । एके हि चेतयितारः प्रकृष्टतरमोहमलीमसेन प्रकृष्टतरज्ञानावरण-मुद्रितानुभावेन चेतकस्वभावेन प्रकृष्टतरवीर्यान्तरायावसादितकार्यकारणसामर्थ्याः सुखदुःखरूपं कर्मफलमेव प्राधान्येन चेतयन्ते । अन्ये तु प्रकृष्टतरमोहमलीमसेनापि प्रकृष्टज्ञानावरणमुद्रितानुभावेन चेतकस्वभावेन मनाग्वीर्यान्तरायक्षयोपशमासादितकार्यकारणसामर्थ्याः सुखदुःखरूपकर्मफलानुभव-नसवलितमपि कार्यमेव प्राधान्येन चेतयन्ते । अन्यतरे तु प्रक्षालितसकलमोहकलङ्केन समुच्छिन्नकृत्स्न-ज्ञानावरणतयात्यन्तमुन्मुद्रितसमस्तानुभावेन चेतकस्वभावेन समस्तवीर्यान्तरायक्षयासादितानन्त-वीर्या अपि निर्जीर्णकर्मफलत्वादत्यन्तकृतकृत्यत्वाच्च स्वतो ऽव्यतिरिक्तस्वाभाविकसुखं ज्ञानमेव चेतयन्त इति ॥३८॥

**सव्वे खलु कम्मफलं थावरकाया तसा हि कज्जजुदं ।**

**पाणित्तमदिवकंता णाणं विदंति ते जीवा ॥३९॥**

सर्वे खलु कर्मफलं स्थावरकायास्त्रसा हि कार्ययुतम् ।

पाणित्वमतिश्रान्ताः ज्ञानं विन्दन्ति ते जीवाः ॥३९॥

अत्र कः किं चेतयत इत्युक्तम् । चेतयन्ते अनुभवन्ति उपलभन्ते विन्दन्तीत्येकार्थश्चेतनानुभूत्यु-पलब्धिवेदनानामेकार्थत्वात् । तत्र स्थावराः कर्मफलं चेतयन्ते, त्रसाः कार्यं चेतयन्ते, केवलज्ञानिनो ज्ञानं चेतयन्त इति ॥३९॥

अथोपयोगगुणव्याख्यानम् ।

**उवओगो खलु दुविहो णाणेण य दंसणेण संजुत्तो ।**

**जीवस्स सव्वकालं अणणभूदं वियाणीहि ॥४०॥**

उपयोगः खलु द्विविधो ज्ञानेन च दर्शनेन संयुक्तः ।

जीवस्य सर्वकालमनन्यभूतं विजानीहि ॥४०॥

द्रव्यगुणानां स्वोचितानन्यत्वोक्तिरियम् । अविभक्तप्रदेशत्वलक्षणं द्रव्यगुणानामनन्यत्वमभ्यु-  
पगम्यते । विभक्तप्रदेशत्वलक्षणं त्वन्यत्वमनन्यत्वं च नाभ्युपगम्यते । तथा हि—यथैकस्य परमाणो-  
रेकेनात्मप्रदेशेन सहाविभक्तत्वादनन्यत्वं, तथैकस्य परमाणोस्तद्वर्तिनां स्पर्शरसगंधवर्णादिगुणानां  
चाविभक्तप्रदेशत्वादनन्यत्वम् । यथा त्वत्यन्तविप्रकृष्टयोः सह्यविन्ध्ययोरत्यन्तसन्निकृष्टयोरुच-  
मिश्रितयोस्तोयपयसोर्विभक्तप्रदेशत्वलक्षणमन्यत्वमनन्यत्वं च, न तथा द्रव्यगुणानां विभक्तप्रदेशत्वा-  
भावादन्यत्वमनन्यत्वं चेति ॥४५॥

**वचदेसा संठाणा संखा विसया य होंति ते बहुगा ।**

**ते तेसिमणणत्ते अणत्ते चावि विज्जंते ॥४६॥**

व्यपदेशाः संस्थानानि संख्या विषयाश्च भवन्ति ते बहुकाः ।

ते तेषामनन्यत्वे अन्यत्वे चापि विद्यन्ते ॥४६॥

व्यपदेशादीनामेकान्तेन द्रव्यगुणान्यत्वनिवन्धनत्वमत्र प्रत्याख्यातम् । यथा देवदत्तस्य गौरित्य-  
न्यत्वे षष्ठीव्यपदेशः, तथा वृक्षस्य शाखा द्रव्यस्य गुणा इत्यनन्यत्वे ऽपि । यथा देवदत्तः फलमङ्कुशेन  
घनदत्ताय वृक्षाद्वारिकायामवचिनोतीत्यन्यत्वे कारकव्यपदेशः, तथा मृत्तिका घटभावं स्वयं स्वेन  
स्वस्मै स्वस्मात् स्वस्मिन् करोतीत्यात्मात्मानमात्मनात्मने आत्मन आत्मनि जानातीत्यनन्यत्वेऽपि ।  
यथा प्रांशोर्देवदत्तस्य प्रांशुर्गौरित्यन्यत्वे संस्थानं, तथा प्रांशोर्वृक्षस्य प्रांशुः शाखाभरो मूर्तद्रव्यस्य  
मूर्ता गुणा इत्यनन्यत्वेऽपि । यथैकस्य देवदत्तस्य दश गाव इत्यन्यत्वे संख्या, तथैकस्य वृक्षस्य दश  
शाखा एकस्य द्रव्यस्यानन्ता गुणा इत्यनन्यत्वेऽपि । यथा गोष्ठे गाव इत्यन्यत्वे विषयः, तथा  
वृक्षे शाखा द्रव्ये गुणा इत्यनन्यत्वे ऽपि । ततो न व्यपदेशादयो द्रव्यगुणानां वस्तुत्वेन भेदं  
साधयन्तीति ॥४६॥

**णाणं धणं च कुव्वदि धणिणं जह् णाणिणं च दुविधोहि ।**

**भणन्ति तह पुधत्तं एयत्तं चावि तच्चण्हू ॥४७॥**

ज्ञानं धनं च करोति धनिनं यथा ज्ञानिनं च द्विविधाम्याम् ।

भणन्ति तथा पृथक्त्वमेकत्वं चापि तत्त्वज्ञाः ॥४७॥

वस्तुत्वभेदाभेदोदाहरणमेतत् । यथा धनं भिन्नास्तित्वनिवृत्तं त भिन्नास्तित्वनिवृत्तस्य, भिन्नसंस्थान-  
भिन्नसंस्थानस्य, भिन्नसंख्य भिन्नसंख्यस्य, भिन्नविषयलब्धवृत्तिक भिन्नविषयलब्धवृत्तिकस्य पुरुषस्य  
घनीति व्यपदेशं पृथक्त्वप्रकारेण कुरुते, यथा च ज्ञानमभिन्नास्तित्वनिवृत्तमभिन्नास्तित्वनिवृत्तस्या-  
भिन्नसंस्थानमभिन्नसंस्थानस्याभिन्नसंख्यमभिन्नसंख्यस्याभिन्नविषयलब्धवृत्तिकमभिन्नविषयलब्ध-



लम्बाच्च मूर्तमूर्तद्रव्यं विकलं सामान्येनावबुध्यते तदचक्षुर्दर्शनम्, यत्तदावरणक्षयोपशमादेव मूर्तद्रव्यं विकलं सामान्येनावबुध्यते तदवधिदर्शनम्, यत्सकलावरणात्यन्तक्षये केवल एव मूर्तमूर्तद्रव्यं सकलं सामान्येनावबुध्यते तत्स्वाभाविक केवलदर्शनमिति स्वरूपाभिधानम् ॥४२॥

ण वियप्पदि णाणादो णाणी णाणाणि होंति णेगाणि ।

तम्हा दु विस्सरूवं भणियं दवियं ति णाणीहि ॥४३॥

न विकल्प्यते ज्ञानात् ज्ञानी ज्ञानानि भवन्त्यनेकानि ।

तस्मात्तु विश्वरूपं भणितं द्रव्यमिति ज्ञानिभिः ॥४३॥

एकस्यात्मनो ज्ञेकज्ञानात्मकत्वसमर्थनमेतत् । न तावज्ज्ञानी ज्ञानात्पृथग्भवति, द्वयोरप्येकास्ति त्वनिवृत्तत्वेनैकद्रव्यत्वात्, द्वयोरप्यभिन्नप्रदेशत्वेनैकक्षेत्रत्वात्, द्वयोरप्येकसमयनिवृत्तत्वेनैककालत्वात्, द्वयोरप्येकस्वभावत्वेनैकभावत्वात् । न चैवमुच्यमाने ज्ञेकस्मिन्नात्मन्याभिनिबोधि-कादीन्यनेकानि ज्ञानानि विरुध्यन्ते, द्रव्यस्य विश्वरूपत्वात् । द्रव्यं हि सहकर्मप्रवृत्तानन्तगुणपर्याया-धारतयानन्तरूपत्वादेकमपि विश्वरूपमभिधीयत इति ॥४३॥

जदि ह्वदि दव्वमण्णं गुणदो य गुणा य दव्वदो अण्णे ।

दव्वणंति यमधवा दव्वाभावं पकुवन्ति ॥४४॥

यदि भवति द्रव्यमन्यद्गुणतश्च गुणाश्च द्रव्यतोऽन्ये ।

द्रव्यानन्त्यमथवा द्रव्याभावं प्रकुर्वन्ति ॥४४॥

द्रव्यस्य गुणेभ्यो भेदे, गुणानां च द्रव्याद्भेदे दोषोपन्यासो ऽयम् । गुणा हि क्वचिदाश्रिताः । यत्राश्रितास्तद्द्रव्यम् । तच्चेदन्यद्गुणेभ्यः । पुनरपि गुणाः क्वचिदाश्रिताः । यत्राश्रितास्तद्द्रव्यम् । तदपि अन्यच्चेद्गुणेभ्यः । पुनरपि गुणाः क्वचिदाश्रिताः । यत्राश्रिताः तद्द्रव्यम् तदप्यन्यदेव गुणेभ्यः एव द्रव्यस्य गुणेभ्यो भेदे भवति द्रव्यानन्त्यम् । द्रव्यं हि गुणानां समुदायः । गुणाश्चेदन्ये समुदायात्, को नाम समुदायः । एवं गुणानां द्रव्याद्भेदे भवति द्रव्याभाव इति ॥४४॥

अविभक्तमण्णत्तं दव्वगुणाणं विभक्तमण्णत्तं ।

णेच्छन्ति णिच्छयण्हू तव्विवरीदं हि वा तेऽसि ॥४५॥

अविभक्तमन्यत्वं द्रव्यगुणानां विभक्तमन्यत्वम् ।

नेच्छन्ति निश्चयज्ञास्तद्विपरीतं हि वा तेषाम् ॥४५॥

सहवृत्तिर्हि समवर्तित्वम्; स एव समवायो जैनानाम्; तदेव संज्ञादिभ्यो भेदे ऽपि वस्तुत्वेनाभेदाद-  
पृथग्भूतत्वम्, तदेव युतसिद्धिनिबन्धनस्यास्तित्वान्तरस्याभावादयुतसिद्धत्वम् । ततो द्रव्यगुणानां  
समवर्तित्वलक्षणसमवायभाजामयुतसिद्धिरेव, न पृथग्भूतत्वमिति ॥५०॥

वर्णरसगन्धकासा परमाणुपरूषिदा विसेसेर्हि ।

दव्वादो य अण्णा अण्णत्तपगासगा होति ॥५१॥

दंसणणाणाणि तहा जीवणिबद्धाणि णण्णभूदाणि ।

ववदेसदो पुधत्तं कुव्वंति हि णो सभावादो ॥५२॥

वर्णरसगन्धस्पर्शाः परमाणुपरूपिता विशेषैः ।

द्रव्याच्च अनन्याः अन्यत्वप्रकाशका भवन्ति ॥५१॥

दर्शनज्ञाने तथा जीवनिबद्धे अनन्यभूते ।

व्यपदेशतः पृथक्त्वं क्लृप्तः हि नो स्वभावात् ॥५२॥

हृष्टान्तदाण्टान्तिकार्थपुरस्सरो द्रव्यगुणानामनयन्ति रत्वव्याख्योपसहारो ऽयम् । वर्णरसगन्ध-  
स्पर्शा हि परमाणो प्ररूप्यन्ते; ते च परमाणोरविभक्तप्रदेशत्वेनानन्ये ऽपि संज्ञादिव्यपदेशनिबन्ध-  
नविशेषैरन्यत्वं प्रकाशयन्ति । एव ज्ञानदर्शने अप्यात्मनि संबद्धे आत्मद्रव्यादविभक्तप्रदेशत्वेनानन्ये  
ऽपि संज्ञादिव्यपदेशनिबन्धनविशेषैः पृथक्त्वमासादयत; स्वभावतस्तु नित्यमपृथक्त्वमेव विभ्रत.  
॥५१-५२॥ इति उपयोगगुणव्याख्यानं समाप्तम् ।

अथ कर्तृत्वगुणव्याख्यानम् । तत्रादिगाथात्रयेण तदुपोद्घातः—

जीवा अणाइणिहणा संता णंता य जीवभावादो ।

सवभावदो अणंता पच्चगगुणप्पधाणा य ॥५३॥

जीवा अनादिनिघनाः सान्ता अनन्ताश्च जीवभावात् ।

सदभावतो ऽनन्ताः पञ्चागुणप्रधानाः च ॥५३॥

जीवा हि निश्चयेन परभावानामकरणात्स्वभावानां कर्तारो भविष्यन्ति । तांश्च कुर्वाणाः किम-  
नादिनिघनाः, किं सादिसनिघनाः किं साद्यनिघनाः, किं तदाकारेण परिणताः, किमपरिणताः  
भविष्यन्तीत्याशङ्क्येदमुक्तम् । जीवा हि सहजचैतन्यलक्षणपारिणामिकभावेनानादिनिघनाः । त

५१. P विसेसाहि ।

५२. P जीवनिबद्धानि ।

५३. P ०पधाणा हि ।

वृत्तिकस्य पुरुषस्य ज्ञानीति व्यपदेशमेकत्वप्रकारेण कुरुते; तथान्यत्रापि । यत्र द्रव्यस्य भेदेन व्यपदेशादिः तत्र पृथक्त्व, यत्राभेदेन तत्रैकत्वमिति ॥४७॥

णाणी णाणं च सदा अत्थंतरिदा दु अण्णमण्णस्स ।

दोहं अचेदणत्तं पसजदि सम्मं जिणावमदं ॥४८॥

ज्ञानी ज्ञानं च सदार्थान्तरिते त्वन्योन्यस्य ।

द्वयोरचेतनत्वं प्रसजति सम्यग् जिनावमतम् ॥४८॥

द्रव्यगुणानामर्थान्तरभूतत्वे दोषोऽयम् । ज्ञानी ज्ञानाद्यर्थान्तरभूतस्तदा स्वकरणांशमन्तरेण परशुरहितदेवदत्तवत्करणव्यापारासमर्थत्वादचेतयमानोऽचेतन एव स्यात् । ज्ञानं च यदि ज्ञानिनोऽर्थान्तरभूतं तदा तत्करणांशमन्तरेण देवदत्तरहितपरशुवत्तत्कर्तृत्वव्यापारासमर्थत्वादचेतयमानमचेतनमेव स्यात् । न च ज्ञानज्ञानिनोर्युतसिद्धयोः सयोगेन चेतनत्व द्रव्यस्य निर्विशेषस्य गुणानां निराश्रयाणां शून्यत्वादिति ॥४८॥

ण हि सो समवायादो अत्थंतरिदो दु णाणदो णाणी ।

अण्णाणि त्ति य वयणं एगत्तपसाधगं होदि ॥४९॥

न हि स समवायादर्थान्तरितस्तु ज्ञानतो ज्ञानी ।

अज्ञानीति च वचनमेकत्वप्रसाधकं भवति ॥४९॥

ज्ञानज्ञानिनोः समवायसंबन्धनिरासोऽयम् । न खलु ज्ञानाद्यर्थान्तरभूतः पुरुषो ज्ञानसमवायात् ज्ञानी भवतीत्युपपन्नम् । स खलु ज्ञानसमवायात्पूर्वं किं ज्ञानी किमज्ञानी । यदि ज्ञानी तदा ज्ञानसमवायो निष्फलः । अथाज्ञानी तदा किमज्ञानसमवायात्, किमज्ञानेन सहैकत्वात् । न तावदज्ञानसमवायात्; अज्ञानिनो ह्यज्ञानसमवायो निष्फलः, ज्ञानित्वं तु ज्ञानसमवायाभावात्नास्त्येव । ततोऽज्ञानीति वचनमज्ञानेन सहैकत्वमवश्यं साधयत्येव । सिद्धे चैवमज्ञानेन सहैकत्वे ज्ञानेनापि सहैकत्वमवश्यं सिध्यतीति ॥४९॥

समवत्तो समवाओ अपुघब्भूदो य अजुदसिद्धो य ।

तम्हा दव्वगुणाणं अजुदा सिद्धि त्ति णिद्धिट्ठा ॥५०॥

समवर्तित्वं समवायः अपृथग्भूतत्वमयुतसिद्धत्वं च ।

तस्माद्द्रव्यगुणानाम् अयुता सिद्धिरिति निर्दिष्टा ॥५०॥

समवायस्य पदार्थान्तरत्वनिरासोऽयम् । द्रव्यगुणानामेकास्तित्वनिवृत्तित्वादनानिर्वाधना

उदयेनोपशमेन च क्षयेण द्वाभ्यां मिथिताभ्यां परिणामेन ।

युक्तास्ते जीवगुणा बहुषु चार्थेषु विस्तीर्णाः ॥५६॥

जीवस्य भावोदयवर्णनमेतत् । कर्मणा फलदानसमर्थतयोद्भूतिरुदयः, अनुद्भूतिरुपशमः, उद्भूत्यनुद्भूती क्षयोपशमः, अत्यन्तविश्लेषः क्षयः, द्रव्यात्मलामहेतुकः परिणामः । तत्रोदयेन युक्त औदयिकः, उपशमेन युक्त औपशमिकः, क्षयोपशमेन युक्तः क्षायोपशमिकः, क्षयेन युक्त क्षायिकः, परिणामेन युक्तः पारिणामिकः । त एते पञ्च जीवगुणा । तत्रोपाधिचतुर्विधत्वनिवन्धनाश्चत्वारः, स्वभावनिबन्धन एकः । एते चोपाधिभेदात्स्वरूपभेदाच्च भिद्यमाना बहुष्वर्थेषु विस्तार्यन्त इति ॥५६॥

कम्मं वेदयमाणो जीवो भावं करेदि जारिसयं ।

सो तेण तस्स कत्ता हवदि त्ति य सासणे पढिदं ॥५७॥

कर्म वेदयमानो जीवो भावं करोति यावृक्षकम् ।

स तेन तस्य कर्ता भवतीति च शासने पठितम् ॥५७॥

जीवस्यौदयिकादिभावानां कर्तृत्वप्रकारोक्तिरियम् । जीवेन हि द्रव्यकर्म व्यवहारनयेनानुभूयते; तच्चानुभूयमान जीवभावानां निमित्तमात्रमुपवर्ण्यते । तस्मिन्निमित्तमात्रभूते जीवेन कर्तृभूतेनात्मनः कर्मभूतो भावः क्रियते । अमुना यो येन प्रकारेण जीवेन भावः क्रियते, स जीवस्तस्य भावस्य तेन प्रकारेण कर्ता भवतीति ॥५७॥

कम्मेण विणा उदयं जीवस्स ण विज्जदे उवसमं वा ।

खइयं खओवसमियं तम्हा भावं तु कम्मकदं ॥५८॥

कर्मणा विनोदयो जीवस्य न विद्यत उपशमो वा ।

क्षायिकः क्षायोपशमिकस्तस्माद्भावस्तु कर्मकृतः ॥५८॥

द्रव्यकर्मणां निमित्तमात्रत्वेनौदयिकादिभावकर्तृत्वमत्रोक्तम् । न खलु कर्मणा विना जीवस्योदयोपशमौ क्षयक्षायोपशमावपि विद्येते, ततः क्षायिकक्षायोपशमिकश्चौदयिकौपशमिकश्च भावः कर्मकृतोऽनुमन्तव्यः । पारिणामिकस्त्वनन्तनिबन्धनो निरुपाधिः स्वाभाविक एव । क्षायिकस्तु स्वभावव्यक्तिरूपत्वादनन्तो ऽपि कर्मणः क्षयेणोत्पद्यमानत्वात्सादिरिति कर्मकृत एवोक्तः । औपशमिकस्तु कर्मणामुपशमे समुत्पद्यमानत्वादनुपशमे समुच्छिद्यमानत्वात् कर्मकृत एवेति ।

अथवा उदयोपशमक्षयक्षयोपशमलक्षणाश्चतस्रो द्रव्यकर्मणामेवावस्थाः, न पुनः परिणामलक्षणैकावस्थस्य जीवस्य, ततः उदयादिसजातानामात्मनो भावानां निमित्तमात्रभूततथाविधावस्थत्वेन स्वयं परिणमनाद्द्रव्यकर्मापि व्यवहारनयेनात्मनो भावानां कर्तृत्वमापद्यत इति ॥५८॥

एवौदयिकक्षायोपशमिकौपशमिकभावे. सादिसनिधनाः । त एव क्षायिकभावेन साद्यनिधनाः । न च सादित्वात्सनिधनत्व क्षायिकभावस्याशङ्क्यम् । स खलूपाधिनिवृत्तौ प्रवर्तमानः सिद्धभाव इव सद्भाव एव जीवस्य ; सद्भावेन चानन्ता एव जीवाः प्रतिज्ञायन्ते । न च तेषामनादिनिधनसहजचैतन्यलक्षणैकभावानां सादिसनिधनानि साद्यनिधनानि भावान्तराणि नोपपद्यन्ते इति वक्तव्यम् ; ते खल्वनादिकर्ममलीमसाः पङ्क्तसंपृक्ततोयवत्तदाकारेण परिणतत्वात्पञ्चप्रधानगुणप्रधानत्वेनैवानुभूयन्ते इति ॥५३॥

**एवं सतो विनाशो असदो जीवस्स होइ उप्पादो ।**

**इदि जिणवरोंहं भणिदं अण्णोण्णविरुद्धमविरुद्धं ॥५४॥**

**एवं सतो विनाशो ऽसतो जीवस्य भवत्युत्पादः ।**

**इति जिनवरैर्भणितमन्योन्यविरुद्धमविरुद्धम् ॥५४॥**

जीवस्य भाववशात्सादिसनिधनत्वे[अनादि]सादि-अनिधनत्वे च विरोधपरिहारो ऽयम् । एवं हि पञ्चभिर्भावैः स्वयं परिणममानस्यास्य जीवस्य कदाचिदौदयिकेनैकेन मनुष्यत्वादिलक्षणेन भावेन सतो विनाशस्तथापरेणौदयिकेनैव देवत्वादिलक्षणेन भावेन असत उत्पादो भवत्येव । एतच्च 'न सतो विनाशो नासत उत्पादः' इति पूर्वोक्तसूत्रेण सह विरुद्धमपि न विरुद्धम् ; यतो जीवस्य द्रव्याधिकनया-देशेन न सत्प्रणाशो नासदुत्पादः, तस्यैव पर्यायार्थिकनयादेशेन सत्प्रणाशोऽसदुत्पादश्च । न चैतदनुपपन्नम्, नित्ये जले कलोलानामनित्यत्वदर्शनादिति ॥५४॥

**णेइयतिरियमणुया देवा इदि णामसंजुदा पयडी ।**

**कुव्वन्ति सदो णासं असदो भावस्स उप्पादं ॥५५॥**

**नारकतिर्यङ्मनुष्या देवा इति नामसंयुताः प्रकृतयः ।**

**कुर्वन्ति सतो नाशमसतो भावस्योत्पादम् ॥५५॥**

जीवस्य सदसद्भावोच्छ्रित्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तोपाधिप्रतिपादनमेतत् । यथा हि जलराशेर्जलराशित्वेनासदुत्पाद सदुच्छेदं चाननुभवतश्चतुर्भ्यः ककुब्बिभागेभ्यः क्रमेण वहमानाः पवमानाः कलोलानामसदुत्पादं सदुच्छेदं च कुर्वन्ति, तथा जीवस्यापि जीवत्वेन सदुच्छेदमसदुत्पत्तिं चाननुभवतः क्रमेणोदीयमानाः नारकतिर्यङ्मनुष्यदेवनामप्रकृतयः सदुच्छेदमसदुत्पादं च कुर्वन्तीति ॥५५॥

**उदयेण उवसमेण य खयेण दुहं भिस्सिदोहं परिणामे ।**

**जुत्ता ते जीवगुणा बहुसु य अत्थेसु वित्थिण्णा ॥५६॥**

सात्कुर्वन्, प्राप्यकर्मत्वपरिणामरूपेण कर्मतां कलयत्, पूर्वभावव्यपये ऽपि ध्रुवत्वान्म्वनादुपात्ता-  
पादानत्वम्, उपजायमानपरिणामरूपकर्मणाश्रीयमाणत्वादुपोढसंप्रदानत्वम्, आधीयमानपरिणामा-  
धारत्वाद्गृहीताधिकरणत्व, स्वयमेव षट्कारकीरूपेण व्यवतिष्ठमानं न कारकान्तरमपेक्षते । एव  
जीवो ऽपि भावपर्यायेण प्रवर्तमानात्मद्रव्यरूपेण कर्तृतामनुविभ्राणो, भावपर्यायगमनगतिरूपेण  
करणतामात्मसात्कुर्वन्, प्राप्यभावपर्यायरूपेण कर्मता कलयन्, पूर्वभावपर्यायव्यपये ऽपि ध्रुवत्वा-  
लम्बनादुपात्तापादानत्वः, उपजायमानभावपर्यायरूपकर्मणाश्रीयमाणत्वादुपोढसंप्रदानत्वः, आधीय-  
मानभावपर्यायाधारत्वाद्गृहीताधिकरणत्व, स्वयमेव षट्कारकीरूपेण व्यवतिष्ठमानो न कारकान्त-  
रमपेक्षते । अतः कर्मणः कर्तुर्नास्ति जीवः कर्ता, जीवस्य कर्तुर्नास्ति कर्म कर्तृ निश्चयेनेति ॥६२॥

कम्मं कम्मं कुव्वदि जदि सो अप्पा करेदि अप्पाणं ।

किध तस्स फलं भुंजदि अप्पा कम्मं च देदि फलं ॥६३॥

कर्म कर्म करोति यदि स आत्मा करोत्यात्मानम् ।

कथं तस्य फलं भुङ्क्ते आत्मा कर्म च ददाति फलम् ॥६३॥

अथ सिद्धान्तसूत्राणि कर्मजीवयोरन्योन्याकर्तृत्वे ऽन्यदत्तफलान्योपभोगलक्षणदूषणपुरःसरः  
पूर्वपक्षोऽयम् ॥६३॥

अथ सिद्धान्तसूत्राणि

अोगाढगाढणिचिदो पोगलकार्येहि सव्वदो लोगो ।

सुहुमेहि बादरोहि य णताणंतेहि विविधेहि ॥६४॥

अवगाढगाढनिचितः पुद्गलकार्यैः सर्वतो लोकः ।

सूक्ष्मैर्बाहिरैश्चानन्तानन्तैर्विविधैः ॥६४॥

कर्मयोग्यपुद्गला अञ्जनचूर्णपूर्णसमुद्गकन्यायेन सर्वलोकव्यापित्वाद्यत्रात्मा तत्रानानीता  
एवावतिष्ठन्ति इत्यत्रोक्तम् ॥६४॥

अत्ता कुणदि सभावं तत्थ गदा पोगला सभावोहि ।

गच्छंति कम्मभावं अण्णणोगाहमवगाढा ॥६५॥

आत्मा करोति स्वभावं तत्र गताः पुद्गलाः स्वभावाः ।

गच्छन्ति कर्मभावमन्योन्यावगाहावगाढाः ॥६५॥

अन्याकृतकर्मसम्भूतिप्रकारोक्तिरियम् । आत्मा हि ससारावस्थायां पारिणामिकचैतन्यस्वभाव-  
मपरित्यजन्नेवानादिबन्धनबद्धत्वादानादिमोहरागद्वेषस्निग्धैरविशुद्धैरेव भावैर्विवर्तते । स खलु यत्र

६४ P विविहेहि ।

६५ P सहावं, सहावेहि ।

भावो जदि कम्मकदो अत्ता कम्मस्स होदि किध कत्ता ।

ण कुणदि अत्ता किंचि वि मुत्ता अण्णं सगं भावं ॥५६॥

भावो यदि कर्मकृत आत्मा कर्मणो भवति कथं कर्ता ।

न करोत्यात्मा किंचिदपि मुक्त्वान्यत् स्वकं भावम् ॥५६॥

जीवभावस्य कर्मकर्तृत्वे पूर्वपक्षोऽयम् । यदि खल्वीदयिकादिरूपो जीवस्य भावः कर्मणा क्रियते, तदा जीवस्तस्य कर्ता न भवति । न च जीवास्याकर्तृत्वमिष्यते । ततः पारिशेष्येण द्रव्यकर्मणः कतपिद्यते । तत्तु कथम् । यतो निश्चयनयेनात्मा स्वं भावमुज्जिभत्वा नान्यत्किमपि करोतीति ॥५६॥

भावो कम्मणिमित्तो कम्मं पुण भावकारणं हवदि ।

ण दु तेसिं खलु कत्ता ण विणा भूदा दु कत्तारं ॥६०॥

भावः कर्मनिमित्तः कर्म पुनर्भावकारणं भवति ।

न तु तेषां खलु कर्ता न विना भूतास्तु कर्तारम् ॥६०॥

पूर्वसूत्रोदितपूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्तोऽयम् । व्यवहारेण निमित्तमात्रत्वाज्जीवभावस्य कर्म कर्तृ, कर्म-  
णोऽपि जीवभावः कर्ता; निश्चयेन तु न जीवभावानां कर्म कर्तृ, न कर्मणो जीवभावः । न च ते  
कर्तारमन्तरेण संभूयेते; यतो निश्चयेन जीवपरिणामानां जीवः कर्ता, कर्मपरिणामानां कर्म कर्तृ  
इति ॥६०॥

कुव्वं सगं सहावं अत्ता कत्ता सगस्स भावस्स ।

ण हि पोगलकम्माणं इदि जिणवयणं मुणेयव्वं ॥६१॥

कुर्वन् स्वकं स्वभावम् आत्मा कर्ता स्वकस्य भावस्य ।

न हि पुद्गलकर्मणामिति जिनवचनं ज्ञातव्यम् ॥६१॥

निश्चयेन जीवस्य स्वभावानां कर्तृत्वं पुद्गलकर्मणामकर्तृत्वं चागमेनोपदिशितमत्र इति ॥६१॥

कम्मं पि सगं कुव्वदि सेण सहावेण सम्ममप्पाणं ।

जीवो वि य तारिसओ कम्मसहावेण भावेण ॥६२॥

कर्मापि स्वकं करोति स्वेन स्वभावेन सम्यगात्मानम् ।

जीवो ऽपि च तादृशकः कर्मस्वभावेन भावेन ॥६२॥

अत्र निश्चयनयेनाभिन्नकारकत्वात्कर्मणो जीवस्य च स्वयं स्वरूपकर्तृत्वमुक्तम् । कर्म खलु  
कर्मत्वप्रवर्तमानपुद्गलस्कन्धरूपेण कर्तृतामनुविभ्राणं, कर्मत्वगमनशक्तिरूपेण करणतामात्म-

एव जीवः कर्मफलभूतानां कथंचिदात्मनः सुखदुःखपरिणामानां कथंचिद्विष्टानिष्टविषयाणां भोक्ता प्रसिद्ध इति ॥६८॥

एवं कर्ता भोक्ता होज्जं अप्पा सगेहिं कम्मोहिं ।

हिंडदि पारमपारं संसारं मोहसंछण्णो ॥६९॥

एवं कर्ता भोक्ता भवन्नात्मा स्वकैः कर्मभिः ।

हिण्डते पारमपारं संसारं मोहसंछन्नः ॥६९॥

कर्मसंयुक्तत्वमुखेन प्रभुत्वगुणव्याख्यानमेतत् । एवमयमात्मा प्रकटितप्रभुत्वशक्तिः स्वकैः कर्म-भिर्गृहीतकर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वाधिकारोऽनादिमोहावच्छन्नत्वादुपजातविपरीताभिनिवेशः प्रत्यस्तमितसम्यग्ज्ञानज्योतिः सान्त्तमनन्तं वा संसारं परिभ्रमतीति ॥६९॥

उवसंतस्त्रीणमोहो मग्गं जिणभासिदेण समुवगदो ।

णाणाणुमग्गच्चारी णिव्वाणपुरं वजदि धीरो ॥७०॥

उपशान्तस्त्रीणमोहो मार्गं जिनभाषितेन समुपगतः ।

ज्ञानानुसार्गचारी निर्वाणपुरं व्रजति धीरः ॥७०॥

कर्मवियुक्तत्वमुखेन प्रभुत्वगुणव्याख्यानमेतत् । अयमेवात्मा यदि जिनाजया मार्गमुपगम्योपशान्त-स्त्रीणमोहत्वात्प्रहीणविपरीताभिनिवेशः समुद्भिन्नसम्यग्ज्ञानज्योतिः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वाधिकारं परिस-माप्य सम्यक्प्रकटितप्रभुत्वशक्तिज्ञानस्यैवानुमार्गेण चरति, तदा विगुह्यात्मतत्त्वोपलम्भरूपमपवर्गनगरं विगाह्य इति ॥७०॥

अथ जीवविकल्पा उच्यन्ते ।

एको चेव महप्पा सो दुवियप्पो तिलक्खणो होदि ।

चदुच्चंक्रमणो भणिदो पंचग्गगुणप्पधाणो य ॥७१॥

छक्कापक्कमजुत्तो उवउत्तो सत्तभंगसब्भावो ।

अट्ठासओ णवट्ठो जीवो दसठाणगो भणिदो ॥७२॥

एक एव महात्मा स द्विविकल्पस्त्रिलक्षणो भवति ।

चतुश्चङ्क्रमणो भणितः पञ्चागुणप्रधानश्च ॥७१॥

षट्कापक्रमयुक्तः उपयुक्तः सप्तभङ्गसद्भावः ।

अष्टाश्रयो नवार्यो जीवो दशस्थानगो भणितः ॥७२॥



यदा मोहरूपं द्वेषरूपं वा स्वस्थ भावमारभते, तत्र तदा तमेव निमित्तीकृत्य जीवप्रदेशेषु परस्परवगा-  
हेनानुप्रविष्टाः स्वभावैरेव पुद्गलाः कर्मभावमापद्यन्ते इन्ति ॥६५॥

जह पुगलदव्वाणं बहुप्पयारोहिं खंधणिव्वत्ती ।

अकदा परोहिं दिट्ठा तह कम्माणं वियाणाहि ॥६६॥

यथा पुद्गलद्रव्याणां बहुप्रकारैः स्कन्धनिवृत्तिः ।

अकृता परैर्दृष्टा तथा कर्मणां विजानीहि ॥६६॥

अनन्यकृतत्व कर्मणां वैचित्र्यस्यात्रोक्तम् । यथा हि स्वयोग्यचन्द्रार्कप्रभोपलम्भे सध्याभ्रेन्द्र-  
चापपरिवेपप्रभृतिभिर्बहुभिः प्रकारैः पुद्गलस्कन्धविकल्पाः कर्त्रन्तरनिरपेक्षा एवोत्पद्यन्ते, तथा  
स्वयोग्यजीवपरिणामोपलम्भे ज्ञानावरणप्रभृतिभिर्बहुभिः प्रकारैः कर्माण्यपि कर्त्रन्तरनिरपेक्षाय-  
वोत्पद्यन्ते इति ॥६६॥

जीवा पुगलकाया अण्णणोगादगहणपडिबद्धा ।

काले विजुज्जमाणा सुहदुखं देति भुञ्जति ॥६७॥

जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः अन्योन्यावगाहग्रहणप्रतिबद्धाः ।

काले वियुज्यमानाः सुखदुःखं ददति भुञ्जन्ति ॥६७॥

निश्चयेन जीवकर्मणोश्चैककर्तृत्वे ऽपि व्यवहारेण कर्मदत्तफलोपलम्भो जीवस्य न विरुध्यत  
इत्यत्रोक्तम् । जीवा हि मोहरागद्वेषस्निग्धत्वात्पुद्गलस्कन्धाश्च स्वभावस्निग्धत्वाद्बन्धावस्थायाम्  
परमाणुद्वन्द्वानिवान्योन्यावगाहग्रहणप्रतिबद्धत्वेनावतिष्ठन्ते । यदा तु ते परस्परं वियुज्यन्ते, तदोदित-  
प्रच्यवमाना निश्चयेन सुखदुःखरूपात्मपरिणामानां व्यवहारेणैष्टानिष्टविषयाणां निमित्तमात्रत्वात्पुद्-  
गलकायाः सुखदुःखरूपं फलं प्रयच्छन्ति । जीवाश्च निश्चयेन निमित्तमात्रभूतद्रव्यकर्मनिर्वर्तितसुख-  
दुःखरूपात्मपरिणामानां व्यवहारेण द्रव्यकर्मोदयापादितैष्टानिष्टविषयाणां भोक्तृत्वात्तात्थाविधं फलं  
भुञ्जन्ते इति । एतेन जीवस्य भोक्तृत्वगुणोऽपि व्याख्यातः ॥६७॥

तम्हा कम्मं कत्ता भावेण हि संजुदोध जीवस्स ।

भोत्ता दु हवदि जीवो चेदगभावेण कम्मफलं ॥६८॥

तस्मात्कर्म कर्तृ भावेन हि संयुतमथ जीवस्य ।

भोक्ता तु भवति जीवश्चेतकभावेन कर्मफलम् ॥६८॥

कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वव्याख्योपसहारोऽयम् । तत एतत् स्थित निश्चयेनात्मनः कर्म कर्तृ, व्यवहारेण  
जीवभावस्य; जीवोऽपि निश्चयेनात्मभावस्य कर्ता, व्यवहारेण कर्मण इति यथात्रोभयनयाभ्यां कर्म  
कर्तृ, तथैकेनापि नयेन न भोक्तृ । कृतः । चैतन्यपूर्वकानुभूतिसद्भावभावात् । ततश्चेतनत्वात् केवल

पुद्गलद्रव्यविकल्पनिर्देशो ऽयम् । अनन्तानन्तपरमाण्वारब्धोऽप्येकः स्कन्धो नाम पर्यायः । तदर्थ-  
स्कन्धदेशो नाम पर्यायः । तदर्थार्थं स्कन्धप्रदेशो नाम पर्यायः । एव भेदवशात् द्व्यणुकस्कन्धादनन्ताः  
स्कन्धप्रदेशपर्यायाः । निर्विभागाैकप्रदेश-स्कन्धस्यान्त्यो भेदः परमाणुरेकः । पुनरपि द्वयोः परमाण्वोः  
संघातादेको द्व्यणुकस्कन्धपर्यायः । एव संघातवशादनन्ताः स्कन्धपर्यायाः । एवं भेदसंघाताभ्यामप्य-  
नन्ता भवन्तीति ॥७५॥

**बादरसुहृमगदाणं खंधाणं पुगलो त्ति व्यवहारो ।**

**ते होंति छप्पयारा तेलोक्कं जेहि निप्पण्णं ॥७६॥**

**बादरसौक्ष्म्यगतानां स्कन्धानां पुद्गलः इति व्यवहारः ।**

**ते भवन्ति षट्प्रकारास्त्रैलोक्यं यैः निष्पन्नम् ॥७६॥**

स्कन्धानां पुद्गलव्यवहारसमर्थनमेतत् । स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णगुणविशेषैः षट्स्थानपतितवृद्धिहानिभिः  
पूरणगलनधर्मत्वात् स्कन्धव्यक्त्याविर्भावितरोभावाभ्यामपि च पूरणगलनोपपत्तेः परमाणवः पुद्गला  
इति निश्चीयन्ते । स्कन्धास्त्वनेकपुद्गलमयैकपर्यायित्वेन पुद्गलेभ्योऽनन्यत्वात्पुद्गला इति व्यवहृ-  
यन्ते, तथैव च बादरसूक्ष्मत्वपरिणामविकल्पैः षट्प्रकारतामापद्य त्रैलोक्यरूपेण निष्पद्य स्थितवन्त  
इति । तथा हि—बादरबादरा, बादरा, बादरसूक्ष्मा, सूक्ष्मबादराः, सूक्ष्माः, सूक्ष्मसूक्ष्मा इति । तत्र  
छिन्नाः स्वयं सधानासमर्थाः काष्ठपाषाणादयो बादरबादरा । छिन्नाः स्वयं संधानसमर्थाः क्षीरघृत-  
तैलतोयरसप्रभृतयो बादराः । सूक्ष्मलोपलम्भा अपि छेत्तुं छेत्तुमादातुमशक्या छायातपतमोज्योत्स्नादयो  
बादरसूक्ष्माः । सूक्ष्मत्वे ऽपि सूक्ष्मलोपलम्भाः स्पर्शरसगन्धशब्दाः सूक्ष्मबादरा । सूक्ष्मत्वे ऽपि हि  
करणानुपलम्भा कर्मवर्णादयः सूक्ष्माः । अत्यन्तसूक्ष्माः कर्मवर्णाभ्यो ऽवो द्व्यणुकस्कन्धपर्यन्ताः  
सूक्ष्मसूक्ष्मा इति ॥७६॥

**सर्व्वेसि खंधाणं जो अंतो तं वियाण परमाणु ।**

**सो सस्सदो असद्दो एक्को अविभाणि मूर्तिभवो ॥७७॥**

**सर्व्वेषां स्कन्धानां यो ऽत्यस्तं विज्ञानीहि परमाणुम् ।**

**स ज्ञाश्वतो ऽशब्दः एको ऽविभागी मूर्तिभवः ॥७७॥**

परमाणुव्याख्येयम् । उक्तानां स्कन्धरूपपर्यायाणां यो ऽत्यो भेदः स परमाणुः । स तु पुनर्विभागा-  
भावादविभागी, निर्विभागाैकप्रदेशत्वादेकः, भूतद्रव्यत्वेन सदाप्यविनश्वरत्वान्नित्यः, अनादिनिधन-  
रूपादिपरिणामोत्पत्तत्वान्मूर्तिभवः, रूपादिपरिणामोत्पन्नत्वे ऽपि शब्दस्य परमाणुगुणत्वाभावात्पुद्-  
गलस्कन्धपर्यायित्वेन वक्ष्यमाणत्वाच्चाशब्दो निश्चीयत इति ॥७७॥

स खलु जीवो महात्मा नित्यचैतन्योपयुक्तत्वादेक एव, ज्ञानदर्शनभेदाद्द्विविकल्पः, कर्मफल-  
कार्यज्ञानचेतनाभेदेन लक्ष्यमाणत्वात्त्रिलक्षणः ध्रौव्योत्पादविनाशभेदेन वा, चतसृषु गतिषु चङ्क्रमण-  
त्वाच्चतुश्चङ्क्रमणः, पञ्चभिः परिणामिकौदयिकादिभिरग्नगुणैः प्रधानत्वात्पञ्चाग्नगुणप्रधानः, चत-  
सृषु दिक्षूर्ध्वमधश्चेति भवान्तरसक्रमणषट्केनापक्रमेण युक्तत्वात्पट्कापक्रमयुक्तः, अस्तिनास्त्यादिभिः  
सप्तभङ्गैः सद्भावो यस्येति सप्तभङ्गसद्भावः, अष्टानां कर्मणां गुणानां वा आश्रयत्वादष्टाश्रयः, नव-  
पदार्थरूपेण वर्तनान्तवार्थः, पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवनस्पतिसाधारणप्रत्येकद्वित्रिचतुःपञ्चेन्द्रियरूपेषु दशसु  
स्थानेषु गतत्वादशस्थानग इति ॥७१-७२॥

पयडिट्टिदिअणुभागप्पदेसबंघोहं सव्वदो मुक्को ।

उड्ढं गच्छदि सेसा विदिसावज्जं गदिं जंति ॥७३॥

प्रकृतिस्थित्यनुभागप्रदेशबन्धैः सर्वतो मुक्तः ।

ऊर्ध्वं गच्छति शेषा विदिग्वर्जां गतिं यान्ति ॥७३॥

बद्धजीवस्य षड्गतयः कर्मेनिमित्ताः । मुक्तस्याप्यूर्ध्वगतिरेका स्वाभाविकीत्यत्रोक्तम् ॥७३॥  
इति जीवद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यानं समाप्तम् ।

अथ पुद्गलद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यानम् ।

खंधा य खंधेसा खंधपदेसा य होंति परमाणू ।

इदि ते चट्ठुवियप्पा पुगलकाया मुणेयव्वा ॥७४॥

स्कन्धाश्च स्कन्धदेशाः स्कन्धप्रदेशाश्च भवन्ति परमाणवः ।

इति ते चतुर्विकल्पाः पुद्गलकाया ज्ञातव्याः ॥७४॥

पुद्गलद्रव्यविकल्पादेशो ज्यम् । पुद्गलद्रव्याणि हि कदाचित्स्कन्धपर्यायेण, कदाचित्स्कन्धदेश-  
पर्यायेण, कदाचित्स्कन्धप्रदेशपर्यायेण, कदाचित्परमाणुत्वेनात्र तिष्ठन्ति । नान्या गतिरस्ति । इति  
तेषां चतुर्विकल्पत्वमिति ॥७४॥

खंधं सयलसमत्थं तस्स दु अद्धं भणंति देसो त्ति ।

अद्धद्धं च पदेसो परमाणू चेव अविभागी ॥७५॥

स्कन्धः सकलसमस्तस्तस्य त्वर्धं भणन्ति देश इति ।

अर्धार्धं च प्रदेशः परमाणुश्चैवाविभागी ॥७५॥

परमाणोरेकदेशत्वख्यापनमेतत् । परमाणुः स खल्वेकेन प्रदेशेन रूपादिगुणसामान्यभाजा सर्व-  
दैवाविनश्वरत्वान्निःस्पृहः एकेन प्रदेशेन तदविभक्तवृत्तीनां स्पर्शादिगुणानामवकाशदानान्नानवकाशः ।  
एकेन प्रदेशेन द्रव्यादिप्रदेशाभावादात्मादिनात्ममध्येनात्मान्तेन न सावकाशः । एकेन प्रदेशेन  
स्कन्धानां भेदनिमित्तत्वात् स्कन्धानां भेदाः । एकेन प्रदेशेन स्कन्धसंघातनिमित्तत्वात् स्कन्धानां कर्ता ।  
एकेन प्रदेशेनैकाकाशप्रदेशातिवर्तितद्वृत्तिपरिणामापन्नेन समयलक्षणकालविभागकरणात् कालस्य  
प्रविभक्तता । एकेन प्रदेशेन तत्सूत्रितद्रव्यादिभेदपूर्विकायाः स्कन्धेषु द्रव्यसंख्यायाः, एकेन प्रदेशेन तद-  
वच्छिन्नैकाकाशप्रदेशपूर्विकायाः क्षेत्रसंख्यायाः, एकेन प्रदेशेनैकाकाशप्रदेशातिवर्तितद्वृत्ति-  
परिणामावच्छिन्नसमयपूर्विकायाः कालसंख्यायाः, एकेन प्रदेशेन तद्विवर्तितजघन्यवर्णादिभावावबोध-  
पूर्विकायाः भावसंख्यायाः प्रविभागकरणात् प्रविभक्ता संख्याया अपीति ॥८०॥

**एयरसवर्णगन्धं दो फासं सद्कारणमसद् ।**

**खंधंतरिदं द्रव्यं परमाणुं तं विद्याणाहि ॥८१॥**

एकरसवर्णगन्धं द्विस्पर्शं शब्दकारणमशब्दम् ।

स्कन्धान्तरितं द्रव्यं परमाणुं तं विजानीहि ॥८१॥

परमाणुद्रव्ये गुणपर्यायवृत्तिरूपणमेतत् । सर्वत्रापि परमाणौ रसवर्णगन्धस्पर्शाः सहभूवो गुणाः ।  
ते च क्रमप्रवृत्तैस्तत्र स्वपर्यायैर्वर्तन्ते । तथा हि—पञ्चानां रसपर्यायाणामन्यतमेनैकेनैकदा रसो वर्तते ।  
पञ्चानां वर्णपर्यायाणामन्यतमेनैकेनैकदा वर्णो वर्तते । उभयोर्गन्धपर्याययोरन्यतरेणैकेनैकदा गन्धो  
वर्तते । चतुर्णां शीतस्निग्धशीतरूक्षोष्णस्निग्धोष्णरूक्षरूपाणां स्पर्शपर्यायद्वन्द्वानामन्यतमेनैकेनैकदा  
स्पर्शो वर्तते । एवमयमुक्तगुणवृत्तिः परमाणुः शब्दस्कन्धपरिणतिशक्तिस्वभावात् शब्दकारणम् । एक-  
प्रदेशत्वेन शब्दपर्यायपरिणतिवृत्त्यभावादशब्दः । स्निग्धरूक्षत्वप्रत्ययबन्धवशादनेकपरमाण्वेकत्व-  
परिणतिरूपस्कन्धान्तरितोऽपि स्वभावमपरित्यजन्नुपात्तसंख्यत्वादेक एव द्रव्यमिति ॥८१॥

**उबभोज्जमिदिएहि य इंदियकाया मणो य कम्माणि ।**

**जं हवदि मुत्तमण्णं तं सव्वं पुग्गलं जाणे ॥८२॥**

उपभोग्यमिन्द्रियैश्चेन्द्रियकाया मनश्च कर्माणि ।

यद्वभवति मूर्तमन्यत् तत्सर्वं पुद्गलं जानीयात् ॥८२॥

- सकलपुद्गलविकल्पोपसंहारोऽयम् । इन्द्रियविषयाः स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णशब्दाश्च, द्रव्येन्द्रियाणि  
स्पर्शरसनघ्राणचक्षुःश्रोत्राणि, कायाः औदारिकवैक्रियकाहारकतैजसकार्मणानि, द्रव्यमनः, द्रव्य-  
कर्माणि, नोकर्माणि, विचित्रपरायितोत्पत्तिहेतवो अनन्ता अनन्ताणुवर्गणाः, अनन्ता असंख्येयाणुवर्गणाः,

आदेसमेतमुत्तो धादुचदुक्कस्स कारणं जो दु ।

सो णेओ परमाणू परिणामगुणो समयसद्दो ॥७८॥

आदेशमात्रमूर्तः धातुचतुष्कस्य कारणं यस्तु ।

स ज्ञेयः परमाणुः परिणामगुणः स्वयमशब्दः ॥७८॥

परमाणूनां जात्यन्तरत्वनिरासोऽयम् । परमाणोर्हि मूर्तत्वनिवन्धनभूताः स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णा आदेश-  
मात्रेणैव भिद्यन्ते; वस्तुतस्तु यथा तस्य स एव प्रदेश आदिः, स एव मध्यं, स एवान्तः इति, एवं  
द्रव्यगुणयोरविभक्तप्रदेशत्वात् य एव परमाणोः प्रदेशः, स एव स्पर्शस्य, स एव रसस्य, स एव  
गन्धस्य, स एव रूपस्येति । ततः क्वचित्परमाणौ गन्धगुणो, क्वचित् गन्धरसगुणयो, क्वचित् गन्धरस-  
रूपगुणेषु अपक्वव्यमाणेषु तदविभक्तप्रदेशः परमाणुरेव विनश्यतीति । न तदपकर्षो युक्तः । ततः  
पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुरूपस्य धातुचतुष्कस्यैक एव परमाणुः कारणं परिणामवशात् । विचित्रो हि  
परमाणोः परिणामगुणः क्वचित्कस्यचिदगुणस्य व्यक्ताव्यक्तत्वेन विचित्रा परिणतिमादधाति । यथा  
च तस्य परिणामवशाद् व्यक्तो गन्धादिगुणोऽस्तीति प्रतिज्ञायते, न तथा शब्दोऽप्यव्यक्तोऽस्तीति  
ज्ञातुं शक्यते तस्यैकप्रदेशस्यानेकप्रदेशात्मकेन शब्देन सहैकत्वविरोधादिति ॥७८॥

सद्दो खंधप्पभवो खंधो परमाणुसंगसंधादो ।

पुट्ठेसु तेसु जायदि सद्दो उप्पादगो णियदो ॥७९॥

शब्दः स्कन्धप्रभवः स्कन्धः परमाणुसंगसंधातः ।

स्पृष्टेषु तेषु जायते शब्द उत्पादको नियतः ॥७९॥

शब्दस्य पुद्गलस्कन्धपर्यायत्वख्यापनमेतत् । इह हि बाह्यश्रवणेन्द्रियावलम्बितो भावेन्द्रिय-  
परिच्छेद्यो ध्वनिः शब्दः । स खलु स्वरूपेणान्तपरमाणूनामेकस्कन्धो नाम पर्यायः । बहिरङ्गसाधनी-  
भूतमहास्कन्धेभ्यः तथाविधपरिणामेन समुत्पद्यमानत्वात् स्कन्धप्रभवः, यतो हि परस्पराभिहतेषु  
महास्कन्धेषु शब्दः समुपजायते । किं च स्वभावनिवृत्ताभिरैवान्तपरमाणुमयीभिः शब्दयोग्यवर्गणा-  
भिरन्योन्यमनुप्रविश्य समन्ततोऽभिव्याप्य पूरितेऽपि सकले लोके यत्र यत्र बहिरङ्गकारणसामग्री  
समुदेति तत्र तत्र ताः शब्दत्वेन स्वयं व्यपरिणमन्त इति शब्दस्य नियतमुत्पाद्यत्वात् स्कन्धप्रभवत्व-  
मिति ॥७९॥

णिच्चो णाणवकासो ण सावकासो पदेसदो भेत्ता ।

खंधाणं पि य कत्ता पविहत्ता कालसंखाणं ॥८०॥

नित्यो नानवकाशो न सावकाशः प्रदेशतो भेत्ता ।

स्कन्धानामपि च कर्ता प्रविभवता कालसंख्यायाः ॥८०॥

धर्मस्य गतिहेतुत्वे दृष्टान्तोऽयम् । यथोदकं स्वयमगच्छदगमयच्च स्वयमेव गच्छता मत्स्यानामु-  
दासीनाविनाभूतसहायकारणमात्रत्वेन गमनमनुगृह्णाति, तथा धर्मोऽपि स्वयमगच्छन् अगमयच्च  
स्वयमेव गच्छतां जीवपुद्गलानामुदासीनाविनाभूतसहायकारणमात्रत्वेन गमनमनुगृह्णाति  
इति ॥८५॥

जह हवदि धम्मदव्वं तह तं जाणेह दव्वमधमखं ।

ठिदिकिरियाजुत्ताणं कारणभूदं तु पुढवीव ॥८६॥

यथा भवति धर्मद्रव्यं तथा तज्जानीहि द्रव्यमधर्माख्यम् ।

स्थितिक्रियायुक्तानां कारणभूतं तु पृथिवीव ॥८६॥

अधर्मस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । यथा धर्मः प्रज्ञापितस्तथाधर्मोऽपि प्रज्ञापनीय । अयं तु विशेषः । स  
गतिक्रियायुक्तानामुदकवत्कारणभूत एष पुनः स्थितिक्रियायुक्तानां पृथिवीवत्कारणभूतः । यथा  
पृथिवी स्वयं पूर्वमेव तिष्ठन्ती परमस्थापयन्ती च स्वयमेव तिष्ठतामद्वादीनामुदासीनाविनाभूत-  
सहायकारणमात्रत्वेन स्थितिमनुगृह्णाति तथाधर्मोऽपि स्वयं पूर्वमेव तिष्ठन् परमस्थापयश्च  
स्वयमेव तिष्ठतां जीवपुद्गलानामुदासीनाविनाभूतसहायकारणमात्रत्वेन स्थितिमनु-  
गृह्णातीति ॥८६॥

जादो अलोगलोगो जेसि सवभावदो य गमणठिदी ।

दो वि य मया विभत्ता अविभत्ता लोयमेत्ता य ॥८७॥

जातमलोकलोकं ययोः सद्भावतश्च गमनस्थितिः ।

द्वावपि च मतौ विभक्तावविभक्तौ लोकमात्रौ च ॥८७॥

धर्माधर्मसद्भावे हेतूपन्यासोऽयम् । धर्माधर्मौ विद्येते, लोकालोकविभागान्ध्यानुपपत्तेः ।  
जीवादिसर्वपदार्थानामेकत्र वृत्तिरूपो लोकः । शुद्धकाशवृत्तिरूपोऽलोकः । तत्र जीवपुद्गलौ स्वर-  
सत् एव गतितत्पूर्वस्थितिपरिणामापन्नी । तयोर्यदि गतिपरिणामं तत्पूर्वस्थितिपरिणामं वा स्वयमनु-  
भवतोर्बहिरङ्गहेतु धर्मधर्मौ न भवेताम्, तदा तयोर्निरर्गलगतिस्थितिपरिणामत्वादलोकेऽपि वृत्तिः  
केन वार्येत । ततो न लोकालोकविभागः सिध्येत् । धर्माधर्मयोस्तु जीवपुद्गलयोर्गतितत्पूर्वस्थित्योर्ब-  
हिरङ्गहेतुत्वेन सद्भावे ऽभ्युपगम्यमाने लोकालोकविभागो जायत इति । किञ्च धर्माधर्मौ द्वावपि  
परस्परं पृथग्भूतास्तित्वनिर्वृत्ताद्विभक्तौ । एकक्षेत्रावगाढत्वादविभक्तौ । निष्क्रियत्वेन सकललोक-  
वर्तिनोर्जीवपुद्गलयोर्गतिस्थित्युपग्रहकरणात्लोकमात्राविति ॥८७॥

ण य गच्छदि धम्मत्थी गमणं ण करेदि अण्णदवियस्स ।

हवदि गदिस्स य पसरो जीवाणं पुग्गलाणं च ॥८८॥

अनन्ताः संख्येयाणुवर्गणाः, द्वयणुकसकन्धपर्यन्ताः, परमाणवश्च, यदन्यदपि मूर्तं तत्सर्वं पुद्गल-  
विकल्पत्वेनोपसहृतं व्यमिति ॥८२॥ इति पुद्गलद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यान समाप्तम् ।

अथ धर्माधर्मद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यानम् ।

धम्मत्थिकायमरसं अवण्णगंधं असह्मप्पासं ।

लोगागाढं पुट्टं पिहुलमसंखादियपदेसं ॥८३॥

धर्मास्तिकायो ऽरसो ऽवर्णगन्धो ऽशब्दो ऽस्पर्शः ।

लोकावगाढः स्पृष्टः पृथुलो ऽसंख्यातप्रदेशः ॥८३॥

धर्मस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । धर्मो हि स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णानामत्यन्ताभावादमूर्तस्वभावः । तत् एव चा-  
शब्दः । सकललोकाकाशाभिध्याप्यावस्थितत्वालोकावगाढः । अयुतसिद्धप्रदेशत्वात् स्पृष्टः ।  
स्वभावादेव सर्वतो विस्तृतत्वात्पृथुलः । निश्चयनयेनैकप्रदेशो ऽपि व्यवहारनयेनासंख्यातप्रदेश  
इति ॥८३॥

अगुरुलघुगेहिं सया तेहिं अणंतेहिं परिणदं णिच्चं ।

गदिकिरियाजुत्ताणं कारणभूदं सयमकज्जं ॥८४॥

अगुरुलघुकैः सदा तैः अनन्तैः परिणतः नित्यः ।

गतिक्रियायुक्तानां कारणभूतः स्वयमकार्यः ॥८४॥

धर्मस्यैवावशिष्टस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । अपि च धर्मः अगुरुलघुभिर्गुणैरगुरुलघुत्वाभिधानस्य  
स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठत्वनिबन्धनस्य स्वभावस्याविभागपरिच्छेदैः प्रतिसमयसम्भवत्पदस्थानपतितवृद्धिहानिभि-  
रन्तैः सदा परिणतत्वादुत्पादव्ययवत्वेऽपि स्वरूपादप्रच्यवनान्नित्यः । गतिक्रियापरिणतानामुदासी-  
नाविनाभूतसहायमात्रत्वात्कारणभूतः । स्वास्तित्वमात्रनिर्वृत्तत्वात् स्वयमकार्य इति ॥८४॥

उदयं जह मच्छाणं गमणाणुगहकरं हवदि लोए ।

तह जीवपुगलानं धम्मं दव्वं वियाणेहि ॥८५॥

उदकं यथा मत्स्यानां गमनानुगहकरं भवति लोके ।

तथा जीवपुद्गलानां धर्मं द्रव्यं विजानीहि ॥८५॥

८३. P लोकोगाढं ।

८४. P लघुगेहिं सदा ।

८५. P जघ, धम्म-हव्वं ।

८६. P जाणिह, ०मधम्मकखं, सुदं दु ।

जीवा पुद्गलकाया धर्माधर्मा य लोगदोणणा ।

ततो अण्णमण्णं आयासं अंतवदिरित्तं ॥६१॥

जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः धर्माधर्मौ च लोकतो जन्ये ।

ततो जन्यदन्यदाकाशमन्तव्यतिरिक्तम् ॥६१॥

लोकाद्बहिराकाशसूचनेयम् । जीवादीनि शेषद्रव्याण्यवधृतपरिमाणत्वात्लोकादनन्यान्येव ।  
आकाशं त्वनन्तत्वात्लोकादनन्यदन्यच्चेति ॥६१॥

आगासं अवगासं गमणट्टिदिकारणेहि देदि जदि ।

उड्ढंगदिप्पधाना सिद्धा चिट्ठंति किध तस्थ ॥६२॥

आकाशमवकाशं गमनस्थितिकारणाभ्यां ददाति यदि ।

ऊर्ध्वगतिप्रधानाः सिद्धाः तिष्ठन्ति कथं तत्र ॥६२॥

आकाशस्यावकाशकहेतुर्गतिस्थितिहेतुत्वशङ्कायां दोषोपन्यासोऽयम् । यदि खत्वाकाशमव-  
गाहिनामवगाहहेतुरिव गतिस्थितिमतां गतिस्थितिहेतुरपि स्यात्, तदा सर्वोत्कृष्टस्वाभाविकोर्ध्वगति-  
परिणता भगवन्तः सिद्धा बहिरङ्गान्तरङ्गसाधनसामग्र्या सत्यामपि कुतस्तन्नाकाशे तिष्ठन्ति  
इति ॥६२॥

जम्हा उवरिट्ठाणं सिद्धाणं जिणवरेहिं पण्णत्तं ।

तम्हा गमणट्ठाणं आयासे जाण णत्थि ति ॥६३॥

यस्मादुपरिस्थानं सिद्धानां जिनवरैः प्रज्ञप्तम् ।

तस्माद्गमनस्थानमाकाशे जानीहि नास्तीति ॥६३॥

स्थितिपक्षोपन्यासोऽयम् । यतो गत्वा भगवन्तः सिद्धा लोकोपर्यवतिष्ठन्ते, ततो गतिस्थिति-  
हेतुत्वमाकाशे नास्तीति निश्चेतव्यम् । लोकालोकावच्छेदकौ धर्माधर्मविव गतिस्थितिहेतु मन्त-  
व्याविति ॥६३॥

जदि हवदि गमणहेद्दु आगासं ठाणकारणं तेसि ।

पसजदि अलोगहाणी लोगस्स य अंतपरिवुड्ढी ॥६४॥

यदि भवति गमनहेतुराकाशं स्थानकारणं तेषाम् ।

प्रसज्यलोकहानिलोकस्य चान्तपरिवृद्धिः ॥६४॥

आकाशस्य गतिस्थितिहेतुत्वाभावे हेतूपन्यासोऽयम् । नाकाश गतिस्थितिहेतुः लोकालोकसीम-  
व्यवस्थायास्तथोपपत्तेः । यदि गतिस्थित्योराकाशमेव निमित्तमिष्येत, तदा तस्य सर्वत्र सद्भावा-



न च गच्छति धर्मास्तिको गमनं न करोत्यन्यद्रव्यस्य ।

भवति गतेः च प्रसरो जीवानां पुद्गलानां च ॥८८॥

धर्माधर्मयोगतिस्थितिहेतुत्वेऽप्यत्यन्तौदासीन्याख्यापनमेतत् । यथा हि गतिपरिणतः प्रभञ्जनो वैजयन्तीनां गतिपरिणामस्य हेतुकर्तावलोच्यते न तथा धर्मः । स खलु निष्क्रियत्वात् न कदाचिदपि गतिपरिणाममेवापद्यते । कुतोऽस्य सहकारित्वेन परेषा गतिपरिणामस्य हेतुकर्तृत्वम् । किंतु सलिलमिव मत्स्यानां जीवपुद्गलानामाश्रयकारणमात्रत्वेनोदासीन एवासौ गतेः प्रसरो भवति । अपि च यथा गतिपूर्वस्थितिपरिणतस्तुरङ्गोऽववारस्य स्थितिपरिणामस्य हेतुकर्तावलोच्यते न तथा धर्मः । स खलु निष्क्रियत्वात् न कदाचिदपि गतिपूर्वस्थितिपरिणाममेवापद्यते । कुतोऽस्य सहसंस्थायित्वेन परेषां गतिपूर्वस्थितिपरिणामस्य हेतुकर्तृत्वम् । किंतु पृथिवीवस्तुरङ्गस्य जीवपुद्गलानामाश्रयकारणमात्रत्वेनोदासीन एवासौ गतिपूर्वस्थितेः प्रसरो भवतीति ॥८८॥

विज्जदि जेसिं गमणं ठाणं पुण तेसिमेव संभवदि ।

ते सगपरिणामोहं दु गमणं ठाणं च कुवन्ति ॥८९॥

विद्यते येषां गमनं स्थानं पुनस्तेषामेव संभवति ।

ते स्वकपरिणामैस्तु गमनं स्थानं च कुर्वन्ति ॥८९॥

धर्माधर्मयोरौदासीन्ये हेतूपन्यासोऽयम् । धर्मं किल न जीवपुद्गलानां कदाचिद्गतिहेतुत्वमभ्यस्यति, न कदाचित्स्थितिहेतुत्वमधर्मं । तौ हि परेषा गतिस्थित्योर्यदि मुख्यहेतु स्यातां तदा येषा गतिस्तेषां गतिरेव न स्थितिः, येषा स्थितिस्तेषां स्थितिरेव न गतिः । तत एकेषामपि गतिस्थितिदर्शनादनुमीयते न तौ तयोर्मुख्यहेतु । किंतु व्यवहारनयव्यवस्थापितौ उदासीनौ । कथमेवं गतिस्थितिमतं पदार्थानां गतिस्थितौ भवत इति चेत्, सर्वे हि गतिस्थितिमन्तः पदार्थाः स्वपरिणामैरेव निश्चयेन गतिस्थितौ कुर्वन्तीति ॥८९॥ इति धर्माधर्मद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यान समाप्तम् ।

अथ आकाशद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यानम् ।

सर्व्वेसिं जीवाणं सेसाणं तह य पुग्गलाणं च ।

जं देदि विवरमखिलं तं लोए हवदि आगासं ॥९०॥

सर्व्वेषां जीवानां शेषाणां तथैव पुद्गलानां च ।

यद्गदाति विवरमखिलं तल्लोके भवत्याकाशम् ॥९०॥

आकाशस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । षड्रव्यात्मके लोके सर्व्वेषां शेषद्रव्याणां यत्समस्तावकाशनिमित्तं विशुद्धक्षेत्ररूपं तदाकाशमिति ॥९०॥

जीवा पुद्गलकाया सह सविकरिया ह्वन्ति ण य सेसा ।

पुद्गलकरणा जीवा खंधा खलु कालकरणां दु ॥६८॥

जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः सह सक्रिया भवन्ति न च शेषाः ।

पुद्गलकरणा जीवाः स्कन्धा खलु कालकरणास्तु ॥६८॥

अत्र सक्रियनिष्क्रियत्वमुक्तम् । प्रदेशान्तरप्राप्तिहेतुः परिस्पन्दनरूपपर्यायः क्रिया । तत्र सक्रिया बहिरङ्गसाधनेन सहभूताः जीवाः, सक्रिया बहिरङ्गसाधनेन सहभूता पुद्गलाः । निष्क्रियमाकाशम्, निष्क्रियो धर्मः, निष्क्रियो धर्मः, निष्क्रियः कालः । जीवानां सक्रियत्वस्य बहिरङ्गसाधनं कर्मनो-  
कर्मोपचयरूपाः पुद्गला इति ते पुद्गलकरणाः । तदभावान्निष्क्रियत्व सिद्धानाम् । पुद्गलानां सक्रियत्वस्य बहिरङ्गसाधनं परिणामनिर्वर्तकं काल इति ते कालकरणाः । न च कर्मादीनामिव कालस्याभावः । ततो न सिद्धानामिव निष्क्रियत्व पुद्गलानामिति ॥६८॥

जे खलु इन्द्रियगेज्झा विसया जीवेहिं होति ते मुत्ता ।

सेसं हवदि अमुत्तं चित्तं उभयं समादियदि ॥६९॥

ये खलु इन्द्रियग्राह्या विषया जीवैर्भवन्ति ते मूर्ताः ।

शेषं भवत्यमूर्तं चित्तमुभयं समाददाति ॥६९॥

मूर्तामूर्तलक्षणाख्यानमेतत् । इह हि जीवैः स्पर्शनरसनघ्राणचक्षुभिरिन्द्रियैस्तद्विषयभूताः स्पर्श-  
रसगन्धवर्णस्वभावा अर्था गृह्यन्ते । श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण तु त एव तद्विषयहेतुभूतशब्दाकारपरिणता गृह्यन्ते ।  
ते कदाचित्स्थूलस्कन्धत्वमापन्ना कदाचित्सूक्ष्मत्वमापन्ना कदाचित्परमाणुत्वमापन्नाः इन्द्रियग्रहण-  
योग्यतासद्भावाद् गृह्यमाणा अगृह्यमाणा वा मूर्ता इत्युच्यन्ते । शेषमितरत् समस्तमप्यर्थजातं स्पर्श-  
रसगन्धवर्णभावस्वभावमिन्द्रियग्रहणयोग्यताया अभावादमूर्तमित्युच्यते । चित्तग्रहणयोग्यतासद्भाव-  
भारभवति तदुभयमपि, चित्तं हानियतविषयमप्राप्यकारि मतिश्रुतज्ञानसाधनीभूतं मूर्तममूर्तं च समाद-  
दातीति ॥६९॥ इति चूलिका समाप्ता ।

अथ कालद्रव्यव्याख्यानम् ।

कालो परिणामभवो परिणामो द्रव्यकालसंभूदो ।

दोण्हं एस सहावो कालो खणभंगुरो णियदो ॥१००॥

कालः परिणामभवः परिणामो द्रव्यकालसंभूतः ।

द्वयोरेव स्वभावः कालः क्षणभङ्गुरो नियतः ॥१००॥

व्यवहारकालस्य निश्चयकालस्य च स्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । तत्र क्रमानुपाती समयार्थः पर्यायो  
व्यवहारकालः, तदाधारभूतं द्रव्यं निश्चयकालः । तत्र व्यवहारकालो निश्चयकालपर्यायिरूपो ऽपि

ज्जीवपुद्गलानां गतिस्थित्योर्निःसीमत्वात्प्रतिक्षणमलोको ह्रीयते, पूर्व पूर्व व्यवस्थाप्यमानश्चान्तो लोकस्योत्तरोत्तरपरिवृद्ध्या विघटते । ततो न तत्र तद्धेतुरिति ॥६४॥

तस्मा धम्माधम्मा गमणट्टिदिकारणाणि णागासं ।

इदि जिणवरोहिं भणिदं लोगसहावं सुणंताणं ॥६५॥

तस्माद्धर्माधर्मौ गमनस्थितिकारणे नाकाशम् ।

इति जिनवरैः भणितं लोकस्वभावं शृण्वताम् ॥६५॥

आकाशस्य गतिस्थितिहेतुत्वनिरासव्याख्योपसंहारोऽयम् । धर्माधमविव गतिस्थितिकारणे नाकाशमिति ॥६५॥

धम्माधम्मागासा अपुधब्भूदा समाणपरिमाणा ।

पुधगुवल्लद्विसेसा करेति एगत्तमणत्तं ॥६६॥

धर्माधर्माकाशान्यपृथग्भूतानि समानपरिमाणानि ।

पृथगुपलब्धविशेषाणि कुर्वन्त्येकत्वमन्यत्वम् ॥६६॥

धर्माधर्मलोकाकाशानामवगाहवशादेकत्वेऽपि वस्तुत्वेनान्यत्वमत्रोक्तम् । धर्माधर्मलोकाकाशानि हि समानपरिमाणत्वात्सहावस्थानमात्रेणैकत्वभाञ्जि । वस्तुतस्तु व्यवहारेण गतिस्थित्यवगाह-हेतुत्वरूपेण निश्चयेन विभक्तप्रदेशत्वरूपेण विशेषेण पृथगुपलभ्यमानेनान्यत्वभाञ्ज्येव भवन्तीति ॥६६॥ इति आकाशद्रव्यास्तिकायव्याख्यान समाप्तम् ।

अथ चूलिका ।

आगासकालजीवा धम्माधम्मा य मुत्तिपरिहीणा ।

मुत्तं पुग्गलदब्बं जीवो खलु चेदणो तेसु ॥६७॥

आकाशकालजीवा धर्माधर्मौ च मूर्तिपरिहीनाः ।

मूर्तं पुद्गलद्रव्यं जीवः खलु चेतनस्तेषु ॥६७॥

अत्र द्रव्याणां मूर्तामूर्तत्वं चेतनाचेतनत्वं चोक्तम् । स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णसङ्ख्यावस्वभाव मूर्तम्, स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णाभावस्वभावममूर्तम् । चैतन्यसद्भावस्वभावं चेतनं, चैतन्याभावस्वभावमचेतनम् । तत्रामूर्तमाकाशम्, अमूर्तं कालः, अमूर्तं स्वरूपेण जीवः पररूपावेशान्मूर्तोऽपि, अमूर्तो धर्मः, अमूर्तोऽधर्मः, मूर्तः पुद्गल एवैक इति । अचेतनमाकाशं, अचेतनः कालः, अचेतनो धर्मः, अचेतनोऽधर्मः, अचेतनः पुद्गलः, चेतनो जीव एवैक इति ॥६७॥

तदवबोधफलपुरस्सर. पञ्चास्तिकायव्याख्योपसंहारो ऽयम् । न खलु कालकलितपञ्चास्तिकायैभ्यो ऽन्यत् किमपि सकलेनापि प्रवचनेन प्रतिपाद्यते । ततः प्रवचनसार एवायं पञ्चास्तिकायसंग्रहः । यो हि नामामुं समस्तवस्तुतत्त्वाभिधायिनमर्थतोऽर्थात्तयावबुद्ध्यात्रैव जीवास्तिकायान्तर्गतमात्मानं स्वरूपेणात्यन्तविशुद्धचैतन्यस्वभाव निश्चित्य परस्परकार्यकारणीभूतानादिरागद्वेषपरिणामकर्मबन्धसततिसमारोपितस्वरूपविकारं तदात्वे ऽनुभूयमानमवलोक्य तत्कालोन्मीलितविवेकज्योतिः कर्मबन्धसतततिप्रवर्तिकां रागद्वेषपरिणतिमत्यस्यति, स खलु जीर्यमाणस्नेहो जघन्यस्नेहगुणाभिमुखपरमाणुवद्भाविबन्धपराङ्मुख. पूर्ववन्धात्प्रच्यवमान. शिखितप्तोदकदीस्थ्यानुकारिणी दुःखस्य परिमोक्षं विगाह्यति इति ॥१०३॥

**मुणिऊण एतदट्टं तदणुगमणुज्जदो णिहृदमोहो ।**

**पसमियरागद्वोसो हवदि हृदपरावरो जीवो ॥१०४॥**

**ज्ञातचैतदर्थं तदनुगमनोद्यतो निहृतमोहः ।**

**प्रशमितरागद्वेषो भवति हृदपरापरो जीवः ॥१०४॥**

दुःखविमोक्षकरणक्रमाख्यानमेतत् । एतस्य शास्त्रस्यार्थभूतं शुद्धचैतन्यस्वभावमात्मानं कश्चिज्जीवस्तावज्जानीते । ततस्तमेवानुगन्तुमुद्यमते । ततो ऽस्य क्षीयते दृष्टिमोहः । ततः स्वरूपपरिचयादुन्मज्जति ज्ञानज्योतिः । ततो रागद्वेषौ प्रशम्यतः । ततः उत्तरः पूर्वस्य बन्धो विनश्यति । ततः पुनर्बन्धहेतुत्वाभावात् स्वरूपस्थो नित्यं प्रतपतीति ॥१०४॥

इति समयव्याख्यायामन्तर्नीतषट्त्रयपञ्चास्तिकायवर्णनं. प्रथमः श्रुतस्कन्धः समाप्तः ॥१॥



जीवपुद्गलानां परिणामेनावच्छिद्यमानत्वात्तत्परिणामभव इत्युपगम्यते, जीवपुद्गलानां परिणामस्तु बहिरङ्गनिमित्तभूतद्रव्यकालसद्भावे सति संभूतत्वाद्द्रव्यकालसंभूत इत्यभिधीयते । तत्रेदं तात्पर्यम्— व्यवहारकालो जीवपुद्गलपरिणामेन निश्चीयते, निश्चयकालस्तु तत्परिणामान्यथानुपपत्त्येति । तत्र क्षणभङ्गी व्यवहारकालः सूक्ष्मपर्यायस्य तावन्मात्रत्वात्, नित्यो निश्चयकालः स्वगुणपर्यायाधार-द्रव्यत्वेन सर्वदैवाविनश्वरत्वादिति ॥१००॥

**कालो ति य ववदेसो सन्भावपरूपगो हवदि णिच्चो ।**

**उप्पण्णप्पद्धंसी अवरो दीहंतरट्ठाई ॥१०१॥**

काल इति च व्यपदेशः सद्भावप्ररूपको भवति नित्यः ।

उत्पन्नप्रध्वंस्यपरो दीर्घान्तरस्थायी ॥१०१॥

नित्यक्षणिकत्वेन कालविभागख्यापनमेतत् । यो हि द्रव्यविशेषः 'अयं कालः, अयं कालः' इति सदा व्यपदिश्यते स खलु स्वस्य सद्भावमावेदयन् भवति नित्यः । यस्तु पुनरुत्पन्नमात्र एव प्रध्वंस्यते स खलु तस्यैव द्रव्यविशेषस्य समयाख्यः पर्याय इति । स तूत्सगितक्षणभङ्गो ऽप्युपदिशितस्वसंतानो नयबलादीर्घान्तरस्थाय्युपगम्यमानो न दुष्यति; ततो न खत्वावलिकापत्योपमसागरोपमादिव्यवहारो विप्रतिषिध्यते । तदत्र निश्चयकालो नित्यः द्रव्यरूपत्वात्, व्यवहारकालः क्षणिकः पर्यायरूप-त्वादिति ॥१०१॥

**एदे कालागासा धम्माधम्मा य पुग्गला जीवा ।**

**लभन्ति दव्वसण्णं कालस्स दु णत्थि कायत्तं ॥१०२॥**

एते कालाकाशे धर्माधर्मौ च पुद्गला जीवाः ।

लभन्ते द्रव्यसंज्ञां कालस्य तु नास्ति कायत्वम् ॥१०२॥

कालस्य द्रव्यास्तिकायत्वविधिसंप्रतिषेधविधानमेतत् । यथा खलु जीवपुद्गलधर्माधर्माकाशानि सकलद्रव्यलक्षणसद्भावाद्द्रव्यव्यपदेशमाञ्जि भवन्ति, तथा कालोऽपि । इत्येवं षड्द्रव्याणि । किंतु यथा जीवपुद्गलधर्माधर्माकाशानां द्वादिप्रदेशलक्षणत्वमस्ति अस्तिकायत्वं न तथा लोकाकाश-प्रदेशसंख्यानामपि कालाणूनामेकप्रदेशत्वादस्त्यस्तिकायत्वम् । अत एव च पञ्चास्तिकायप्रकरणे न हीह मुख्यत्वेनोपन्यस्तः कालः । जीवपुद्गलपरिणामावच्छिद्यमानपर्यायत्वेन तत्परिणामान्यथानुप-पत्त्यानुमीयमानद्रव्यत्वेनात्रैवान्तर्भावितः ॥१०२॥ इति कालद्रव्यव्याख्यानं समाप्तम् ।

**एवं पवयणसारं पंचत्थियसंगहं वियाणित्ता ।**

**जो मुयदि रागदोसे सो गाहदि दुक्खपरिमोक्खं ॥१०३॥**

एवं प्रवचनसारं पञ्चास्तिकायसंग्रहं विज्ञाय ।

यो मुञ्चति रागद्वेषौ स गाहते दुःखपरिमोक्षम् ॥१०३॥

सम्मत्तं सद्गृहणं भावाणं तेसिमधिगमो णाणं ।

चारित्तं समभावो विसयेसु विरूढमग्गाणं ॥१०७॥

सम्यक्त्वं श्रद्धानं भावानां तेषामधिगमो ज्ञानम् ।

चारित्रं समभावो विषयेषु विरूढमार्गाणाम् ॥१०७॥

सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणां सूचनेयम् । भावा. खलु कालकलितपञ्चास्तिकायविकल्परूपा नव पदार्थाः । तेषां मिथ्यादर्शनोदयापादिताश्रद्धानाभावस्वभाव भावान्तरश्रद्धानं सम्यग्दर्शनं, शुद्ध-चैतन्यरूपात्मतत्त्वविनिश्चयबीजम् । तेषामेव मिथ्यादर्शनोदयान्नीयानसत्कारादि[व]स्वरूप-विपर्ययेणाध्यवसीयमानानां तन्निवृत्तौ समञ्जसाध्यवसाय. सम्यग्ज्ञानं, मनाज्ञानचेतनाप्रधानात्म-तत्त्वोपलम्भबीजम् । सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानसंनिधानादमार्गेभ्यः समग्रेभ्यः परिच्युत्य स्वतत्त्वे विशेषेण रूढमार्गाणां सतामिन्द्रियानिन्द्रियविषयभूतेष्वर्थेषु रागद्वेषपूर्वकविकाराभावान्निर्विकारावबोधस्व-भाव. समभावश्चारित्रम्, तदात्वायतिरमणीयमनणीयसोऽपुनर्भवसौख्यस्यैकबीजम् । इत्येष त्रिल-क्षणो मोक्षमार्गः पुरस्तान्निश्चयव्यवहाराभ्या व्याख्यास्यते । इह तु सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानयोर्विषयभूतानां नवपदार्थानामुपोद्घातहेतुत्वेन सूचित इति ॥१०७॥

जीवाजीवा भावा पुण्णं पावं च आसवं तेसि ।

संवरणिज्जरब्धो मोक्खो य हवंति ते अट्ठा ॥१०८॥

जीवाजीवौ भावौ पुण्यं पापं चास्त्रवस्तयोः ।

संवरनिर्जरबन्धा मोक्षश्च भवन्ति ते अर्थाः ॥१०८॥

पदार्थानां नामस्वरूपाभिधानमेतत् । जीव, अजीवः, पुण्यम्, पापम्, आस्त्रव, संवरः, निर्जरा, बन्ध, मोक्ष इति नवपदार्थानां नामानि । तत्र चैतन्यलक्षणो जीवास्तिक एवेह जीव । चैतन्याभाव-लक्षणोऽजीवः । स पञ्चधा पूर्वोक्त एव—पुद्गलास्तिकः, धर्मास्तिकः, अधर्मास्तिकः, आका-शास्तिकः, कालद्रव्यं चेति । इमौ हि जीवाजीवौ पृथग्भूतास्तित्वनिर्वृत्तत्वेन भिन्नस्वभावभूतौ मूल-पदार्थाः । जीवपुद्गलसंयोगपरिणामनिर्वृत्ता. सप्तान्ये पदार्थाः । शुभपरिणामो जीवस्य, तन्निमित्त. कर्मपरिणाम. पुद्गलानां च पुण्यम् । अशुभपरिणामो जीवस्य, तन्निमित्त. कर्मपरिणाम पुद्गलानां च पापम् । मोहरागद्वेषपरिणामो जीवस्य, तन्निमित्त कर्मपरिणामो योगद्वारेण प्रविशता पुद्गलानां चास्त्रवः । मोहरागद्वेषपरिणामनिरोधो जीवस्य, तन्निमित्त कर्मपरिणामनिरोधो योगद्वारेण प्रवि-शता पुद्गलानां च संवरः । कर्मवीर्यशासनसमर्थो बहिरङ्गान्तरङ्गतपोर्बृंहितशुद्धोपयोगो जीवस्य, तदनुभावनीरसीभूतानामेकदेशसंश्रयः समुपात्तकर्मपुद्गलानां च निर्जरा । मोहरागद्वेषस्तिग्धपरिणामो

: २ :

## [ II ]

द्रव्यस्वरूपप्रतिपादनेन  
शुद्धं बुधानामिह तत्त्वमुक्तम् ।  
पदार्थभङ्गेन कृतावतारं  
प्रकीर्त्यते संप्रति वर्त्म तस्य ॥७॥

अभिर्वदिरुण सिरसा अपुण्णभवकारणं महावीरं ।  
तेसं पयत्थभंगं मग्गं मोक्खस्स वोच्छामि ॥१०५॥  
अभिवन्ध-शिरसा अपुनर्भवकारणं महावीरम् ।  
तेषां पदार्थभङ्गं मार्गं मोक्षस्य वक्ष्यामि ॥१०५॥

आप्तस्तुतिपुरस्सरा प्रतिज्ञेयम् । अमुना हि प्रवर्तमानमहाधर्मतीर्थस्य मूलकर्तृत्वेनापुनर्भव-  
कारणस्य भगवतः परमभट्टारकमहादेवाधिदेवश्रीवर्धमानस्वामिनः सिद्धिनिबन्धनभूतां भावस्तु-  
तिमासूत्र्य, कालकलितपञ्चास्तिकायानां पदार्थविकल्पो मोक्षस्य मार्गश्च वक्तव्यत्वेन प्रतिज्ञात  
इति ॥१०५॥

सम्मत्तणाणजुत्तं चारित्तं रागदोसपरिहीणं ।  
मोक्खस्स हवदि मग्गो भव्वाणं लब्धबुद्धीणं ॥१०६॥  
सम्यक्त्वज्ञानयुक्तं चारित्रं रागद्वेषपरिहीणम् ।  
मोक्षस्य भवति मार्गो भव्यानां लब्धबुद्धीनाम् ॥१०६॥

मोक्षमार्गस्यैव तावत्सूचनेयम् । सम्यक्त्वज्ञानयुक्तमेव नासम्यक्त्वज्ञानयुक्तम्, चारित्रमेव नाचा-  
रित्रम्, रागद्वेषपरिहीणमेव न रागद्वेषपरिहीणम्, मोक्षस्यैव न भावतो बन्धस्य, मार्ग एव नामार्गः,  
भव्यानामेव नाभव्यानाम्, लब्धबुद्धीनामेव नालब्धबुद्धीनाम्, क्षीणकषायत्वे भवत्येव न कषायसहि-  
तत्वे भवतीत्यष्टधा नियमो ऽत्र द्रष्टव्यः ॥१०६॥

एदे जीवणिकाया पंचविधा पुढविकाइयादीया ।

मणपरिणामविरहिदा जीवा एगेदिया भणिया ॥११२॥

एते जीवणिकायाः पञ्चविधाः पृथिवीकायिकाद्याः ।

मनःपरिणामविरहिता जीवा एकेन्द्रिया भणिताः ॥११२॥

पृथिवीकायिकादीना पञ्चानामेकेन्द्रियत्वनियमो ज्यम् । पृथिवीकायिकादयो हि जीवाः स्पर्शनेन्द्रियावरणक्षयोपशमात् शेषेन्द्रियावरणोदये नोइन्द्रियावरणोदये च सत्येकेन्द्रिया अमनसो भवन्तीति ॥११२॥

अंडेसु पवडुं ता गढ्भत्था माणुसा य मुच्छगया ।

जारिसया तारिसया जीवा एगेदिया णेया ॥११३॥

अण्डेषु प्रवर्धमाना गर्भस्था मानुषाश्च मूर्च्छा गताः ।

यादृशास्तादृशा जीवा एकेन्द्रिया ज्ञेयाः ॥११३॥

एकेन्द्रियाणा चैतन्यास्तित्वे दृष्टान्तोपन्यासो ज्यम् । अण्डान्तर्लीनाना, गर्भस्थानां, मूर्च्छितानां च बुद्धिपूर्वकव्यापारादर्शने ऽपि येन प्रकारेण जीवत्व निश्चीयते, तेन प्रकारेणैकेन्द्रियाणामपि, उभये-षामपि बुद्धिपूर्वकव्यापारादर्शनस्य समानत्वादिति ॥११३॥

संबुक्कमादुवाहा संखा सिप्पी अपादगा य किमी ।

जाणंति रसं फासं जे ते बेइन्दिया जीवा ॥११४॥

शम्बूकमातृवाहाः शङ्खः शुक्तयो ऽपादकाः च क्रुमयः ।

जानन्ति रसं स्पर्शं ये ते द्वीन्द्रियाः जीवाः ॥११४॥

द्वीन्द्रियप्रकारसूचनेयम् । एते स्पर्शनरसनेन्द्रियावरणक्षयोपशमात् शेषेन्द्रियावरणोदये नोइन्द्रियावरणोदये च सति स्पर्शरसयोः परिच्छेत्तारो द्वीन्द्रिया अमनसो भवन्तीति ॥११४॥

जूगागुंभीमक्कुणपिपीलिया विच्छियादिया कीडा ।

जाणंति रसं फासं गंधं तेइन्दिया जीवा ॥११५॥

यूकाकुम्भीमत्कुणपिपीलिका वृश्चिकादयः कीटाः ।

जानन्ति रसं स्पर्शं गन्धं त्रीन्द्रियाः जीवाः ॥११५॥



जीवस्य, तन्निमित्तेन कर्मत्वपरिणताना जीवेन संहान्योन्यसमूच्छनं पुद्गलानां च बन्धः ।  
अत्यन्तशुद्धात्मोपलम्भो जीवस्य, जीवेन सहात्यन्तविश्लेषः 'कर्मपुद्गलानां च मोक्ष  
इति ॥१०८॥

अथ जीवपदार्थानां व्याख्यानं प्रपञ्चयति ।

**जीवा संसारस्था णिष्वादा चेदणप्पगा दुविहा ।**

**उदओगलक्खणा वि य देहादेहप्पवीचारा ॥१०९॥**

जीवाः संसारस्था निर्वृत्ताः चेतनात्मका द्विविधाः ।

उपयोगलक्षणा अपि च देहादेहप्रवीचाराः ॥१०९॥

जीवस्वरूपोद्देशोऽयम् । जीवाः हि द्विविधाः, संसारस्था अशुद्धा निर्वृत्ताः शुद्धाश्च । ते खलूभये  
ऽपि चेतनस्वभावाः, चेतनापरिणामलक्षणोपयोगेन लक्षणीयाः । तत्र संसारस्था देहप्रवीचाराः,  
निर्वृत्ता अदेहप्रवीचारा इति ॥१०९॥

**पुढवी य उदगमगणी चाउ वणप्पदि जीवसंसिदा काया ।**

**देति खलु मोहबहुलं फासं बहुगा वि ते तेसि ॥११०॥**

पृथिवी चोदकमग्निर्वायुर्वनस्पतिः जीवसंश्रिताः कायाः ।

बदति खलु मोहबहुलं स्पर्शं बहुका अपि ते तेषाम् ॥११०॥

पृथिवीकायिकादिपञ्चभेदोद्देशोऽयम् । पृथिवीकायाः, अप्कायाः, तेजःकायाः, वायुकायाः,  
वनस्पतिकायाः इत्येते पुद्गलपरिणामा बन्धवशाज्जीवानुसंश्रिताः, अवान्तरजातिभेदाद्बहुका अपि  
स्पर्शनेन्द्रियावरणक्षयोपशमभाजां जीवानां बहिरङ्गस्पर्शनेन्द्रियनिर्वृत्तिभूताः कर्मफलचेतनाप्रधान-  
त्वान्मोहबहुलमेव स्पर्शोपलम्भं सपादयन्तीति ॥११०॥

**ति त्थावरतणुजोगा अणिलाणलकाइया य तेसु तसा ।**

**मणपरिणामविरहिदा जीवा एइंदिया णेया ॥१११॥**

त्रयः स्थावरतनुयोगा अनिलानलकायिकाश्च तेषु त्रयाः ।

भनःपरिणामविरहिता जीवा एकैन्द्रिया ज्ञेयाः ॥१११॥

तत्र देवमनुष्यनारकाः पञ्चेन्द्रिया एव । तिर्यञ्चस्तु केचित्पञ्चेन्द्रियाः, केचिदेक-द्वि-त्रि-चतु-  
रिन्द्रिया अपीति ॥११८॥

क्षीणे पुनर्वणिबद्धे गदिनामे आजसे य ते वि खलु ।

पापुण्णंति य अण्णं गदिमाजस्सं सलेसवसा ॥११९॥

क्षीणे पूर्वनिबद्धे गतिनाम्नि आयुषि च ते ऽपि खलु ।

प्राप्नुवन्ति चान्यां गतिमायुष्कं स्वलेश्वावशात् ॥११९॥

गत्यायुर्नामोदयनिर्वृत्तत्वाद्देवत्वादीनामनात्मस्वभावत्वोद्द्योतनमेतत् । क्षीयते हि क्रमेणारब्ध-  
फलो गतिनामविशेष आयुर्विशेषश्च जीवानाम् । एवमपि तेषां गत्यन्तरस्यायुरन्तरस्य च कषाया-  
नुरञ्जिता योगप्रवृत्तिलेश्या भवति बीजम् । ततस्तदुचितमेव गत्यन्तरमायुरन्तरं च ते प्राप्नुवन्ति ।  
एवं क्षीणाक्षीणाभ्यामपि पुनः पुनर्नवीभूताभ्या गतिनामायुःकर्मभ्यामनात्मस्वभावभूताभ्यामपि चिर-  
मनुगम्यमाना संसरन्त्यात्मानमचेतयमाना जीवा इति ॥११९॥

एदे जीवणिकाया देहप्पविचारमस्सिदा भणिदा ।

देहविहूणा सिद्धा भव्वा संसारिणो अभव्वा य ॥१२०॥

एते जीवणिकाया देहप्रवीचारमाश्रिताः भणिताः ।

देहविहीनाः सिद्धाः भव्याः संसारिणो ऽभव्याश्च ॥१२०॥

उक्तजीवप्रपञ्चोपसंहारो ऽयम् । एते ह्युक्तप्रकाराः सर्वे संसारिणो देहप्रवीचाराः, अदेहप्रवी-  
चारा भगवन्तः सिद्धाः शुद्धाः जीवाः । तत्र देहप्रवीचारत्वादेकप्रकारत्वे ऽपि संसारिणो द्विप्रकाराः  
भव्या अभव्याश्च । ते शुद्धस्वरूपलम्भशक्तिसद्भावासद्भावाभ्या पाच्यापाच्यमुद्गवदभिधीयन्त  
इति ॥१२०॥

ण हि इंदियाणि जीवा काया पुण छप्पयार पणत्ता ।

जं हवदि तेसु णाणं जीवो ति य तं परूवंति ॥१२१॥

न हीन्द्रियाणि जीवाः कायाः पुनः षट्प्रकाराः प्रज्ञप्ताः ।

यद्भवति तेषु ज्ञानं जीव इति च तत्प्ररूपयन्ति ॥१२१॥

व्यवहारजीवत्वैकान्तप्रतिपत्तिनिरासोऽयम् । य इमे एकेन्द्रियादयः पृथिवीकायिकादयश्चानादि-  
जीवपुद्गलपरस्परवगाहमवलोक्य व्यवहारनयेन जीवप्राधान्याज्जीवा इति प्रज्ञाप्यन्ते । निश्चयनयेन

त्रीन्द्रियप्रकारसूचनेयम् । एते स्पर्शनरसनघ्राणेन्द्रियावरणक्षयोपशमात् शेषेन्द्रियावरणोदये नोइन्द्रियावरणोदये च सति स्पर्शरसगन्धाना परिच्छेत्तारस्त्रीन्द्रिया अमनसो भवन्तीति ॥११५॥

**उद्दंसमसयमविखयमधुकरभमरा पतंगमादीया ।**

**रूवं रसं च गंधं फासं पुण ते विजाणंति ॥११६॥**

उद्दंसमसयमविखयमधुकरभमराः पतङ्गाद्याः ।

रूप रसं च गन्धं स्पर्शं पुनस्ते विजानन्ति ॥११६॥

चतुरिन्द्रियप्रकारसूचनेयम् । एते स्पर्शनरसनघ्राणचक्षुरिन्द्रियावरणक्षयोपशमात् श्रोत्रेन्द्रियावरणोदये नोइन्द्रियावरणोदये च सति स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णाना परिच्छेत्तारश्चतुरिन्द्रिया अमनसो भवन्तीति ॥११६॥

**सुरणरणारयतिरिया वण्णरसप्फासगंधसहण्हू ।**

**जलचरथलचरखचरा बलिया पंचेदिया जीवा ॥११७॥**

सुरनरनारकतिर्यञ्चो वर्णरसस्पर्शगन्धशब्दज्ञाः ।

जलचरस्थलचरखचरा बलिन पञ्चेन्द्रिया जीवाः ॥११७॥

पञ्चेन्द्रियप्रकारसूचनेयम् । अथ स्पर्शनरसनघ्राणचक्षुःश्रोत्रेन्द्रियावरणक्षयोपशमात् नोइन्द्रियावरणोदये सति स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णशब्दाना परिच्छेत्तारः पञ्चेन्द्रिया अमनस्काः । केचित्तु नोइन्द्रियावरणस्यापि क्षयोपशमात् समनस्काश्च भवन्ति । तत्र देवमनुष्यनारकाः समनस्का एव, तिर्यञ्च उभयजातीया इति ॥११७॥

**देवा चउण्णिकाया मणुया पुण कम्मभोगभूमीया ।**

**तिरिया बहुप्पयारा णेरइया पुढविभेयगदा ॥११८॥**

देवाश्चतुर्णिकायाः मनुजा पुनः कर्मभोगभूमिजाः ।

तिर्यञ्चः बहुप्रकाराः नारकाः पृथिवीभेदगताः ॥११८॥

इन्द्रियभेदेनोक्ताना जीवाना चतुर्गतिसबन्धत्वेनोपसहारो ज्यम् । देवगतिनाम्नो देवायुषश्चोदयाद्देवाः, ते च भवनवासिव्यन्तरज्योतिष्कवैमानिकनिकायभेदाच्चतुर्धा । मनुष्यगतिनाम्नो मनुष्यायुषश्च उदयान्मनुष्याः । ते कर्मभोगभूमिजभेदात् द्वेधा । तिर्यग्गतिनाम्नस्तिर्यगायुषश्च उदयात्तिर्यञ्चः । ते पृथिवीशम्बूकयूकोद्दृशजलचरोरगपक्षिपरिसर्पचतुष्पदादिभेदादनेकेधा । नरकगतिनाम्नो नरकायुषश्च उदयान्नारकाः । ते रत्नशर्करावालुकापङ्कधूमतमोमहातमःप्रभाभूमिजभेदात्सप्तधा ।

जीवगुणा नो विद्यन्ते, आकाशादीनां तेषामचेतनत्वसामान्यत्वात् । अचेतनत्वसामान्यं चाकाशादीना-  
मेव, जीवस्यैव चेतनत्वसामान्यादिति ॥१२४॥

सुखदुःखजाणणा वा हिदपरियम्मं च अहिदभीरुत्तं ।

जस्स ण विज्जदि णिच्चं तं समणा बेति अज्जीवं ॥१२५॥

सुखदुःखज्ञानं वा हितपरिकर्म चाहितभीरुत्वम् ।

यस्य न विद्यते नित्यं तं श्रमणा ब्रुवन्त्यजीवम् ॥१२५॥

आकाशादीनामचेतनत्वसामान्ये पुनरनुमानमेतत् । सुखदुःखज्ञानस्य हितपरिकर्मणो ऽहितभी-  
रुत्वस्य चेति चैतन्यविशेषाणां नित्यमनुपलब्धेरविद्यमानचैतन्यसामान्या एवाकाशादयो ऽजीवा  
इति ॥१२५॥

संठाणा संघादा वण्णरसप्फासगंधसद्दा य ।

पोग्गलद्वव्यप्रभवा होंति गुणा पज्जया य बहू ॥१२६॥

अरसमरूपमगंधं अव्वत्तं चेदणागुणमसद्दं ।

जाण अलिंगग्हणं जीवमणिद्धिसंठाणं ॥१२७॥

संस्थानानि संघाताः वर्णरसस्पर्शगन्धशब्दाश्च ।

पुद्गलद्रव्यप्रभवा भवन्ति गुणाः पर्यायारूच बहवः ॥१२६॥

अरसमरूपमगन्धमव्यक्तं चेतनागुणमशब्दम् ।

जानीह्रालिङ्गग्रहणं जीवमनिर्दिष्टसंस्थानम् ॥१२७॥

जीवपुद्गलयोः सयोगे ऽपि भेदनिबन्धनस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । यत्खलु शरीरशरीरिसयोगे स्पर्शरस-  
गन्धवर्णगुणत्वात्संशब्दत्वात्संस्थानसंघातादिपर्यायपरिणतत्वाच्च इन्द्रियग्रहणयोग्यम्, तत्पुद्गलद्रव्यम् ।  
यत्पुनरस्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णगुणत्वादशब्दत्वादनिरिष्टसंस्थानत्वादव्यक्तत्वादिसंशयैः परिणतत्वाच्च  
नेन्द्रियग्रहणयोग्यम्, तच्चेतनागुणत्वात् रूपिभ्यो ऽरूपिभ्यश्च जीवेभ्यो विशिष्ट जीवद्रव्यम् । एवमिह  
जीवाजीवयोर्वस्तवो भेदः सम्यग्ज्ञानिना मार्गप्रसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रतिपादित इति ॥१२६-१२७॥ इति  
अजीवपदार्थव्याख्यानं समाप्तम् ।

उक्तौ मूलपदार्थौ । अथ सयोगपरिणामनिवृत्तेतरसप्तपदार्थानामुपोद्घातार्थं जीवपुद्गलकर्म-  
चक्रमनुवर्ण्यते—

तेषु स्पर्शनादीन्द्रियाणि पृथिव्यादयश्च कायाः जीवलक्षणभूतचैतन्यस्वभावाभावान्न जीवा भवन्तीति ।  
तेष्वेव यत्स्वपरपरिच्छित्तिरूपेण प्रकाशमानं ज्ञानं तदेव गुणगुणिनोः कथंचिदभेदाज्जीवत्वेन प्ररूप्यत  
इति ॥१२१॥

**जाणदि पस्सदि सव्वं इच्छदि सुक्खं बिभेदि दुक्खादो ।**

**कुव्वदि हिमहिदं वा भुंजदि जीवो फलं तेसि ॥१२२॥**

जानाति पश्यति सर्वमिच्छति सौख्यं बिभेति दुःखात् ।

करोति हितमहितं वा भुङ्क्ते जीवः फलं तयोः ॥१२२॥

अन्यासाधारणजीवकार्यख्यापनमेतत् । चैतन्यस्वभावत्वात्कर्तृस्थायाः क्रियायाः जप्तेर्दशेश्च जीव  
एव कर्ता, न तत्संबन्धः पुद्गलः, यथाकाशादि । सुखामिलाषक्रियायाः दुःखोद्वेगक्रियायाः स्वसवेदित-  
हिताहितनिर्वर्तनक्रियायाश्च चैतन्यविवर्तरूपसकलप्रभवत्वात्स एव कर्ता, नान्यः । शुभाशुभकर्मसफल-  
भूताया इष्टानिष्टविषयोपभोगक्रियायाश्च सुखदुःखस्वरूपस्वपरिणामक्रियाया इव स एव कर्ता,  
नान्यः । एतेनासाधारणकार्यानुभेयत्वं पुद्गलव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनो द्योतितमिति ॥१२२॥

**एवमभिगम्म जीवं अण्णेहिं वि पज्जएहिं बहुणेहिं ।**

**अभिगच्छदु अज्जीवं णाणंतरिदेहिं लिगेहिं ॥१२३॥**

एवमभिगम्य जीवमन्यैरपि पर्यायेर्बहुकैः ।

अभिगच्छत्वजीवं ज्ञानान्तरितैर्लिङ्गैः ॥१२३॥

जीवाजीवव्याख्योपसंहारोपक्षेपसूचनेयम् । एवमनया दिशा व्यवहारनयेन कर्मग्रन्थप्रतिपादित-  
जीवगुणमार्गणास्थानादिप्रपञ्चितविचित्रविकल्परूपैः, निश्चयनयेन मोहरागद्वेषपरितिसंपादितविश्व-  
रूपत्वात्कदाचिदशुद्धैः कदाचित्तदभावाच्छुद्धैश्चैतन्यविवर्तग्रन्थिरूपैर्बहुभिः पर्यायेर्जीवमधिगच्छेत् ।  
अधिगम्य चैवमचैतन्यस्वभावत्वात् ज्ञानादर्थान्तरभूतैरितः प्रपञ्च्यमानैर्लिङ्गैर्जीवसबद्धमसबद्धं वा  
स्वतो भेदबुद्धिप्रसिद्धयर्थमजीवमधिगच्छेदिति ॥१२३॥ इति जीवपदार्थव्याख्यानं समाप्तम् ।

अथ अजीवपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

**आगासकालपुगलधम्माधम्मेषु णत्थि जीवगुणा ।**

**तेसि अचेदणत्तं भणिदं जीवस्स चेदणदा ॥१२४॥**

आकाशकालपुद्गलधर्माधर्मेषु न सन्ति जीवगुणाः ।

तेषामचेतनत्वं भणितं जीवस्य चेतनता ॥१२४॥

आकाशादीनामेवाजीवत्वे हेतूपन्यासो ऽयम् । आकाशकालपुद्गलधर्माधर्मेषु चैतन्यविशेषरूपा

चित्तप्रसादपरिणामः । एवमिमे यस्य भावे भवन्ति, तस्यावश्यं भवति शुभो ऽशुभो वा परिणामः । तत्र यत्र प्रशस्तरागश्चित्तप्रसादश्च तत्र शुभः परिणामः, यत्र तु मोहद्वेषावप्रशस्तरागश्च तत्राशुभ इति ॥१३१॥

**सुहपरिणामो पुण्यं असुहो पावं ति हवदि जीवस्स ।**

**दोह्लं पोगलमेत्तो भावो कम्मत्तणं पत्तो ॥१३२॥**

शुभपरिणामः पुण्यमशुभः पापमिति भवति जीवस्य ।

द्वयोः पुद्गलमात्रो भावः कर्मत्वं प्राप्तः ॥१३२॥

पुण्यपापस्वरूपाख्यानसेतत् । जीवस्य कर्तुं निश्चयकर्मतामापन्नः शुभपरिणामो द्रव्यपुण्यस्य निमित्तमात्रत्वेन कारणीभूतत्वात्तदास्त्रवक्षणादूर्ध्वं भवति भावपुण्यम् । एव जीवस्य कर्तुं निश्चयकर्मतामापन्नो ऽशुभपरिणामो द्रव्यपापस्य निमित्तमात्रत्वेन कारणीभूतत्वात्तदास्त्रवक्षणादूर्ध्वं भावपापम् । पुद्गलस्य कर्तुं निश्चयकर्मतामापन्नो विशिष्टप्रकृतित्वपरिणामो जीवशुभपरिणामनिमित्तो द्रव्यपुण्यम् । पुद्गलस्य कर्तुं निश्चयकर्मतामापन्नो विशिष्टप्रकृतित्वपरिणामो जीवाशुभपरिणामनिमित्तो द्रव्यपापम् । एवं व्यवहारनिश्चयाभ्यामात्मनो मूर्तममूर्तं च कर्म प्रज्ञापितमिति ॥१३२॥

**जम्हा कम्मस्स फलं विसयं फासेहं भुंजदे णियदं ।**

**जीवेण सुहं दुक्खं तम्हा कम्माणि मुत्ताणि ॥१३३॥**

यस्मात्कर्मणः फल विषयः स्पर्शोभुज्यते नियतम् ।

जीवेन सुखं दुःखं तस्मात्कर्माणि मूर्तानि ॥१३३॥

मूर्तकर्मसमर्थनमेतत् । यतो हि कर्मणां फलभूतः सुखदुःखहेतुविषयो मूर्तो मूर्तेरिन्द्रियैर्जीवेन नियतं भुज्यते, ततः कर्मणां मूर्तत्वमनुमीयते । तथा हि—मूर्तं कर्म, मूर्तसंबन्धेनानुभूयमानफलत्वादाखुविषवदिति ॥१३३॥

**मुत्तो फासदि मुत्तं मुत्तो मुत्तेण बंधमणुहवदि ।**

**जीवो मुत्तिविरहिदो गाहदि ते तेहि उग्गहदि ॥१३४॥**

मूर्तः स्पृशति मूर्तं मूर्तो मूर्तेन बन्धमनुभवति ।

जीवो मूर्तिविरहितो गाहति तानि तैरवगाह्यते ॥१३४॥

मूर्तकर्मणोरमूर्तजीवमूर्तकर्मणोश्च बन्धप्रकारसूचनेयम् । इह हि ससारिणि जीवे ज्ञादिसंतानेन प्रवृत्तास्ते मूर्तकर्म । तत्स्पृशादिमत्त्वादागामि मूर्तकर्म स्पृशति, ततस्तन्मूर्तं तेन सह स्नेहगुण-

जो खलु संसारस्थो जीवो ततो दु होदि परिणामो ।  
 परिणामादो कम्मं कम्मादो होदि गदिसु गदो ॥१२८॥  
 गदिसधिगदस्स देहो देहादो इन्द्रियाणि जायन्ते ।  
 तेहिं दु विसयग्रहणं ततो रागो व दोसो वा ॥१२९॥  
 जायदि जीवस्सेवं भावो संसारचक्कवालम्मि ।  
 इदि जिणवरेहिं भणिदो अणादिणिघणो सणिघणो वा ॥१३०॥

यः खलु संसारस्थो जीवस्ततस्तु भवति परिणामः ।  
 परिणामात्कर्म कर्मणो भवति गतिषु गतिः ॥१२८॥  
 गतिमधिगतस्य देहो देहादिन्द्रियाणि जायन्ते ।  
 तैस्तु विषयग्रहणं ततो रागो वा द्वेषो वा ॥१२९॥  
 जायते जीवस्यैवं भावः संसारचक्रवाले ।  
 इति जिनवरैर्भणितो ज्ञादिनिघनः सनिघनो वा ॥१३०॥

इह हि संसारिणो जीवादनादिबन्धनोपाधिवशेन स्निग्धः परिणामो भवति । परिणामात्पुनः पुद्गलपरिणामात्मकं कर्म । कर्मणो नारकादिगतिषु गतिः । गत्यधिगमनाद्देहः । देहादिन्द्रियाणि । इन्द्रियेभ्यो विषयग्रहणम् । विषयग्रहणाद्रागद्वेषौ । रागद्वेषाभ्यां पुनः स्निग्धः परिणामः । परिणामात्पुनः पुद्गलपरिणामात्मकं कर्म । कर्मणः पुनर्नारकादिगतिषु गतिः । गत्यधिगमनात्पुनर्देहः । देहात्पुनरिन्द्रियाणि । इन्द्रियेभ्यः पुनर्विषयग्रहणम् । विषयग्रहणात्पुनरागद्वेषौ । रागद्वेषाभ्यां पुनरपि स्निग्धः परिणामः । एवमिदमन्योन्यकार्यकारणभूतजीवपुद्गलपरिणामात्मकं कर्मजालं संसारचक्रे जीवस्यानाद्य-निघनं अनादिसनिघनं वा चक्रवत्परिवर्तते । तदत्र पुद्गलपरिणामनिमित्तो जीवपरिणामो जीव-परिणामनिमित्तः पुद्गलपरिणामश्च वक्ष्यमाणपदार्थबीजत्वेन सप्रधारणीय इति ॥१२८-१३०॥

अथ पुण्यपापपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

मोहो रागो दोसो चित्तपसादो य जस्स भावम्मि ।  
 विज्जदि तस्स सुहो वा असुहो वा होदि परिणामो ॥१३१॥  
 मोहो रागो द्वेषश्चित्तप्रसादः वा यस्य भावे ।  
 विद्यते तस्य शुभो वा अशुभो वा भवति परिणामः ॥१३१॥

पुण्यपापयोग्यभावस्वभावाख्यापनमेतत् । इह हि दर्शनमोहनीयविपाककलुषपरिणामता मोहः । विचित्रचारित्र्यमोहनीयविपाकप्रत्यये प्रीत्यप्रीती रागद्वेषौ । तस्यैव मन्दोदये विशुद्धपरिणामता

अनुकम्पास्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । कचिदुदन्यादिदुःखप्लुतमवलोक्य करुणया तत्प्रतिचिकीर्षाकुलित-  
चित्तत्वमज्ञानिनोऽनुकम्पा । ज्ञानिनस्त्वधस्तनभूमिकासु विहरमाणस्य जन्मार्णवनिमग्नजगदवलोक-  
नान्मनाग्मनःखेद इति ॥१३७॥

क्रोधो व जदा माणो माया लोभो व चित्तमासेज्ज ।

जीवस्स कुणदि खोहं कलुसो त्ति य तं बुधा वेत्ति ॥१३८॥

क्रोधो वा यदा मानो माया लोभो वा चित्तमासाद्य ।

जीवस्य करोति क्षोभं कालुष्यमिति च तं बुधा ब्रुवन्ति ॥१३८॥

चित्तकलुषत्वस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । क्रोधमानमायालोभाना तीव्रोदये चित्तस्य क्षोभः कालुष्यम् ।  
तेषामेव मन्दोदये तस्य प्रसादोऽकालुष्यम् । तत् कादाचित्कविशिष्टकषायक्षयोपशमे सत्यज्ञानिनो  
भवति । कषायादयानुवृत्तेरसमग्रव्यावर्तितोपयोगस्यावान्तरभूमिकासु कदाचित् ज्ञानिनोऽपि  
भवतीति ॥१३८॥

चरिया पमादबहुला कालुस्सं लोलदा य विसयेसु ।

परपरितापपवादो पावस्स य आसवं कुणदि ॥१३९॥

चर्या प्रमादबहुला कालुष्यं लोलता च विषयेषु ।

परपरितापपवादः पापस्य चास्रवं करोति ॥१३९॥

पापास्रवस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । प्रमादबहुलचर्या परिणतिः, कालुष्यपरिणतिः, विषयलौल्यपरिणतिः,  
परपरितापपरिणतिः, परापवादपरिणतिश्चेति पञ्चाशुभा भावा द्रव्यपापास्रवस्य निमित्तमास्रत्वेन  
कारणभूतत्वात्तदास्रवक्षणादूर्ध्वं भावपापास्रवः । तन्निमित्तोऽशुभकर्मपरिणामो योगद्वारेण प्रविशतां  
पुद्गलानां द्रव्यपापास्रव इति ॥१३९॥

सण्णाओ य तिलेस्सा इंदियवसदा य अट्टरुहाणि ।

णाणं च दुप्पउत्तं मोहो पावप्पदा होति ॥१४०॥

संज्ञाश्च त्रिलेश्या इन्द्रियवशता चार्तरौद्रे ।

ज्ञानं च दुःप्रयुक्तं मोहः पापप्रदा भवन्ति ॥१४०॥

पापास्रवभूतभावप्रपञ्चाख्यानमेतत् । तीव्रमोहविपाकप्रभवा आहारभयमैशुनपरिग्रहसंज्ञाः,  
तीव्रकषायादयानुर्विजितयोगप्रवृत्तिरूपाः कृष्णनीलकापोतलेभ्यास्तिष्ठः, रागद्वेषोदयप्रकर्षादिन्द्रिया-

१३८ P खोभं ।

१३९ P विसयेसु, परिदावयवादी ।

१४० P तिलेस्सा ।



वशाद्बन्धमनुभवति । एष मूर्तयोः कर्मणोर्बन्धप्रकारः । अथ निश्चयनयेनामूर्तो जीवो ज्ञादिमूर्तकर्म-  
निमित्तरागादिपरिणामस्तिगन्धः सन् विशिष्टतया मूर्तानि कर्माण्यवगाहते, तत्परिणामनिमित्तलब्धात्म-  
परिणामैः मूर्तकर्मभिरपि विशिष्टतयावगाहते च । अयं त्वन्योन्यावगाहात्मको जीवमूर्तकर्मणोर्बन्ध-  
प्रकारः । एवममूर्तस्यापि जीवस्य मूर्तेन पुण्यपापकर्मणा कश्चिद्बन्धो न विरुध्यते ॥१३४॥ इति  
पुण्यपापपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

अथ आस्रवपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

रागो जस्स पसत्थो अणुकंपासंसिदो य परिणामो ।

चित्तिमिह णत्थि कलुसं पुण्णं जीवस्स आसवदि ॥१३५॥

रागो यस्य प्रशस्तो ऽनुकम्पासंश्रितश्च परिणामः ।

चित्ते नास्ति कालुष्यं पुण्यं जीवस्यास्रवति ॥१३५॥

पुण्यास्रवस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । प्रशस्तरागो ऽनुकम्पापरिणतिः चित्तस्याकलुषत्वं चेति त्रयः शुभा-  
भावाः द्रव्यपुण्यास्रवस्य निमित्तमात्रत्वेन कारणभूतत्वात्तदास्रवक्षणादूर्ध्वं भावपुण्यास्रवः । तन्निमित्तः  
शुभकर्मपरिणामो योगद्वारेण प्रविशतां पुद्गलानां द्रव्यपुण्यास्रव इति ॥१३५॥

अरहंतसिद्धसाधुसु भत्ती धम्मम्मि जा य खलु चेट्ठा ।

अणुगमणं पि गुरूणं पसत्थरागो त्ति वुच्चंति ॥१३६॥

अर्हत्सिद्धसाधुषु भक्तिर्धर्मे या च खलु चेष्टा ।

अनुगमनमपि गुरूणां प्रशस्तराग इति ब्रूवन्ति ॥१३६॥

प्रशस्तरागस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । अर्हत्सिद्धसाधुषु भक्तिः, धर्मे व्यवहारचारित्रानुष्ठाने वासना-  
प्रधाना चेष्टा, गुरूणामाचार्यादीनां रसिकत्वेनानुगमनम्—एष प्रशस्तो रागः प्रशस्तविषयत्वात् ।  
अयं हि स्थूललक्ष्यतया केवलभक्तिप्रधानस्याज्ञानिनो भवति । उपरितनभूमिकायामलब्धास्पदस्या-  
स्थानरागनिषेधार्थं तीव्ररागज्वरविनोदार्थं वा कदाचिज्ज्ञानिनो ऽपि भवतीति ॥१३६॥

तिसिदं बुभुक्खिदं वा दुहिदं दट्ठूण जो दु दुहिदमणो ।

पडिवज्जदि तं किवया तस्सेसा होदि अणुकंपा ॥१३७॥

तृषितं बुभुक्षितं वा दुःखितं दृष्ट्वा यस्तु दुःखितमनाः ।

प्रतिपद्यते तं कृपया तस्येषा भवत्यनुकम्पा ॥१३७॥

विशेषेण संवरस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । यस्य योगिनो विरतस्य सर्वतो निवृत्तस्य योगे वाङ्मनः-  
कायकर्मणि शुभपरिणामरूपं पुण्यमशुभपरिणामरूपं पापं च यदा न भवति तस्य तदा शुभाशुभभाव-  
कृतस्य द्रव्यकर्मणः सवरः स्वकारणाभावात्प्रसिद्ध्यति । तदत्र शुभाशुभपरिणामनिरोधो भावपुण्य-  
पापसंवारो द्रव्यपुण्यपापसंवारस्य हेतुः प्रधानो ऽवधारणीय इति ॥१४३॥ इति संवरपदार्थव्याख्यान  
समाप्तम् ।

अथ निर्जरापदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

संवरजोगेहि जुदो तवेहिं जो चिट्ठे बहुविहेहिं ।

कम्मणं णिज्जरणं बहुगणं कुणदि सो णियदं ॥१४४॥

संवरयोगाभ्यां युक्तस्तपोभिर्यश्चेष्टते बहुविधैः ।

कर्मणां निर्जरणं बहुकानां करोति स नियतम् ॥१४४॥

निर्जरास्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । शुभाशुभपरिणामनिरोधः सवरः, शुद्धोपयोगो योगः । ताभ्या युक्त-  
स्तपोभिरनशनावमौदर्यवृत्तिपरिसंख्यानरसपरित्यागविविक्तशय्यासनकायक्लेशादिभेदाद्बहिरङ्गः  
प्रायश्चित्तदिनयवैधावृत्त्यस्वाध्यायव्युत्सर्गध्यानभेदादन्तरङ्गश्च बहुविधैर्यश्चेष्टते स खलु बहूनां  
कर्मणां निर्जरणं करोति । तदत्र कर्मवीर्यशातनसमर्थो बहिरङ्गान्तरङ्गतपोभिर्वृंहितः शुद्धोपयोगो  
भावनिर्जरा, तदनुभावनीरसीभूतानामेकदेशसंक्षयः समुपात्तकर्मपुद्गलानां द्रव्यनिर्जरेति ॥१४४॥

जो संवरेण जुत्तो अप्पट्टपसाधगो हि अप्पाणं ।

मुणिऊण भादि णियदं णाणं सो संघुणोदि कम्मरयं ॥१४५॥

यः संवरेण युक्तः आत्मार्यप्रसाधको ह्यात्मानम् ।

ज्ञात्वा ध्यायति नियतं ज्ञानं स संघुनोति कर्मरजः ॥१४५॥

मुख्यनिर्जराकारणोपन्यासो ऽयम् । यो हि संवरेण शुभाशुभपरिणामपरमनिरोधेन युक्तः परि-  
ज्ञातवस्तुस्वरूपः परप्रयोजनेभ्यो व्यावृत्तबुद्धिः केवलं स्वप्रयोजनसाधनोद्द्योतमना आत्मानं स्वोप-  
लम्बेनोपलभ्य गुणगुणिनोर्वस्तुत्वेनाभेदात्तदेव ज्ञानं स्व स्वेनाविचलितमना संचेतयते स खलु  
नितान्तिस्नेहः प्रहीणस्नेहाभ्यङ्गपरिष्वङ्गशुद्धस्फटिकस्तम्भवत् पूर्वोपात्त कर्मरजः संघुनोति ।  
एतेन निर्जरामुख्यत्वे हेतुत्वं ध्यानस्य द्योतितमिति ॥१४५॥

जस्स ण विज्जदि रागो दोसो मोहो व जोगपरिकम्मो ।

तस्स सुहासुहृदहणो भाणमसो जायए अगणी ॥१४६॥

यस्य न विद्यते रागो द्वेषो मोहो वा योगपरिकर्म ।

तस्य शुभाशुभदहनो व्यानमयो जायते अग्निः ॥१४६॥

धीनत्वम्, रागद्वेषोद्रेकात्प्रियसंयोगाप्रियवियोगवेदनामोक्षणनिदानाकाङ्क्षणरूपमार्तम्, कषायशूरा-  
शयत्वाद्धिसाजसत्यस्तेयविषयसंरक्षणानन्दरूपं रौद्रम्, नैष्कर्म्यं तु शुभकर्मणश्चान्यत्र दुष्टतया प्रयुक्तं  
ज्ञानम्, सामान्येन दर्शनचारित्रमोहनीयोदयोपजनिताविवेकरूपो मोहः । एष भावपापास्रवप्रपञ्चो  
द्रव्यपापास्रवप्रपञ्चप्रदो भवतीति ॥१४०॥ इति आस्रवपदार्थव्याख्यान समाप्तम् ।

-अथ संवरपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

इन्द्रियकसायसण्णा णिग्गहिदा जेहिं सुट्ठु मग्गम्मि ।

जावत्तावत्तेहिं पिहियं पावासवच्छिद्दं ॥१४१॥

इन्द्रियकषायसंज्ञा निगृहीता यैः सुष्ठु मार्गैः ।

यावत्तावत्तेषां पिहित पापास्रवच्छिद्रम् ॥१४१॥

अनन्तरत्वात्पापस्यैव संवराल्लानमेतत् । मार्गो हि सवरस्तन्निमित्तमिन्द्रियाणि कषायाः संज्ञाश्च  
यावतांशेन यावन्त वा कालं निगृह्यन्ते तावतांशेन तावन्त वा काल पापास्रवद्वार पिधीयते । इन्द्रिय-  
कषायसंज्ञाः भावपापास्रवो द्रव्यपापास्रवहेतुः पूर्वमुक्तः । इह तन्निरोधो भावपापसंवरो द्रव्यपाप-  
संवरहेतुरवधारणीय इति ॥१४१॥

जस्स ण विज्जदि रागो दोसो मोहो व सव्वदव्वेसु ।

णासव्वदि सुहं असुहं समसुहदुक्खस्स भिक्खुस्स ॥१४२॥

यस्य न विद्यते रागो द्वेषो मोहो वा सर्वद्रव्येषु ।

नास्रवति शुभमशुभं समसुखदुःखस्य भिक्षोः ॥१४२॥

सामान्यसंवरस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । यस्य रागरूपो द्वेषरूपो मोहरूपो वा समग्रपरद्रव्येषु न हि विद्यते  
भावः तस्य निर्विकारचैतन्यत्वात्समसुखदुःखस्य भिक्षोः शुभमशुभं च कर्म नास्रवति, किंतु संब्रियत एव ।  
तदत्र मोहरागद्वेषपरिणामनिरोधो भावसंवरः । तन्निमित्तः शुभाशुभकर्मपरिणामनिरोधो योगद्वारेण  
प्रविशतां पुद्गलानां द्रव्यसंवर इति ॥१४२॥

जस्स जदा खलु पुण्णं जोगे पावं च णत्थि विरदस्स ।

संवरणं तस्स तदा सुहासुहकदस्स कम्मस्स ॥१४३॥

यस्य यदा खलु पुण्यं योगे पापं च नास्ति विरतस्य ।

संवरणं तस्य तदा शुभाशुभकृतस्य कर्मणः ॥१४३॥

पुना रतिरागद्वेषभोहयुतः, मोहनीयविपाकसपादितविकार इत्यर्थः । तदत्र पुद्गलानां ग्रहणहेतु-  
त्वाद्बहिरङ्गकारणं योगः, विशिष्टशक्तिस्थितिहेतुत्वादन्तरङ्गकारणं जीवभाव एवेति ॥१४८॥

हेतू चदुर्वियम्पो अदुर्वियम्पस्स कारणं भणिदं ।

तेसिं पि य रागादी तेसिमभावे ण बज्झंति ॥१४९॥

हेतुश्चतुर्विकल्पो ऽष्टविकल्पस्य कारणं भणितम् ।

तेषामपि च रागादयस्तेषामभावे न बध्यन्ते ॥१४९॥

मिथ्यात्वादिद्रव्यपर्यायिणामपि बहिरङ्गकारणद्योतनमेतत् । तत्रान्तरे किलाष्टविकल्पकर्म-  
कारणत्वेन बन्धहेतुर्द्रव्यहेतुरूपश्चतुर्विकल्पः प्रोक्त मिथ्यात्वासंयमकषाययोगा इति । तेषामपि जीव-  
भावभूता रागादयो बन्धहेतुत्वस्य हेतवः, यतो रागादिभावानामभावे द्रव्यमिथ्यात्वासंयमकषाययोग-  
सद्भावे ऽपि जीवान् बध्यन्ते । ततो रागादीनामन्तरङ्गत्वान्निश्चयेन बन्धहेतुत्वमवसेयमिति ॥१४९॥  
इति बन्धपदार्थव्याख्यानं समाप्तम् ।

अथ मोक्षपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

हेतुमभावे णियमा जायदि णाणिस्स आसवणिरोधो ।

आसवभावेण विणा जायदि कम्मस्स दु णिरोधो ॥१५०॥

कम्मस्साभावेण य सव्वण्हू सव्वलोगदरिसी य ।

पावदि इंदियरहिदं अवावाहं सुहमणंतं ॥१५१॥

हेत्वभावे नियमाज्जायते ज्ञानिनः आस्रवनिरोधः ।

आस्रवभावेन विना जायते कर्मणस्तु निरोधः ॥१५०॥

कर्मणामभावेन च सर्वज्ञः सर्वलोकदर्शी च ।

प्राप्तोतीन्द्रियरहितमव्याबाधं सुखमनन्तम् ॥१५१॥

द्रव्यकर्ममोक्षहेतुपरमसंवरूपेण भावमोक्षस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । आस्रवहेतुहि जीवस्य मोहराग-  
द्वेषरूपो भावः । तदभावो भवति ज्ञानिनः । तदभावे भवत्यास्रवभावाभावः । आस्रवभावाभावे  
भवति कर्माभावः । कर्माभावेन भवति सार्वज्ञं सर्वदर्शित्वमव्याबाधमिन्द्रियव्यापारातीतमनन्तसुखत्वं  
चेति । स एष जीवन्मुक्तिनामा भावमोक्षः, कथमिति चेत् । भावः खल्वत्र विवक्षितः कर्मावृत्तचैतन्य-  
स्य क्रमप्रवर्तमानज्ञप्तिक्रियारूपः । स खलु संसारिणो ज्ञादिभोहनीयकर्मोदयानुवृत्तिवशादगुदो द्रव्य-

ध्यानस्वरूपाभिधानमेतत् । शुद्धस्वरूपे ऽविचलितचैतन्यवृत्तिर्हि ध्यानम् । अथास्यात्मलाभ-  
विधिरभिधीयते । यदा खलु योगी दर्शनचरित्रमोहनीयविपाकं पुद्गलकर्मत्वात् कर्मसु संहृत्य, तद-  
नुवृत्ते, व्यावृत्त्योपयोगममुहान्तमरज्यन्तमद्विषन्त चात्यन्तशुद्ध एवात्मनि निष्कम्प निवेशयति, तदास्य  
निष्क्रियचैतन्यरूपस्वरूपविश्रान्तस्य बाङ्मनःकायानभावयतः स्वकर्मस्वव्यापारयतः सकलशुभा-  
शुभकर्मन्धनदहनसमर्थत्वात् अग्निकल्पं परमपुरुषार्थसिद्ध्युपायभूतं ध्यानं जायते इति । तथा  
चोक्तम्—

“अज्ज वि तिरयणसुद्धा अप्पा भाएवि लहइ इदत्तं ।

लोयंतियदेवत्तं तत्थ चुआ णिव्वुदि जंति” ।

“अतो णत्थि सुईणं कालो थोओ वयं च दुम्मेहा ।

तं णवरि सिक्खियव्वं जं जरमरणक्ख कुणइ” ॥१४६॥

इति निर्जरापदार्थव्याख्यान समाप्तम् ।

अथ बन्धपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ।

जं सुहमसुहमुदिणं भावं रत्तो करोदि जदि अप्पा ।

सो तेण ह्वदि बद्धो पोग्गलकम्मेण विविहेण ॥१४७॥

यं शुभमशुभमुदीर्णं भावं रक्तः करोति यद्यात्मा ।

स तेन भवति बद्धः पुद्गलकर्मणा विविधेन ॥१४७॥

बन्धस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । यदि खल्वयमात्मा परोपाश्रयेणानादिरक्तः कर्मोदयप्रभावत्वादुदीर्ण  
शुभमशुभं वा भाव करोति, तदा स आत्मा तेन निमित्तभूतेन भावेन पुद्गलकर्मणा विविधेन बद्धो  
भवति । तदत्र मोहरागद्वेषस्निग्धः शुभो ऽशुभो वा परिणामो जीवस्य भावबन्धः, तन्निमित्तेन शुभा-  
शुभकर्मत्वपरिणतानां जीवेन सहान्योन्यमूर्च्छन पुद्गलानां द्रव्यबन्ध इति ॥१४७॥

जोगणिमित्तं ग्रहणं जोगो मणवयणकायसंभूदो ।

भावणिमित्तो बंधो भावो रदिरागदोसमोहजुदो ॥१४८॥

योगनिमित्तं ग्रहणं योगो मनोवचनकायसंभूतः ॥

भावनिमित्तो बन्धो भावो रतिरागद्वेषमोहयुतः ॥१४८॥

बहिरङ्गान्तरङ्गबन्धकारणाख्यानमेतत् । ग्रहणं हि कर्मपुद्गलानां जीवप्रदेशवर्तिकर्मस्कन्धा-  
नुप्रवेशः । तत् खलु योगनिमित्तम् । योगो बाङ्मनःकायकर्मवर्गणालम्बन आत्मप्रदेशपरिस्पन्दः ।  
बन्धस्तु कर्मपुद्गलानां विशिष्टशक्तिपरिणामेनावस्थानम् । स पुनर्जीवभावनिमित्तः । जीवभावः

अथ मोक्षमार्गप्रपञ्चसूचिका चूलिका ।

जीवसहावं शाणं अप्पडिहृददंसणं अणणमयं ।

चरियं च तेसु णियदं अत्थित्तर्माणदियं भणियं ॥१५४॥

जीवस्वभावं ज्ञानमप्रतिहतदर्शनमनन्यमयम् ।

चारित्रं च तयोनियतमस्तित्वमनिन्दितं भणितम् ॥१५४॥

मोक्षमार्गस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । जीवस्वभावनियत चरितं मोक्षमार्गं । जीवस्वभावो हि ज्ञानदर्शन-  
अनन्यमयत्वात् । अनन्यमयत्वं च तयोर्विशेषसामान्यचैतन्यस्वभावजीवनिर्वृत्तत्वात् । अथ तयोर्जीवस्य-  
रूपभूतयोर्ज्ञानदर्शनयोर्योन्यनियतमवस्थितमुत्पादव्ययध्रौव्यरूपवृत्तिमयमस्ति न च गगनादिपरिणामभावात्-  
निन्दितं तच्चरितम् । तदेव मोक्षमार्ग इति । द्विविध हि किञ्च ससारिषु चरितम्—स्वचरितं परचरितं  
च ; स्वसमयपरसमयविवक्षितम् । तत्र स्वभावावस्थितान्तिवस्वरूपं स्वचरितम्, परभावावस्थितान्ति-  
स्तित्वस्वरूपं परचरितम् । तत्र यत्स्वभावावस्थितान्तिवस्वरूपं परभावावस्थितान्तिवस्वरूपं परभावावस्थितान्ति-  
नात्यन्तमनिन्दितं तदत्र साक्षान्मोक्षमार्गत्वेनावधारणीयमिति ॥१५४॥

जीवो सहावणियदो अणियदगुणपज्जओध परसमओ ।

जदि कुणदि सगं समयं पढभस्सदि कम्मवंधादो ॥१५५॥

जीवः स्वभावनियतः अनियतगुणपर्यायोऽथ परसमयः ।

यदि कुस्ते स्वकं समयं प्रभ्रस्यति कर्मवन्धात् ॥१५५॥

स्वसमयपरसमयोपादानव्युदासपुरस्सरकर्मक्षयद्वारेण जीवस्वभावनियतचरितस्य मोक्षमार्ग-  
त्वद्योतनमेतत् । संसारिणो हि जीवस्य ज्ञानदर्शनावस्थितत्वात् स्वभावनियतगुणपर्यायोऽथ परसमय-  
यानुवृत्तिपरत्वेनोपरक्तोपयोगस्य सतः समुपात्तभाववैश्वरूप्यत्वादनियतगुणपर्यायत्वं परसमय-  
चरितमिति यावत् । तस्यैवानादिमोहिनीयोदयानुवृत्तिपरत्वमपान्यान्त्यशुद्धोपयोगस्य सतः समुपात्त-  
भावैक्यरूप्यत्वान्नियतगुणपर्यायत्वं स्वसमय-चरितमिति यावत् । अथ कुत यदि कश्चन मोक्षि-  
सम्यग्ज्ञानज्योतिर्जीवः परसमयं व्युदस्य त्वसमयमुपादत्ते तदा कर्मवन्धादवश्यं भ्रमति । सगं हि  
जीवस्वभावनियतं चरितं मोक्षमार्ग इति ॥१५५॥

जो परदव्वम्मि सुहं असुहं राणेण कुणदि जदि भावं ।

सो सगचरित्तभट्टो परचरियचरो हवदि जीवो ॥१५६॥

यः परद्रव्ये शुभमशुभं राणेण करोति यदि भावम् ।

स स्वचरित्रभ्रष्टः परचरित्रचरो भवति जीवः ॥१५६॥

कर्मास्त्रिवहेतुः । स तु ज्ञानिनो मोहरागद्वेषानुवृत्तिरूपेण प्रहीयते । ततोऽस्य आस्रवभावो निरुध्यते । ततो निरुद्धास्रवभावस्यास्य मोहक्षयेणात्यन्तनिर्विकारनयादिमुद्रितानन्तचैतन्यवीर्यस्य शुद्धज्ञप्तिक्रियारूपेणान्तर्मुहूर्तमतिवाह्य युगपज्ज्ञानदर्शनावरणान्तरायक्षयेण कथंचित् कूटस्थज्ञानत्वमवाप्य ज्ञप्ति-क्रियारूपे क्रमप्रवृत्त्यभावाद्भावकर्म विनश्यति । ततः कर्माभावे स हि भगवान्सर्वज्ञः सर्वदर्शी व्युपरतेन्द्रियव्यापाराव्याबाधानन्तसुखश्च नित्यमेवावतिष्ठते । इत्येष भावकर्ममोक्षप्रकारः द्रव्यकर्म-मोक्षहेतुः परमसंवरप्रकारश्च ॥१५०-१५१॥

**दंसणणाणसमग्गं भाणं णो अण्णदव्वसंजुत्तं ।**

**जायदि णिज्जरहेद्दु सभावसहिदस्स साधुस्स ॥१५२॥**

दर्शनज्ञानसमग्रं ध्यानं नो अन्यद्रव्यसंयुक्तम् ।

जायते निर्जराहेतुः स्वभावसहितस्य साधोः ॥१५२॥

द्रव्यकर्ममोक्षहेतुपरमनिर्जराकारणध्यानालयानमेतत् । एवमस्य खलु भावमुक्तस्य भगवतः केवलिनः स्वरूपतृप्तत्वाद्विश्रान्तसुखदुःखकर्मविपाककृतविक्रियस्य प्रक्षीणावरणत्वादनन्तज्ञानदर्शन-सपूर्णशुद्धज्ञानचेतनामयत्वादतीन्द्रियत्वात् चान्यद्रव्यसयोगवियुक्त शुद्धस्वरूपे ऽविचलितचैतन्यवृत्ति-रूपत्वाकथंचिद्धान्यव्यपदेशार्हमात्मनः स्वरूपं पूर्वसंचितकर्मणां शक्तिशासनं पतनं वा विलोक्य निर्जराहेतुत्वेनोपवर्ण्यते इति ॥१५२॥

**जो संवरेण जुत्तो णिज्जरमाणोध सव्वकम्माणि ।**

**ववगदवेदाडस्सो मुयदि भवं तेण सो मोक्खो ॥१५३॥**

य. संवरेण युक्तो निर्जरन्नय सर्वकर्माणि ।

व्यपगतवेद्यायुष्को मुञ्चति भवं तेन स मोक्षः ॥१५३॥

द्रव्यमोक्षस्वरूपाध्यानमेतत् । अथ खलु भगवतः केवलिनो भावमोक्षे सति प्रसिद्धपरमसंवरस्थो-त्तरकर्मसंततौ निरुद्धायां परमनिर्जराकारणध्यानप्रसिद्धौ सत्यां पूर्वकर्मसंततौ कदाचित्स्वभावेनैव कदा-चित्समुद्धातविधानेनायुःकर्मसमभूतस्थित्यामायुःकर्मनुसारेणैव निर्जीर्यमाणायामपुनर्भावाय तद्भव-त्यागसमये वेदनीयायुनामगोरूपाणां जीवेन सहात्यन्तविश्लेषः कर्मपुद्गलानां द्रव्यमोक्षः ॥१५३॥ इतिमोक्षपदार्थव्याख्यानं समाप्तम् ।

समाप्तं च मोक्षमागवियवरूपसम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानविषयभूतनवपदार्थव्याख्यानम् ॥

मप्यात्मनो ऽविक्लपत्वेन चरति, स खलु स्वक चरित् चरति । एव हि शुद्धद्रव्याश्रितमभिन्नसाध्य-  
साधनभावं निश्चयनयमाश्रित्य मोक्षमार्गप्ररूपणम् । यत्तु पूर्वमुद्दिष्ट तत्त्वपरप्रत्ययपर्यायाश्रित भिन्न-  
साध्यसाधनभावं व्यवहारनयमाश्रित्य प्ररूपितम् । न चैतद्विप्रतिषिद्ध निश्चयव्यवहारयोः साध्य-  
साधनभावत्वात्सुवर्णसुवर्णपाषाणवत् । अत एवोभयनयायत्ता पारमेश्वरी तीर्थप्रवर्तनेति ॥१५६॥

**धर्मादीसद्गुह्यं सम्मत्तं णाणमंगपुव्वगदं ।**

**चेट्ठा तवम्हि चरिया ववहारो मोक्खमग्गो त्ति ॥१६०॥**

धर्मादिश्रद्धानं सम्यक्त्वं ज्ञानमङ्गपूर्वगतम् ।

चेष्टा तपसि चर्या व्यवहारो मोक्षमार्ग इति ॥१६०॥

निश्चयमोक्षमार्गसाधनभावेन पूर्वोद्दिष्टव्यवहारमोक्षमार्गनिर्देशो ज्यम् । सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञान-  
चारित्राणि मोक्षमार्गः । तत्र धर्मादीनां द्रव्यपदार्थविकल्पवत्ता तत्त्वार्थश्रद्धानभावस्वभावं भावान्तरं  
श्रद्धानाख्यं सम्यक्त्वं, तत्त्वार्थश्रद्धाननिवृत्तौ सत्यामङ्गपूर्वगतार्थपरिच्छित्तिज्ञानम्, आचारादिसूत्र-  
प्रपञ्चितविचित्रयतिवृत्तसमस्तसमुदयरूपे तपसि चेष्टा चर्या—इत्येष—स्वपरप्रत्ययपर्यायाश्रित  
भिन्नसाध्यसाधनभाव व्यवहारनयमाश्रित्यानुगम्यमानो मोक्षमार्गः । कार्त्तस्वरपाषाणापितदीप्तजात-  
वेदोवत्समाहितान्तरङ्गस्य प्रतिपदमुपरितनशुद्धभूमिकासु परमरम्यासु विश्रान्तिमभिन्नां निष्पादयन्,  
जात्यकार्त्तस्वरस्येव शुद्धजीवस्य कथंचिद्भिन्नसाध्यसाधनभावाभावात्स्वयं शुद्धस्वभावेन विपरिणम-  
मानस्यापि, निश्चयमोक्षमार्गस्य साधनभावमापद्यत इति ॥१६०॥

**णिच्छयणयेण भणिदो तिहि तेहिं समाहिदो हु जो अप्पा ।**

**ण कुणदि किंचि वि अण्णं ण मुयदि सो मोक्खमग्गो त्ति ॥१६१॥**

निश्चयनयेन भणितस्त्रिभिस्तैः समाहितः खलु यः आत्मा ।

न करोति किंचिदप्यन्यन्न मुञ्चति स मोक्षमार्ग इति ॥१६१॥

व्यवहारमोक्षमार्गसाध्यभावेन निश्चयमोक्षमार्गोपन्यासो ज्यम् । सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्रसमाहित  
आत्मैव जीवस्वभावनियतचरित्रत्वादिनिश्चयेन मोक्षमार्गः । अथ खलु कथंचनानाद्यविद्याव्यपगमाद्  
व्यवहारमोक्षमार्गमनुप्रपन्नो धर्मादितत्त्वार्थश्रद्धानाङ्गपूर्वगतार्थज्ञानातपश्चेष्टानां धर्मादितत्त्वार्थ-  
श्रद्धानाङ्गपूर्वगतार्थज्ञानातपश्चेष्टानां च त्यागोपादानाय प्रारब्धविविक्तभावव्यापार, कुतश्चिदुपा-  
देयत्यागे त्याज्योपादाने च पुनः प्रवर्तितप्रतिविधानाभिप्राय, यस्मिन्यावति काले विशिष्टभावनसौ-  
ष्ठववशात्सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्रै स्वभावभूतैः सममङ्गाङ्गिभावपरिणत्या तत्समाहितो भूत्वा त्यागो-  
पादानविकल्पबुन्यत्वाद्विश्रान्तभावव्यापारः सुनिष्प्रकम्प. अयमात्मावतिष्ठते, तस्मिन् तावति काले  
अयमेवात्मा जीवस्वभावनियतचरित्तत्त्वान्निश्चयेन मोक्षमार्ग इत्युच्यते । अतो निश्चयव्यवहारमोक्ष-  
मार्गयोः साध्यसाधनभावो नितरामुपपन्न इति ॥१६१॥



परचरितप्रवृत्तस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । यो हि मोहनीयोदयानुवृत्तिवशाद्रज्यमानोपयोगः सन् प्रद्रव्ये शुभमशुभ वा भावमादधाति, स स्वकचरित्रभ्रष्टः परचरित्रचर इत्युपगीयते; यतो हि स्वद्रव्ये शुद्धोपयोगवृत्तिः स्वचरितम्, परद्रव्ये सोपरागोपयोगवृत्तिः परचरितमिति ॥१५६॥

आसवदि जेण पुण्णं पावं वा अप्पणोघ भावेण ।

सो तेण परचरित्तो ह्वदि त्ति जिणा परूवंति ॥१५७॥

आस्रवति येन पुण्यं पापं वात्मनो ऽथ भावेन ।

स तेन परचरित्रः भवतीति जिनाः प्ररूपयन्ति ॥१५७॥

परचरितप्रवृत्तेर्बन्धहेतुत्वेन मोक्षमार्गत्वनिषेधनमेतत् । इह किल शुभोपरक्तो भावः पुण्यास्रवः, अशुभोपरक्तः पापास्रव इति । तत्र पुण्यं पापं वा येन भावेनास्रवति यस्य जीवस्य यदि स भावो भवति स जीवस्तदा तेन परचरित इति प्ररूप्यते । ततः परचरितप्रवृत्तिर्बन्धमार्ग एव, न मोक्षमार्ग इति ॥१५७॥

जो सव्वसंगमुक्को णणमणो अप्पणं सहावेण ।

जाणदि पस्सदि णियदं सो सगचरियं चरदि जीवो ॥१५८॥

यः सर्वसंगमुक्तः अनन्यमनाः आत्मानं स्वभावेन ।

जानाति पश्यति नित्यं सः स्वकचरितं चरति जीवः ॥१५८॥

स्वचरितप्रवृत्तस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । यः खलु निरुपरागोपयोगत्वात्सर्वसंगमुक्तः परद्रव्यव्यावृत्तोपयोगत्वादनन्यमनाः आत्मानं स्वभावेन ज्ञानदर्शनरूपेण जानाति पश्यति नियतमवस्थितत्वेन, स खलु स्वकं चरितं चरति जीवः । यतो हि दृशिज्ञप्तिस्वरूपे पुरुषे तन्मात्रत्वेन वर्तनं स्वचरितमिति ॥१५८॥

चरियं चरदि सगं सो जो परदव्वप्पभावरहिदप्पा ।

दंसणणाणवियप्पं अवियप्पं चरदि अप्पादो ॥१५९॥

चरितं चरति स्वकं स यः परद्रव्यात्मभावरहितात्मा ।

दर्शनज्ञानविकल्पमविकल्पं चरत्यात्मनः ॥१५९॥

शुद्धस्वचरितप्रवृत्तिपथप्रतिपादनमेतत् । यो हि योगीन्द्रः समस्तमोहब्यूहवर्हिभूतत्वात्परद्रव्यस्वभावभावरहितात्मा सन्, स्वद्रव्यमेकमेवाभिमुख्येनानुवर्तमानः स्वस्वभावभूतं दर्शनज्ञानविकल्प-

संवलितानीव धृतानि कथंचिद्विरुद्धकारणत्वरूढेर्बन्धकारणान्यपि भवन्ति । यदा तु समस्तपरसमय-  
प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिरूपया स्वसमयप्रवृत्त्या संगच्छन्ते, तदा निवृत्तकुशानुसंवलनानीव धृतानि विरुद्धकार्य-  
कारणभावाभावात्साक्षान्मोक्षकारणान्येव भवन्ति । ततः स्वसमयप्रवृत्तिनाम्नो जीवस्वभावनियत-  
चरितस्य साक्षान्मोक्षमार्गत्वमुपपन्नमिति ॥१६४॥

**अण्णाणादो णाणी जदि मण्णदि मुद्धसंपओगादो ।**

**हवदि त्ति दुक्खमोक्खं परसमयरदो हवदि जीवो ॥१६५॥**

अज्ञानात् ज्ञानी यदि मन्यते शुद्धसंप्रयोगात् ।

भवतीति दुःखमोक्षः परसमयरतो भवति जीवः ॥१६५॥

सूक्ष्मपरसमयस्वरूपाख्यानमेतत् । अर्हदादिषु भगवत्सु सिद्धिसाधनीभूतेषु भक्तिभावानुरञ्जिता  
चित्तवृत्तिरत्र शुद्धसंप्रयोगः । अथ खल्वज्ञानलवावेशाद्यदि यावत् ज्ञानवानपि ततः शुद्धसंप्रयोगान्मोक्षो  
भवतीत्यभिप्रायेण खिद्यमानस्तत्र प्रवर्तते तदा तावत्सोऽपि रागलवसद्भावात्परसमयरत  
इत्युपगीयते । अथ न किं पुनर्निरङ्कुशरागकलिकलङ्कितान्तरङ्गवृत्तिरितरो जन इति ॥१६५॥

**अरहंतसिद्धचेदियपवयणगणणाणभत्तिसंपण्णो ।**

**बंधदि पुण्यं बहुसो ण ह सो कम्मक्खयं कुणदि ॥१६६॥**

अर्हत्सिद्धचैत्यप्रवचनगणज्ञानभक्तिसंपन्नः ।

बध्नाति पुण्यं बहुशो न खलु स कर्मक्षयं करोति ॥१६६॥

उक्तशुद्धसंप्रयोगस्य कथंचिद्वन्धहेतुत्वेन मोक्षमार्गत्वनिरासो ऽयम् । अर्हदादिभक्तिसंपन्नः  
कथंचिच्छुद्धसंप्रयोगोऽपि सन् जीवो जीवद्रागलवत्वाच्छुभोपयोगतामजहत् बहुशः पुण्यं वध्नाति,  
न खलु सकलकर्मक्षयमारभते । ततः सर्वत्र रागकणिकापि परिहरणीया परसमयप्रवृत्तिनिबन्धनत्वा-  
दिति ॥१६६॥

**जस्स हिदये णुमेत्तं वा परदव्वम्हि विज्जदे रागो ।**

**सो ण विजाणदि समयं सगस्स सव्वागमघरो वि ॥१६७॥**

यस्य हृदये ऽणुमात्रो वा परद्रव्ये विद्यते रागः ।

स न विजानाति समयं स्वकस्य सर्वागमघरोऽपि ॥१६७॥

स्वसमयोपलम्भाभावस्य रागैकहेतुत्वद्योतनमेतत् । यस्य खलु रागरेणुकणिकापि जीवति हृदये  
न नाम स समस्तसिद्धान्तसिन्धुपारगोऽपि निरुपरामशुद्धस्वरूप स्वसमयं चेतयते । ततः स्वसमय-  
प्रसिद्ध्यर्थं पिञ्जनलभनतुल्यासन्त्यायमधिदधतार्हदादिविषयोऽपि क्रमेण रागरेणुरपसारणीय  
इति ॥१६७॥

जो चरदि णादि पेच्छदि अप्पाणं अप्पणा अणणमयं ।

सो चारित्तं णाणं दंसणमिदि णिच्छिदो होदि ॥१६२॥

यश्चरति जानाति पश्यति आत्मानमात्मनानन्यमयम् ।

स चारित्रं ज्ञानं दर्शनमिति निश्चितो भवति ॥१६२॥

आत्मनश्चारित्रज्ञानदर्शनत्वद्योतनमेतत् । यः खत्वात्मानमात्ममयत्वादनन्यमयमात्मना चरति—  
स्वभावनियतास्तित्वेनानुवर्तते, आत्मना जानाति—स्वपरप्रकाशकत्वेन चेतयते, आत्मना पश्यति—  
याथातथ्येनावलोकयते, स खत्वात्मैव चारित्रं ज्ञान दर्शनमिति कर्तृकर्मकरणानामभेदान्निश्चितो  
भवति । अतश्चारित्रज्ञानदर्शनरूपत्वाज्जीवस्वभावनियतचरितत्वलक्षण निश्चयमोक्षमार्गत्वमात्मनो  
नितरामुपपन्नमिति ॥१६२॥

जेण विजाणदि सव्वं पेच्छदि सो तेण सोक्खमणुहवदि ।

इदि तं जाणदि भविओ अभव्वसत्तो ण सद्दहदि ॥१६३॥

येन विजानाति सर्वं पश्यति स तेन सौख्यमनुभवति ।

इति तज्जानाति भव्यो ऽभव्यसत्त्वो न श्रद्धते ॥१६३॥

सर्वस्यात्मन संसारिणो मोक्षमार्गहेतुनिरासो ऽयम् । इह हि स्वभावप्रातिकूल्याभावहेतुकं  
सौख्यम् । आत्मनो हि दृशिज्ञप्ती स्वभावः । तयोर्विषयप्रतिबन्धः प्रातिकूल्यम् । मोक्षे खत्वात्मनः  
सर्वं विजानतः पश्यतश्च तदभावः । ततस्तद्धेतुकस्यानाकुलत्वलक्षणस्य परमार्थसुखस्य मोक्षे ऽनुभूति-  
रचलितास्ति । इत्येतद्बुध्य एव भावतो विजानाति, ततः स एव मोक्षमार्गार्हः । नैतदभव्यः श्रद्धते,  
ततः स मोक्षमार्गार्हः एवेति । अतः कतिपये एव संसारिणो मोक्षमार्गार्हं न सर्वं  
एवेति ॥१६३॥

दंसणणाणचरित्ताणि मोक्खमग्गो त्ति सेविदव्वानि ।

साधूहि इवं भणिदं तेहिं दु बंधो व मोक्खो वा ॥१६४॥

दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्गं इति सेवितव्यानि ।

साधुभिरिदं भणितं तैस्तु बन्धो वा मोक्षो वा ॥१६४॥

दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणां कथंचिद्बन्धहेतुत्वोपदर्शनेन जीवस्वभावे नियतचरितस्य साक्षान्मोक्षहेतुत्व-  
द्योतनमेतत् । अमूनि हि दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि कियन्मात्रयापि परसमयप्रवृत्त्या सवलितानि क्लेशानु-

१६२. P अप्पणो, होति ।

१६३ P अभवियसत्तो ।

१६४ P साधूहि इदि

अर्हत्सिद्धचैत्यप्रवचनभवतः परेण नियमेन ।

यः करोति तपःकर्म स सुरलोकं समादत्ते ॥१७१॥

अर्हदादिभक्तिमात्ररागजनितसाक्षान्मोक्षस्यान्तरायद्योतनमेतत् । यः खल्वर्हदादिभक्तिविधेय-  
बुद्धिः सन् परमसंयमप्रधानमतितीव्रं तपस्तप्यते, स तावन्मात्ररागकलिकलङ्घितस्वान्तः साक्षान्मोक्ष-  
स्यान्तरायीभूत विषयविषद्वृत्ताभोदमोहितान्तरङ्गं स्वर्गलोकं समासाद्य, सुचिरं रागाङ्गारैः पच्य-  
मानोऽन्तस्ताम्यतीति ॥१७१॥

तम्हा णिव्वुदिकामो रागं सव्वत्थ कुणदु मा किंचि ।

सो तेण वीतरागो भविओ भवसायरं तरदि ॥१७२॥

तस्तान्निवृत्तिकामो रागं सर्वत्र करोतु ना किंचित् ।

स तेन वीतरागो भव्यो भवसागरं तरति ॥१७२॥

साक्षान्मोक्षमार्गसारसूचनद्वारेण शास्त्रतात्पर्योपसंहारो ऽयम् । साक्षान्मोक्षमार्गपुरस्सरो हि  
वीतरागत्वम् । ततः खल्वर्हदादिगतमपि रागं चन्दननगसगतमग्निमिव सुरलोकादिक्लेशग्राप्यात्यन्त-  
मन्तर्दाहाय कल्पमानमाकलय्य साक्षान्मोक्षकामो महाजनः समस्तविषयमपि रागमुत्सृज्यात्यन्तवीत-  
रागो भूत्वा समुच्छलज्ज्वलद्दुःखसौख्यकल्लोलं कर्माग्निनप्तकलकलोदभारप्राग्भारभयंकर भव-  
सागरमुत्तीर्य, शुद्धस्वरूपपरमाभूतसमुद्रमध्यास्य सद्यो निर्वाति ॥

अलं विस्तरेण । स्वस्ति साक्षान्मोक्षमार्गसारत्वेन शास्त्रतात्पर्यभूताय वीतरागत्वायेति । द्विविधं  
किल तात्पर्यम्—सूत्रतात्पर्यं शास्त्रतात्पर्यं चेति । तत्र सूत्रतात्पर्यं प्रतिसूत्रमेव प्रतिपादितम् । शास्त्र-  
तात्पर्यं त्विदं प्रतिपाद्यते । अस्य खलु पारमेश्वरस्य शास्त्रस्य, सकलपुरुषार्थसारभूतमोक्षतत्त्वप्रतिपत्ति-  
हेतोः पञ्चास्तिकायषड्द्रव्यस्वरूपप्रतिपादनेनोपदक्षितसमस्तवस्तुस्वभावस्य, नवपदार्थप्रपञ्चसूचना-  
विष्कृतबन्धमोक्षसवन्धिवन्धमोक्षायतनवन्धमोक्षविकल्पस्य, सम्यगावेदितनिश्चयव्यवहाररूपमोक्ष-  
मार्गस्य, साक्षान्मोक्षकारणभूतपरमवीतरागत्वविश्रान्तसमस्तहृदयस्य, परमार्थतो वीतरागत्वमेव  
तात्पर्यमिति । तदिदं वीतरागत्वं व्यवहारनिश्चयाविरोधेनैवानुगम्यमानं भवति समीहितसिद्धये न  
पुनरन्यथा । व्यवहारनयेन भिन्नसाध्यसाधनभावमवलम्ब्यानादिभेदासितबुद्ध्य सुखेनैवावतरन्ति  
तीर्थं प्राथमिका । तथा हीदं श्रद्धेयमिदमश्रद्धेयमयं श्रद्धातेदं श्रद्धानमिदं ज्ञेयमिदमज्ञेयमयं ज्ञातेदं  
ज्ञानमिदं चरणीयमिदमचरणीयमयं चरितेदं चरणमिति कर्तव्याकर्तव्यकर्तृकर्मविभागावलोकनोल्हा-  
सितपेशलोत्साहाः शनैः शनैर्मोहमलमुन्मूलयन्त, कदाचिदज्ञानान्धप्रमादतन्त्रतया शिथिलतात्माधि-  
कारस्यात्मनो न्याय्यपथप्रवर्तनाय प्रयुक्तप्रचण्डदण्डनीतयः, पुनः पुनः दोषानुसारेण दत्तप्रायश्चित्ताः  
संततोद्यताः सन्तो ऽथ तत्पर्यवात्मनो भिन्नविषयश्रद्धानज्ञानचारित्रैरधिरोप्यमाणसंस्कारस्य भिन्न-  
साध्यसाधनभावस्य रजकशिलातलस्फाल्यमानविमलसलिलाप्लुतविहितोषपरिज्वलमलिनवासस इव

धरिदुं जस्स ण सक्कं चित्तुब्भामं विणा दु अप्पाणं ।

रोधो तस्स ण विज्जदि सुहासुहकदस्स कम्मस्स ॥१६८॥

धतुं यस्य न शक्यं चित्तोद्भ्रामं विना त्वात्मानम् ।

रोधस्तस्य न विद्यते शुभाशुभकृतस्य कर्मणः ॥१६८॥

रागलवमूलदोषपरंपराख्यानमेतत् । इह खल्वहंदादिभक्तितरपि न रागानुवृत्तिमन्तरेण भवति । रागाद्यनुवृत्तौ च सत्यां, बुद्धिप्रसरमन्तरेणात्मा न त कथंचनापि धारयितुं शक्यते । बुद्धिप्रसरे च सति शुभस्याशुभस्य वा कर्मणो न निरोधो ऽस्ति । ततो रागकलिविलासमूल एवायमनर्थसंतान इति ॥१६८॥

तम्हा णिव्वुदिकामो णिस्संगो णिम्ममो य हविय पुणो ।

सिद्धे सु कुणदि भत्ति णिव्वाणं तेण पप्पोदि ॥१६९॥

तस्मान्निवृत्तिकामो निस्सङ्गो निर्ममश्च भूत्वा पुनः ।

सिद्धेषु करोति भक्तिं निर्वाणं तेन प्राप्नोति ॥१६९॥

रागकलिनि शोषीकरणस्य करणीयत्वाख्यानमेतत् । यतो रागाद्यनुवृत्तौ चित्तोद्भ्रान्तिः, चित्तोद्भ्रान्तौ कर्मबन्ध इत्युक्तम्, ततः खलु मोक्षार्थिना कर्मबन्धमूलचित्तोद्भ्रान्तिमूलभूता रागाद्यनुवृत्तिरेकान्तेन निःशोषीकरणीया । निःशोषिताया तस्या प्रसिद्धनैःसङ्ग्यनैर्मम्य शुद्धात्मद्रव्य-विश्रान्तिरूपां पारमाथिकीं सिद्धभक्तिमनुविभ्राणः प्रसिद्धस्वसमयप्रवृत्तिर्भवति । तेन कारणेन स एव निःशेषितकर्मबन्धं सिद्धिमवाप्नोतीति ॥१६९॥

सपयत्थं तित्थयरं अभिगदबुद्धिस्स सुत्तरोइस्स ।

दूरतरं णिव्वाणं संजमतवसंपउत्तस्स ॥१७०॥

सपदार्थं तीर्थकरमभिगतबुद्धेः सूत्ररोचिनः ।

दूरतरं निर्वाणं संयमतपःसंप्रयुक्तस्य ॥१७०॥

अहंदादिभक्तिरूपपरसमयप्रवृत्तेः साक्षान्मोक्षहेतुत्वाभावे ऽपि परंपरया मोक्षहेतुत्वसद्भावद्योत-नमेतत् । यं खलु मोक्षार्थमुद्यतमना समुपाजिताचिन्त्यसयमतपोभारो ऽप्यसभावितपरमवैराग्य-भूमिकाधिरोहणसमर्थप्रभुशक्तिः पिञ्जनलग्नतूलन्यासन्यायेन नवपदार्थैः सहार्हदादिदृष्टिरूपां परस-मयप्रवृत्तिं परित्यक्तुं नोत्सहते, स खलु न नाम साक्षान्मोक्ष लभते किन्तु सुरलोकादिक्लेशप्राप्तिरूपया परंपरया तमवाप्नोति ॥१७०॥

अरहंतसिद्धचेदियपवयणभत्तो परेण णियमेण ।

जो कुणदि तवोक्कम्मं सो सुरलोगं समादियदि ॥१७१॥

ये तु पुनरपुनर्भवाय नित्यविहितोद्योगमहाभागा भगवन्तो निश्चयव्यवहारयोरन्यतरानवलम्बने-  
नात्यन्तमध्यस्थीभूताः शुद्धचैतन्यरूपात्मतत्त्वविश्रान्तिविरचनोन्मुखाः प्रमादोदयानुवृत्तिनिवर्तिकां  
क्रियाकाण्डपरिणति माहात्म्यान्निवारयन्तो ज्यन्तमुदासीना यथाशक्त्यात्मानमात्मनात्मनि संचेतय-  
माना नित्योपयुक्ता निवसन्ति, ते खलु स्वतत्त्वविश्रान्त्यनुसारेण क्रमेण कर्माणि सन्यसन्तो ज्यन्त-  
निष्प्रमादा नितान्तनिष्कम्पमूर्तयो वनस्पतिभिरुपमीयमाना अपि दूरनिरस्तकर्मफलानुभूतयः कर्मानु-  
भूतिनिरुत्सुकाः केवलज्ञानानुभूतिसमुपजाततात्त्विकानन्दनिर्भरतरास्तरसा ससारसमुद्रमुत्तीर्य शब्द-  
ब्रह्मफलस्य शाश्वतस्य भोक्तारो भवन्तीति ॥१७२॥

**मग्न्यपभावणदृढं पवयणभक्तिपञ्चोद्दिष्टेन मया ।**

**भणियं पवयणसारं पञ्चस्थियसंग्रहं सुतं ॥१७३॥**

मार्गप्रभावनार्थं प्रवचनभक्तिप्रचोदितेन मया ।

भणितं प्रवचनसारं पञ्चास्तिकसंग्रहं सूत्रम् ॥१७३॥

कर्तुः प्रतिज्ञानिव्यूढिसूचिका समापनेयम् । मार्गो हि परमवैराग्यकरणप्रवणा पारमेश्वरी पर-  
माज्ञा; तस्याः प्रभावन प्रख्यापनद्वारेण प्रकृष्टपरिणतिद्वारेण वा समुद्द्योतनम्; तदर्थमेव परमाग-  
मानुरागवेगप्रचलितमनसा संक्षेपत समस्तवस्तुतत्त्वसूचकत्वादतिविस्तृतस्यापि प्रवचनस्य सारभूत  
पञ्चास्तिकायसंग्रहाभिधानं भगवत्सर्वज्ञोपज्ञत्वात् सूत्रमिदमभिहितं मयेति । अथैव शास्त्रकारः  
प्रारब्धस्यान्तमुपगम्यात्यन्तं कृतकृत्यो भूत्वा परमनैष्कर्म्यरूपे शुद्धस्वरूपे विश्रान्त इति श्रद्धी-  
यते ॥१७३॥

इति समयव्याख्यायां नवपदार्थपुरस्सरमोक्षमार्गप्रपञ्चवर्णनो द्वितीयः श्रुतस्कन्ध समाप्त ॥

स्वशक्तिसंसूचितवस्तुतत्त्वै-

र्व्याख्या कृतेयं समयस्य शब्दैः ।

स्वरूपगुप्तस्य न किंचिदस्ति

कर्तव्यमेवामृतचन्द्रसूरेः ॥

इति पञ्चास्तिकायसंग्रहाभिधानस्य समयस्य व्याख्या समाप्ता ।



मनाङ्मनागिविशुद्धिर्माधिगम्य निश्चयनयस्य भिन्नसाध्यसाधनभावाभावादर्शनज्ञानचारित्रसमाहितत्वरूपे विश्रान्तसकलक्रियाकाण्डाडम्बरनिस्तरङ्गपरमचैतन्यशालिनि निर्भरानन्दमालिनि भगवत्यात्मनि विश्रान्तिसामुद्रयन्तः क्रमेण समुपजातसमरसीभावाः परमवीतरागभावमधिगम्य, साक्षान्मोक्षमनुभवन्तीति ॥

अथ ये तु केवलव्यवहारावलम्बनस्ते खलु भिन्नसाध्यसाधनभाववलोकनेनानवरत नितरां खिद्यमाना मुहुर्मुहुर्धर्मादिश्रद्धानरूपाध्यवसायानुस्यूतचेतसः प्रभूतश्रुतसंस्काराधिरोपितविचित्रविकल्पजालकलमषितचैतन्यवृत्तयः, समस्तयतिवृत्तसमुदायरूपतपःप्रवृत्तिरूपकर्मकाण्डोद्गमराचलिताः, कदाचित्किञ्चिद्रोचमानाः, कदाचित् किञ्चिद्विकल्पयन्तः, कदाचित्किञ्चिदाचरन्तः, दर्शनाचरणाय कदाचित्प्रशाम्यन्तः, कदाचित्सर्वविजमानाः, कदाचिदनुकम्पमाना, कदाचिदास्तित्वयुद्धहन्तः, शङ्काकाङ्क्षाविचिकित्सामूढदृष्टितानां व्युत्थापननिरोधाय नित्यबद्धपरिकराः, उपबृंहणस्थितिकरणवात्सल्यप्रभावनां भावयमाना वारंवारमभिवर्धितोत्साहाः, ज्ञानाचरणाय स्वाध्यायकालमवलोकयन्तो, बहुधा विनयं प्रपञ्चयन्तः, प्रविहितदुर्घरोपधानाः, सुष्ठु बहुमानमातन्वन्तो निह्नुवार्पित नितरां निवारयन्तोऽर्धव्यञ्जनतदुभयशुद्धौ नितान्तसावधानाः, चारित्र्याचरणाय हिसानृतस्तेयान्नह्यपरिग्रहसमस्तविरतिरूपेषु पञ्चमहाव्रतेषु तन्निष्ठवृत्तयः, सम्यग्योगनिग्रहलक्षणसु गुप्तिषु नितान्तं गृहीतोद्योगाः, ईर्ष्याभैषवणादाननिक्षेपोत्सर्गरूपासु समितिष्वत्यन्तनिवेशितप्रयत्नाः, तपसाचरणायानशनावमौदर्यवृत्तिपरिसंस्थानरसपरित्यागविविक्तशय्यासनकायक्लेशेष्वभीक्ष्णमुत्सहमानाः, प्रायश्चित्तविनयवैयावृत्यव्युत्सर्गस्वाध्यायध्यानपरिकराङ्कुशितस्वान्ताः, वीर्याचरणाय कर्मकाण्डे सर्वशक्त्या व्याप्रियमाणाः, कर्मचेतनाप्रधानत्वादूर्ध्वनिवारिताशुभकर्मप्रवृत्तयो ऽपि समुपात्तशुभकर्मप्रवृत्तयः, सकलक्रियाकाण्डाडम्बरोत्तीर्णदर्शनज्ञानचारित्र्यपरिणतिरूपां ज्ञानचेतनां मनागप्यसंभावयन्तः, प्रभूतपुण्यभारमन्थरितचित्तवृत्तयः, सुरलोकादिक्लेशप्राप्तिपरंपरया सुचिरं संसारसागरे भ्रमन्तीति । उक्तं च—“चरणकरणप्पहाणा ससमयपरमत्थमुक्कवावारा ।

चरणकरणस्स सारं णिच्छयसुद्धं ण जाणंति” ॥

येऽत्र केवलनिश्चयावलम्बिनः सकलक्रियाकर्मकाण्डाडम्बरविरक्तबुद्धयो ऽर्धमीलितविलोचनपुटाः किमपि स्वबुद्ध्यावलोक्य यथासुखमासते, ते खल्ववधीरितभिन्नसाध्यसाधनभावा अभिन्नसाध्यसाधनभावमलभमाना अन्तराल एव प्रमादकादम्बरीमदभरालसचेतसो मत्ता इव, मूर्च्छिता इव, सुषुप्ता इव, प्रभूतघृतसितोपलपायसासादितसौहित्या इव, समुल्बणबलसंजनितजाड्या इव, दारुणमनोभ्रंशविहितमोहा इव, मुद्रितविशिष्टचैतन्या वनस्पतय इव, मौनीन्द्री कर्मचेतनां पुण्यबन्धभयेनानवलम्बमाना अनासादितपरमनैष्कर्म्यरूपज्ञानचेतनाविश्रान्तयो व्यक्ताव्यक्तप्रमादतन्त्रा अरमागतकर्मफलचेतनाप्रधानप्रवृत्तयो वनस्पतय इव केवलं पापमेव बध्नन्ति । उक्तं च—

“णिच्छयमालंबंता णिच्छयदो णिच्छयं अयाणंता ।

णासति चरणकरणं बाहरिचरणालसा केई” ॥

पंचास्तिकाय-गाथासूची

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